State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Messenger Lectures) by Francis Fukuyama

State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Messenger Lectures) Reviews

• 
  Steve Greenleaf

  The first issue that I should address comes from the fact that that I have posted this book review on my “Steve’s View from Abroad” website. What has this to do with India? While a far cry from the failed states that are the primary focus of this book, India, nevertheless, is a state (or states, as it’s a federal system) that fails to function effectively in many realms. Anytime I speak about India, I almost always mention the lack of basic government services and the effect that this has daily life. Poor roads, poor drainage, poor sewers, poor water and air quality—I could go on (and did with some dinner partners just the other night). I believe that India will gain a measure sophistication and decent quality of life (which includes and transcends a mere increase in GDP) when Jaipur no longer has garbage strewn upon its streets; when the poor living in shanties have found decent housing; and when the middle class has initiated a “Progressive Era” for India to clean-up political corruption and to address its failing infrastructure. India is far from a world-class economy currently, but if it can reach a critical minimum of an engaged middle-class willing to fight the good political fight, it has a future. A lot of work—a lot—remains to be accomplished, but it can happen.
  
  So issues of governance drew me to this work as one reason, but the other is the reputation of Fukuyama himself. Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man, now much maligned, is a very interesting and instructive book. I read it many years ago to great benefit and delight. The benefit and delight came from understanding a train of political thought that I’d never grasped very well before. Plato, Hegel (via Kojeve), and Nietzsche were brought to life in a manner that I’d never before appreciated. The English tradition, with Locke, Bentham, Mill, etc. emphasizes rational, utilitarian man, homo economus. However, this older tradition, going back to Plato and Thucydides (although Plato wanted to crush all human instinct under reason), emphasizes thymos, our human demand for dignity and respect, the kinds of things that the English tradition, at least in economics, tended to downplay if not outright ignore. Fukuyama raised my understanding Hegel’s dialectic of master and slave, something that in a rush toward Marx, too much political theory ignored. For this education alone, Fukuyama’s book was very worthwhile.
  
  The other part of The End of History and the Last Man concerns the growing trend toward liberal democracy in the world, and here’s where people have come down hard on Fukuyama, considering him a failed prophet. However, I don’t recall (sorry, my copy not here with me) that Fukuyama emphasized that we would all become happy, bourgeoisie democrats. What I believe that he did—and on which he has not been rebutted—is to establish that no political system is more appropriate for human affairs than liberal democracy. As a practice, liberal democracy has not swept the field, but as an ideal (non-utopian), who stands as a contender? No other system, I submit, and for this reason, Fukuyama deserves more praise than the easy derision he has received.
  
  The criticism that The End of History and the Last Man has received hasn’t slowed Fukuyama, and he’s gained in prominence. I enjoyed his The Great Disruption and Trust, and well as a number of articles that he’s written. Meanwhile, the Panda (sometimes Hungry, sometimes Inscrutable), during her earlier visit India, was reading his most recent book, The Origins of Political Order (Part 1). She began it with some skepticism but concluded it with approval and assigned it to me to read (my copy awaits me in IC). Thus, when I saw this slender (179 p.) book, I took it up and read it in less than a day. It proved worthwhile, indeed.
  
  Written in 2004 after the invasion of Iraq and our incursion (if that’s the right term) into Afghanistan, it reflects on these experiences as well as the long list of “failed-states” that grabbed world attention in the years following the collapse of the Communism. Put simply, states (governments) serve crucial functions and when they fail (no longer function effectively), people suffer and often die. Fukuyama initially details the function of states and how these functions can vary. For instance, the state in the U.S. is much more limited than European states in the provision of services and policies. Think healthcare, for instance. While thoughts can vary in this regard, a certain minimum number of functions need attention. In addition, Fukuyama devotes a chapter to public administration, which proves to me, again, not only his mastery of a great empirical body of knowledge, but his ability to draw out some of the fundamental theoretical and practical aspects of a topic like public administration.
  
  Fukuyama discusses how public administration is an issue around the globe and identifies its unique problems. For instance, the agency problem, the scope of authority problem, and the motivation problem. Fukuyama criticizes the microeconomics approach to public administration and the institutional approach, at least to the extent that those approaches aren’t augmented by a sociological approach. Fukuyama notes that organizations, or more exactly, the individuals within them, are governed by group norms, personal relationships, leadership standards, and other non-economic motivations (without totally ignoring the economic issues). His example of the armed forces serves perfectly: men and women don’t fight and die for the great pay; they fight and die for each other. (By the way, this applies to terrorists as well. See Scott Atran’s work Talking with the Enemy.) Among our economics-envying social sciences, this may come as news. It shouldn’t, but at least in the current policy-making world, it does. (Economics, in the meanwhile, suffers from a perverse physics-envy.) Everyone should consider this from Fukuyama:
  
  It has been a longstanding dream of the social sciences to turn the study of human behavior into a true science, moving from the mere description to formal models of causation with nontrivial predictive value, based on rigorous empirical observation. This project can be realized more readily in some spheres of human behavior than in others. Markets are susceptible to this kind of analysis, which is why economics emerged as the queen of the social sciences in the late twentieth century. But organizations constitute a complicated case. Individuals in the organizations look out for their narrow self-interests, and to the extent they do, the economist’s methodological individualism provides genuine insight. But to a much greater extent than in markets, norms and social ties affect individual choices in organizations. The effort to be more “scientific” than the underlying subject matter permits carries a real cost in blinding us to the real complexities of public administration as it is practiced in different societies. (123)
  
  Agreed. Thus, theorists like Herbert Simon, James March, and Chester Barnard receive Fukuyama’s use and praise instead of more recent thinkers. In addition, I must note the fascinating account of Japanese public administration after WWII when American “experts” attempted to “fix it”. Amazing.
  
