The Next Decade: What the World Will Look Like by George Friedman

The Next Decade: What the World Will Look Like Reviews

• 
  S.

  STRATFOR is a political think tank that gained prominence after Anonymous hacked its servers and spewed out its exceedingly boring dossiers onto the uncaring public. Its director, George Friedman, also wrote a book called THE NEXT 100 YEARS which contained such fantastic prediction as that in the year 2060, Japanese schoolgirl ninjas and Polish Space Marines would build a giant moon laser and sunburn half of the USA. One tends to wonder a bit how these scenarios get created, although it's probably all clever disinformation. Yeah, actually maybe STRATFOR really does run the world (as the tin foil crowd believes), they're just feigning absurdity.
  
  Apparently Friedman does a little better with ten years of predictions rather than the full hundred. This work comes out of the school of foreign policy that says, hey, we're an empire, let's deal with it (not all FP professionals agree). The result is a outlook that relies extensively on the Westphalian model of states and alliances. Niall Ferguson does a better job of noticing things like the Protestantization of Latin America and growing Christianity of China. Other writers are a bit more subtle in dissecting racial politics and civilizational models. Friedman sees national states as inevitable and then subsequently conflict. On the other hand, other geopolitical thinkers find multiethnic empires the norm. Who knows? (who cares?) I predict fusion power will always be 20 years away and bioengineered superflu will kill off a tenth of humanity. But fine, yeah, it's possible humanity will settle Mars. by that time, VR will be so good Perky Pat will knock all our socks off
  
  If you read this far, I want to say, man, it wasn't that I didn't know enough. It was that I knew too much
  
• 
  Ammar Hammoudeh

  This book learned me how mega trends, technology, demography, resources, wars, and foreign political actions are being observed and analyzed from American politicians perspective.
  Although Friedman admits that America has some moral hypothesis that must maintain, but he confess that it must use all imperial power resources it possess to prevent any potential rival from competing its global role in both short and long terms.
  
  As a Moslem-Arabic, i have to highlight two things about this book to two different segments:
  1- to the Moslems and Arabs: America is like any other empire, it cares nothing about your own shit, don't expect any moral movement from it's side to help you to solve your own problems, any single action it takes is to strengthen its global power on your expenses, not else. It did the same to Japan, Germany and Russia in last century, and it does that to Russia-Germany now and will do that to Brazil and Turkey in next decades.
  2- to the others: many examples in Middle east and terrorism chapters are misleading; the terrorism examples Friedman cites amplify palestinian resistance actions without citing any of uncountable israeli terror actions, or, at least, explaining the things behind palestinian hostility actions to Israel. Moreover, he concluded that America chose to support Israel as a result to the arab hostility to USA, which is precisely counter contrast. USA took strategic decision to support Israel, and that decision lead Arabs and Moslems to hostile American administrations.
  
  In the final analysis, I liked this book, it taught me a bunch of political things I hadn't known before, and i recommend others, who are interested in foreign policy and geopolitics, to read it.
• 
  Kira Simion

  I like the way Friedman said something like the leaders of today can be taught yesterday (not his exact words, these are mine.)
  
  From 8,000 BCE to now, from empires to states, from theocracy to democracy, the world has changed again and again, and will continue to change, for better or for worse.
  
  The way we know how to progress and not retrogress is by looking to the past and seeing how we can better the future.
  
  For example (these are my own examples since I don't want to spoil:)
  
  The majority of the empires were taken over or just became too unstable and collapsed because of nomadic tribes, decentralized governments, or revolts that brought down the power by bringing down the economy. We can and have learned from these mistakes and each new decade or century has proved this.
  
  I like his wording and hope to read more of Friedman's work soon.
  
  4/5
  
  See? I can be smart too! :')
  
  His stories are actually quite interesting.
• 
  Benedict

  The author makes a bold and unshakable declaration: America is an imperial empire and that's a fact. Also America could lose itself as a Republic.
  
  The author is CEO of Stratfor, which does intelligence analysis for the CIA and the multinationals. So the opinions in this book count for something.
  
  He gives the big picture that faces America abroad. It is simple power and balance of power. He states that this country is always striving to set other countries at each other so they cannot combine against the United States. Not pretty, but the alternative is like believing pink horsies with wings bring babies.
  
  I learned from this book why politicians always lie to us and why they will continue to do so. The reason is: We cannot handle the truth (wasn't that in a movie or something?). Politicians always have to dose the public with something it can accept.
  
  I quickly noticed what I read in this book was being mentioned in the news of the day. How we are concerned about Egypt falling could be dangerous because the Israel/Egypt combination is important to us.
  
  The book predicts that Germany and Russia will try to combine and that we will interfere with that. It predicts the rise of Japan, the fall of China and ultimately the fall of Russia (Russia cannot make it in the end because the rivers run the wrong way).
  
  There are other areas of the world the book mentioned and that make this book a must read for anyone getting baptized into real world politik.
  
  As I say, this book helps me to follow along with the news.
  
  The author does not get into a detailed discussion about how we may lose our Republic...So I knocked a star off the rating, because I am so unfair.
• 
  Nilesh Jasani

  If anyone is as "involuntarily" power hungry as the book wants to make the US, it is given that our world will continue to move towards more wars and an eventual doom. The book's main point is exactly opposite - that the best way for world peace is for US to subjugate others, decide everyone's fate and make sure others do not become friends with each other. Of course, the book assumes that despite its open advocation, the US can stealthily implement these policies and the rest of the world will never see through them.
  
  The premise that the US must divide the rest of the world and rule by strengthening itself, making sure others stay behind and keep everyone suspicious of their neighbours etc is wrong. To assume that such strategies will succeed and is the only way not just for the world but the US to lead an ever better life is utter naivety. Great information, as always from the master geo-historian but one simply has to hope that real life power brokers do not think the same way.
• 
  Sevda Sarp

  Less interesting, more repetitive compared to his previous books
• 
  Dennis Littrell

  Definitely worth reading with some reservations
  
  I must confess to not having read George Friedman before taking this volume into hand. He certainly is an engaging and crystal clear writer. His understanding of international relationships is second to none that I have read. I highly recommend this book. However I do have a few reservations that I want to express.
  
