The Story of Russia by Orlando Figes

The Story of Russia Reviews

• 
  Roman Clodia

  This is the book I've been wanting to read about Russia - and Figes is exactly the right person to write it. While this does sweep through the history of the country, the real focus, and what makes this so timely and fascinating, is that it doesn't just tell what happens, but how the cultural myth-making of 'Russia' runs alongside, and sometimes over, the historical material narrative.
  
  This is about how 'Russia' thinks of itself, how it creates its ideological and mythical narratives and what those flashpoints are and have been across millennia, all the way up to the present. Given our current urgency to understand what is happening and how, Figes traces myths of 'Holy Russia' and the deep desire for a patriarchal figure to dominate and control: from the Tsars to Stalin to Putin, to the place of religious patriotism, and the almost masochistic sense of sublimation. This isn't just the story of Russia but the stories that Russia has seemingly always told itself.
  
  Thanks to Bloomsbury for an ARC via NetGalley
• 
  Stefan Mitev

  Съвременната руска политика твърде често е анализирана без достатъчно разбиране на руската история. Два пъти през ХХ век, в 1917 и 1991, автократичната държава е разбита само за да бъде преродена в различна форма. Обществените сили се оказват твърде слаби и разделени за затвърждаване на демократично правителство.
  
  Историята на Русия винаги е била политически обременена. Даването на примери от минали събития и до днес е ефективен начин за печелене на аргументи. В същото време историята на Русия е обвита от митове, които трябва да се познават. Дори произходът на руския народ е обект на дебат. Дали водещи при формиране на Киевска Русия през двевети век са били славяните или викингите (варяги)? Отговорът се е променял няколко пъти в исторически план според актуалната политическа конюнктура. Учудващо, но фигурата на Петър Велики създава дълбоко разделение в руското общество. Едни разглеждат неговите реформи за отваряне към Европа като спасение, а други - като поемане по греш��н път. Дори преди революцията от 1917 г. руската история е внимателно цензурирана с цел да се предотврати разпространението на потенциално опасни идеи и факти, т.е. всичко, което ще представи авторитаризма в негативна светлина.
  
  Налагането на митове явно се случва успешно, защото в анкета от 2007 г. около 70% от руснаците смятат, че Феликс Дзержински, основателят на Чека (предшественик на НКВД и КГБ), е "защитил публичния ред и обществения живот". Само 7% го смятат за "убиец и екзекутор". Още по-смущаващо е, че в същата анкета почти две трети от запитаните признават масовите репресии на Сталин върху собствения му народ, но въпреки това го определят ролята му като "позитивна" за страната. И днес има хора, които смятат, че Съветският съюз влиза във войната (Великата отечествена) през лятото на 1941 г. Периодът между пакта Молотов-Рибентроп и операция Барбароса (1939 - 1941 г.) неудобно се премълчава, а поставянето на въпроси за него дори може да бъде обект на съдебно преследване. Тъжният извод е, че пропагандата действа. Промиването на мозъци дава закономерен резултат.
  
  Прочетете новата книга на изтъкнатия историк Орландо Файджис, за да не бъдете заблудени от многобройните митове в руската история.
• 
  Anthony Taylor

  Russia in a Nutshell.
  
  Orlando Figes is one of the authorities of Russian history. He is also incapable of writing a bad book. So when he writes a full history on the story of Russia and the national myths that make up the nation, it can only hit the mark. This book of course is excellent, by a man passionate and knows his topic.
  
  The Story of Russia is a short volume on Russia’s history, it’s national myths on key events in its history. Such as who is the natural successor to the medieval kingdom of the Kievan Rus and the Byzantium Empire. How living under the Mongols yoke was broken, the consolidation of a state under Ivan IV, the growth under Peter I and Catherine II, the great patriotic wars, the strong days of the USSR and belief that a strong central ruler equals a strong prosperous Russia. A nation that grew 50 square miles per day, every day from Ivan IV to the revolution in 1917.
  
  Figes argues all of this has been building towards the rule of Vladimir Putin, a modern autocracy born in the Soviet Union. A man who has studied Russian History and these myths. A man who believes that areas of the Ukraine long belong to Russia and will stop at nothing to ‘get them back.’
  