  Finally, Fukuyama addresses the issue of sovereignty, one in which the U.S. (especially the Bush Administration) and other countries often parted ways. To his credit, Fukuyama mentions Robert Kagan, whom I believe has been a critic of Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man. He cites Kagan’s appreciation of the differences between the U.S. and Europe on these issues.
  
  All in all, a short but powerful book. Having now experienced ineffective or marginally effective states (I’ll throw in Cameroon as well), I have a new and greater appreciation of the mundane but crucial work of government.
• 
  Sumaya Shoole

  لماذا أنصح الصوماليين بقرآءة كتاب كهذا، ولا سيما الفصلان الثاني والثالث؟
  سيبدو لنا الكثير مما ورد في هذا الكتاب مألوفاً ، فآذاننا أشبعت بعبارات مثل: (بناء الدولة) (إعادة الإعمار) (تفويض الصلاحية) (المركزية واللا مركزية والفيدرالية) (السيادة) (المجتمع الدّولي) وغالباً ما تثير هذه الموضوعات نقاشات حادة ومحمومة، ونعود للتخوف ضمناً من تأثير سلبي على القبيلة والعشيرة ومصالحها "المقدسة" والواقع أن قرآءة كتاب كهذا سيغيّر من نظرتنا لهذه الكلمات ومفهومها. وسيلاحظ القارئ أن فوكوياما المغرق في الليبرالية حين يتحدث عن عدم نجاح أي من محاولات المجتمع الدّولي حلّ المشكلات الداخلية للدول الضعيفة (التي تعاني من مشكلة في بسط سلطاتها) بالقوة وبأفكار لا تولد من الدّاخل، وممارسة دور الوصي عليها، سيؤكد في جملة لاحقة أن هذا لا يعني أنّ المجتمع الدولي وتدخله ليس مصدر أزما، وهذه الدول تضر بالأمن الدولي من غير أن يمنحنا دليلاً على ملائكية أو خيرية هذه الرعاية الأممية التي حلت محل ما كان يعرف سابقاً ب (الانتداب) أيام عصبة الأمم.
  
  
• 
  Alexandru

  A rather short book on a very large topic. The basics is here with the function of states and why some states fail and various tines in history rendered different results while statebuilding. Still the book only touches the tip of the iceberg, there are many factors that were only mentioned and not dug deep into.
• 
  Almigdad

  لي عليه ملاحظتين : الأولى هو أنه متشرب كلية بالليبرالية - بطبيعة الحال - ويبحث في كيفية تحقيقها على الوجه أفضل ، و هو إذاك يحاول أن يقيم تجارب التصدير السابقة إلى الدول النامية عبر الحروب أو المعونات أو الديون .. إلخ ، ويحاول أن يجيب عن الأسباب التي منعت تلك الدول من أن أن تتقمص النموذج أو تبني "الدولة القوية" كما يقول ..
  
  أما الملاحظة الثانية فهي أنه يطرح فكرة هامة ويركز عليها ، مفادها أنه لا يكفي اقرار توجهات جديدة ناجحة نظرياً (كتحرير السوق مثلاً)، دون وجود مؤسسات قوية فعالة تضمن تنفيذ تلك السياسات والبرامج ، كالبنية الإدارية والتشريعية والقانونية ... إلخ ، وأنه من الممكن جداً في عدم وجود تلك المؤسسات أن يحدث أسوأ السيناريوهات ، فعوضاً عن أن يكون إصلاحاً و تقدماً ، يكون فاتحة خراب ودمار إذا لم تكن الظروف مواتية ومؤسسات الدولة قادرة .
  و لعل الفكرة -مع بعض التحفظ- تفسر عديداً من الحالات في دول العالم النامي والتي حاولت استيراد تلك النماذج ، أو فرض عليها ذلك (العراق وافغانستان على وجه المثال)دون أن يكون ثمة نظرية "علمية" هنا يمكن تطبيقها بحذافيرها (وهي دعوى تأسيسية لدى الكاتب يسعى لإثباتها)و بالتالي دون أن تتم دراسة السياق المناسب في وضعية الدولة وجهازهاالمؤسساتي ، و من ثم السياقات الإجتماعية الخاصة و التي لا يمكن تعميمها.
  
  و على كل حال فإن الكتاب يصنف ضمن كتب الوعي بالعصر ، و كاتبه يطرح أفكاراً ونماذج تفسيرية جديدة تستحق النظر بحق للمشغولين بحال الدول النامية وإقتصاداتها .
  ولصاحبه طريقة جيدة في عرض أفكاره ، فهو يستخدم العدة المنهجية والمنطقية ويستشهد بالدراسات والأرقام و يحيل إلى المراجع ، دون أن يلجأ لتنميق الألفاظ .
  