  Let’s begin with his analysis of what he calls “the unintended empire.” That would be the United States circa the second millennium of the present era. I like the way he insists on using the term “empire” even though George W. Bush and his neoconservative cohorts had to give it up because of its toxic connotations. Yes, America the Beautiful is an empire, and yes it was largely unintentional. Our empire is supported not by the direct spoils of war as was the Roman Empire, but by our ability to benefit from global resources through trade and technological advantage. Our military might is a mailed fist behind our back of course; but we maintain the empire mainly through the use of what political scientists call “soft power.” Regardless of the value of the spoils of empire, the American Empire is an expensive one to maintain, and in some quarters the perception is that the balance sheet is out of whack.
  
  Now let us move on to Friedman’s justification for the actions of the Bush administration in its effort to deal with the threat to our glorious (well, not so glorious) empire posed by the events of 9/11/2001. Friedman speaking frankly as Machiavelli (indeed Friedman seems delighted to do a modern dress Machiavelli impersonation) sees all actions by nation states as serving their unique national interests. All events on the international stage are rationally arrived at by nation states based on this singular criterion. Thus, Friedman argues (p. 67) that North Korea, fearing that the collapse of the Soviet Union “would lead to its own collapse…launched a nuclear weapons program” and “made statements that appeared quite mad.” “The North Koreans were so successful that they had the great powers negotiating to entice them to negotiate. It was an extraordinary performance.”
  
  However, (1) the leadership of North Korea is quite mad (witness what it does to its people) and (2) its utterances were not the result of some extraordinary psychological ploy that the great powers fell for; in fact the reason that the United States and others have treaded so softly and carefully with North Korea is that its leadership is indeed capable of frighteningly crazy behaviors most specifically the utter destruction of Seoul, South Korea. The fact of the matter is that North Korea holds Seoul in hostage and has for literally generations.
  
  Next let’s move to Friedman’s interpretation of Bush’s reasons for invading Iraq. He writes (p. 62): “The Bush administration tied to craft a strategy that forced the Saudis and Pakistanis to be more aggressive in intelligence gathering and sharing and that placed the United States in a dominate position in the Middle East, from which it could project power.” He immediately adds, “These were the underlying reasons for the invasion of Iraq.”
  
  What? Bush invaded Iraq to get the Saudis and Pakistanis to help with intelligence gathering and sharing? Now that’ what you call EXPENSIVE intelligence, and is about as farfetched a rationale as I’ve heard. No, the reasons that Bush invaded Iraq were several, including a deluded attempt to protect American oil interests in the region; to be a wartime president for the 2004 elections (or a president who had just won a war); to go one up on his dad who George W. believed should have overthrown Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War; to allow the US military to test its abilities and its weapons, etc. Friedman even goes so far as to argue that although at the time of the invasion of Iraq Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda were far from friends, they could become allies in the future and therefore that could serve as a rationale for the invasion.
  
  What Friedman has done here and what he does throughout the book is interpret events in ways that are consistent with his overall message which is one of amoral, rational and Machiavellian nation states acting in accordance with their individual national interests when in fact the actual heads of states and their advisors who do the actual acting often behave in irrational and self-defeating ways, which is what happened to the US during the George W. Bush administration—which is something that Friedman freely acknowledges elsewhere in the book, especially in Chapter 5 appropriately entitled “The Terrorist Trap.” Friedman points out that by waging a misdirected and unwinnable war against “a type of warfare” this became a trap that Bush fell into and one that Friedman is warning Obama not to fall into.
  
  Incidentally, part of what Friedman is about in this book is to give advice from his Machiavellian stage to President Obama and presidents (or princes!) to come and/or to their advisors. In this self-appointed capacity I think George Friedman is eminently qualified as long as one balances his “real politic” view of presidential options and strategies with the realities of each individual situation. Basically what Friedman is saying is that regardless of what a nation state does we must infer that it is acting rationally in its own interests and that presidents must realize that they have to lie to their constituencies and be prepared to do brutal and even horrendous things in the pursuit of the national interest, and in fact any other behavior is dereliction of duty.
  
  As for the rest of the book it is also very interesting, and I wish I had the space to go into it. Bottom line: worth reading and thinking about.
  
  —Dennis Littrell, author of “The World Is Not as We Think It Is”
  
• 
  Andrew Barkett

  While the work already feels somewhat dated, there are nonetheless lots of useful observations about the near past that can inform us about the near future.
• 
  Kent Winward

  Intriguing to read almost ten years after it was written. Frightening to think what the next ten will bring based on what Friedman was writing and warning about in 2011. Almost as if we have followed the road map of what not to do. . .
• 
  Joseph D. Walch

  I am glad to have found this author who is a very insightful foreign policy thinker. He looks at foreign policy through Machiavellian spectacles and examines the forces that will shape the world going forward and gives interesting directives for the would-be President of the United States in exerting power around the world while maneuvering through national political discussions.
  
  The book starts with a short history primer and notes the current political realities. It then assesses each geographical region and gives a risk/assessment/plan prescription in much the same way that a physician might make a SOAP (subjective and Objective info, Assessment, Plan) write-up on a patient. For example, He recommends strengthening Poland to be the bone-in-the-throat between a Germany and Russian alliance, strengthening ties with Australia to counterbalance in Asia, doing nothing in Africa because Africa is irrelevant in modern geopolitics, doing nothing about immigration, and nothing to help correct the drug war in Mexico while giving the appearance of working to solve both, etc. There is an interesting discussion about the current financial crisis in the EU countries that raise implications for renewed nationalistic conflagrations (e.g., how Greece benefits from the EU, but is paralyzed economically because they have no sovereign currency to be either closely control monetary policy or suffer the gradual consequences from bad economic policies).
  