  This of course is a fascinating study and goes along way to explain Putin’s actions on the twenty first century. Ultimately this is the focus of the book. It’s a road that leads to the modern day. I couldn’t have thought of anyone better to write this. It is short coming in just over 300 pages, I would have loved the story to be told in a bit more depth. But Figes doesn’t need to, he is aware this has been done many times before, what is unique is he builds all this towards Putin. I really enjoyed this and couldn’t put it down. Figes is always worth reading.
• 
  Wandaviolett

  Russlandkunde (in dt. Übersetzung gelesen).
  Kurzmeinung: Angenehm zu lesen.
  Während der Lektüre von Orlando Figes kam mir des Öfteren der Klassiker von Heinrich Mann „Der Untertan“ in den Sinn. Warum nur? „Patriotismus, Kollektivismus und Unterwerfung sind die traditionellen Werte Russlands“, sagt Putin 1999. Und er meint es so.
  
  Russland ist ein Land mit einer vielfältigen und wechselhaften Geschichte. Sie ist nicht weniger gewalttätig als die vieler anderer Länder. Doch zeichnet sie sich dadurch aus, dass das große Land bis heute fast durchgängig diktatorisch- autokratisch regiert wurde. Der Kommunismus, der das Land erschütterte, hat die diktatorischen Strukturen nicht abgeschüttelt, im Gegenteil! Lenin, vor allem aber Stalin herrschten als Vorsitzende eines Einparteienstaats mit genauso harter Hand wie die einst Russlands Zaren, sogar noch gewaltsamer, noch willkürlicher, von Paranoia gesteuert.
  
  Bis heute hat es sich gehalten, dass in Russland nicht der Staat die Bürger schützt, sondern die Bürger den Staat (In Kriegen wird auf Quantität gesetzt; rücksichtsloser Menschenverschleiß), das heißt dann: die große Opferbereitschaft Russlands und wird entsprechend hochgehängt. Patriotismus und Volkstum ist gesetzt. Antisemitismus und Xenophobie werden systematisch geschürt, ein freies Russland hat es nie gegeben. Der Glaube daran, dass ein Regent sakrosankt ist, gehört zu den traditionellen Werten, die Väterchen Putin wieder hochhält. „Kein anderes Land der Welt hat aus den eigenen Herrschern so viele Heilige fabriziert. In keinem anderen ist Macht so stark sakralisiert worden“, schreibt Figes. Ein weiteres Zitat: „Das System der Abhängigkeit vom Herrscher hat sich bis heute gehalten. Putins Oligarchen sind völlig von seinem Willen abhängig.“
  
  Orlando Figes holt weit aus, geht zurück bis in die Anfänge der Kiewer Rus und durchläuft sämtliche nennenswerten Regenten. Um „Eine Geschichte Russlands“ zu lesen, braucht es also ein echtes Interesse für Geschichte. Wenn man dies aufbringt, bekommt man einen Schnellkursus in russischer Geschichte, deren Stoff in Deutschlands Schulen mehr als unterbelichtet ist. Von Peter dem Großen und Katharina der Großen hat man schon einmal etwas gehört, aber auch nichts Genaues und dann verließen sie ihn. Wenn, wie Wikipedia kundtut Stefan Plaggenborg (ein anderer Historiker) meint, Figes „habe sich verhoben bei dem Versuch, aus tausend Jahren russischer Geschichte heutige Verhältnisse zu erhellen“, will ich dem widersprechen.
  
  „Eine Geschichte Russlands“ mag dem wissenschaftlichen Standard, den man für die Veröffentlichung in einer Fachzeitschrift anlegt, nicht entsprechen, doch es ist ja ein Sachbuch für Laien. Dankenswerterweise hat Figes auch auf die von der Wissenschaft so geliebten Schachtelsätze mit vor- und nachgeschobenen Einschüben vor jedem Substantiv verzichtet, so dass man Figes Sätze nicht entzippen muss wie die seiner Kollegen. Dass dabei trotzdem ein hochwertiges Werk herausgekommen ist, zeigt, dass man sehr wohl f��r den Laien niveauvoll schreiben kann. Mut zur Lücke ist dabei natürlich unerlässlich. Inhaltlich ist „Eine Geschichte Russlands“ gestrafft; so bleibt sie übersichtlich.
  