  كتاب جيد أنصح بقرائته :)
  
• 
  Ted Tyler

  Fukuyama argues that the strength of a government and the scale of its public goods are the most important factors to evaluate when engaging in state-building. He levels fair criticism at the US for not building enough institutions of good governance in Afghanistan, Iraq, Haiti, etc. Fukuyama states that what dooms the US strategy of state-building is the desire to move too quickly. As a result, our interventions under Bush 43 failed because we weakened and dismantled forms of governance that were not replaced with anything viable. Even though he is writing this book in 2003-2004, I Fukuyama is prophetically writing about the issues the US would still encounter nearly 20 years in Afghanistan and approaching that in Iraq. Trillions spent on war and state-building but with nothing to show for it.
• 
  Martti

  Kui raamatus on palju viiteid autori nime ja aastaarvuga ning kasutatakse ladinakeelset väljendit "et al", tekkis mul kerge kahtlus, et olen puhkusele lugemiseks kaasa haaranud tõsiteadusliku akadeemilise töö. Francis Fukuyama on tuntud kui ajaloo lõpu hüpoteesi püstitaja, mis on pärast avaldamist omajagu kriitikat saanud erinevate konfliktide valguses. Eriti praegune Venemaa rünnak Ukrainale.
  
  See akadeemiline töö aga arutleb riigi olemuse üle. Räägib väheke 9/11 järgsetest Afganistani ja Iraagi operatsioonidest ning rahvusvahelistest operatsioonidest, mis üritasid eelneva jama asemel toimivat demokraatlikku riiki püsti panna. Alati ei ole kõige paremini välja kukkunud ja eks see aastal 2022 vaadates tundub veel keerulisem teema pärast Afganistanist väljumist. Kuid tegelikult ei ole see raamat konkreetsusest pakatav manual, vaid pigem üldine arutlus.
  
  Ei teagi, mis teadusharu alla see arutlus kuulub, aga midagi reaalset ja mõõdetavat see mõistagi pole. Pigem vist politoloogia, millega mina olen kursis peamiselt Tujurikkuja dokumentaalide vahendusel. Ehk siis pigem mitte palju. Sain nüüd vist väheke rohkem teada ja jagan teiegagi mõnda lõiku.
  
  
  Riikidel on hulk erisuguseid funktsioone, mis võimaldab riikidel kaitsta omandit ning pakkuda inimestele turvalisust, on ühtlasi ka vahend, mille abil riigid võivad konfiskeerida eraomandi ning rikkuda oma kodanike õigusi.
  
  Max Weber (1946) defineeris riiki kui "inimühendust, mis omab legitiimset füüsilise jõu kasutamise monopoli antud territooriumil".
  
  Järgides Aristotelesele omistatud mõtet "valitsemine seaduste, mitte inimeste poolt" loodi kaasaegne põhiseaduslik valitsus ja õigusriik kindla taotlusega piirata riigivõimu teostamisega kaasnevat omavoli. Ometi ei piisa tulemuslikuks riigivalitsemiseks ainuüksi õigusriigist; tõhus valitsus vajab otsustusvõimet, või nagu on kirjas föderalistide alusdokumentides: "energilist võimu teostajat".
  
  Riigi funktsioonid
  
  * Minimaalsed funktsioonid
  ** Avalike hüvede pakkumine
  *** riigikaitse, seadused ja korrakaitse omandiõigused
  *** makromajanduslik juhtimine
  *** tervishoiu-teenused
  
  ** Võrdsuse edendamine
  *** vaeste kaitse
  
  * Vahefunktsioonid
  ** Välismõjudele reageerimine
  *** haridus, keskkond
  ** Monopolide ohjamine
  ** Hariduse ebakohtade reguleerimine
  *** kindlustus, finantsregulatsioon sotsiaalkindlustus
  
  * Aktivistlikud funktsioonid
  ** Tööstuspoliitika
  ** Rikkuse ümberjaotamine
  ...
  
• 
  Appu

  "Government is the problem"-, Ronald Regan famously said in his first inaugural address. A trend towards smaller states began, reversing the welfare state model that came following the end of the 2nd World War. This small state mantra got canonized as the "Washington Consensus". India also adopted this model in the early 90s giving up its nearly half century-long experiment with socialism.
  
  Fukuyama reminds us that states, with their ability to provide order, security, law, and property rights made possible the rise of the modern world. So states cannot be dismissed as a problem. He distinguishes between two attributes of states: scope of state activity and capacity or strength of state institutions. Affluent countries have states that are limited in scope but with very strong institutions. On the other end of the spectrum are failed countries, which have states with very limited scope and also weak institutions. So state-building projects, such as undertaken by America in Iraq and Afghanistan, should seek to create states that are small yet powerful.
  
  How can you build effective state institutions? The classic solution suggested by the discipline of Public Administration is to build clearly defined hierarchies with rules of conduct. Fukuyama argues that this is not enough. He makes a case for infusing public institutions with strong ethical norms and national ethos.
  
