Trust: The Social Virtue and the Creation of Prosperity by Francis Fukuyama

Trust: The Social Virtue and the Creation of Prosperity Reviews

• 
  Rachel Bayles

  Six stars. This book is like the answer to the universe and everything in it. Or at least the last couple of hundred years of history. I can't recall reading a book that so thoroughly clarified why the world is as it is. It should be on everyone's reading list.
• 
  Jay

  Trust: The Social Virtues and The Creation of Prosperity by Francis Fukuyama explores the role of social capital in promoting or eroding economic prosperity. The issue of social capital continues to receive excellent scholarship by many notable social scientists, including Robert Putnam and Charles Murray.
  
  While these authors all note the role of religion in providing a framework for championing civic involvement, Fukuyama most explicitly credits leading Christian thinkers (particularly Max Weber) for advancing a common ethical system among its protestant adherents.
  
  In its broadest sense, Fukuyama defines social capital as society’s ability to work together in groups and organizations for common purposes. It is through reciprocity, moral obligation and man’s duty toward community that well functioning commerce markets are created. Fukuyama adopts and elucidates Aristotle’s view that ethical virtue is mostly the product of habit (ethos) and our moral dispositions are formed as a result of corresponding activities. Fukuyama further argues that our habits are informed by local and national culture, which is heavily shaped by religious virtue through repetition and tradition.
  
  Through Fukuyama’s cross-cultural study, societies with high social trust are able to adopt new organizational forms more readily, stimulating entrepreneurship, innovation and job creation.
  As was advanced by Weber and has been further confirmed within contemporary society by Putnam, members of voluntary organizations hold a deeper degree of commitment to its values and stronger ties with one another than members of compulsory organizations. Seen globally, countries that have vigorous private non-profit organizations such as schools, hospitals, churches and charities are also likely to develop strong private economic institutions that go beyond the family.
  
  Where communities are unable to come together to organize schools, hospitals, businesses or charities, there is a dependence on external centralized sources of authority such as government or the church. In such a society, people will fear and distrust the government while simultaneously believing in the need for a strong state to control their fellow citizens. Furthermore, low trust societies with weak institutions tend to have higher participation within organized crime.
  
  Social capital has a significant impact on the vitality and scale of economic organizations. Where private firms are small, weak and family based, the state is forced to intervene to maintain employment by subsidizing large, inefficient public sector companies.
  
  Fukuyama cites China as an example where the family plays a central role among social structures with a corresponding weakness of non kinship-based organizations. Within these societies, the industrial structure consists of small family businesses networked together in webs of interdependence.
  
  Fukuyama links the prevalence of the Confucian worldview with its emphasis on five localized social relationships (ruler-minister, father-son, husband-wife, elder-younger brother, friend-friend), along with cultural duties in lieu of personal rights (as emphasized in western societies) as explanatory factors undermining social capital within China. He asserts that traditionally too much emphasis has been placed on a strong family structure which has weaken the bonds among people who are not related to one another and prevented the emergence of associational life based on something other than kinship.
  
  Fukuyama presents a well researched argument to support his view that modern institutions are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for modern prosperity. As leading academics are uncovering 20 years after the publication of Trust, economic and broad-based household flourishing requires certain social and ethical habits if it is to work properly.
  
• 
  محمد باباعمي

  هو كتاب لصاحب نظرية "نهاية التاريخ"، ينحو فيه منحى إنسانيا مغايرا تماما لما ألفناه من داروينية ونيتشوية وميكافيلية في مؤلفاته الأخرى؛ فهو يدافع هنا عن أن الثقة هو المكون الاقتصادي الأهم، وتأتي بعده الثروة والإدارة وغيرها
• 
  Kuszma