  There are little nuggets here about China's political and economic balance and the outlook for their continued growth and instability, how the blocking of the Strait of Hormunz might affect Japan, and the importance of the U.S. Navy even in this modern era of sophisticated satellite and aeronautical power. It was interesting to hear that Great Britain--once the world's preeminent power has just recently retired it's only aircraft carrier, and the role that Latin America (esp. Brazil) will play in the future. It's well worth the read for anybody interested in world geography, economics and politics.
• 
  Julie

  Have you ever played the board game Risk? The game board is a map of the world partitioned into different colored continents, subdivided into countries. Each player places their armies on different countries, battles their opponents, and conquers territory with the ultimate goal of taking over the entire world. The difficult decisions are where to place your armies and who to engage in battle. Reading George Friedman's The Next Decade reminded of Risk, but instead of being a game, it's real life and the US is one of the biggest players. Friedman analyzes the world with a geopolitical lens, assessing different countries strengths and weaknesses, based on their natural resources, their borders and alliances with their neighbors, and a myriad of other factors. He gives specific recommendations of how the US should approach different countries in order to maintain it's current dominance in the world.
  
  This book was a huge eye opener for me. In the US, we are naive in our beliefs that we engage in wars for democracy, freedom, or other ideals. Friedman is pretty blunt. The goal of America's role in foreign policy is the balance of power. We want other countries to be fighting battles among themselves to keep us in our current position. The amount of information on our past relationships with other countries and his forecast on the power shifts that will occur in the next decade were interesting and filled with surprises. Very informative.
• 
  Lisa Reising

  I really enjoy Mr. Friedman's books. His approach in predicting future events is based on historical analysis of all kinds. I learn history and details about every region of the world. There are reasons, backed up by data and sound precedents, why America should stay out of Africa politically and only send humanitarian aid, why we should chill out about border wars with Mexico, why friendly terms with Korea, Singapore and Australia are a good idea, and why we need to keep a sharp eye on Turkey, Russia and Germany. If the author has a political leaning, it's hard to discern - most discussions are based on an honest look at what has happened in the past. Accomplishments and failures have been the story of both American political parties. And I'm coming to the conclusion fast that it is useless to yearn for a forthright President - by definition an American President must be a systematic manipulator, able to cut many backroom deals while lying to the public about it, in order to manage all the subtle and not-so-subtle intricacies of foreign and domestic policy. What a world!
• 
  Daniel Simmons

  Less bonkers than his "The Next 100 Years", but still abounding with cringe-worthy statements. A choice example: Friedman recommends continuing sending aid to Africa not because it will do anything to help the Africans but because it will burnish the image of the U.S. internationally; he then follows that up with, "It is possible that [aid] will do some harm, as many aid programs have had unintended and negative consequences, but the gesture would redound to America's benefit, and at relatively low cost... One of Machiavelli's points is that good comes out of the ruthless pursuit of power, not out of trying to do good. But if doing some good merely convinces Europe to send more troops to the next U.S. intervention, it will be a worthwhile investment."
  
  !!
  
  The first 40 pages, with its breezy homages to Lincoln, Roosevelt, Reagan, and Clausewitz, should be jettisoned entirely.
• 
  Frank Kool

  Whereas The Next Decade is written in great style and is an absolute delight to read for those who like to shuffle around their armies and resources in strategy games like Civilization, the nearing end of this decade makes it painfully obvious how difficult it is to predict these trends.
  
  Germany and Russia are certainly not allies at this point, Israel-Iran relations have hardly changed, you might carefully say that the wars in Islamic countries are subsiding (then again, most wars do within a decade), and China has not undergone a major crisis. However, the most grievous oversight is that this book, released in 2011, failed to predict (like most people) what is arguably the most significant geopolitical event of this decade: the Syrian civil war and the international interventions which followed.
• 
  Jeff

  I read this book following The Next 100 years by the same author and I'm glad I did - panning out before zooming in is how I tend to view complex scenarios; also the author references in this book geopolitical concepts that are outlined in detail in The Next 100 years. His description of the often conflicting responsibilities of the president of a republic and leader of an empire was intriguing. His foreign policy recommendations per region included mini history lessons and were fascinating. The book is extremely US centric by design.
• 
  George

  I go this book at the airport thinking it was by the same guy who wrote "The World is Flat", that was Thomas Friedman. It was a surprisingly interesting book and everything that he predicts over the next decade (well now more like 8 yrs) seems realistic. Now I am reading The Next 100 years which was actually written before this, so it is like seeing Prometheus before Alien (kindof)
• 
  Kuszma

  Friedman egy intézmény az USA-ban, STRATFOR alapító, a jósok jósa. Ez egyrészt annak köszönheti, hogy képes közérthető, rövid (ezért szükségszerűen egyszerűsítő) megfogalmazásokra lefordítani olyan komplex folyamatokat, mint amilyen egy gazdasági válság vagy a terrorizmus elleni háború – ebben alighanem ő a világbajnok. (Mondjuk a jósok pont nem szoktak világosan fogalmazni… Nyilván nem véletlenül…) Másfelől (és én ezt nagyon értékeltem) világosan képes definiálni a problémacsoportokat, mielőtt elemezni kezdené őket. Bár ez evidencia kéne legyen, de sajnálatos módon a kortárs társadalomtudomány számos guruja egész egyszerűen elmismásolja ezt, többek között szerintem Huntington is. De Friedman közismertségének alapja elsősorban az a gyakorlatias, egyéni emberi szempontokat figyelmen kívül hagyó megközelítés, ami bátran címkézhető machiavellizmusként.
  