  Russland sah und sieht sich als hehrer Wächter einzigartiger Ideale, „Russland als Wächter, der Europa vor den „asiatischen Horden“ beschützt, wurde seit dem 17. Jahrhundert Bestandteil des nationalen Mythos.“ „Der Kommunismus verlieh dem Land eine neue messianische Rolle“.
  
  Figes beschreibt die Leibeigenschaft der Bauern genauso wie ihre Auslieferung unter spätere kommunistische Behörden; ein Beamter ist nicht dem Volk gegenüber verantwortlich, sondern nur seinem Vorgesetzten gegenüber verpflichtet. Deshalb gibt es keine Rücktritte von Verantwortungsträgern. Misswirtschaft und Zwangskollektivierung führten zu grauenhaften Hungersnöten.
  
  Die Rolle der Orthodoxie wird beleuchtet, die sich unkritisch unter die Staatspolitik beugt („Im Mythos von der russischen Seele steckt ein messianisches Konzept“); das unmenschliche System der Kollektivschuld wie auch die Besiedlung Russlands Norden fast ausschließlich durch den Gulag (Zwangslager, Zwangsarbeit, Zwangsumsiedlungen), in den verschleppt wird, wer ethnisch nicht passt oder sonst wie auffällt, jetzt zum Beispiel sind es Tausende von ukrainischen Bürgern und ihre Kinder) und vieles mehr, zeigt Figes auf.
  
  Systematische Desinformation und Geschichtsverfälschungen führen dazu, dass die Bürger eines Landes, an dessen Grenzen seit mehr als 30 Jahren keiner mehr Hand anlegte, sich in einem Verteidigungskampf zu befinden glauben. Der letzte Bogen bis in die Neuzeit ist ein bisschen kurz und besorgt. Aber wer kann schon in die Zukunft sehen? Immerhin wagt Figes einen Ausblick und gibt eine Beurteilung ab:
  
  „Es ist ein unnötiger Krieg, geboren aus Mythen und Putins verdrehter Deutung seiner Landesgeschichte. Wenn er nicht bald beendet wird, wird er das Beste in Russland zerstören.“
  
  Fazit: Unerlässliche Faktenkunde.
  
  Kategorie: Sachbuch. Geschichte.
  Verlag: Klett-Cotta, 2022
• 
  Lorenzo Coopman

  I had second thoughts about reading this book after reading a review of it in the Guardian. But I did give him a chance, and I have to say that this book hits all the right notes; it isn't pretentious, and it has a very nice style.
  One of the best texts I've read to introduce myself to Russian culture and history. The chapter on "ван асилeви" is extremely fascinating. The book ends around April 2022, so the chapters about recent history are excellent, but I doubt it will be appreciated in Russia's "imperialist milieu."
  Anyone who wants to gain a better understanding of Russia and its future direction should read this book, in my opinion.
• 
  Greg

  Not only is this a relatively brief (302 pages) history of Russia’s first 1,000 years, but the author wrote it intentionally to highlight those aspects of Russia’s past upon which President Putin is drawing to support his ongoing invasion of Ukraine, a task which he does extremely well.
  In the process, he illustrates the foolishness behind any peoples’ claim to be of pure stock, whether that be like Hitler’s foolishness in touting the Aryan race or with Putin’s assertion that Ukrainians are part of great Russia.
  Professor Figes, who has written several books about Russia, does us all the great favor of reminding us that there is much that is legitimate in Putin’s grievances against the West. While such do not justify his invasion of Ukraine, they remind us that there are, indeed, much larger issues at play than just Russia vs. Ukraine.
  Indeed, Figes argues – and I think the historical facts support him – that “during his first term in office, Putin looked to further Russia’s integration with the West. In interviews he spelled out his vision of the country as ‘part of western European culture’ and said that he was open to the possibility of Russia joining NATO and the European Union. Everything depended on how Western institutions would respond, on how NATO, in particular, would act in regions where the Russians had security concerns, historic links and sensitivities which, if offended or ignored, might provoke an aggressive response from Moscow…. [This] was a recurring pattern running right through Russian history since at least the eighteenth century. Russia wanted to be part of Europe, to be treated with respect. But if it was rejected by the West’s leader, or if they humiliated it, Russia would rebuild itself and arm itself against the West.”
  Unfortunately, Figes argues, and again I agree with him, NATO and the European Union essentially “blew it.” “Instead of trying to bring Russia into new security arrangements for Europe,” he writes, NATO kept it isolated. The US and its North Atlantic allies acted as if the Cold War had been ‘won’ by them, and that Russia, the ‘defeated’ power, need not be consulted on the consequences of the Soviet collapse in regions where the Russians had historic interest. The effect of Western actions was to reinforce the Russians’ own resentments of the West. On the back of years of anti-Western propaganda during the Cold War it did not take a lot to persuade them that a hostile West refused to recognize their country as an equal and took advantage of its current weakness to diminish it. This was the basis on which Putin built his anti-Western ideology.”
  