  Fukuyama az a fajta gondolkodó, aki nagy eszmei fúziókra törekszik – ezt tette már A történelem végé…-ben is, és ezt teszi a Bizalom-ban is. Ezúttal a kultúrtörténetet és a gazdaságot kísérli meg összepároztatni, meglehetős sikerrel. Könyve némiképp Weber könyvének újragondolása, annyi különbséggel, hogy Fukuyama nem a vallásban véli megtalálni azt a titokzatos összetevőt, ami egy ország gazdaságát működőképessé teszi, hanem a kultúra egészében. Ilyen értelemben fityiszt mutat a neomerkantilistáknak, akik szerint elég az ázsiai módszereket nyugati talajba plántálni, és máris dől a lé – felhívja a figyelmet arra, hogy a kínaival meglehetős hasonlóságot mutató eljárások például Dél-Amerikát konkrétan a gazdasági csődbe taszították, tehát élhetünk a gyanúperrel, hogy ami az egyik helyen működik, az a másik helyen (megfelelő kulturális alapok híján) nem. Arról nem is beszélve, hogy „ázsiai” módszer nincs – egymástól teljesen elütő ázsiai módszerek vannak.
  
  Hadd jegyezzem meg gyorsan: ez a könyv ellenáll az ukmukkfukk leegyszerűsítéseknek*. Pedig már maga a cím is arra csábít, hogy leszögezzük: az emberek közti bizalom a kulcsa a gazdasági sikernek, ennyike, kalap-kabát, mehetünk haza. Ez természetesen igaz, de mégsem ilyen szimpla. Az világos, hogy az állampolgárok együttműködésre való hajlama (ami jellemzően civil kezdeményezésekben és egyesületekben nyilvánul meg**) általában jól jelzi, milyen gazdasági teljesítőképességre számíthatunk egy adott ország esetében. Erről még aligha lehetne 500+-os könyvet írni. Meglepőbb állítás, de belegondolva logikus, hogy a család és a vallás szerepét túlhangsúlyozó államoknak sem terem babér a fukuyamai rendszerben – hisz mindketten könnyen ellenfeleivé válhatnak a rajtuk túlnyúló innovatív szerveződéseknek***. És hát az sem mindegy, hogy egy bizalom horizontális, avagy vertikális. Az első ugyanis az azonos „osztályba” tartozók közötti szolidaritást erősíti, és gyakran a magasabb vezetőséggel való engesztelhetetlen szembenálláshoz vezet, a második viszont együttműködésre késztet vezetőt és vezetettet – mint a japán keirecu-csoportokban megfigyelhetjük. Ugyanakkor – ami szintén jelzi a fukuyamai elmélet összetettségét – ez a fajta bizalom mégsem teljesen egyenlő a toleranciával, vagy az általános értelemben vett segítőkészséggel, hiszen egyik eleme épp a felsőbb szintekhez való lojalitás, ami például a II. világháborús Japán (és Németország) ún. „hősiességében” is komoly szerepet játszott. Mindenesetre a Bizalom új kontextusban mutatja meg azt, amit egyesek elintéznek annyival, hogy zsidó/szabadkőműves/bilderberges összeesküvés – holott egyszerűen csak arról van szó, hogy ha egy közösségben nagyobb a spontán társulási készség (ami jobbára kulturális adottság), akkor lényegesen jobban képes kiaknázni a magas szintű együttműködést feltételező piacgazdaság lehetőségeit.
  
  Nem mindig szórakoztató könyv ez. Ugyanis nagyjából 2345 dolog jut eszembe csak e percben, ami élvezetesebb, mint a csébolok (dél-koreai vállalatkonglomerátumok) működéséről olvasni. Időnként volt olyan érzésem, hogy minek vagyok benne, hiszen már az előszóból világos, mire akar kilyukadni – de mindig kibont egy új témát, gazdagítja az eredeti állítást, vagy egyszerűen csak alátámasztja azt, és ettől az ember azt érzi (ha van türelme hozzá), hogy lassacskán, szépecskén egyre okosabb lesz. Nem minden elemében értek egyet vele (ami nyilván egészséges hozzáállás), a paternalista hagyományok gazdaságra gyakorolt hatásainak negatív hozadékát talán bővebben is kifejthette volna, de összességében példaszerű elemzés, ami számos ponton továbbvihető****. Provokatív, okos, kifinomult. Fukuyama pedig az egyik legérdekesebb kortárs gondolkodó: a társadalomtudomány popsztárja.
  