  This is altogether a very insightful book. The downside is that at times it reads like a literature review.
• 
  やみ に

  Хэрвээ ном нь 2021 онд бичигдсэн байсан бол үнэхээр л энгийн ном байх байлаа. Ном дээр байгаа утга агууллага санаанууд Либерал бодлого капиталын илүү өргөн дэлгэрүүлсэн байдлаар буюу хувааж ашиглах, эргэлтэнд хурдан оруулах гэх мэт энгийн мэт болсон ойлголтуудтай өнөө үед мэдээж шүү дээ гэж бодогдохоор, гэвч 2004 онд бичигдсэн эл ном нь тухайн үед онцгой үзэл санааг хэн ч мэдээгүй байхад гаргаж ирсэн нь олны сайшаалыг хүртээх байсан биз. Тэр их олон санааны иш таталтуудыг хараад байхад зохиогч маань олон номыг уншиж нэг урсгалдаа чин үнэнчээр итгэн эргэцүүлэмж гэхээс илүү батламж болгон бичиж байгаа юм шиг санагдаж байна.
  
  Төрийг төвхөнүүлэхийн тулд мөн түүнийг урт хугацаанд товхинуулахын тулд нийтийн хариуцлага нийтийн эрх ашиг тусгагдах хэрэгтэй. Мөн тодорхойлж хэлэхэд, нийтийн шаардлага юм. Нийтийн шаардлагыг институц буюу байгууллага, хамгийн сайн аргаар мөн, шаардлага болон бусад зүйлсийг тодорхойлон шийдвэрлэж байх нь одоогийн хамгийн сайн арга ажээ.
  
  Сулхан төр нийтийн захиргааны хар нүх юм.
  
  Байгууллагын удирдлагын хамгийн дээд эрх мэдлийг хамгийн мундагт нь гэхээс илүү тухайн асуудлаар хамгийн их мэдээлэлтэй хүнээр гаргуулж байх нь хамгийн зохистой шийдвэр юм. Мөчир бүрт гаргах ёстой шийдвэр бий, мөчир бүрт хамгийн их мэдээлэлтэй хүн бий. Тухайн тухайн шийдвэрээ гаргачихвал, хариуцлагыг сайжруулж төвлөрөлийг сааруулан, хяналтыг нэмдэг. Учир нь төлөөний хүн хувьдаа ашиг сонирхол бүхий зүйл хийхгүй.
  
  Төлөөлөгчийн зардал Jensen Meckling 1976
  Төлөөлөгчийг тогтоон барих, хүсээгүй зүйлийг нь хийлгэсний төлөөх, алдааг нь залруулах алдаа зэрэг нь ордог.
  
  Зарим эрдэмтэд менежер нь зан төлвөөрөө удирдагддаг гэж үзсэн бол зарим эрдэмтэд хоёр туйлт харилцаа гэж үзсэн.
  
  Нийгмийн ялгаатай секторуудыг хянах боломж ялгаатай
  
  Өвөрмөц байдал Үйл ажиллагааны багтаамж их байхад хянах боомж их учир нь нийгмийн олон төлөөллийг ялгалгүй үйл ажиллагаа явуулдаг.
  
  Өвөрмөц байдал болон үйл ажиллагааны хүрээнээс үр дүнг хянах хэцүү 75 ху
  
  Сайн засаглал болон сайн лидерүүд нэг нэгнийгээ нөхөж чаддаг ч хоёулаа байх нь урт хугацааны шийдэл юм.
  
  Байгууллагад сайн засаглал зан төлвийг бий болгож чадвал энэ нь нийт нийгэмд эерэг тусгал, систем болж хувирдаг.
  
  "Хүний бус хуулийн засаглал" - Аристотель
  
  Хуулиар удирдагчаар удирдуулан улсууд цэргийн командлал болон мөнгөний бодлогыг хуулиар нарийвчлан тогтоогоогүй байдаг учир эрх мэдлийн хоёр том үзүүр буруу хүний гарт орох нь аюул тарих тохиодол бий.
  
  Аж үйлдвэр болон мэдлэг чадвартай түшмэд авлигад авталгүй байваас олигтой хөгжөөгүй хөрөнгийн зах зээлийг мэдээлэл дутуу байсан ч ав явьж чадсаар байх болно.
  
  Харин буруу гарт орвол хөрөнгө оруулалтын эх үүсвэрийг ус төрийн дэмжлэгтэй бүлгүүд авч эсвэл анд нөхөд хамаатан саданруугаа хийдэг байна.
  
  Байгууллагад харьяалагдаж байгаа хүн байгууллагаараа нийгмийг төсөөлдөг.
  
  Байгууллагад бодлого хэвшсэн бол хүчтэй хяналтыг сулруулж болно.
  
  Байгууллагын оройлогч нь хүн хоорондын оройлогчоос ялгаатай. Оройлогч нь эн тэргүүнд эрхэм зүйлийг хөхиүлэн дэмжигч байна.
  