  Abból indul ki, hogy az Egyesült Államok egy birodalom, és ennek megfelelően kell viselkednie. Önmeghatározása szerint ő nem idealista, és nem is realista*: előbbiektől megkülönbözteti az, hogy szerinte egy nemzetnek saját boldogulása érdekében a mocskos dolgoktól sem szabad visszariadnia, utóbbiaktól pedig az, hogy hite szerint ugyanennek a nemzetnek sosem szabad elfelednie, hogy végső soron egy magasabb rendű erkölcsnek tartozik felelősséggel. Ám mivel sajnálatos módon Friedman ezt a magasabb rendű erkölcsöt az amerikai köztársaság eszméjében találja meg, így etikája nem is lehet más, mint szűkített etika, olyan morál, ami kizárólag amerikai. Ettől lesz olyan európaiként olvasni ezt a könyvet, mint valami újraértelmezett Cion bölcseinek jegyzőkönyvé-t, hisz nem lehet kétségünk afelől, hogy ha mondjuk Putyin lerohanná a Baltikumot, ez a pacák csak a vállát vonogatná, mint ahogy mosolyogva végignézné egy diktatúra kialakulását is Közép-Európában, ha ez az amerikai geopolitikát szolgálná. A friedman-i javaslatok egyértelműen azt a célt szolgálják, hogy az USA egyedül maradjon az egypólusú világrend egyetlen hatalma, ennek érdekében pedig simán keresztbe tenne az EU-nak is, ha ezt a dominanciát veszélyeztetné** (***). Tegyük hozzá, Friedman szerint nem veszélyezteti – sőt, igazából egyáltalán nem lát olyan külső erőt, ami az elkövetkezendő 10 évben az USA globális riválisává nőheti ki magát. Regionális szinten jelenthetnek rá veszélyt, de igazán komoly károkat csak az olyan belső folyamatok okozhatnak neki, mint a meghasonlás vagy a bizalomvesztés.
  
  Amik rendkívül tanulságossá teszik ezt a kötetet, azok éppen a hibái. Friedman hihetetlenül izgalmasan, olvasmányosan és tanulságosan fogalmazza meg a régiók múltját, jelenkorát és közeljövőjét, de kihagy két (globális értelemben vett) apróságot: egyrészt úgy fest, nem veszi észre, hogy az ukránoknak is van nemzeti identitásuk, valamit azt, hogy az Al-Kaida és az amerikai hadtestkivonások által hagyott hatalmi űrt valakinek be kell majd töltenie. Ebből következik, hogy sem az ukrán polgárháborút, sem az Iszlám Államot nem látja előre, úgyhogy a könyv fele máris megy a lecsóba. Ami azonban nem azt jelenti, hogy Friedman kutyaütő, és utólag hatályát veszíti minden egyéb meghatározása is. Viszont remekül példázza azt, hogy legyen akármekkora májer valaki, ha jóslásra adja a fejét, akkor biztosan megüti a bokáját. Talán célravezetőbb lett volna, ha tényleg valami nostredamus-i homályossággal prófétál, abból nem lehet baj. Mondjuk: „És a ködök földjén kinő majd egy virág, és a virág vérben gyökerezik majd, nektárja pedig keserű!” Na, ezt tessék megcáfolni.
  
  * Ahogy ő maga megfogalmazza: "Véleményem szerint a realisták és idealisták vitája a világ naiv félreértelmezésén alapul, amely az elmúlt tíz évben túlságosan nagy befolyással bírt. Az ideálok és a valóság egy és ugyanazon dolog két megközelítése: a hatalomé. Ha az Egyesült Államok egyetlen célja a hatalomszerzés, azzal semmi maradandót nem hoz létre, és elkorcsosítja saját uralmát. Az ideálok hatalom nélkül csupán szavak, és kizárólag a cselekvőképesség birtokában kelhetnek életre. Realizmusnak minősül, ha megtanuljuk kezelni az általunk birtokolt hatalmat, ám ez önmagában nem segít megtalálni annak céljait. A realizmus azon vadhajtása, amely nélkülözi a hatalom céljáról alkotott koncepciót, az erőszakos bűnözők sajátja, és így irreális. Hasonlóképpen az idealizmus egy másik kifejezés az önelégültségre, amely kórra a hatalom mélységeinek megértése az egyetlen ellenszer, míg az elvtelen realizmus sokszor nem több keményfejűségnek álcázott inkompetenciánál. A realizmus és az idealizmus egymás kiegészítői, nem pedig alternatívái, ezért önmagukban nem szolgálhatnak a külpolitika vezérlőelveként."
  ** Ami, hangsúlyozom, nem jelenti azt, hogy keresztbe is tesz. Bár az összeesküvés-elméletek logikája szerint ha egy eseménysor logikailag installálható a saját világképünkbe, akkor rögtön támadhatatlanná is válik, és Friedman valóban sokat segít nekik félelmeik alátámasztásában, de! Itt egyszerűen csak arról van szó, hogy írónknak joga van saját nézeteit kifejteni, és ezek a nézetek meg is jelenhetnek. Ez nem azt bizonyítja, hogy a friedman-i elvek irányítják a politikát, hanem hogy Friedman szerint így kéne működjenek a dolgok. Hogy valóban így működnek-e, azzal kapcsolatban nekünk innen csak hipotéziseink lehetnek.
  *** Csak egy példa Friedman machiavellista gondolkodásmódjára: a bevándorlás problémájával k
• 
  Jonathan Lu

  A worthy follow up to the next 100 years written in the unbiased, unemotional, data-based, and calculated method that I have come to appreciate from the STRATFOR founder. Very interesting prologue when he describes that predicting a century is much easier than predicting a decade. The short term actions of men are difficult to predict, whether by mistake, stroke of genius, etc... But these actions tend to become averaged out in the long run when considering the larger subtle shifts over time. As Machiavelli, this book is highly focused on power and objective.
  