  * Jelzem, A történelem vége… is ellenállt, de ez nem igazán zavarta az értelmezőket, hogy mégis leegyszerűsítsék.
  ** E kezdeményezések hiánya, illetve az állampolgári aktivitástól való távolságtartás (ami, jelzem, nem összeegyeztethetetlen a folyamatos pofázással) egyébként elég erős oka annak is, hogy Magyarország miért tart ott, ahol.
  *** Ugyanakkor az önkéntes vallási társulások („szektásodás”) paradox módon jó indikátorai lehetnek egy társadalom együttműködésre való hajlamának, mint ahogy a családok vállalkozó hajlama is könnyen felpörgetheti a gazdaságot a kis- és középvállalkozások tekintetében. Hogy még bonyolítsuk.
  **** Külön érdekes a másik nagy művel való összevetés, a Bizalom ugyanis számos ponton árnyalja, ugyanakkor továbbgördíti annak megállapításait, és egyben jelzi a róla való leegyszerűsítő gondolkodás tarthatatlanságát.
• 
  James

  I do not subscribe to neoliberal economics inasmuch as I understand economic policy (I'm a lit major and the math frightens me), but this book has been recommended to me, and so for the purpose of better understanding the neoliberal argument I shall begin to read it. Before reading it, though, I can cite at least an appreciation for Fukuyama in that he appears more complex than some of his other peers.
  
  Chapter 1:
  
  I'm already hopping mad. I read with an open mind, meaning that I read, but I am aware of my prejudices already.
  
  Page 3:
  "end of history." There has been some debate as to the credibility of Fukuyama's claim, namely with regard to his understanding of Hegel. I have not read the book that deals with this quote specifically, though.
  Page 4:
  1. Fukuyama makes a number of assumptions about public and international assumption of neoliberalism. The world's nations have apparently adopted neoliberal economics and dismissed Keynesianism, he claims. Yes, perhaps this is true, but the world's developing nations have a gun to their head, and that gun happens to be the combined force of the WTF, IMF and World Bank. Each is presently overrun by neoliberals from wealthy nations. These wealthy nations practice protectionism while forcing the developing world to expose themselves to the ravages of free trade.
  2. He also claims that the public rejected the Clinton health care proposal. A counterargument here would be rather long, but I can at least begin by pointing out that this has less to do with public perception of socialized medicine, which is extremely popular, and much more to do with an industry-led misinformation campaign.
  
  Rest of Chapter 1
  
  Okay. I can only read 1-2 chapters a day because I'm reading other books simultaneously. This first chapter is obviously meant to be an intro. Fukuyama elaborates, presenting a few case studies, which I imagine he'll cover in later chapters. I wonder whether he and I will draw separate conclusions about the examples he provides? Secondly, at present, I don't feel comfortable about his generalizations regarding Japan, Germany, and (formerly) the US as nations of high "trust." This is like the old fallacy of Star Trek where Captain Kirk lands on a planet and the entire planet is a single homogenous culture.
  
  P.S. Right now, I'm reading Ha-Joon Chang's Good Samaritans, so it is as if two people are in my living room holding a debate.
  P.P.S. This is meant to be a reading diary, but I notice a counter telling me that I have X characters left. I may have to provide a link to my diary, which I'll keep elsewhere. But where? Well, we'll figure it out when the time comes.
  
  TTFN
• 
  Lauren

  What a long, drawn- out way to say "America is better than everyone else in the world"! This book was endless, drab, poorly- written, and full of overly- broad stereotypes. When I found out that it was written by a former member of the Bush administration, I immediately had my doubts, but I tried to give it a chance, I really did! Having now read the work, I have to wonder if Fukuyama has even spent any time living among-- and getting to know-- the people about whose nations he is so quick to generalize.
  
