Victory at Sea: Naval Power and the Transformation of the Global Order in World War II by Paul Kennedy

Victory at Sea: Naval Power and the Transformation of the Global Order in World War II Reviews

• 
  Urey Patrick

  An interesting book – even an elegant one in many respects. Kennedy looks at the three sea wars of World War II – the Pacific campaign, the war of the Atlantic, and the naval conflict in the Mediterranean – was three interrelated pieces of the global war in its entirety, not three separate and distinct events. He defines the global war itself as comprised of six great theaters of war – the three ocean theaters plus the German-Soviet Eastern Front, the invasion of France and the Japanese invasion of mainland China. Although he expends little attention to the three land campaigns, he does reference them in terms of the vital nature of the three ocean campaigns. Allied success over the course of the war was inextricably tied to success at sea.
  
  Each of the three ocean theaters was different in character, geography, positional effects, combatants, strategies and tactics and the underlying technical resources and industrial depth of support among the powers at war. He focusses on the six naval powers predominant at the onset of war – the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany and Japan of which only three were true great powers at sea.
  
  The other three were emerging naval powers caught up in a conflict that exceeded their capacity to respond, to operate and to adapt and pursue national objectives. Germany despite its superb technology an ship design was hampered by limited access, limited ship numbers except U-boats, and limited understanding of how to builds and use naval power. France, also gifted with excellent ships and naval technology, was neutered with its fall in 1940. Italy – another builder of excellent warships – was severely constricted by geography (the tight confines of the Mediterranean) and combat reticence for lack of adequate air cover.
  
  Kennedy does not dwell on individual battles or specific events, using them to illustrate his broader perspectives of the effects of geographical realities, the changing technology and industrial outputs, the advent of new weapons, tactics and strategy, naval doctrines and implementation as induced by distinctive national strategies and histories, and how this myriad of factors often unique to each of the three ocean theaters yet interlinked to affect the outcomes, both at sea and on land. For example, he discusses the convoy battles against the German U-boat campaign. Conventional wisdom maintains that the vast industrial output of the US, building merchant ships faster than the U-boats could sink them was the key to victory. Kennedy argues (at length throughout the book) that it was the actual physical defeat of the U-boats that was the decisive factor. Had the U-boats not been decisively defeated and subsequently withdrawn from the Atlantic, things would have been different – certainly more difficult and problematic.
  
  He has very interesting and cogent observations on submarine warfare and its differing implementation among the six naval powers. As has been observed elsewhere, Japan’s failure to recognize the importance of logistics and fleet support, not to mention commerce interdiction such practiced by German and US submarine forces, was a huge factor in their frankly inevitable defeat.
  
  Kennedy is clearly Anglo-centric in his approach ... Great Britain at sea is his interest. Thus the Atlantic theater (including Norway, Bismarck and the Baltic) is largely confined to the North Atlantic (the prime geographic focus of British efforts) with an occasional nod to the south Atlantic convoys (mostly a US effort) supporting the African landings an subsequent amphibious operations in the Mediterranean. US participation in the battles of the North Atlantic are barely recognized. Similarly the Herculean convoy battles of the Mediterranean theater (virtually exclusively British) are more attended to than the Pacific campaign – a vast US theater of war. He gamely draws little distinction in the Pacific between the US forces and the British naval contingent even though the later was late to the party and in limited numbers until the after the defeat of Germany. Nevertheless in examining the Pacific theater he writes extensively of American navies and operations and actions because that is what they were – from the same overall perspective of geography, position, industry and technology, and doctrines that is the theme of the book. So I found that mildly annoying, but understandable given his heritage.
  
  Other annoyances include some odd anomalies that perhaps are editing oversights. For example, discussing the emergence of a new weapon system, he writes “... and this took less than two years (November 1943 to July 1944).” It appears to me that if so, that actually took less than one year. Another nit-picky example, he refers to a US submarine as a “U-boat.” Technically, any submarine is an Undersee Boat but “U-boat” is a term so inextricably and definitionally bound to German subs that it is jarring used otherwise.
  