  In making such an analysis, Figes is clearly not in any way justifying or supporting Putin’s actions in Ukraine. But he is doing something very important by reminding us that situation A of our “now” did not just pop up out of nowhere with no context or history but, rather, that all of “the present” is a product of “the past.” Moreover, if we wish to understand and resolve current issues it is essential that we understand and respect those which preceded them.
  Unfortunately, the gulf between the West’s collective understanding of what is going on in Ukraine and Putin’s – and to a large extent, the Russian peoples’ – view of it is so damned wide, that it is truly hard to envision ways in which this particular nasty genie is ever “put back into its bottle.”
  
  Putin’s View of Russia and “Russianness”
  
  Greater Russia and the “Russian people”
  There is an old Soviet joke – with renewed aptness for today – that said, in essence, “The future is fairly predictable, what is impossible to understand is the past.” And the reason for this droll observation is that Russians – especially its statist and religious rulers – have always and repeatedly interpreted the past to support their present!
  But not all of, perhaps even not even most of this, was to intentionally deceive or misrepresent, for the mists of time make distinguishing exactly what happened 1,000 years ago very difficult.
  Take the very origin of “the Russians” themselves. The great territorial swath that is Russia today – and which had been both Tsarist and Soviet Russia for hundreds of years – began very modestly in Kievan Rus, an entity centered around the now Ukrainian city of Kiev. Who were these people? Slavic peoples originally from central Asia, most likely, with a smattering of other Europeans. Later, as Moscow (Muscovy) came into existence and Kiev itself became less important as other cities, such as Novgorod, gained in status, it appears that a significant number of Northmen – i.e. Vikings – came to intermingle with the population.
  
  
  
  In these early years, not only was there not “one people,” there was not even a “state.” Governance remained highly local and, unlike in Europe at the time, without many over-arching loyalties towards someone calling themselves “king” or “ruler.”
  What is important to note from these times, however, was the close, ongoing, but not always friendly relationship between the peoples living in today’s central Europe – including the western lands of today’s Ukraine – and those in today’s eastern Europe – eastern Ukraine and western Russia. Like many in medieval western Europe their primary experiences and loyalties lay with their home city, and not primarily with any larger region or statist entity.
  It took centuries for the tsars as we tend to think of them – autocratic rulers over large territories – to come into being. In the earliest years, the tsars of Muscovy asserted more authority and control than they actually had but, over time, they began to extend their territory north, south, east and west. And, in doing so, they encountered hostile pushbacks from other peoples – in fact, such contact was often occasioned by those other peoples crowding into “Russian” lands.
  So, to the north, Russia for centuries struggled against Sweden in an effort to secure access to the Baltic Sea. In the more central lands west of Russia she frequently encountered – as did the Ukrainians (who never had their own “state” until modern times) – both Poland and Lithuania. Today’s resentments by both the Poles, Lithuanians, and Baltic republics date back centuries, as these were also the very lands over which titanic struggles were waged in the first and second world wars of the 20th century. And for the very same reasons: relatively flat lands with no natural boundaries but teeming with abundant resources, these were prizes that would give their “owners” rich access to things both desirable and necessary.
  In the Middle Ages, the Russians asserted that there were three groups of “Russians”: the Great Russians of Russia proper, the White Russians of Ukraine, and the Little Russians of Lithuania.
  And Russia also long longed for access to the seas in the south, too, which explains its centuries-long obsession with the Crimean Peninsula as key to the Baltic Sea and, through Constantinople (Istanbul today) to the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas. But to get there and remain, they had to conquer several Turkic and Mongol descendant tribes living there.
  And to the east, the increasingly empty, incredibly broad stretch of land reaching to the Pacific Ocean, Russia also fought local residents in order to expand her reach.
  Russia “won” most of this vast territory in the course of a few hundred years beginning in the 17th century, and these are the times when some of her most powerful and celebrated Tsars reigned, including such figures as Peter the Great and Catherine the Great.
  