  Friedman delves deeply into the difference between great presidents and mediocre ones being that those are the ones able to sacrifice morality for the sake of long term strategy while making the public believe that they are acting in an interest consistent with the principles that we all hold nobly high. The 3 most impactful presidents he cites above all are Lincoln, who wove a masterful job of restricting personal freedom while appealing to public sentiment in order to preserve the union; FDR who secretly supported WWII through alliances with European allies in order to maintain the balance of world powers fighting against each other, while appealing to the public to embrace social programs that were needed after the fall from grace of corporations and greed responsible for the depression; and Reagan who reshuffled the balance the opposite way after the failure of Carter, using blame towards the political elite to drive power back to corporations again, and manipulating countries such as Iran/Iraq and Israel/KSA into thinking we were really their allies but making them perpetually at odds/war so as to maintain a balance of power. Friedman attests that it was 9-11 and our knee-jerk reaction to seek out revenge that ended such a long term functioning strategy, as we no longer sought to balance Iraq vs Iran or India vs Pakistan, but to go 1-sided towards those who would help us eradicate terrorism, an obviously impossible and expensive goal. He cites GW Bush and Carter as 2 presidents who failed as they attempted to blatantly tell/force the public towards their 1-sided intentions rather than manipulating them in a Machiavellian manner. You really want to avoid unentangling alliances... But still want international trade as the US is responsible for 25% of global commerce? The art of telling the public what they think they want to hear while doing what you know is right is the key to good presidency.
  
  I especially appreciate the non-partisan view that Friedman offers. He could at any time have hammered away at Bush or told just 1-side of the story to pronounce why right-wingers are bad for democracy, or left wingers are bad for personal freedom... But instead tells both sides as a historian, without bias. A bit uncomfortable for the idealist in me as his writing is quite cold and Vulcan in the tone that we could/should and have treated our allies as pawns in a greater power game to make them think we support them while really playing both sides to make them both continue fighting and overall weaker, but the reality is probably not too far off. And why I think I could never be a politico. Just how do you judge the true intentions of candidates then as a voter? This novel of course has to center around the US as the dominant superpower. Whether you like it or not, it's the reality and we are the 1 country where actions locally have the most dramatic impact felt by the international community... And the president as the most impactful man.
  
  "The president must, as we have said, always soothe the beers of the public, and must always show his commitment to stopping terrorism. At the same time, he must resist the temptation to try the impossible or undertake actions that have disproportionate costs relative to the effect. He can lie to the public, but he must never ever lie to himself. Above all, he must understand the real threats to the country and act against those." Net, Bush got carried away with a war on terrorism and used it to achieve separate goals that were never inline with grand American strategy. As a result, Iran became empowered without balance in the region, endless resources have and will continue to be spent fighting terrorism that will never end, and no balance was paid to Russia's resurgence.
  "[...] while you and I are allowed the luxury of our pain, a president isn't. A president must take into account how his citizens feel and he must manage them and lead them, but he must not succumb to personal feelings. His job is to maintain a ruthless sense of proportion while keeping the coldness of his calculation to himself. If he succumbs to sentiment, he will make decisions that run counter to the long-term interest if his country. A president had to accept casualties and move on. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt calls for vengeance but privately decided to focus on Germany and not Japan. He understood that a president could not allow himself to craft strategy out of emotion."
  
  Onto some predictions for the next 10yrs: balance of US political power will shift back towards the political elite away from corporations (FDR to Reagan and back). This is a natural procession following the rage against corporate abuses that led to the greatest recession since the depression.
  
  Not a prediction, but suggestion to decrease the support for Israel and balance more towards the Arab states. Although politically difficult to do domestically, Israel has become too powerful to keep playing the Arab states against them. Freidman contends that the root of our support for Israel was after they lost French support, in order to provide a counterbalance to Syria on the side of Egypt. Our alliance was one of convenience, not ideology and so could just as easily shift the other way. Not to say we abandon Israel altogether, just that we balance more support towards the other side especially since Israel is now a power in their own right and does not need to rely on US aid.
  
  Also a suggestion and not a prediction - making a formal alliance with Iran! Now that the Iran-Iraq balance has been destroyed, the US has to rethink how to accommodate the new shift of power in the region. "In the next decade, the most desirable option with Iran is going to be delivered through a move that now seems inconceivable. It is the option chosen by Roosevelt and Nixon when they faced seemingly impossible strategic situations: the creation of alliances with countries that had previously been regarded as strategic and moral threats. Roosevelt aligned the United States with Stalinist Russia, and Nixon aligned with Maoist China, each to block a third pier that was seen as more dangerous."
  "The seemingly impossible strategic situation driving the United States to this gesture is, as we've discussed, the need to maintain the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz, and to achieve this at a time when the country must reduce the forces devoted to this part of the world." Within this decade Turkey will continue to rise as a superpower to the point that the Turkey-Iran conflict can be exploited in the next decade as the new balance of power within the region.
  
  On the rise of Russian and resurgence of a kind if USSR btw eastern bloc counties to counteract NATO and EU to the west: "The Russians can play the Americans indefinitely by threatening to ship weapons to anti-American groups and to countries such as Iran and Syria. This locks the United States in place, trying to entice the Russians when in fact the only thing the Russians want the Americans to do is to remain permanently bogged down in the war. This Russian strategy reveals the price of the American over commitment to the war on terror. It also shows that it is imperative for the United States to find an effective response to radical Islam, as well as an effective response to the Russians." Freidman rightly points out that a German-Russian alliance is a natural one of great convenience since the Germans are in need of energy/natural resources, and the Russians are in need of technology; Germany has tried twice already to invade Russia during the 20th century in order to secure such resources. An alliance of this nature would not be beneficial to american interests, as a combined EU/Russian power would have resources/population even that surpasses the USA. Freidman contends that the top European policy should be to prevent such a German/Russian alliance as it would shift the balance of power away from competing states towards a single dominant one. As Friedman contends in "the next 100 years", the rise of Poland is key and will see its rise in this decade. Strategically located right between Germany and Russia, and with a recent memory of brutal occupation by both, they will be apt to American aid to counterbalance these forces. Will require quite some skill from the president to pull this off strategically without alarming the Russians. Turkey is an easy ally that should be no issue to continue supporting.
  
