The Machinery of Government: Public Administration and the Liberal State by Joseph Heath

The Machinery of Government: Public Administration and the Liberal State Reviews

• 
  Steve C

  I came at this book as a traditionally trained political philosopher, and perhaps the best compliment that I can pay it is that it enlarged my conception of what political philosophy might be. Academic political philosophy traditionally focuses on the legislative branch of government, while the neighbouring philosophy of law focuses on the judicial branch, leaving the executive branch sorely undertheorized. Heath successfully makes the case that there are interesting questions about the executive branch that don't simply reduce to questions about legislative and judicial government. I skipped chapter 5 and 7, but here are some quick remarks about the remaining chapters:
  
  Chapter 1 ("taking public administration seriously") draws on a number of examples - radon regulation, the FDA in the United States, the organization of the military, the TV show "yes minister" - to show that the executive branch has far greater power and discretion than it is usually credited to possess. Here, Heath argues that any picture which imagines these powers as exercised directly or indirectly by the legislature is sorely mistaken (even if the legislature ultimately has some sort of veto power over it).
  
  Chapter 2 ("a framework for ethics of public administration") raises the question "to whom is the public service is accountable?", and pokes holes in the obvious answer - that it is accountable to the elected government. It describes, in useful and critical detail that sheds light on many familiar but seldom-mentioned mechanisms in liberal democratic states, a liberal and conservative account of how the civil service might be thought accountable to the people. Finally, it makes the case that ultimately the public service is accountable to a set of principles that are latent in any liberal state.
  
  Chapter 3 ("liberalism: from classical to modern") provides one of the best historical introductions to liberalism that I've read - it's a remarkably successful explanation of what many different features of liberalism ultimately have in common with one another. Heath's main argument is (a) that classical liberalism is ultimately an answer to the Hobbesian problem of disagreement, and (b) modern liberalism emerged somewhat inevitably from the problems that classical liberalism itself generated. Even if I don't reread the whole book again, I foresee rereading this chapter.
  
  Chapter 4 ("efficiency and the rise of the welfare state") brings in themes from much of Heath's earlier work to emphasize the (generally underappreciated) role of efficiency in liberal theory. (Here I'm not sure I'm fully persuaded. My main issue is that Heath's sense of efficiency is closely linked to Pareto efficiency. But I'm somewhat skeptical that opportunities to maximize Pareto efficiency, in its strict technical sense, occur anywhere as often as Heath and others claim.)
  
  Chapter 6 ("administrative discretion and the rule of law") makes the case that administrative officials should be allowed to exercise discretion, criticizing political arrangements (particularly in the United States) where that discretion is stymied.
  
  
• 
  Ruben Nicolas

  Good content, but not all chapters are as coherent.
• 
  Rennie

  Erudite and dense. The bureaucratic fiasco related to street vendors though was quite entertaining.
• 
  Adam Carter

  This is an outstanding book. Its goal is “reconciling the tension between the traditional commitment to political neutrality on the part of the public service with the fact that administrative discretion inevitably involves making normative judgments.” Although a department will often attempt to justify itself by stressing its deference to the Minister, or to the public directly (via, for example, consultation and representative hiring policies), neither of these explain the distinctive agenda the public sector often pursues. Instead the legitimacy of the public sector comes from its ability to solve complex collective action problems and do so in a way that is consistent with liberal principals of efficiency, equality, and liberty. This positions the role of the public service in the executive alongside the judiciary in legitimately exercising non-elected power. Just as doctors act on the basis of professional judgement and so must be held accountable to their peers via a distinctively medical ethics, so too public servants are accountable to their peers via a distinctive liberal ethics.
  
  Chapter 3 explains the rise of classical liberalism and how its failure to solve pressing collective action problems gave rise to the welfare state with its massive capacity and capability for solving problems. Like classical liberalism, the welfare state (read modern liberal state) is committed to a neutral conception of the good. If classical liberalism showed that enforcing a system of contracts is good for everyone, Heath shows that modern state programs such as state funded health care also makes us all better off by our own lights. Thus Heath challenges the idea that the central task of the welfare state is redistribution although certain policies may also have this effect.
  
  In the second half of the book, Heath shows how the commitment to liberal ideals is inherent in the way the public service operates: its use of cost-benefit analysis, its commitment to the rule of law, and its commitment not to use policy to coerce a particular way of life.