White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War 19191920 and The Miracle on the Vistula by Norman Davies

White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War 19191920 and The Miracle on the Vistula Reviews

• 
  Ray

  Competent telling of the Russo-Polish war of 1919/20. A little too much military detail and poor maps let it down somewhat in my view. It reads and feels like a graduate thesis rather than a book for the general reader.
  
  Plucky Poland gives the Red Army a bloody nose in a strange war that both sides blunder into and flail about in. A war of sweeping advance, strategic overreach and dramatic retreat, featuring the last major cavalry exchanges on European soil. A battle for survival for Poland, one that had to be won - and was. Victory saved Poland for a generation, yet led to the dictatorship of Pilsudski and engendered an inflated sense of security.
  
  Poland was left alone to manage whilst the French and British looked the other way, all the time making vague noises of encouragement. A kind of rehearsal for 1939 in a way. A different and tragic result that time though. (less)
• 
  Jerome Otte

  I'm doing a presentation on this war for my tenth-grade European history class, and this book proved very helpful. I didn't know beans about this war, and only came across it in some reference book.
  
  This is a reasonably well-written book that teases out a forgotten but interesting chapter of 20th century history. The author's prose is robust, and he takes pains to quote from primary sources. I also like his weaving the writings of Isaac Babel into the narrative, as I believe that it brings a sense of color that helps moves things along.
  
  The book is not limited to a Polish viewpoint. Instead, it takes pains to show the Russian point of view as well as that of the Entente. The reference points in English and French politics are particularly revealing. The Battle of Warsaw is strongly downplayed by the author, who holds that the Polish victory was more a fact of Tukhachevskii and Budyenny outrunning their supply lines than anything Pilsudski contrived. It does put to rest the tired belief that General Weygand was the "architect" of the Polish triumph -- his role was a complete fabrication and it is duly exposed as such.
  
  The only things that would have made this book better include information from the USSR that is now available (and wasn't when this book debuted in 1972). I think there is much to be mined from that source which would clear up many of the mysteries that persist. Additionally (and I can't stress this enough), history writers (particularly UK history writers) have to stop assuming that the average reader has an idiomatic grasp of the French language. My schoolboy French is enough to puzzle out the meaning, but for those who don't 'parlez' they can't even get the benefit of a footnote with the English text. If I wanted to read it in French, I would have bought a French translation.
  
  Even so, there's failures.On page 265 the author writes "To paraphrase Gibbon, the interpretation of dialectical materialism is now taught at the schools of Cracow, Prague and Berlin, whose pupils demonstrate to a classless society the sanctity and truth of the revelations of Marx, Engels and Lenin.The battle of Warsaw, far from redeeming an era, did not so much as save a generation."
  
  Well, never there was the existance,of a classless society, in any time or place of human history.Socialism is far more full of class differences than any capitalism.In 1985, the life was beter in a "Banana republic" such as Panama, than in still existing Soviet Union.This book was writen, when the "Iron Courtain" was still existing, but since 1989, the eastern Europe's reality is another thing.
  
  Also, was the Soviets' true intention in waging war on Poland to eventually attack Germany and spread the Revolution westwards? The Bolsheviks' peasant army did not have the capability for such an invasion. That's why they were so quick to make peace with Poland, even though it cost them a foothold in Galicia, which (in Lenin's own words), could "have opened up a straight road of revolution...to Czechoslovakia and Hungary." Lenin actually believed that Pilsudski's Poland had been built up by the Western powers as a tool against Russia.
  
  The maps of this book are all weak. All of them are in Black & white.
  
  The last problem of this book doesn't shows the American, British and German support to Soviet Union.The Warburgs, Rockefellers,etc. were at Lenin's side at that times.When focusing the fact, that this war didn't liberate Ukraine, this book simple forgotten, that the small Poland was basically alone, in this war, while the massive and big Soviet Union had some of the most rich and powerfull eugenicists people in the world at his side.Many of them americans, such as Rockefeller.The Soviet support to Nazis in Germany and the result of this decision, is also forgotten in this book.
  
  
• 
  John

  A good, well-written (if unfortunately slightly out-of-date) history of the Polish-Soviet 1919-1922 war.
  