  Story in the east will be that of china vs Japan competing for the world's #2 spot in the economy. As in "the next 100 years" I have a hard time seeing a world in which USA and Japan are not close allies, but the beginnings of it may be coming in this decade. US policy should be based on ensuring the china-Japan rivalry continues and remains balanced. The key 3rd party geopolitical allies that we should maintain with are Korea, Singapore, as Australia in preparation for the Chinese-Japanese conflict to escalate. A-ha for me was Freidman's analysis of Japanese economy based upon their lack of a social safety net in the post war boom: this caused a reliance upon personal savings for retirement and thus not the high level of consumer spending that fueled the American boom. Capital markets were thus flush with cash from personal savings leading to very low interest rates = cheap
  Money for investment but minimal growth since profits never increased. Japanese companies had kind of a social contract with the public to keep employment at the expense of margins, causing what we in the west refer to as "the lost decade" although they themselves were just fine due to high employment levels and social equality (lost was just for American investors). Following the theme of great presidents as those who can purposely deceive the public to accomplish longer term strategic objectives while making them believe that their short term shallow desires are being met, FDR blatantly lied about social security being both short term and a social safety net. The main outcome was to encourage public spending vs hoarding and thus avoid the stagflation that hit the Japanese economy seeing the growth model of European economies . I imagine that he intended this to be a 50-100yr venture, but greed of infinite and unending growth led continued spending vs saving to the point of overbalance. This probably would have been a positive consequence of W's push to privatize social security, perhaps intended and perhaps not (he was one of the more transparent world leaders we have seen): likely would have caused a crash in social security coffers and thus spur savings anyways... Which ended up happening after the 2008 crash for different reasons. Are we getting closer to the right level of balance now at last?
  
  Prediction in South Asia will be the deterioration of us-indian relations. The top objective of policy should be to keep a strong India vs strong Pakistan balanced in this region, with the result of war on terror in Afghanistan that Pakistan has lagged badly behind India. This must be reversed and requires greater emphasis on strengthening Pakistan over the next decade... India will likely reach out to another benefactor in the meantime such as russia.
  
  Onto the south of us: Freidman contends correctly that nothing in Latin America had ever caused much interest for the US throughout history, no matter how much caudillos say otherwise in order to augment their own power. With the exception of Mexico and Cuba, there has never been much interest from Americans for resources primarily due to the difficulty in transport and the already fragmented area (different cultures, natural barriers) which never posed a threat. "But neither the Germans nor the Soviets made a serious strategic effort to dominate South America, because they understood the in most senses the continent was irrelevant to U.S. interests. Instead, they efforts were designed merely to irritate Washington and divert American resources." Cuba is the exception due to its strategic location as a threat to potentially disrupt American ports (especially New Orleans), thus "The American interest is simple and has nothing to do with human rights or regime change. It is to have guarantees that regardless of future challenges, Cuba will not become a base for foreign powers. Having achieved that, the United States will have achieved much." Freidman rightly points out also that Venezuela has no significant threat to the US. Bordered by dense Amazonian jungles and Andean mountains to the south/east, a hostile and stable Columbia to the west, water to the north means that the US is the only logical market format its oil. Freidman sees Chavez as no threat to anyone excel his own people and will likely lose power shortly. Whether he does or not is of no importance to the US.
  
  Brazil is the one power that has potential to challenge the US beyond the next decade. They are rich, big, and have a diverse economy balanced evenly well among exports across Asia, LA, and EU through various sectors. Potential threat is in the distant future if they ever develop naval capability to start patrolling the south Atlantic, since a logical partnership with Portuguese speaking Angola could lead to a strong brazil-Africa economic partnership. US policy should thus be to support a rival that exists in Argentina and the south cone neighbors of Uruguay and Paraguay.
  
  Fascinating analysis of Mexico and the drug problem! Foreign exports to the Us account for $130B/yr. assuming even a very high 20% GM, this is $26MM in profits. Illegal drug sales represent around $40B/yr, with margins in the 90% range = $36B/yr profits! No matter how you skew the numbers, this cash flow is huge and thus the Mexican government has an incentive to make it appear as if they are doing all they can to fight the drug trade (image for the US, aid, high number if casualties) but really this is reasonable collateral damage to them since most impact is to the lowly populated areas to the north.
  
  Similar parallel is drawn to illegal immigration within the USA: "the segment of society that benefits from large numbers of low-cost workers is greater and more influential than the segment harmed by it. Therefor, as with the Mexican government and drugs, the best U.S. strategy is to appear to be doing everything possible to stop the movement of immigrants while making certain that these efforts fail." A solution such as traceable national identity cards would never pass due to government distrust and potential for abuse, so we can expect no change in the status quo for a while. Just as the drug problem could be easily solved by legalization, at many unknown costs, it's unlikely to see any change here either. As long as cartel violence does not spread northward, which is unlikely since their incentive is to keep moving drugs unmolested, no change is here either despite efforts to make it look as such.
  
  Africa: not much will happen here. Eventually mass warfare in order to redraw borders in a way that makes more sense is inevitable, as Freidman points out because countries are drawn by blood, not politicians sitting together in a board room. With Africa too fragmented currently to make much of a difference, and already being exploited by a Chinese state with its own internal problems, the prognosis is to use Africa for PR purposes. By donating a few billion per year, a lot of goodwill can be bought on the US side since this region directly affects Europe much more. Our philanthropy will have little impact in the end, but sway public opinion away from the general thought that US cares only about meddling in others' affairs and buy support from European allies for future causes.
  
  Excellent concluding chapter: "During the next decade, the United States must overcome the desire to simplify, because there is no single phrase or formula that solves the problem [...] To reach this point, the American people must mature. We are an adolescent lot, expecting solutions to insoluble problems and perfection in our leaders [...] The demands of an unintended empire and immature expectations of our leaders will bring down the regime long before militarism or corruption might."
  