  Байгууллагын уламжлал хэлбэр хэм хэмжээ дээр тогтож байсан бол орчин үед урамшууллын хэлбэрлүү шилжжээ. Байгууллагадаа хүртэл хохирол учруулахгүй байх нь байгууллагын шилдэг ёс зүйн төлөөлөгч гэх мэт...
  
  Тодорхой нэг удирдагчийг гаргаж ирж түүний нүүр царайгаар нийт институц улсын байр байдлыг илэрхийлэх нь орчин үеийн гадаад харилцааны тренд. Амархан зайлуулж болох том давуу талтай учраас...
  
  Талууд хөдөлсөнөөр өөр өөрийгөө өөрийн гараар тодорхойлно.
• 
  THANA

  عن الكاتب:
  فرانسيس فوكوياما. فيلسوف، عالم اجتماع سياسيّ، وأستاذ جامعي أمريكي.
  -
  عن الكتاب:
  تنويه: العولمة، الليبرالية -التي تتنافى كثير من مبادئهما مع الدين الإسلامي العظيم- هي أهم سمات الكتاب.
  -
  بناء الدولة.. ما هو؟ في جوهره هو خروج على الإجماع الاقتصادي والسياسي السائد.
  ويعرفه فوكوياما على أنه: تقوية المؤسسات القائمة وبناء مؤسسات جديدة فاعلة، وقادرة على البقاء والاكتفاء الذاتي.
  يتناول الكتاب مصطلح "الخصخصة" كمصطلح رئيسي فيه، وتعريفه:
  "الخصخصة هي عملية تحويل كلي أو جزئي لملكية رأسمال الشركات العمومية إلى القطاع الخاص، عن طريق البيع المباشر أو بوساطة الأسواق المالية، ونقيضها هو التأميم." المصدر: الجزيرة نت.
  وكما سيُفهم من التعمق في القراءة، هو الحلّ البديل المؤقت عند غياب دولة المؤسسات والقانون.
  (لماذا تسعى الدول القوية اقتصادياً إلى نزع السيادة عن الدول الضعيفة ودول الصراعات؟)
  سؤال مهم يخطر ببال كثيرين نجد إجابته في مقدمة الكتاب:
  مفهوم الجواب من ص14:
  الليبراليون الجدد يؤمنون بأن توفر أسلحة الدمار الشامل بأيدي هذه الدول أو بأيدي جماعات داخلها، يشكل تهديداً غير مسبوق في تاريخ العالم الغربي، [الليبرالي] مقتنع بأن هذا التهديد الإرهابي يبرر منطقياً وليبراليا اعتماد الغرب مبدأ الحرب الوقائية والاستبقائية؛ ويسعى الغرب لإيجاد نظام عالمي، يبيح للغرب حق الاستيلاء على حكم تلك الدول لأسباب "أمنية" أو "إنسانية".
  -
  "يعتبر فوكوياما ضعف الإدارة العامة لب أزمة التنمية التي تعيشها الدول النامية، ويعتبر الشروط الظالمة التي يفرضها البنك الدولي نوعا من الحب القاسي الذي ثبت فشله."
  تغيرت نظرتي للبنك الدولي بمجرد قراءة هذا الجزء، إذاً، لم يكن القصد من فكرة البنك الدولي تدمير اقتصاد الدول النامية، كان القصد عكسياً لكنه فشل، افتقر للحكمة، إن صحّ القول. وربما.. كان هذا هو القصد الأول خلف الستار؟ من يدري.. لكن في النهاية، الكتاب به اعتراف بفشل فكرة البنك الدولي. يُنظر ص19-21.
  -
  قبل قراءتي للكتاب كنت أرى أن الدولة الضعيفة ليست سوى مشكلة تؤذي وترهق أفراد شعبها فقط، أو بشكل أوسع أفراد شعبها والشعوب القليلة المجاورة، ثم تبين لي أن الأمر أوسع وأشمل بكثير، ضعف دولة ما يؤثر على الغالبية العظمى من العالم، الفقر، المرض، العوز المناعي المكتسب، الإرهاب، المخدرات، الجهل.. وغير ذلك مما يمكن تصديره بقصد أو دونه إلى دول أخرى، هذا يشكل خطراً على ما هو أوسع وأبعد نطاقاً من تلك الدولة الضعيفة لوحدها...
  -
  المصطلحات والأسلوب ليسا بالسهلين، تحتاج قراءة الكتاب لجهد وتركيز.
  
  
• 
  Abdul Raheem

  Key Lessons from “State Building”
  
  1.      Unclear Goals
  2.      Lack of Accountability
  3.      Badly allocated discretion
  
  Unclear goals
  
  The first problem that the public sector faces regarding its organization is vague goals. Organizations don’t always have delegate specific goals the right way. In theory, principals should delegate activities to subordinates which they should execute.
  
  Nonetheless, in reality, organizations rarely function in this manner. Goals and tasks move all over the organizational chart.
  
  Often, organizations give authority to people who are more functionally oriented, instead of hierarchically. These problems are rooted in the past, but no one has solved them yet.
  
  Lack of Accountability
  
  Public organizations do not use profit as a metric for their success.
  
  They put attention to another variable: service outputs. These outputs differ in specificity and transaction volume. Specificity refers to the possibility to measure the output.
  