  The book's main failing lies in not providing enough background information about peripherally mentioned - yet crucial - figures such as Peter Wrangel, Semeon Petlura, etc.) It is, however, well researched, its conclusions are solidly backed up, and the maps, photographs and other supporting materials allow the reader to easily keep an overview of an otherwise obscure and ill-documented conflict.
• 
  Czarny Pies

  White Eagle, Red Star is one of four books written by Norman Davies thathave dramatically altered the way Westerners and Poles have come to view the history of Poland. (The other three are God's Playground, Rising 44 and Microcosm.) This succinct volume tells how Josef Pilsudki recreated Poland after 125 years in which it had been partitioned between Austria, Germany and Russia,. He then defended it against a communist invasion from Russia.
  
  Pilsudski is venerated in Poland as the founder of the modern state. In the west he has been accorded scant respect and wrongly accused of many sins that he was entirely innocent of. Pilsudki was born into a minor noble family in was now part of Lithuania. He started his career as a communist where he showed a great deal of skill providing funds for the Russian communist party by robbing trains. Unfortunately he was close enough to Lenin's brother that when an assassination attempt was made on the Tsar, Pilsudski was sentenced to five years of internment in Siberia.
  
  After his internment, Pilsudski organized a regiment that fought int he Austrian army on the Eastern Front. Pilsudski was no longer a communist by this point but he retained resolutely socialist and atheistic ideas all his life which was quite unusual for a Polish nobleman. Pilsudski had come to the conclusion that a common front of Poles from the entire political spectrum was needed to recreate Poland. When Austria surrendered, Germany asked him to swear allegiance to the Kaiser and join the fight against Russia. When Pilsudsk refused, he was jailed. However, he was released several months later when Germany surrendered. In a startling manoeuvre he persuaded the Germans to give him the weapons from their arsenal in the city where he was jailed. The Germans agreed and within days Pilsudki had an army with which to carve out a state in the territories of the three occupying powers that had just fallen.
  
  Pilsudski had seized most of the Ukraine before the Russians counter-attacked in early 1920. The Russians wanted to first subdue Poland and then continue driving West so as to link up with the communists who had begun insurrections in Germany. However, in August 1920 the Russians were stopped at Warsaw in a battle that the Poles refer to as the Miracle on the Vistula. Pilsudski than launched a counteroffensive which in turn stalled in the Ukraine. At this point, the Russians and Poles signed a treaty to end their war and which settled their boundaries until WWII.
  
  In this remarkable book, Davies demolishes several mythes about Pilsudki notably:
  
  -1-Myth #1: Pilsudski as a fascist. The reality was that Pilsudski did rule as a autocrat but his political agenda was socialist. He staunchly defended Poland's Jewish population through-out his life.
  -2- Myth #2: Pilsudski was pro-German. The reality was that Pilsudski believed that in the long term, Russia was a bigger threat to Poland's independence than Germany and thus he made opportunistic deals with the Germans.
  -3- Myth #3 Pilsudski was an irresponsible adventurer. The truth is that Pilsudski was opportunistic and very lucky that the regimes of all three powers occupying Poland fell at the same time. In his campaigns, Pilsudki commanded in a very competent fashion never taking greater risks that the relative strengths of his army and the Russian army warranted.
  -4- Myth #4 - The French volunteer officers who served with the Poles at the Battle of Warsaw were responsible for the Poliish Victory. In fact, De Gaulle Weygand and the other French volunteers never made any such claim for themselves and lauded Pilsudski as the mastermind of the Victory.
  -5- Myth #5 -The revival of Polish State was the result of Woodrow Wilson's doctrine of the self-determination of nations. The reality is Treaty of Versailles did not allocate any territory to Poland that was not being occupied by Pilsudki's army. In fact, under the Treaty of Versailles the Poles were forced to conduct a referendum in Silesia which ultimately forced them to return most of Silesia to Germany.
  
  In Davies view, Poland was recreated solely because Pilsudski and his soldiers successfully fought for it. They got no significant help and much hostility from the West.
  
  White Eagle, Red Star is an absolutely essential book for anyone wishing to understand today's Poland and is a great read for World I history buffs.
  
  
  
• 
  Cian

  White Eagle – Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War 1919-20 by Norman Davies
  
  “An energetic conduct of war strengthens the national character; by contrast wars conducted over a long time and lamely entail the greatest material losses and moral damage,” wrote Colonel Blume some years after the Franco-Prussian War. A sentiment that is especially telling of the war in question.
  