  "The last decade posed challenges to the united states that it was not prepared for and that it did not manage well [...] but the threat that will arise later in the century will tower over those of the last decade [...] The United States is fortunate to have the next decade in which to make the transition from an obsessive foreign policy to a more balanced and nuanced exercise of power [...] It is important not to fight wars that can't be won and to fight wars in order to win. Fighting wars out of rage is impermissible for a country with such vast power and interests."
• 
  Costin Manda

  I started reading this book at random, and by random I mean I used a tool to choose it for me. And what a coincidence that, published in 2011, it talks about the geopolitical and economical drivers that would shape the next decade while I read it in 2022, as a conflict between Russian and the U.S. in Ukraine is looming. Was Friedman a sort of Hari Seldon and he predicted it all or was it all just bull? Well, a bit of both.
  
  The Next Decade wants to be a U.S. centric but objective dissection of the world, all pretenses aside, with the goal of predicting what will happen and what Americans should be doing about it. George Friedman starts by explaining why the United States have become an empire, almost by accident, and that while the reality of the fact cannot be denied, the anti-imperial principles upon which the nation was founded as still relevant and even essential to the wellbeing of America (and hence the world). He decides that the most important actor in this story is the American president, the modern embodiment of both the principles of the nation and of a Machiavellian prince. The rest of the book is a continent by continent analysis of what countries are driven by and will do and what this prince has to do to ensure and promote American supremacy over the world. In the author's view, the highest virtue of a good leader is to act in the best interests of his nation, while attempting to follow a moral code as well as possible in the circumstances.
  
  Does it sound arrogant, pompous and presumptuous? Yes, quite. But does it also sound close to how heads of state think and make decisions? A resounding yes. In fact, his talk of the Georgian conflict, where Russians invaded and Americans wrote some stern condemnations in response is terrifyingly close to what happens now in Ukraine, only the U.S. cannot afford to repeat that performance now.
  
  Here's a quote:
  
  In order to understand this office I look at three presidents who defined American greatness. The first is Abraham Lincoln, who saved the republic. The second is Franklin Roosevelt, who gave the United States the world’s oceans. The third is Ronald Reagan, who undermined the Soviet Union and set the stage for empire. Each of them was a profoundly moral man … who was prepared to lie, violate the law, and betray principle in order to achieve those ends. They embodied the paradox of what I call the Machiavellian presidency, an institution that, at its best, reconciles duplicity and righteousness in order to redeem the promise of America.
  
  Friedman thinks, for example, that bin Laden forced the hand of the American president to overextend in the Middle East, a pointless military gesture, but a politically necessary one, which lead to a rise of Iranian influence and distracted from Russia. As in The Next 100 Years, the author is still obsessed with the importance of Mexico, Poland and Turkey, but he adds more stuff related, for example, to Romania, which must be built up militarily so that it defends the Carpathians for the Americans for free. The European Union is a joke, fractured by history, culture, economy, financial systems, laws and held together by a fairy tale ideal of a bureaucratic world where war (inevitable to Friedman) doesn't exist. But even so, Germany must be stopped from joining up with Russia and as best as possible removed from its alliance with France. Africa is a place that the U.S. should just ignore. And so on and so on. Basically, America should make sure that in no place will any power even begin to rise in a region because it would impede its natural right to rule the world.
  
  The scary thing is that every one of these predictions or analyses are propped by well explained and documented arguments. It's not that Americans are assholes for doing that, it would be costly and stupid for them to not do that. As Friedman puts it, the U.S. has become empire without intention and is now forced to act as such for better or worse.
  
  I must warn you that this is not your school history book, where valiant heroes defend their homeland against evil, but a very cynical overview of how foreign policy is done. It describes a world in which every country is at war with every other country and any sense of morals is slave to necessity and only serves to bring a modicum of validation to the inevitable evil nations do.
  
  Bottom line: a very well written book, extremely apropos these days, something that I urge to be taken with a grain of salt, but highly recommended as a read.
• 
  Abner Rosenweig

  Friedman is an outstanding writer with an excellent grasp of his subject. Yet, his perspective is one of a veteran geopolitical insider and, at times, it is woefully out of touch with the socio-political-economic emergencies of the world today.
  
  Friedman's strengths are his breadth and depth of knowledge, and his accessible and engaging style. The author covers a lot of ground in TND, spanning power centers and flash points around the globe, and while the book was written to address the 2011 to 2020 decade, much of his analysis remains relevant in 2017 and beyond because the big-picture issues and dynamics it covers have not gone away. As Friedman elegantly shows, the future emerges from the past. By understanding the patterns and cycles in world history that led up to this moment, one can better appreciate where we are now and where we're going. The "crash course" in geopolitical history is one of the best parts of the book.
  
  Friedman is a realist, rather than an idealist, in geopolitics. He presents the global chessboard from the perspective of an insider who believes the fundamental rule of maximizing national self-interest will continue far into the future. From this perspective, Friedman believes the central tenet of US foreign policy should be to maintain regional balances of power through all kinds of underhanded, Machiavellian schemes. He believes the public must be placated and deceived into these policy decisions. He recognizes the US has transcended its superpower status and developed into a bona fide empire, and he insists the US must do everything it can to manage and extend its global hegemony. He suggests "what makes us most human, community, is forged only through the inhumanity of war" (221). He is highly skeptical of the climate crisis.
  
  While Friedman's views offer a masterful window into modern statecraft, they fail to reveal how savagely violent, exploitative, destructive, and evil this practice is. More of the same from a ravenous US empire simply won't do. Like never before, the challenges humanity faces--the very real, very serious climate breakdown, ocean acidification, species depletion, industrial pollution and toxicity, water and energy crises, nuclear proliferation, staggering inequality, and a class of wrongheaded elites willing to go down with the ship as long as they're gorging on wealth--are global, and they require us to transcend personal and national self-interest in favor of the common good of the earth and its people. Civilization in its current form is testing the living systems of the planet like never before, and the survival of our species depends on our ability to consciously steer our evolution toward the collective good through radical reform. Friedman, a relic of a bygone geopolitical era, fails to see any of this.
  