  
  
  Russia as the “Third Rome”
  Most of the territory of Russia – at any phase of its expansion – was occupied by peasants and, like peasants everywhere seemingly, they were very pious. The land was holy, and – pagan or Christian – they tended to be quite devout.
  The early tsars recognized the value that would accrue to them if they could harness this piety as but another means to tether the loyalty of the people to the throne. They checked out the religious faiths of the Turks (Muslims), the West (Rome) and the East (Constantinople), and eventually settled upon the Greek Orthodox tradition – that embraced and followed throughout the Eastern Roman Empire with its capital at Constantinople – as the one most compatible. They frankly regarded Western Christianity, with its headquarters in Rome, as corrupt, just as the City of Rome – the First Rome – had fallen into disrepair. Constantinople was the Second Rome but, after it fell to the Turks in 1453, the tsars and their Eastern Orthodox patriarchs happily proclaimed that now Moscow was the Third – and last – Rome. This assertion was part of the tzars’ reasoning that Moscow – indeed, Russia – was head of all true Christians, especially the various Slavic peoples who also adhered to Eastern Orthodox Christianity.
  Together with how the Tzars came to frame the Russian people as those true Russians of blood wherever they lived, so also did this claim about Moscow being the Third Rome reinforce their understanding of their sacred duty towards all Eastern Orthodox adherents as being their protectors. These two ideas – the universalism of Russia and her obligations flowing from her status as the Third Rome help explain her centuries-long interest in central and eastern Europe as well as the Slavic and Balkan states to her south.
  
  No Separation of Church and State
  Unlike in the West, there was no tradition from the very beginning of different “realms” of authority for the state vis-à-vis the church. In reality, in Russia the Church has always been subordinate to the political wishes of the Tsar and, as is clear today from the Patriarch of Moscow’s endorsement of Putin’s efforts in Ukraine, the Russian Orthodox Church has repeatedly played a key role in reinforcing the concept of the absolute loyalty Russian people owe to their statist sovereign, whether that be a tzar, the head of the Soviet Union, or the current president of Russia.
  
  The lack of what Figes terms “the building blocks of democracy”
  One of the reasons why Putin is able to rule as he does is that – like most Russian leaders before him – he does not have to contend with the pesky realities of a free press nor, very importantly, any strong, relatively independent bodies, whether political, economic, or social. Russia never developed the tradition of strong labor unions, for example, which can wield some semblance of countervailing power to that of the state. Nor was there a legacy of strong city or regional governments that functioned independent of the central government – everything had long been centralized, although as Figes makes clear this is far from implying efficient direction or administration from the tzarist structure.
  Because of this, and because the tradition of “what the tzar/commissar/president” says must be obeyed and, moreover, must be the truth, Putin – like other heads of the Soviet and Russian states before him – is quite able to weave his own interpretation of “the facts” so that the majority of the Russian people accept, if not always believe, them.
  
  In sum, Putin’s arguments are not without a basis in history, even if he is also dipping deep into the mythology long relied upon by Russia’s rulers, and the proven ability of his people to absorb tremendous sufferings and hardships – plus the legacy of great human loss during war – means that any hopes in the West for a “short” war, or the idea that Putin will soon “give up,” are baseless.
  
  How Might This Impasse – this Gulf of Misunderstanding – Be Resolved?
  I wish to add the following: For all of these reasons, I believe only a bold effort by the United States to implement a broad discussion concerning future European security for all the countries of Europe – very much including Russia – has a chance to essentially “reset” the stage for the kind of settlement that can bring sustainable peace to the continent. Note that such an effort would not be centered on Ukraine but, rather, on attaining the kind of inclusion of Russia as an equal partner in European affairs.
  Unfortunately, I don’t believe this idea has a snowflake’s chance in hell because of the rigid postures of both sides. President Biden – unlike his French and German counterparts – appears to regard all of Putin’s concern about Western encroachment and the dismissal of Russia’s “rightful place” as lacking any merit whatsoever.
  Thus, not only will the suffering and tragedy of Ukraine likely continue, but so will the stand-off between Russia and “the West.”
  