  White Eagle – Red Star is an excellent piece not just on the Polish-Soviet War but on the conflation of war-time conceptualisation itself with a stern overhead review of both the art of historiography itself and its impact upon modern and immediate perspectives of the conflict.
  Simultaneously dispelling the historiographical myths construed by Soviet and Polish scholars – the illusion of dominant Entente support for the Poles and the Miracle on the Vistula fable respectively. With the first fabrication being used to justify Soviet insurrection into Europe in the vain hope that a collective European Imperialism, which did not include the Polish Republic by any stretch of the imagination, would crumple from within by proletariat revolutions that would rise to welcome the invasion. And the second as a political tool used by Pilsudski’s political and various other internal rivals to discredit his achievement in favour of divination and the power of Gods as the bastion of Christendom.
  
  But as Davies rightly points, even if such favour had been extended to the Poles in their most desperate hour, who else but Pilsudski could be his appropriate agent? For the victory chiefly lay with Pilsudski and his ability to mobilise the morale of the newly formed Polish Republic with the substantial logistical and administrative support abilities of his two primary ministers – Kazimierz Sosnkowski and Wladyslaw Sikorski.
  
  From a geopolitical and strategic standpoint, the book is invaluable. A must read for any students of warfare or the relationship between political and battlefield realities. Stratagem never played so crucial a role in a duel between such unprepared military entities – where little yet was standardised to a sufficient of strategic reliability. Excellent operational-tactical maps are included to ease the difficulties of the topography and multi-faceted terminology and names that may prove unwieldy to English readers.
  
  As rightly stated warfare in the borderlands had a quality all of its own. From the melt-water flood hazards to the endless plains framed by boundless horizons of the borderlands of modern Ukraine and Belarus. Rivers formed the only line of defence and even these conditions varied wildly from season to season. And of course, these geographical positions quickly shaped the nature of its campaigns. Cavalry, mounted hussars, flank attacks, artillery posts, machine-gun nests and an ever elusive, changing and transparently vague frontline.
  In many senses the terrain dictated most of the war as one of scouts and skirmishers with Pilsudski’s ‘strategy of the wolf’ adeptly encapsulating a kind of war in which mass offensives carried scant advantage. In fact, they were generally disastrous due to the vastness of the front line. Vantage points and settlement had to be taken with lighting fast action and subsequent reaction. Speed, mobility and the horse were once again following the catastrophes of WWI across the continent, the vital components of military success. The last cavalry to cavalry engagement was fought in this war and a reading of such a book as this may give those interested in the follies of WWI a perspective of how the mindsets of such wars fought first in 1914-16 had made especial sense for such a long period of human history. Speed and mobility had been key components to victory in Europe since the era of the mounted knight after all.
  The books tactical vantage point with special regard to the Soviet First Cavalry Army the Konarmiya battalion reaping across the borderlands as the Cossacks of old was fascinating. And I believe that Davis used the appropriate quantity of literary allusions to illustrate the conflict. The accounts of Isaak Babel were most exceptional. Having fought in the war his was perhaps the most effective say in regards to the realities on the ground.
  
  Furthermore Davies’ analysis of the inward schisms of the perspective forces leading and competing with the primary parties – along with most importantly examining the prejudices of both sides, are perhaps his greatest contributions to the historiography of this oft-over looked, greatly reduced or exaggerated series of conflicts. The escalation and pinnacles of the war are difficult to understand for someone living outside of the related regions that much is clear. But Davies diminishes this burden of historical imprecision and popular biases (especially on the parts of the Soviet and Allied scholarships as the Poles themselves would be rarely granted a voice on the subject outside their own countries in the decades to follow) and presents one of the earliest versions of the truth of said history as written in English.
  