  In spite of the book's tragic oversight, I still appreciate the insight the author does provide. The Next Decade is an entertaining read throughout, and I learned a great deal.
• 
  Benedict De Meulemeester

  Why do I keep buying books that pretend go know what will happen in the future if I firmly believe that forecasting is impossible? Especially in a field with so many variables and so much human psychology involved as geopolitics? I know why I bought and read this one. Because never before has there been more uncertainty about where this world is going to, as a present day Caligula reigns the main imperial force.
  Written six years ago, most of Mr. Friedman’s forecasts have failed to materialize and other fundamental trends have popped up that he failed to preview. Think about the Russian invasion of the Krim or Turkey drifting away from Europe. And most importantly of course, the arrival of Trump. Whenever the books says: “this will happen”, it becomes uninteresting. Therefore, the future-telling reads more as a wishlist than science. And I can imagine that Mr. Friedman is most dissapointed with current events as Mr. Trump is doing exactly everything contrary to what is, according to this book, in the US’ interest. I’m reading it just weeks after Trump fired Tillerson, and it makes me see even more sharply how deeply damaging this President’s policy is to the United States as the main global power. One can only hope that in a few years’ time we will be capable to look back on this period as a startling, funny but irrelevant intermezzo.
  Mr. Friedman’s analysis is 100% Machiavellian. And that is both appealing and appaling. Appealing because a geopolitical analysis that is undone of any ideological or moral demands leads to a very sharp unveiling of world politics’ mechanics. Appaling because it sounds so cynical so often. I’m sorry Mr. Friedman, but I keep hoping that our world leaders sometimes have more noble intentions than purely the preservation and exercise of power. That being said, the power game needs to be played and no one knew its rules better than Machiavelli. So, and this might sound strange, Mr. Trump should maybe take some lessons in the old Italian’s philosophy (I don’t think he reads books). It would prevent him from being so simply outplayed by the likes of Putin, Merkel or Kim.
• 
  Woojong

  "We cannot play innocents abroad in a world that is not innocent." --Ronald Reagan
  
  This is the challenge for the American president as we enter the next decade. He must move with misdirection in order not to create concern in Moscow or Berlin that might make those governments increase the intensity of their relationship before the United States can create a structure to limit it. At the same time, the United States must reassure Poland and other countries of the seriousness of its commitment to their interests. These things can be done, but success will require the studied lack of sophistication of a Ronald Reagan and the casual dishonesty of an FDR. The president must appear to be not very bright yet be able to lie convincingly. The target of this charade will not be future allies but potential enemies. The Unites States needs to buy time. P.164
  
  The third and most likely path is several generations of warfare, out of which will grow a continent where nations are forged into states with legitimacy. As harsh as it may sound, nations are born in conflict, and it is through the experience of war that people gain a sense of shared fate. This is true not only in the founding of a nation but over the course of a nation's history. The United States, Germany, or Saudi Arabia are all nations that were forged in the battles that gave rise to them. War is not sufficient, but the tragedy of the human condition is that the thing that makes us most human---community---originates in the inhumanity of war. pp.220-221
  
  One of Machiavelli's points is that good comes out of the ruthless pursuit of power, not out of trying to do good. p.222
  
  But computing is still essentially passive, restricted to manipulating and transmitting data. The next and necessary phase is to become active, using that data to manipulate and change reality, with robotics as a primary example. Moving to that active phase is necessary for achieving the huge boost in productivity that will compensate for the economic shifts associated with the demographic change about to hit. P.230
  
  "I hope to have God on my side, but I must have Kentucky." --Abraham Lincoln
  
  The exercise of power is always morally ambiguous, yet the moral principles of the United States mean nothing if the country is destroyed. The pursuit of universal rights requires more than speeches. It requires power. "Nobody get hurt" is unrealistic, and the best we can do is to make difficult decisions about who gets hurt and when. Lincoln had to support slavery in Kentucky. It wasn't right, but it was either that or lose the war, and if he lost the war, then his entire moral project was destroyed. P.238
  
  At the same time, simply pursuing power without any moral purpose leads nowhere. Nixon exercised power without purpose, and it was his lack of moral perspective that led him to Watergate and destruction. It is one thing to justify the means by the end. It is another thing for the means to become the end. P.238
  
  The United States has spent sixteen of the past fifty years fighting wars in Asia. After his experience in Korea, Douglas MacArthur, hardly a pacifist, warned Americans to avoid such adventures. The reason was simple: as soon as Americans set foot in Asia, they are vastly outnumbered. The logistical problems of supplying forces thousands of miles from home, and of fighting an enemy that has nowhere to go and is intimately familiar with the terrain, only compound an already overwhelming challenge. Yet the United States continues to wade in, expecting that each time will be different. Of all the lessons of the last decade, this is the most important for the decade to come. P.240
• 
  Sharyn Campbell

  This book dates to 2011, so it is about the decade that is ending in 2020. I was still curious to see what Friedman had foreseen nine years ago. It was interesting to read his thoughts on the relevance (or not) of NATO, countries as perpetual friends and enemies (no such thing), and America's imperialism (whether Americans like or it not). Friedman is not an emotional writer. He examines the facts of geopolitics and predicts accordingly. I find this refreshing. Friedman advocates for the role of government in long-term innovation (and gives examples from the past). He ends the book by advising Americans to grow up. The country is now an empire, whether we like it or not, and it affects all other countries as a result of this status. We need to own it, pure and simple.
• 
  Harry Harman

  The first is the concept of the unintended empire. I argue that the United States has become an empire not because it intended to, but because history has worked out that way.
  
  The United States was founded against British imperialism.
  
  who was prepared to lie, violate the law, and betray principle in order to achieve those ends.
  
  master the art of ruling
  
  as Sherlock Holmes put it, “When you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.”
  
  losing sight of its long-term strategic principles
  
  over a billion people living in abject poverty
  
  economic interdependence in Europe