  I had to read this for a Sociology course, and am still confused as to why, because "Trust" is almost entirely a treatise on the economies of the world, and how they are impacted by the cultural levels of trust and family ties in individual nations. Overall, this book was too long, too dry, and confusingly- written. At first, Fukuyama is all for the successes of, for example, the Japanese economy as superior to others, but then he descends into appallingly closed- minded American nationalism, ending Section IV with this actual quote:
  
  "As this book should have indicated by now, the more one is familiar with different cultures, the more one understands that they are not all created equal. An honest multiculturalism would recognize that some cultural traits are not helpful in the sustenance of a healthy democratic political system and capitalist economy. This should not be the grounds for barring certain people with cultures deemed unacceptable but, rather, grounds for the assertion of positive aspects of American culture like the work ethic, sociability, and citizenship as immigrants move through the educational system" (318- 19).
  Read: I'm not saying all foreigners are uneducated, but they don't know what's good for them, so let's assimilate them into the superior Capitalist system of the US. 'Merica!
  
  I am ashamed that any publisher allowed such a statement to be printed in a book intended for public consumption. As an American myself, I am also ashamed that people like the author of this book are elected to represent my nation on the global stage.
• 
  Eduardo Santiago

  Prosperity (financial, social) is more than just property rights and contract enforcement. Without trust, fundamental human interactions are too costly; that harms human societies. How to measure such an intangible? Fukuyama teaches by example, describing social institutions in high-trust cultures (Japan, Germany, USA) and low-trust ones (China, Southern Italy, France). He analyzes and explains, and warns us -- fifteen years ago! -- of the dangers of relying on trust without building more. He sees the US doing just that ... and that was before Bush II, before Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib, before Iraq/Afghanistan/Libya/whatever is next. Before the current crop of Batshit-Crazy Republicans. And he correctly warns that it's easier to spend trust than to build it. We're in trouble.
  
  Fukuyama holds no punches. He is not afraid to make moral judgments, especially about the tendency of multiculturalists to say that all societies are equally valid. They're not, and good on him for stressing that. To my dismay, though, he defends religion -- especially Protestantism -- as a force for good, in the sense that it is strongly linked to building a work ethic in developing cultures. Ouch. It hurts me to consider that, and I don't know if this "good" is enough to justify the rest of the evils brought on by religion ... but clearly I need to evaluate the possibility.
  
  Sadly, Fukuyama doesn't touch on issues near and dear to me: the effect of urban mobility on trust; reputation management; or biological/evolutionary components of trust (his analysis is historical/cultural, i.e. recent). I'd love to see followup writings taking those into consideration.
• 
  Karthik

  The author talks about social capital's (ability to form social bonds that spans beyond family or kinship) ability to reduce transaction costs in a market economy. Free market economy is based on ability of free willed individuals to enter into contracts with fellow individuals and one of the main functions of the government is to maintain a judiciary that can bring swift justice and offer compensation when such contracts are violated. But free markets in a society endowed with high degree of trust does not need an external force like the government enforce contracts since it comes from within individual members of the society. Hence markets operates like a well oiled machine under such conditions. The book explores several low-trust (France, China and Korea) and high-trust societies (Germany, Japan and US) and shows how the ones with high trust are able to create huge multinational corporations and achieve prosperity better than the low trust society. High trust societies are also better at creating a stronger safety net for individuals. Fukuyama also shows that social capital is not something that can be manufactured through social engineering by governments but has to be cultivated by strong civic societies. Hence social capital takes a long time to build and easily depleted by short sighted governments. Another fascinating observations is around how companies achieve scale in a high trust society like Japan. What's distinct about Japan is that their large corporations are not vertically linked entities. Instead it's a series of small companies integrated tightly. These small companies are independently operated businesses (sometimes owned one governing board). This gives the agility of small companies (in decision making) while also giving financial stability available in big corporations.
  
  Fukuyama concludes by warning about dangers of eroding social capital in the US and also points out that network model that mimics small information sharing nodes as the ideal model to scale corporations!
  
  Fascinating book that will go into my "continuous reading" bookshelf!
  