  And finally, the illustrations used are just not what I would have liked. The artist whose work comprises all of the illustrations in the book was renowned in his field, and a colleague and friend of the author’s so again, I understand the homage paid. But the art is hazy – akin to impressionist watercolor work, lacking definition and detail. It is very good art and I actually like it, but not so much for illustrating a history of victory at sea – more suitable for a coffee table book of naval art of the World War II era. But, annoyances aside, this is a book well worth the read, and a macro perspective and analysis of the Allied victory at sea that is cogent and stimulating.
• 
  Ted

  I believe that there was too much emphasis on the war in the Atlantic in this book. The book certainly has an Anglo slant. There is very little discussion of the participation of the U.S. Navy in the North Atlantic. I objected to Kennedy calling U.S. submarines "U-boats". I was not as enabored as others here by the book's artwork. Most of these water colored prints were too fuzzy and blurred for my taste. Don't expect much detail in the description of sea battles, for the most part they are but brief summaries. The Battle at Midway is described in five short paragraphs.
  
  I do agree with Kennedy that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were necessary to bring the war with Japan to an end and in doing so saved lives. Continued air bombings of its cities and strangling of food and supplies by an Allied naval blockade would have resulted in hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of more Japanese deaths.
• 
  Jim

  An excellent and in-depth look at the war at sea from both the Axis and Allies points of view. Mr. Kennedy describes both the strengths and weaknesses of all navies involved and provides explanation as to how the outcomes might have been different if actions were adjusted even slightly. Well worth the time investment to read.
• 
  David Readmont-Walker

  Excellent
• 
  William Peace

  This history book includes a remarkable series of fifty-five paintings of warships by Ian Marshall who was a fellow and past president of the American Society of Marine Artists. The paintings are a valuable addition, bringing the text alive.
  
  Written in five parts and three appendices, it begins with stage-setting background of the development of the six navies involved in WW II: USA, the UK, Germany, France, Italy and Japan. There is also a discussion of sea power in the sweep of history, and an overview of geographic and economic considerations. Kennedy argues, persuasively, that geography and economics favoured the United States, while both factors worked against the Axis alliance.
  
  The next four parts cover the periods: 1939-42 (the early years, which favoured the Axis); 1943 (the critical year); 1944-45 (triumph of the Allies); and Aftermath and Reflections. In these sections, Kennedy does not describe the sea battles in detail. Rather, he describes the situation, the strategies, the combatants, and the results materially and psychologically. Even without the real time detail, one has a feeling for what the battle was like.
  
  The principle point which Kennedy is making in this book is that once the US decided to enter the war, the conclusion was inevitable principally because of the economic potential of the country. It had access to all the natural resources it needed; at the end of a major recession, the human resources were available; and the financial resources were made available by wealthy, patriotic individuals. Geography also favoured the US in the sense that none of the conflict came within its borders.
  
  In the appendices, there are examples of American production of weapons. In 1945, the US had a cumulative total of eleven an a a half million tons of warships, and increase of nine million tons since 1941. In 1945, the US had considerably more warships than the rest of the world, combined. Similar gains were achieved in aircraft and tank production. Kennedy argues that this increase in productivity resulted in the US becoming the world leader with about 50% of the world's GDP.
  
  This book makes clear that, given the right resources and motivation, major changes in the world order are possible in a short time period.
• 
  Jarrett Bell

  Kennedy masterfully explains the role of economics, strategy, tactics, and geography on the war at sea. Kennedy begins the book with a fascinating review of each major power’s naval situation entering the war—their strengths, weaknesses, geographic dispositions, and more. What stands out from this is how much can change in only a short few years. At the start of the war, the Royal Navy remained the most powerful navy in the world, with naval bases spanning from England to Gibraltar to Malta to Suez and to Singapore. And yet, its nightmare scenario of facing three navies at once—one in the Baltic and north Atlantic, one in the Mediterranean, and one in the Pacific was too much and in the end, the Royal Navy had to sacrifice its position in the Pacific to maintain its control over the sea lanes approaching Great Britain and in the Mediterranean. Kennedy deftly shows how power balances shifted as the war progressed and highlights the role of technology and production. The statistics for American production are staggering. And yet, as Kennedy explains, should not be surprising: while the Axis spent upwards of 25% of their national income on their militaries before WWII, the Allies spent less than 10%, with the US only spending 1.5% (that 1.5% in nominal terms was still more than the 28% Japan was spending—America’s economic potential was just that great!). The Allies had room to grow and grow they did. Fascinating read
• 
  Casey