  A true – and unnecessary – tragedy!
• 
  Ben Dutton

  This whistle-stop tour through hundreds of years of Russian history has probably taken on more resonance and perked the interest of more readers than Figes probably imagined due to recent events in Ukraine (2022). Indeed, the final paragraphs of this work seem especially prescient in their forewarning of future events.
  
  This work, being a whistle stop tour, does not do every era full justice, but this is not a criticism. The end notes provide details of other books if you wish to pursue a particular rabbit hole of Russian history. Figes spends more time in the twentieth century in this book than the previous centuries, but he draws enough parallels and shows us the connective tissue between Putin and those rulers of old whose ideology and iconography Putin has adapted to make every section here absolutely vital.
  
  As Figes notes near the end of this work, there are now hundreds of works which deal with Putin-era Russia, and doubtless there will be thousands more to come. This book is great introduction to that era and more besides, and is an expert primer to a country with whom we are all familiar, but about whose internal life we are unfamiliar. Great stuff.
  
  Thank you to the publishers and Netgalley for the ARC.
• 
  Ann Otto

  This is an easy-to-read history of Russia from the 800s to the date of publication in 2022. As the author notes, no other country has been so divided over its own beginnings, changed its story so often, and been unable to separate history and myth. The political disagreements and tragedies are described along with the controversial leaders often responsible. We have a better understanding of the current war in Ukraine given the historical relationship between the two countries.
• 
  Kim Becker (MIDDLE of the Book MARCH)

  Read for the Booktube Prize 2023.
• 
  piet van genderen

  Zeker in de huidige tijd is achtergrond informatie over Rusland belangrijk. Hoe en waarom zijn leiders denken en handelen. Het boek van Figes verschaft een gedetailleerd historisch overzicht, waarbij vooral de gebeurtenissen sinds begin vorige eeuw tot de verbeelding spreken. Ben blij dat ik het boek heb gelezen.
• 
  Allison Valentine

  If you have ever wondered about the history of Russia then you must read this book.
  Orlando Figes gives an accurate account and without bias over the last thousand years of the country and its leaders.
  Figes has written the book excellently so it reads more as a story than a reference book.
  I have learned more about Russia and it's history by reading this book than I ever did at school!
  The last few chapters gives the reader an account of Putin in the years following up to the invasion of Ukraine. It also gives the view point from both the western and Russian point of view.
  Exceptionally written.
• 
  Hamid

  A good primer on the history of Russia since its broad inception (interwoven with the histories of neighbouring communities and eventually neighbouring states). Figes does a solid job of grounding competing national myths that continue to influence politics through to today though he routinely dips into wild claims about the singularness of Russian history ("no other country" etc) which are easily countered with examples. This is more the dramatic love of a historian for his work than any meaningful embellishment.
  
  While the book is admirably short, its purview is so all-ranging that it can't possibly address key events - how they started and how they shaped history - with enough justice. So, for example, the Soviet-Afghan war which spanned a decade, and cost the lives of tens of thousands of Soviet troops and perhaps two million Afghans, gets a single-sentence aside in the book. And yet its implications for the Soviet economy, international status and internal cohesion were vast.
  
  So what is focused on in the books serves some themes, usually the continuing nature of Tsar-like control on an almost teleological basis. 'Boyars' (think: 'Knights') are routinely surfaced as a comparison for localised control over areas. It feels like he's softly making the 'Russia requires autocratic rule as a historical inevitability' argument, tempered with interesting interpretations eg of the fall of Communism not as revolution but as a power vacuum that the Communist state.
  
  The Chapters covering Nicholas II through to the Russian Civil War are essentially a condensed version of 'A People's Tragedy'. I thought he'd plagiarised some familiar phrases at first because I recognised them but cross-referenced them with APT and found them. For example, "It was not Marxism that made Lenin a revolutionary but Lenin who made Marxism revolutionary" is verbatim in APT but not referenced here.
  
  His concluding chapter stretches right up to publication (covering a chunk of the Ukraine war). He handles the most recent events carefully and sensibly, covering Russia's NATO concerns as well as the aggression of its newest Tsar.
  