• 
  Julio Pino

  "You risk your life for family, not strangers. Never forget it".---Sonny Corleone, talking to Michael, THE GODFATHER
  
  "You know, there are times I don't even trust myself".---Josef Stalin, speaking to Nikita Kruschev
  
  After THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN, predicting (or so he thought) the eternal victory of liberal capitalism, Francis Fukuyama turned his attention to an equally challenging question, why are some capitalist economies more successful than others and stay on top of the global food chain? (The failed capitalist states do not interest Fukuyama. As he wrote in THE END OF HISTORY, "what happens in Albania or Burkina Faso does not matter to the course of history".) As an Asian-American and State Department flunk he wonders why East Asian capitalism (China, Taiwan, Japan, Singapore, South Korea) has produced prosperity but still cannot overtake the West, particularly the United States, in income per person, delivery of goods, fast service, minimum of corruption or a social safety net. His answer, long on delivery (this book requires patience) is that these are still family-oriented societies where trust in strangers is low. This means smaller investments in the stock market, businesses that cannot grow beyond a small size (compared to the U.S.), nepotism(yes, even in Communist China; maybe especially in China), and worse, clinging to tradition rather than putting your money on innovation. Capitalism to function at full speed requires trust in others, from business partners to whom you are not related to the government bureaucrat. The twenty-first century is not and will not be "the century of Asia" even if China were to over the U.S. in GDP. Rest assured, America. Thus far, F.F. has been proven right. But, is another capitalist power lurking about? Or, might one of the losers in this global game, much like Germany and Japan in the twentieth century, risk conflict to take down the winners? Stay tuned.
• 
  Jukka Aakula

  This book is important for understanding trust as one basis of the economy.
  
  Having laws optimized for a free market, having mechanisms (like the environmental tax) to solve negative externalities (like pollution) etc. is not enough. Trust is not something which can be created through law or social construction just like that. Creating trust takes time.
  
  Fukuyama goes through interesting case studies of high trust societies and low trust societies. Every society is different and the differences matter.
• 
  Zoltán

  Ez a könyv bizonyos tekintetben egy újabb lépés azon az analitikus gondolatösvényen, amin a szerző A történelem vége és az utolsó ember című elemzésével indult útnak. Míg abban a munkájában olyan kérdések boncolgatásával, mint például az embernek a hegeli értelemben vett "elismerésért folytatott küzdelme", azt a tételt igyekezett megalapozni, hogy eddigi tapasztalataink szerint a kapitalizmus és a liberális demokrácia az emberi társadalmi fejlődés lehetséges legjobb - vagy inkább legkevésbé rossz - és éppen ezért végső fázisa, addig az említett alapokon nyugvó jelen teória legfontosabb célkitűzése annak bemutatása és igazolása, hogy a társadalmak közötti kulturális különbségek milyen mértékben és főleg mely mechanizmusokon keresztül befolyásolják a kiépülő gazdasági rendszer típusát, annak sikerességét, eredményességét, és végső soron az így létrejött nemzetgazdasági berendezkedés kihatását a politikai fejleményekre.
  Azon nyugodtan el lehet polemizálni, hogy Fukuyamának miben van igaza vagy miben téved a részleteket illetően, no meg persze kritikával lehet illetni bizonyos rövid távú prognózisait, melyekre az élet maga ugyan rácáfolt, de melyeket ezen a világon senki sem volna képes pontosabban megjövendölni. Amiért mindenkinek ajánlanám elolvasni a könyvet, az két, egymástól elválaszthatatlan, félig-meddig ok-okozati viszonyban álló kulturális körülmény szerepének megértése: az adott társadalmat alkotó emberek közötti kölcsönös bizalom fokára illetve az emberek társas készségének mértékére gondolok. Fukuyama néhány, szinte lábjegyzetszerűen rövid és mellékesnek tűnő megállapításából minden különösebb nehézség nélkül kiolvasható, miért, milyen tényezők hatására vált kudarccá (és szinte szükségszerűen azzá kellett válnia) a rendszerváltás a posztkommunista országokban, miért mozdult el Magyarország egy személyi kultuszon alapuló, vezér-elvű, túlcentralizált, teljes egészében felülről vezérelt, marakodó és széthúzó ellenzékkel megáldott, abszolút fejletlen és lényegében hiányzó civil társadalmi szervezetekkel "megáldott" társadalommá, de cseppnyi továbbgondolással azon kérdés megválaszolásához is közelebb juthatunk, hogy miért futott vakvágányra az "Arab Tavasz" néven emlegetett társadalmi átalakulás a Közel-Kelet egyes államaiban.
  Készséggel elismerem ugyanakkor, hogy Fukuyamát olvasni nem könnyű. Elsősorban nem azért, mert roppant összetett elképzeléseket bonyolult nyelvezeten vetett volna papírra, hanem sajátos stílusa okán, melyre leginkább a "szájbarágós" jelző illik. A legfőbb argumentumok vagy a végkövetkeztetés premisszái úton-útfélen előkerülnek, itt is és ott is felütik fejüket, többször is kibontásra kerülnek, mintha a szerző az imprinting módszerével akarná biztosítani, olvasója nehogy véletlenül elkalandozzon vagy legalábbis szem elöl tévessze a lényeget. Mindez egy kissé tankönyvízű eszmefuttatásba torkollik, mely azonban csekély ár azért az intellektuális izgalomért, amit Fukuyama meglátásai kínálnak az értő olvasó számára.
• 
  Nelson