  A great book, presenting a maritime history of WWII. The author, noted Yale historian Paul Kennedy, explains how the maritime victory of the allied powers was the major fulcrum which created the post-WWII world. The book is a continuation of his previous works. Essentially a detailed case study of his theories on industrial capacity, maritime strength, and great power status. Kennedy emphasizes the importance of the maritime campaigns in both theaters of WWII, lays out the inherent advantages of the allied maritime nations, and describes how economic power translated into military superiority. I appreciated Kennedy’s division of the war into different phases by time rather than geography. His understanding of the strategic links between the Pacific and European theaters point to importance of a global strategic outlook vice regional strategic silos. Highly recommended for understanding WWII as a global maritime struggle.
• 
  Craig Fiebig

  This is an unsurprisingly great piece of history, given the considerable talents of the author, and one replete with all the geeky details naval history nerds enjoy. I happen to be reading The Martin / Parker work, "Armada" and I can't help but be struck by a similar theme. Spanish Admirals were wed to the success of a particular platform, the galleas, in recent prior battles. In WW II admirals loved their battleships. In both cases the preferred platform of the naval leadership proved largely irrelevant in the next conflict. Now, in an era of mutually (US and PRC) undetectable submarines, high-speed torpedoes, and hyper=sonic missiles I can't help but wonder about the efficacy of the multi-billion dollar investments in super carriers. Will the USS Gerald R Ford become the next USS Arizona, doomed to irrelevance minutes from the onset of hostilities?
• 
  Paul

  B: Outstanding overview of the allied victory in the Second World War. A pleasure to read. It is a history not a prescription for how things might go in the future, but one is tempted to ask, could the West do it again? The economies undergirding success in the war have changed drastically as has our capacity to absorb the massive debts incurred to build and support such an endeavor. The recent GAO report
  https://www.gao.gov/assets/730/721511... indicates we are not aligning our economic resources effectively.
  
  Strikingly Kennedy shows that not one but several strategies were required to defeat the Axis and that too closely adhering to one theory may expose weaknesses the enemy could exploit.
• 
  Ronald Golden

  A very interesting look at World War II from the naval aspect. The author examines World War II from the global naval aspect from the earliest days of the war in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean Sea and the Pacific. He describes the geopolitical world before the war and describes how that situation changed as a result of the war. He also looks at the war from the point of view of the economies of the combatants. He compares strengths and weaknesses of the participants and shows how the war, in a few short years changed the global economic and political landscape.
• 
  Keith Yocum

  Extremely comprehensive (too comprehensive IMO) review of the decline of British naval power over the ages, and the corresponding growth of US naval power. Just wish there was less repetitive layering on of fact after fact, detail after detail about this change in naval power...
• 
  Liquidlasagna

  In Victory at Sea, Paul Kennedy demonstrates why he is the world’s leading scholar on naval strategy. For serious students of World War II or naval history, this book is a must read.
  John J. Mearsheimer
  
• 
  Cynthia

  Only four stars because, at times, the narration was a bit too dry and overly wordy. I would have preferred a more action-driven narrative.
• 
  Jordan Schneider

  the man is an all time great, still pitching his fastball in this work
• 
  Thor Toms

  Great description of the war at sea. Lots of stats but not so many that they interfere with the narritive.
• 
  Brock

  A great history of naval power in WW2
  
  Especially discusses the crucial battle of the Atlantic. The American agreement of repair of British ships in American ports as part of the Lend Lease act as critical for an edge for the British. The importance of long range bombers for anti submarine duty in the middle of the Atlantic manufactures by America.