  Solid read. Should be three times as long to get the depth it's crying out for.
• 
  Ben Rogers

  Revolutionary Red Square: A Retrospective Reader On Russia's Rise
  
  This book is an outstanding and comprehensive book that covers the history of Russia in an impressive manner.
  
  The level of research and detail provided is truly remarkable, making it an invaluable resource for anyone interested in the history of Russia.
  
  While the book is lengthy, it is well worth the read as it provides deep insights into current political and social issues in Russia.
  
  Figes does a fantastic job of presenting the complex history of Russia in an accessible and engaging way, making it a great book for both academics and general readers.
  I particularly enjoyed how he highlighted the major events and personalities that shaped Russia throughout its history, as well as how he tied everything together to provide a clear and cohesive understanding of the country's development.
  
  Overall, this is one of the best books on Russia out there and I highly recommend it to anyone interested in the history and politics of this fascinating country.
  Its depth of information and insightful analysis make it an essential read for anyone seeking to better understand Russia's past, present, and future.
  
  4.6/5
• 
  Carlton

  History of course is more complex – even if it is a story too.
  Confident, concise history which is not afraid to make claims of historic trends and acknowledge multiple interpretations.
  Russia now comprises four geographical zones:
  • Treeless Tundra, above Arctic Circle, about one-fifth of Russia’s land mass
  • Taiga forest zone - pine trees, spruce and larch, interspersed with marshes, lakes and rivers
  • Central Agricultural zone, rich black soil
  • Pontic Steppe - semi-arid grasslands and savannas
  
  The history is told in eleven necessarily broad brush chapters that outline chronological developments and usually concentrate on a few individual stories to bring out the important changes.
  
  1. Origins - Kievan Rus and Byzantium’s Eastern Orthodox Christianity. Creation of myth of Holy Russia with Mary as Mother, rather than Virgin (Roman Catholic interpretation).
  2. Mongol Impact - 1223 and horsemen from the east. The capture of Kiev on 6 December 1240 effectively marking the end of Kievan Rus. With the subsequent rise of Moscow as a powerful principality, although subject to the Golden Horde, it was not until 1378 that the Mongols could first be successfully challenged. Today the Kulikovo victory is linked in the nationalist consciousness to other episodes when Russia’s military sacrifice ‘saved’ the West, in 1812–15 (against Napoleon) or 1941–5, for example; each time its sacrifice had been unthanked, unrecognised by its Western allies in these wars. The country’s deep resentment of the West is rooted in this national myth. Although gradually weakening, Moscow remained a vassal of the khans until 1502.
  3. Ivan the Terrible (1530-84) and the conquest of Khazan and Astrakhan, with an unsuccessful attempt to conquer Livonia to access the Baltic Sea. The opening up of Siberia, which was conquered by Ivan’s son
  4. Time of Troubles - civil war following Ivan the Terrible’s death without a successor (he had unintentionally(?) killed his son) and choosing of a Romanov as the next Tsar.
  5. Russia faces West - Catherine the Great (1762-98) embraces the European Enlightenment, to a point, and creates the West facing St Petersburg.
  6. The Shadow of Napoleon - the French Revolution turns Russia away from Europe, as does Napoleon’s invasion. I found this really interesting in highlighting Russian belief that Russia was responsible for defeating Napoleon.
  7. An Empire in Crisis - the problem of making Russian farming and industry efficient, with serfdom eventually abolished (1861). Some Tsars embrace European ideas, whilst others are isolationist. The build up to revolution, or break down of the autocracy, is also outlined.
  8. Revolutionary Russia - the 1917 revolution, civil war and creation of the Soviet state. There are more quotable insights: Throughout the peasant world Communist regimes have been built on the ambition of peasant sons to join the bureaucratic class. And plausible explanations as to the Bolsheviks success, as a: unifying goal (the defence of ‘the revolution’) with clear symbols (the Red Flag and the Red Army’s emblem, the Red Star) capable of winning mass support.
  9. The War on Old Russia - Stalin’s “reign”, including the Five Year Plans, disastrous large scale agricultural collectivisation (kolkholzesj, and Stalin’s paranoia leading to the progroms and show trials in the 1930’s,
  10. Motherland - the pragmatic reasons behind the 1939 Soviet:Nazi non-aggression pact (but also its betrayal of ideological Communism), the massive casualty rate in the Second World War, when the timing of the invasion had been unexpected. But also the patriotism and hatred of the Nazis that allowed the country to defeat the invasion (The cult of sacrifice was a more important factor than terror. It was the Soviet system’s main advantage over Western liberal societies where the loss of human life was given greater weight in the reckonings of the command.). Stalin died in 1953, to be followed by Krushchev, Brezhnev (1964), Andropov (1982), Chernenko (1984), and Gorbachev (1985), with the break up of the USSR.
  11. Ends - discussion of the rise of Putin and how the potential for a more “Western liberal” government was lost, the possible missed chances, perhaps caused by the “West’s” understanding of Russia.
  