  Perspective is extraordinarily well presented here. With the contextual essences of the Soviet soldiery at this time examined in a stark and bloody contrast with the Polish legionaries demonstrating just how uniquely and completely different the two ideological sides were besides the fact that they were both fledgling states. One ancient, proud and recently resurrected and the other bold, ambitious and in dire straits embroiled as they were in the Civil War. The scrambles of both ‘the first socialist state in history’ and the recently emerged entity of the Polish State from the folds of a three-way partition a hundred and eleven years old are examined in close detail and conjunction.
  Neither side took any account of the aspirations of the other. Both were misrepresented by their opponents and the wider European context which nursed the wars development as benefited them. It was neither the insignificant borderland contest nor the tell-tale turning point in human history. But it was an enormously significant and unique engagement which set the stage for much of the political and geopolitical climate to come, particularly within the future USSR as Lenin and the Politburo were forced to drastically alter their agendas and means of operations.
  Such were the levels of hyperbole, misinformation and outright lies that twisted the realities of the involved individuals, factions and regional collectives in The Polish-Soviet War that the truth was mythicised not just for readers and historians today but for the very people who lived through the events!
  Strategically too, it was an extraordinary feat. Eternally underrated and dismissed by the Allies. And when it was acknowledged, it was seen as an Entente gain outside of Poland. For both the Allies and the Soviets, this version of events suited perfectly.
  What is perhaps most important about this book is its ability to tell the truth about Poland’s conduct in the war and their significance not just here in history but those conflicts prior, future and especially in World War II. In terms of historiography ‘British writers carelessly follow(ed) the prejudices of Russians. Thus in 1919 when the Polish-Soviet War was vital only to Poland they pretend(ed) it did not really exist; in 1920 when it became vital to Russia also they suddenly discover an outbreak.’ Eternally underrated, ridiculed and politically neutered by their respective ‘Allied’ nations (Britain and France) Poland was an opposed on both sides of the conflict with the Soviets themselves of course hoping to default and discredit Russia’s age old nemesis at every possible juncture.
  
  Therefore, Davies dispelling of numerous such misconceptions and errors in historical writing are perhaps his greatest contribution here to the indignities of the war. For example, the Rada Obrony Panstwa as voted in by the Sejm (the Polish government) to ‘provide a framework for that essential unity purpose which Poland’s normal governmental machinery could not have engendered’ lasted only three months and was not the arch0type dictatorial hand played by Pilsudski and his ministers as so often claimed by their opponents
  It was always Pilsudski’s last great war – his personality and political conduct unraveling in peace times. A sad irony that he was destined to die much too early for the greatest conflict of all WW2 when his country needed his steely indestructibility more than ever.
  
  Regardless this book does story an elaborate and far-reaching conflict. One which is brushed over by the Allies as incidental – the Soviets as an uncredited lesson in defeat – and by the Poles themselves when they found themselves severed from their history with the eventual Soviet occupation and Ally betrayal and abandonment of them to that fate in World War II.
  The conflict is too often forgotten or falsified purposely or not the discredit is the same. The war was a major precursor to the fate of Europe in the 1920s and beyond. A bold engagement in the uncertainty of post-Imperial Europe where chaos reigned upon the unstable footing of a scrambling and ill-fated series of new orders within the dark continent of Europe. I cannot fault this book on any point. It is no page turner and is quite dense but for someone interested in the war it is an impeccable secondary source. As Davies offers criticism of every side with an unprejudiced scope that places the conflict in its rightful arena in history.
  
  
• 
  Matthew Dambro

  Excellent doctoral dissertation written in the early 1970s by the now top Polish historian writing in English. It has all the problems of a dissertation but one can see even at that early stage the strength of Davies as a writer and historian. He dissects the events and personalities and examines them under a microscope. One should have some background in the time period because Davies assumes a great deal knowledge on the part of the reader. This is a wonderful book about Polish heritage and sacrifice.
• 
  Robert

  A short but jam-packed history of the 1919-1920 Polish Soviet war, covering military, diplomatic, political, & historiographical aspects. The style is sometimes dated, but the book is a very quick read. I picked up this book because it was cited in the Wikipedia article about the 1919-1920 Polish-Soviet war. I was curious if there are parallels between then & the Russian-Ukrainian war & also I wondered how it was that horse cavalry played such a major role in a war that took place right after the First World War, which is widely seen as the end of horse cavalry in warfare. The latter question is answered pretty well in the 1st 50 pages (the distances involved in the war, & shortages of modern weapons such as artillery & even bullets on both sides). The book took longer to answer the 1st question (the answer is “not really”), which is unsurprising considering that it was written 50 years before the question could be asked. White Eagle Red Star has a lot of commentary on the state of historical memory of the Polish-Soviet War, taking issue with both Soviet & Polish “apologists”, & with other western European historians & commentators. Reading this makes me want to read more about the Russian Revolution, & especially about the Ukrainian Anarchists, who got a brief mention on page 119. Also made me want to check out Isaac Babel's writing. I like the Polish pronunciation guide at the beginning; maybe I’ll copy it for future reference.
• 
  John

  A well written and balanced history of the Polish Russian war of 1919-20. Davies' presents the conflict clearly while establishing the political and social context of post WWI Eastern Europe, Russia going through its Civil War, the rebirth of Poland, the interests and limited influence of the Western Allies in regard to Communism, and the objectives of International Communism. While the results of this war changed the Communist view of international revolution it was merely the first step toward Polish independence which took another 70 years.
• 
  James