  Transaction volume, on the other hand, shows the number of processed transactions. Some services, however straightforward they might be, are almost impossible to measure.
  
  Badly Allocated Discretion
  
  Often, organizations should delegate decision making and discretion. The more judgment the task requires, the more of them they should appoint. The problem is that delegating authority is risky.
  
  In government and public organizations, delegating authority to federal officials may bring forth a patronage network. Furthermore, the need and acceptable rate of delegated discretion are different for different cultures. For all these reasons, there is no general rule about how much delegation is enough.
  
  In the end, it all comes down to taking the right action in a specific situation.
• 
  Steven Peterson

  Francis Fukuyama, in an important slender volume, sees nation building as the process of helping to ". . .create self-sustaining democratic political institutions and robust market-oriented economies. . . ." He draws a critical distinction between "nation building" and "state building." The former refers to ". . .creating or repairing all the cultural, social, and historical ties that bind people together as a nation." The latter, in contrast, aims at ". . .creating or strengthening such government institutions as armies, police forces, judiciaries, central banks, tax-collection agencies, health and education systems, and the like." The two are not the same--but are interdependent one upon the other.
  
  Fukuyama argues that the process must proceed in two stages: first, the country must be stabilized, with the provision of humanitarian assistance, rebuilding of infrastructure, disaster relief, and economic development. Only then, second, comes the building of self-sustaining political and economic institutions that can support competent democratic governance and economic growth. Thus, nation building involves stabilization of ties that bind a people together as well as supporting the construction of government institutions.
  
  This is a real challenge and not one that can be done easily, without much effort and care. In short, eny effort at democratic nation building must be done with patience and making sure that prerequisites are in place before trying to introduce the full regalia of democracy.
  
• 
  M. Ashraf

  فرانسيس فوكوياما، أول قرائتي ليه كانت بكتاب "نهاية التاريخ"
  
  The End of History and the Last Man
  و تقريبا أشهر كتبة ،و لأن عادة كتب العلوم السياسة دي بقراها بلغتها الأصلية عشان مشاكل الترجمة، معاني كتيير بتضيع في النص ،و القصد من الجملة و أو كلمات معينة، لكن للأسف ملقتش المرة دي الكتاب بلغته :/ :/ :/ فأضطريت اضطرارا على قراءته مترجم و أظن الترجمة دي ترجمة محترمة، مظنش كان فيه نقل غير صادق للكلمات أو الجمل و لكن نقلها زي ما هي كدا أظن يعني، من شوية جملة و كلمات في بعض المواضع تحس ان الانجليزي بتاعها أحسن :) :) ما علينا :)
  
  :) كتاب حلو و بيتكلم عن بناء الدول، الفرق بين بين الدول و بناء الأمم في نبذه و تقريبا في كتاب تاني عن النقطة دي :) في حتت زي اليابان ، أفغانستان، البوسنة ، الاسباب لكدا- نظرة امبريالية كتيرة للموضوع من أمريكا و أوروبا - // المؤسسات الاقتصادية و البروقراطية و طرق لحل المشاكل و حاجات كتير :) كتاب يتقرا يعني للي بيحب يقرا في السياسة :)
  
  
  
  مقتطفات + اسقاط على الوضع الحالي :)
  
• 
  Ali Hassan

  This book has three main parts.
  The first lays out an analytical framework for understanding the multiple dimensions of “stateness”—that is, the functions, capabilities, and grounds for legitimacy of governments. This framework will explain why, in most developing countries, states are not too strong but rather too weak.
  The second part looks at the causes of state weakness, particularly why there can be no science of public administration despite recent efforts by economists to establish one. This lack sharply limits the ability of outsiders to help countries strengthen their state capacity.
  The final part discusses the international dimensions of state weakness: how instability is driven by state weakness, how weakness has eroded the principle of sovereignty in the international system, and how questions of democratic legitimacy on an international level have come to dominate disputes between the United States, Europe, and other developed countries in the international system.
• 
  Puri Kencana Putri

  The book is not bad at all, particularly to bring such a brief explanation on how to shape the art of state building, how can a state be failed or having a wrong turn to be weaken. Fukuyama underlines that weak states have posed threats to international order because they are the source of conflict and grave abuses of human rights. In the end of the book he strongly supports to turn back to sovereign-nation state by trying to understand how to make it solid and effective. Yet, bring back the security issue on the table shouldn't be the only answer. And there is still a big gap to operationalise the notion of soft power, though there are some windows to use it in order to reshape the notions if governance and world order in the 21 century.
• 
  Barka Ahmed Kashtu

  I consider this book as a gift to the rulers, particular those who are leading developing countries, as a Libyan young man Im seeing tragically how domestic leaders are destroying everything without any sense of responsibility, despite we no longer believe on their intention to make our lives better. This book is a perfect guidance and illustrates some previous experiences for instance, Japanese experience after 19945, and other Eastern Asian countries. I sent this book to a friend who works in our parliament and he promised to give it to some pms and some ministers he closely in touch, and I hope from my deep it catches their attention and read it in intention to improve their performance. Finally I say Thanks Francis for this gift
• 
  Annas Jiwa Pratama

  Randomly picked up this gem from Dad's shelf. It's very intro-ey on its titular topic but got me intrigued on the historical and political aspect of state building (which is to say it presented the many failed attempts at interventions, mostly by the US). It feels a bit bashy against economists, which means this is the second book of the year I read that spends a lot of its pages on that.
  