  As someone trained in the neoclassical tradition (BA Economics, BYU '05) I must be uber open-minded to read about something hand-wavy like culture in explaining economic phenomena.
  
  This book is great at description, awful at prediction. In fact, which of Fukuyama's predictions have been realized? He prophesied that capitalism and democracy are bound to universally triumph, and here we are fighting the jihadists. Huntington pwned him on that one.
  
  In this book, Fukuyama predicts that countries with high levels of trust (USA, Japan, Germany) are able to create large firms, and large firms are needed in industries such as semiconductors and autos because you can't really operate mom-and-pop semiconductor shops. Countries with low trust (France, Italy, Chinese societies) do not create many firms that extend beyond the family. Fukuyama recognizes that the IT revolution gives advantages to small, nimble firms. So where does the tiebreaker go? It goes to the firms with higher trust, because lower trust equates to a tax you have to pay.
  
  Geez Dr. Fukuyama...people collect cross-national data on trust levels. Why don't you take that, take a country's average firm size, and run a regression. The statistics in your book are nothing but descriptive.
  
  So where are we now? Low-trust societies have already surpassed high-trust Japan in per-capita wealth. Singapore in 1993, Hong Kong in 1997, Taiwan in 2010. Your thesis isn't holding up well.
  
  Nonetheless, Fukuyama does a nice job of explaining why Chinese societies can't create big firms. Learning about how this relationship holds in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, France, and Italy was really really fun.
  
  One final word: Fukuyama is pretty much taking Putnam's
  
  Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community and applying it to economics, the way he took turned Marx on his head.
• 
  TarasProkopyuk

  Взрыв мозга в самом лучшем смысле этого понятия! Невероятно качественная работа автора, которая настолько на��ыщенна данными и экспертной оценкой Фукуямы, что среди них практически не осталось места для того, чего можно было бы назвать лишним. Книга один сплошной концентрат! Обожаю такие! Готов поставить 10 балов из 5!
  
  Эта книга невероятно интереснейшее обозрение предпосылок и принципов которые заложенные в фундаменте самых экономически развитых регионов мира и их народностей не только в экономической плоскости, а и в социальном, политическом, культурном и антропологическом срезе. Такой угол автора не только очень интересный, а и ещё показывает как на на всю эту сложную картину смотрят и должны смотреть подлинные эксперты.
  
  Самое главное, что автор не просто сделал свое обозрение. Френсис Фукуяма показывает, и я даже бы сказал доказывает, почему аспект тотального доверия должен в скором будущем плотно войти в жизнь каждого народа и мира в целом.
  
  Это была моя первая книга Фукуямы. Но после такой книги осознаешь, что не успокоишься, пока не прочитаешь все остальные его книги!
• 
  Lily Borovets

  
  
  Трудовий контракт - це добре, ви знаєте, що робота буде виконана, але якщо між вами є довіра, то робота буде виконуватись більш якісно.
  
  Довіра - змазка соціального механізму. (Кеннет Ерроу)
  
  В маленькій команді людям важче симулювати, ніж у великій. Та коли цінності й інтереси групи стоять вище ніж власні економічні інтереси, тоді все ок. (
  
  Чим більше людям потрібні правила, тим менше вони довіряють одне одному.
  