  Norman Davies' White Eagle, Red Star is still the definitive work on the Polish-Soviet War and it shows: expertly researched and well-written, Davies covers every angle of the war, from the Polish side to the Soviets and the reactions to the Poles' victory in Western Europe and Germany. A little-known period of history is brought to life, and with it, the consequences of that Miracle on the Vistula for all of Europe. As A. J. P. Taylor wrote in the book's forward, this book "is a permanent contribution to historical knowledge and international understanding."
• 
  Monty Milne

  An excellent account of a fascinating conflict. Isaac Babel’s superb “Red Cavalry” piqued my interest, and Davies does not disappoint. It was a strange conflict, looking both backwards and forwards: perhaps the last war where great sweeping masses of cavalry were of decisive importance, and a surprisingly fluid war of movement coming so soon after the end of trench warfare in World War One. The horse, the armoured train, and the aeroplane were all significant. Only the last of these really pointed to the future.
  
  The “Miracle on the Vistula” which pretty much ended the war was a significant Polish victory. It was nicely planned, fortunately timed, and well executed. It also owed a lot of its success to Soviet mistakes: Tukhachevsky, for all his flair, is shown to have been something of a reckless gambler. The “Miracle” owed nothing to the French General Weygand, despite the propaganda at the time: he was an irrelevance, and Davies trashes his reputation. Stalin’s role was shifty and duplicitous: no surprises there. Pilsudski remains an enigma. Davies is even handed, although one’s sympathies tend to be with the Poles (had I had the misfortune to be living on the battlefield at the time, I would rather be mistreated by the Poles for not being an ethnic Pole than murdered by the Reds for being a class enemy).
  
  Had the Reds taken Warsaw, would the Revolution have rolled on westwards until it reached the Atlantic? Certainly, the opportunistic nature of the gangster regime in Moscow had the notion that if a door yielded to pressure, wrench it open and keep going until eventually a door is slammed in your face – but there was just no way they were facing a succession of easily-opened doors, and after the Vistula battles they quickly realised it, signed a treaty, and settled down to the dismal task of destroying their own people. The Polish claim to have saved Europe from Bolshevism thus needs qualification: if the Poles hadn’t stopped them, the Bolsheviks would have tried to carry on, but the reality of the circumstances were such that this was never a realistic prospect.
  
  This book was first written in the 1970’s and I suspect there must be a lot of information which came to light in Russia and Poland after the fall of Communism. It would be interesting to know if Professor Davies would want to revise any of his judgements now that a wider range of source material is available. A revised edition (with better maps) would easily get five stars.
• 
  Rob Prince

  Another Davis masterpiece... at first view, it sounds so esoteric - a war between the young Soviet Union and the young Poland in 1920, that is, just after WW1 ended. It was a period of extraordinary turmoil in what were referred to as "the border areas" between what had formerlly been the Russian Empire, Prussia and Austria-Hungary. As the Russia and Austro-Hungarian empires collapsed and Prussia - now transformed into Germany - took a beating at Versailles a whole new constellation of nations emerged in their place...
  
  The struggles - wars actually between so many of the players - the soon-to-be USSR, Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania etc were complicated and for the most part short lived affairs, with one exception - the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1920. It was a war that would - by the time it ended - both define the limits of the expansion of Communism west into Europe - the door slammed in Poland - as well as general parameters - both geographic and ethnic - of modern Poland. For different reasons, neither the Poles nor the Soviets paid much attention to that war. Davis' research suggests it was a key moment in European history.
  
  Again, I read this to learn more about my ancestors who hailed from "the Pale" - that region of the Russian empire into which the Jews were herded and largely confined. It was the instability of that region I wanted to know more about. Take for example one of Davis' descriptions: at one point, it appeared that the Soviets were about to storm Warsaw. In the end they didn't, repelled by the military genius of Pilsudski (who in many ways reminds me of his opponent, Lenin, in that war).
  
  Anyway Warsaw is threatened and the Poles living there are pretty much nonplussed, going about their business as if nothing was happening, at least that is how it is described by foreign commentators at the time. It makes more sense when Davis comments that over the past few years previously that Warsaw, during World War 1 had changed hands 16 (I think that is the number he quoted) times! And so it was with Bialystok, Grodno from whence my grandparents hailed.
  