  Favorite quote:
  "..reinventing a wheel that had been first rolled out over fifty years previously.
  Such is the nature of progress in the social sciences."
• 
  أسدالدين أحمد

  أكره التنظير الاكاديمى بتلك الطريقة
  
  كنت أظن أن فرانسيس سيحاول أن يعتدل ويبتعد عن نظرياته الخيالية بعد مالاقاه من مجابهة فى كتاب نهاية التاريخ ولكن مع الآسف
  
  مازال يطيح بالنظريات دون أى اسانيد وكأنه يملك آلة استشراق للمستقبل
  
• 
  Kuszma

  Ez a könyv bizonyos tekintetben logikus folytatása A történelem végé-nek. Fukuyama abban azt állítja, hogy a társadalmak fejlődésének logikus végpontja a demokrácia, az Államépítés-ben pedig arra reflektál, hogy amennyiben ez így van, akkor miért csődölnek be rendszeresen azok az államok, amiket a nyugatiak (gyakran akaratuk ellenére) kirángatnak a maguk autoriter, elnyomó rezsimjeik alól, és megkísérelnek bennük valami demokráciaszerűséget felépíteni. Válaszában mindenekelőtt kifejti az állami intézmények működésének sajátosságait, majd a szervezetelméleti kutatások gazdag tárházára támaszkodva kifejti, milyen nehézségek árán lehet átültetni őket idegen talajba. Meg hogy miért sorvadnak ott el szinte kivétel nélkül. Fukuyamának erre természetesen több válasza is van, de a legtöbb aköré csoportosul, hogy az amerikai decentralizált föderalizmus merev alkalmazása a nem-demokratikus államokra lebontja azok már meglévő intézményeit. Így végső soron hatalmi űrt hoz létre, amiben könnyen megteremnek az olyan kártékony gyomok, mint a korrupció és a terrorizmus. (Csak hogy a mezőgazdasági hasonlatoknál maradjunk.) Kissé primitívre lefordítva a konklúziót: vannak országok, akik elég jók a demokráciához, és vannak, akik még nem elég jók.
  
  Ez a kötet természetszerűen szűkebb keresztmetszetet vizsgál, mint A történelem vége, így nem is szól olyan széles olvasóközönséghez. Legnagyobb hibája mindazonáltal az, amit maga az író is leszögez már idejekorán: hogy nem lehet olyan általános javaslatokat tenni a kérdésben, amivel ezek a kínzó problémák egyértelműen feloldhatóak lennének. Ami az egyik közösség problémáira orvosság, az a másiknak méreg – ez nyilván nagyon igaz, de éppen ezért ez a könyv nem lehet több, mint az alapok lefektetése a nemzetépítés jövőbeli tudományához. Nem a Szent Grál, csak egy felhívás annak keresésére.
  
  Amúgy meg kifejezetten aktuális olvasmány, nem pusztán a Közel-Kelet eseményei iránt érdeklődőknek, hanem annak is, akit érdekel az EU és az USA közötti súrlódás gyökerei, amelyek sajátos demokráciaértelmezéseikre vezethetőek vissza.
• 
  Ala Mohsen

  Actually I expected more especially that I keep hearing a lot about Fukuyama however I found this book to be average in quality. Not much new stuff from what I learned in political science and public administration classes. The exception is chapter 3, which offered excellent perspectives to the issue of weak states, interventions and international legitimacy and a differentiation to the US-EU approaches.
• 
  Logan Streondj

  It was pretty good albeit brief book on various methods for improving state formation and which have worked in which contexts.
  Though it falls short of the 21st century part as it doesn't address any of major high probability future crises. Better would have been to name it 1990's state formation, would have been more accurate.
• 
  D

  Almost feels like the author is trying to justify colonialism. And help make it more effective and successful.
  The agent problem part is helpful.
  Will try to read the other two big books by the author. Maybe will feel differently about this one after understanding the author’s framework better.
• 
  WaldenOgre

  在这本书里，比起理论的严谨和深度，福山更关注的其实是现实世界里的政策问题。所以它的优缺点，都源于这一点。
  
  但无论如何，在民主制度和国家构建的复杂互动、对欧洲国家和美国在外交政策及其历史成因的差异性分析、对美国当代外交政策的辩护和反思上，福山依然在这本书里抛出了很多有见地的观察和思考。
  
  至于弱国家的国家能力黑洞和外部援助这部分内容，则尤其适合跟保罗·科利尔的《战争、枪炮与选票》结合起来一起读。
• 
  Marius CEO

  Short read. Not too deep. Not too difficult. Read it in a couple of hours - worth it if you're new to this.
• 
  Nick

  IMA TELL YOU WHAT I THOUGHT ABOUT THIS BOOK.
  
  Soo... Not as controversial as I expected. If all neo-cons were Fukuyama grade instead of Boot or Bush grade, I'd be a bit happier.
  