  Ситуація, коли у громадян немає інтересу до публічних справ, прямий зв'язок із встановленням деспотичного режиму.
  
  Чи є корпорації в державі залежить від втручання держави
  
  Одна з найважчих проблем Польщі, Росії, України в намаганні утворити демократичні інститути не беручи до уваги переваг капіталістичної економіки.
• 
  Shawn

  A multi-disciplinary masterpiece! Modern economies are not solely influenced by capital and infrastructure as technological determinists argue, but also structural peculiarities of families, religion and ethnic interaction as cultural determinists posit.
• 
  Javier Castillo

  Impresionante analisis de el impacto de los valores y el comportamiento social en la economia. Las aristas son multiples,y terribles...
• 
  صالح

  حول دور الفضائل الأخلاقية التعاونية بين أفراد المجتمع في إزدهارهم اقتصادياً
  هذا الكتاب يكشف الضوء عن خطورة المبالغة في العقود القانونية حول التعاملات اليومية حيث تؤدي تدني الثقة بين أفراد أي مجتمع إلى صعوبة و تعقيد التنمية الاقتصادية و كثرة التكاليف المادية الغير ضرورية في صياغة العقود و المستندات بينما يؤدي مستوى الثقة العالي إلى سلاسة في التعاملات الحياتية و من ثم قدرة تنموية مميزة في المؤشرات
  الاقتصادية
  
  الثقة كما عبر عنها المؤلف لا تُفرض من الحكومات على المجتمع بل هي تتشكل عبر قرون من خلال التعاليم الدينية الغير مادية و مايراه البعض غير عقلانية و للاسف هذا المخزون من الثقة قد ينفد بسرعة في حالة الاضطرابات و الحروب و استعادته تتطلب وقت طويل
  
  في الكتاب تحليل رائع لتطور اليابان و ألمانيا الاقتصادي و كيف كان مؤشر الثقة في هاتين البلدين بعكس فرنسا و ايطاليا
  
  أعجبني نقاشه المعمق حول فردانية المجتمع الامريكي و جوانبها مع وجود حالات ظهر فيها بشكل جماعي خلافاً لنموذجه الفرداني
  
  كنت أتمنى أن أقرأ رأيه عن المجتمعات العربية و الاسلامية لكن يبدو أن انعدام الاحصاءات و المعلومات لم تجعله يكوّن تصوراً معتبراً ��و ربما تجاهلها
• 
  Bee

  Takes ages to make a point that can be summarised in 20 pages. The observed economic differences between cultures are there but the "why" that Fukuyama gives to explain said difference hasn't entirely convinced me. Just to illustrate what I mean, I don't see why you couldn't put all that down to different ways of trading capital, taxation, or economic constructions for example, and then infer cultural values from the economic.
• 
  Alex Rauket

  Very interesting discussion on the forming of trust in various societies. Extends into the impact on economic development and contrasts a number of examples. Recommended read for those involved with groups of people trying to accomplish things together - many generalizable ideas. Some discussions are a little dated but still relevant.
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  Umesh Badole

  Trust is very important in personal life. Our all personal relation are on solid foundation if mutual trust exist between us. But here Fukuyama tells us how trust is also important in commercial tranction and cold economic decision. A different perspective. Intersting reading.
• 
  Stacy

  Skimmed through this over a few weeks and found it wasn't really what I was looking for (but I'm not sure what I was looking for). A bit dated, a bit dry....to be expected but I didn't want to invest any more time on it.
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  Mohammed Anas

  اول كتب فرانسيس فوكوياما التي اقرأها ، بداية مشجعة
  الكتاب فوق متوسط الصعوبة ، جميل به الكثير من المعلومات المفيدة والجميلة . ويطرح العديد من التساؤلات حول الكثير من المواضيع في مجالات الادارة والاقتصاد والمجتمع .
• 
  Teodor

  Surprising insight from the '90s that still applies today to business logic.
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  Keven Wang

  Every time I read a book by Fukuyama. It has to be paperback or hardcover. Since I need to take lots of notes