  This book alone would have established Norman Davies as a major historian of 20th century European history even if he hadn't followed up with his two volume history of Poland "God's Playground."
• 
  Fred Dameron

  Davies has written a good history of a time that has been ignored by both the East and the West. This book is neutral as far as the actual history political, foreign, and military is concerned but definitely has a Polish edge to it. Mostly seen in place names which take the Polish spelling over the conventional Western spelling of the Cyrillic names. This leads to a lot of reoffering to the end maps to orient yourself to where the military action is taking place. It is a fair book on the post war aftermath but the conclusions in the last chapter have been shown to be inaccurate. This will always be a problem when reading sources that are 40 years old.
  
  If you are a Russian history fan, especially a person who subscribes to Sun Tzu's maxim, "Know your enemy as you know your self and you will never be defeated" then this is a must read. If you believe that Russia is still our enemy then understanding why Lenin did what he did and why Stalin acted the way he acted; then the Russian Polish War is more than just another episode in the history of the Revolution. And if the Russian Polish war is more than just another attempt by the West to end the Revolution this war needs to understood. It's repercussions are still felt today in the way the Kremlin thinks and the Polish war still influences the actions of the kremlin even in 2017.
• 
  Brian Mikołajczyk

  The history of one of the forgotten wars of Europe, the Polish-Soviet War, where the Poles fended off the Soviets immediately after World War I and thus preventing the spread of communism westward (for the time being).
  Russian military blunders coupled with Marshal Piłsudski's prowess and cunning allowed the Poles to fight the Soviets back from the gates of Warsaw back into the heart of Russia.
  Davies tells an incredible story from all aspects of the war; a great read!
• 
  Eric

  Normand Davis does and excellent job of giving the chaotic and confusing history of the Polish Soviet war a cohesive narrative. Lots of information and facts that I really did not know before. Gives excellent insight into post WWI and pre WWII Europe.
• 
  Jeremy

  Excellent and fascinating account of a much forgotten war that has repercussions even to this day
• 
  Matthew Zabka

  Excellent -- very informative book. The only downside is that the maps are difficult to read.
• 
  Joe Collins

  Very good overview at the upper levels of the politics and military operations of the Polish Soviet War. There is some low level information on a couple of battles and politics, but this book is not heavy into that.
• 
  Charles

  I started reading this book after finishing
  War of Attrition: Fighting the First World War. This book was referenced in the Bibliography. Although I'd read about the Russian Civil War, I'd never read anything about the Polish-Soviet conflict of 1919 or the early Polish nation-building.
  
  Davies is a good author. His prose is very clear in describing the military and diplomatic history of the conflict. I found myself reading several paragraphs over, because I found them so insightful. Frankly, I was more interested in the military aspects, but the author is persuasive in the need to understand the ex-Allies, Soviet and Polish politics of the time.
  
  If I have a complaint, its that the great majority of material the book draws on is Polish. There is some reference to French and British sources, but only very scanty material from ex-Soviet archives.
  
  Militarily what I found interesting was how inappropriately organized and armed the major combatants were for the war.
  
  Eastern Poland was a vast expanse to non-motorized formations. There was little artillery on either side. There was no air support. Reconnaissance was horse bound. Logistics was horse bound too, once away from the rails, which had low carrying capacity. Formations were small, untrained and ill equipped, despite the stockpiles remaining in the West from the recent conflict.
  
  The terrain was a wilderness. There was little transportation infrastructure, other than the rail lines. Cities were few and far between. Territory was almost impossible to defend, because mobile units (cavalry) with cross-country capability, could outflank and isolate any infantry held position.
  
  The Soviets were better at this type of warfare, simply because it was very similar to the recently ended Russian Civil War.
  
  Odd weapons and formations, like armored trains and cavalry armies became important in this strange battlefield. However, armored trains were trapped on their rails, and cavalry armies can cover distance, but can't hold ground.
  
  The attacker (the Soviets) had the advantage in this environment.
  
  The battle changed, as the Soviet fronts (army groups) pushed into the more developed western Poland. There, Polish interior lines contributed to the final and critical Battle of the Vistula before Warsaw.
  
  This book is considered to be the book to read on the Soviet-Polish War of 1919. I agree. However, readers looking for an exclusively military history, will not find it here.
  
  An important find (to me) from reading this book was
  Red Cavalry by
  Isaac Babel. Its his memoir of serving on the Soviet-side of the conflict. I've only browsed my copy, but I'm looking forward to reading it.