  First thing I noticed was that a lot of false dichotomies were drawn since he doesn't at all recognize the possibility that non-state institutions can handle things like law, security, or arbitration. His emphasis on strong institutions is warranted, but his assumption that states are the only logical providers of certain institutions is not warranted.
  
  His criticism of the "washington consensus" is good insofar as they seemingly didnt care about institution building, or having a strong legal framework/property rights. However his solution of having state maintained institutional infrastructure is just as silly. However, within the extremely narrow band of modern, quasi-liberal internationalism his prescriptions generally seem to be much more on target than the ones purported by WTO, world bank, IMF, "washington consensus" types. But it still feels like rearranging deck chairs on the titanic.
  
  The points he makes about pre-existing (state and non-state) cultural institutions in foerign countries which differ strongly from Western cultural institutions are great. The mix of self interested motivations and "collectivist" motivations vary in strength and structure across the world. He aptly points out that these differences are major reasons why formal public institution structures or methods fail when planners try to export them from one country to another. However the conclusion he draws from this is that state institutions should be developed by locals (probably with westerners pushing them along) on the basis of local culture, temperament, history, prior institutions, etc. Again, this is probably the best version of the neocon state-building notion, but its still a crappy notion because it assumes that this diversity of institutional structures must always manifest in a state. I see the same analysis and conclude that stateless societies across the world would widely vary based on the aforementioned differences. This is simply too far out of Fukuyama's paradigm to even consider.
  
  Hes a writer who is clearly at least somewhat familiar with public choice theory, libertarianism, and austrian economics. Buchanan, Tullock, Mises, and Hayek are all mentioned. But im not sure how deep his understanding is (not to malign him. it might be deep, but I cant tell from this book). He focouses a lot of energy on attacking public choice theory on the basis of the "homo economicus" premise. He notes that people often serve the collective in spite of their "narrow self interest" due to lots of things including culture, ideology, or simply group dynamic. The (obvious to me) conclusion of this is that as a result of these "altruistic" deviations from "homo economicus", non-state institutions could easily solve things like the "free rider" problem without the need of state institutions of any sort. He instead uses it to show that it is possible to have public institutions without mostly self interested participants who will actually work for the common good.
  
  If people are mostly selfish, so are public employees
  If selfishness can be "broken" into altruism, then that altruism need not manifest itself in state institutions.
  
  Furthermore, because of epistemic problems (which Fukayama acknowledges) its almost impossible for a single person (or firm) to figure out how to balance these two sides of human nature towards the construction of effective institutions. Only a decentralized process can do that. Which flattens out his whole theory and leads us back to anarchism.
  
  The "homo economicus" criticism kind of falls apart if its thrown at an Austrian school tinged version of public choice theory.
  
  So his analysis brings up a lot of good criticisms of existing schools of thought, but is also deeply flawed. The flaws are more apparent when he tries to apply them to policy and ends up sanctioning the invasion and occupation of countries so long as they go about state building HIS way. Which is weird, since his way is so ambiguous that its almost impossible to apply im practice. Why he sanction invading countries in order to state-build, when state-building is not at all understood (by his own admission) is beyond me. Still, hes probably one of the more tempered, and sane neocons.
  
  The book was a very enjoyable read though. The ideas, even when flawed are clearly presented and easy to digest. He also makes use of charts to help people who learn graphically (such as myself). Its lucid and has almost no "slack". Hence, it gets a high rating
• 
  Xiang Li

  开始以为是如何构建国家的作品……原来似乎是在阐述外来者构建国家的正当性……还有 导读是个什么玩意 这套译丛最差的导读？
• 
  May Ling

  Not bad. I like the charts that he uses in the early chapters to describe the ideas that he has of various stages of development. I also think he has numerous cogent point that point towards what is really important vs. what isn't. I like that he isn't so biased towards democracy that he fails to understand the underlying power structures that support such an institution.
  
  I am not 100% certain that he should have veered off course. He starts to try to do a comparative, I think a little too soon before making a real amazing point on his observations of the underlying infrastructure that is required to support the type of development. I think in many ways he confuses the desire to build a state with the power of the state. This is potentially personal opinion, so I only docked him a star.
  
  What I am saying is rather nuanced. I think Fukuyama's point in this book, whether it is his point or not is that the power of states that are weak continues to weaken and that this is the result of a number of things including foreign policy of other nations. The nuance that I point out is that underlying this is an assumption of legitimacy pre-formed. There is something that is not organic that drives hard against the practicality of his point, making such an approach forever doomed to feel incomplete and unable to be achieved.
  
  But soooo close! Really a wonderful work and cross-sectional comparison.
• 
  Francisco

  The work as a whole is a decent summary of the current mainstream of moderate-liberal internationalist thought. It is effective as a review of the salient points of what these positions have to offer in regards to state building. However it does not add anything particularly new, so unless one wants to tread over the basics there is not much point to reading it.
  
  A note must be made on the overreaching "theme". This book was very topical upon publication, but the strong focus that it brings on the Afghanistan and Iraq cases makes it seem rapidly dated. Of course the book is not dedicated to mere theory-crafting regarding intervention in these two countries.