| Title | : | On Evidence in Philosophy |
| Author | : | |
| Rating | : | |
| ISBN | : | - |
| Format Type | : | Kindle Edition |
| Number of Pages | : | 176 |
| Publication | : | Published January 24, 2019 |
specified sense of that term.
The first half of On Evidence in Philosophy expounds a version of Moore's method and applies it to each of several issues. This version is shown to resist all the standard objections to Moore; most of them do not even apply. It is argued, in Chapters 5 and 6, that philosophical method is far less powerful than most have taken it to be. In particular, deductive argument can accomplish very little, and hardly ever is an opposing position refuted except by common sense or by science. The
final two chapters defend the evidential status of intuitions and the Goodmanian method of reflective equilibrium; it is argued that philosophy always and everywhere depends on them. The method is then set within a more general explanatory-coherentist epistemology, which is shown to resist standard forms of
skepticism.
In sum, William G. Lycan advocates a picture of philosophy as a very wide explanatory reflective equilibrium incorporating common sense, science, and our firmest intuitions on any topic-and nothing more, not ever.
On Evidence in Philosophy Reviews
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Although only 176 pages, this short book covers the core issues of why we believe what we believe, with a particular focus on the author’s ‘coherentist’ and ‘intuitionist’ approach.
He thinks that most philosophers are appealing to their intuitions for the premises and foundations of their arguments; but they are rarely sufficiently self-aware to be able to recognise the fact. It is refreshingly honest to hear a professional philosopher admit such possibilities.
One of the issues which recurs in the book is Scepticism. The book begins by reviving an approach taken by GE Moore at the beginning of the twentieth century. Rather than trying to defeat the sceptic argument, GE Moore simply pointed to the fact that it always rests upon premises, and it is always more plausible to not-believe one of those premises, than it is to doubt obvious facts such as that his breakfast preceded his dinner.
Of course this raises the question of what does it mean for your experience of breakfast to be a more plausible fact than the possibility that all your experiences are a dream?
The book assumes a common sense appreciation of what it means to be more plausible. Factors such as the clearness of memory, or the vividness of perception create convictions…, and a ‘plausibility.’
Yes, but the force of the sceptic’s challenge is to ask whether we ‘should’ allow such convictions to be considered as ‘more plausible.’ The Sceptic says no. The author says yes. But why?
There is no obvious rational (or epistemic) argument. This is why scepticism has been a serious philosophical problem for thousands of years. If there is an answer at all, then it needs to be found elsewhere. Sadly, this is where the author’s reflections stop. He has turned the problem of Scepticism about knowledge into a problem of scepticism about plausibility. But has that moved the important issues forward ?
The book includes further chapters on free will, philosophical method and the role of intuitions. They are an interesting read and will prompt many thoughts. However the book is written for fellow philosophers, so it is a demanding read for non-specialists.
The author's choice of vocabulary adds an extra level of complexity. He ‘prescinds’ from ‘negands’ and takes issues with ‘quotidian’ ‘canards’ that are not ‘apodictic’. There are simpler ways of expressing the same ideas. A technical vocabulary is useful when it aids clarity. But when it is just a choice of a ultra low frequency words, is it really aiding the reader?
Overall I enjoyed the ideas, but I wish there had been more thought to making the book more readable.