  I found this narrative really useful to gain some understanding of modern Russia as throughout the book Figes highlights how Russian society was different from other European countries, and how some of these differences might explain the Russian public’s acquiescence to Putin’s current aggression to other countries. Recommended.
  
  I received a Netgalley copy of this book, but this review is my honest opinion.
• 
  Sage

  4.5 stars. Brilliant up until the conclusion, where in Spring 2022 Figes speculates on the end of the Russia-Ukraine war, and does not foresee the events of early October 2022. At that point, none of us knew the Russian army was as poorly equipped as it turned out to be, so this isn't a dig at him. Figes is one of the best Russia scholars in the world and this volume condenses five or so books on various eras of Russian history into one easily digested survey of HOW Russia got from scattered alliance of tribal warlords to what it is today. Highly recommended, though I do hope the second edition will replace the last chapter with an analysis of the current war and where Russia will go next.
• 
  Annarella

  The story of Russia is an intriguing, complex, and fascinating topic. I have to admit that I knew very little about the myths and how the history was modified according to the type of regime.
  The author is an excellent storyteller and this extensive book is never dry and always kept my attention.
  An important book for the current times.
  Highly recommended.
  Many thanks to the publisher and Netgalley for this ARC, all opinions are mine
• 
  Rachel Smith

  As usual, excellent! My only quibble is the last five pages, which he would've written differently if he'd had just four more months before having to submit the final revision of the chapter. If you want to understand why the Russians have behaved the way they currently are in 2022 and you want that understanding through a historical lens, look no further than this book. Pair it with The Whisperers, also by Figes, and you have an excellent picture of why Russians on camera say they support Putin 125% when most of them really don't.
• 
  Bart Parka

  A gripping summary of Russia's history. From medieval times, Kievan Rus' and the Rurik dynasty, Muscovy and Ivan the Terrible, the Romanovs and Catherine the Great through to Bolsheviks and Soviet Russia to the fall of the Soviet Union as Russia is once more plunged into autocracy by Putin's rule.
  
  The author pauses at regular intervals to refer back to current events and how history has shaped the modern Russian psyche. The author explains how these events have been twisted or embellished to spawn myths that are now used by Putin to explain his war of aggression in Ukraine.
  
  Overall, great book.
• 
  Appu

  Ever since I started reading Tolstoy, I have been a Russophile. But the war In Ukraine has made me rethink my position on Russia. Orlando Figes tries to make sense of Putin's Russia by looking at its history. He comes to the conclusion that Putin's policies flow directly from historical myths about Russia. "It [Ukraine war]goes to show how dangerous myths can be when used by dictators to re-invent their country's past."
• 
  Kerree

  This book is a fantastic overview of the history of Russia, and poinant considering the war in Ukraine.
  
  I think I will go away and read/listen to other books that deal with specific parts of the story that I find intersting.
• 
  Katie Coleman

  A concise Russian history written with an eye towards explaining the current conflict in Ukraine. Sometimes quite dry and even a bit hurried but I am happy to have learned a lot in a short amount of time. Would recommend for those interested in the topic and also teachers of this material.
• 
  Steve

  Solid (really) quick history of Russia with a special focus on Russia's recurring national toxic myths, with Putin acting like just another autocratic Tsar. It seems ridiculous that Russia's history can be boiled down toe 300 pages, but there is someone capable of doing it, it's Figes.
• 
  Shana Yates

  3.5 stars
• 
  Deirdre

  Very insightful, but too dry and factual for me to get through
• 
  Tim O'mahony

  Just brilliant!
• 
  Brian Krivisky

  Great overview of Russia/Soviet history