The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities by John J. Mearsheimer

The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities Reviews

• 
  David M

  17 years after 9/11 and al Qaeda has not been defeated. Bush sold the "war on terror" not just as a campaign to protect American lives but also as an idealistic crusade to spread democracy and freedom throughout the world. Obama toned down the embarrassing rhetoric of his predecessor, but for the most part did not alter the course of American foreign policy in the Middle East.
  
  Obama made drone assassination a totally normal, accepted instrument of policy; authorized a record number of arms sales to Saudi Arabia and gave record aid packages to Israel, also giving them both diplomatic cover for their hideous assaults on Yemen and Gaza respectively. He also destroyed Libya, committed more troops to an unwinnable, never-ending war in Afghanistan, and helped arm Salafi militias in Syria. To be fair, one might* also point to the Iran deal as a genuine step towards. Even so, Obama's legacy still seems to be one of sowing more death and destruction.
  
  I don't think the problem was that Obama was an especially bad man (mostly just a typical lightweight celebrity and narcissist); he seems to even have been somewhat aware that Saudi Arabia and Israel are terrorist states, that the war in Afghanistan is pointless, and that the US should have stayed out of the Syrian civil war. Apparently he just lacked the wherewithal and leadership to really challenge the foreign policy establishment. The problem goes much deeper than a single person, even if that person happens to be president. Clearly what's needed is systematic critique and the creation of a new intelligentsia to replace the foreign policy "experts" who have caused so much harm.
  
  In light of all this, John Mearsheimer's new book is a welcome intervention. Mearsheimer is probably best known for being the co-author of that bold, taboo-shattering book the Israel Lobby. While he and Stephen Walt did important work exposing the stranglehold the lobby has on any rational discussion of Palestine in America, they also perhaps overplayed their hand in suggesting the lobby was the main source of all the evils of American policy in the region. For instance, by arguing the Iraq war was fought for Israel. This flaw may have been indicative of a general tendency Mearsheimer has to take rhetoric or apologetics for ideas and think ideas are the driving force of history.
  
  His latest book contains an enormous amount on the ideology of liberalism, but neoliberalism never even comes up. When he mentions Marx it's only to point out that the 19th century thinker underestimated the power of nationalism. Fair enough. On the other hand, Mearhseimer could have learned from the old boy the importance of material conditions when analyzing ideology.
  
  Very much to his credit, Mearhseimer is able to lucidly acknowledge the scandal of US policy in the Middle East. However, he seriously goes astray in arguing all these disasters stem from a naive desire to spread democracy around the world. There might be a few cases where this framework sort of fits (Libya 2011?), but clearly there are at least as many blatant exceptions. In 2006, the people of Gaza committed the sin of voting the wrong way in an open election, and to this day Israel and the US are punishing them for it. How can that plausibly be interpreted as even misguided democracy promotion? Saudi Arabia is probably the least democratic, most reactionary regime on the face of the earth and has remained one of the key US allies in the region (even as it has continued to fund al Qaeda affiliates). It's true there were elections in Iraq after the 2003 invasion, but the one right the Bush administration really protected was the right of private property.
  
  Rather than a case of good intentions gone awry, it seems to me much more likely those good intentions were never much more than ideological window-dressing. Bush's messianic "war on terror" failed because it never really happened. Propaganda aside, there never really was a serious effort to promote democracy, nor even to counter fanatical Wahhabism (as that would have required seriously altering our relationship with Saudi Arabia and the other wealthy Gulf monarchies). What have all these wars been about, in that case? In lieu of a more detailed explanation, for the moment I think I'm going to have to go with money and power.
  
  *Perry Anderson has pointed out that the main purpose of the Iran deal was to ensure Israel retained its monopoly on nuclear weapons in the region. There's also a surprisingly good
  case to be made for why Iran should have nukes
• 
  Murtaza

  This is a very methodical deconstruction of the liberal foreign policy paradigm that we have grown accustomed to over the past century, arguing instead for embracing a cold realism in international affairs. Mearsheimer argues that such a system will be more honest and also more peaceful on balance. I'm not sure if I accept his arguments entirely but I have to respect the thoroughness of his argument, which is actually quite revolutionary beyond just foreign policy.
  
  The book starts with an attack on liberalism itself as being based on a flawed and contentious understanding of human nature. According to Mearsheimer, liberals wrongly assert that individualism and individual rights are universally valued by all peoples, above, for example, communal wellbeing. As such they downplay the value of other far more durable group-based ideologies like nationalism. The fact is that there is no consensus on what constitutes "the good" and people around the world have all sorts of different ideas that are based on their own circumstances and histories. Liberals indeed tend to have a specific vision for what the good life is while claiming to be neutral on such questions, and are then zealously driven to impose that vision on the rest of the world. Mearsheimer says that he supports liberalism at home but is simply against imposing it abroad or using it as a prism through which to see the rest of the world. I'm not sure if I agree that liberal values are so absolutely contentious as he makes them out to be, as at least some of them have shown themselves to be highly popular across societies.
  
  It takes him quite a long time to actually get to the crux of his argument, which is about foreign policy. In the liberal world order, states are like the individuals who inhabit a liberal society. Technically speaking a liberal society has a minimalist anthropology, meaning that it is more like a noble police officer that lets people live as they choose so long as they don't harm each other and obey the law. In a liberal society that police officer is embodied in the state, who you dial 9-11 for when you need help. But in international affairs, there is no 9-11. There is no police officer and no ultimate enforcer of any law. States live in a fundamentally Hobbesian, realpolitik environment, lofty liberal rhetoric aside. Above all they prioritize their survival and the weakening or destruction of rivals, living much like gangs do in lawless regions. This is the reality that we can actually observe, regardless of any honeyed words about international law.
  
  Even ostensibly liberal states like the United States act as realists in foreign affairs, despite their rhetoric. When such states have competitors, they have no choice but to think in pure balance-of-power terms to ensure their long-term survival. When a liberal state is the sole superpower things are even worse. A lone liberal superpower will naturally feel compelled to embark on crusades because liberalism is at core a proselytizing faith. Its record shows it to be quite a violent and intolerant one at that, despite the fact that it technically doesn't even consider war to be a legitimate part of foreign relations. Liberal states are unable to deal on equal terms with illiberal ones because they view them as fundamentally illegitimate. Instead they seek to undermine and destroy them because they cannot conceive that others may have different concepts of the good, Mearsheimer argues. The wars of liberal states also tend to be full-blown moral crusades that wind up being even more brutal than the interests-based conflicts of realists, because they generate a moral compulsion to wipe out entirely an evil illiberal Other, rather than simply defeat a rival.
  
  Would a "realist" world that discards liberal values in foreign policy entirely be better? Mearsheimer believes so. In his view states should do what is in their interests and be honest about it. They should respect each others sovereignty and not go on adventures to gift liberalism to other peoples or, God forbid, fight wars to transform their countries into liberal democracies. Instead they should seek to preserve their interests while managing their place in the global balance of power, which will hopefully lead to a more coldly honest but ultimately less violent world. It will also preserve liberalism at home by leading to less wars, and correspondingly less erosion of domestic civil liberties that such wars tend to generate over time.
  
  The destruction wrought by the current liberal establishment is obvious. There really is an addiction to war on the part of the United States, which should generate some reflection on the violent nature of actually existing liberalism. Having said that, I could imagine a realism that is even worse, where states consider all sorts of expansive and horrible privileges to be "vital interests" worth eradicating lesser powers over. In a way they do that today anyways but are dishonest about it, Mearsheimer argues, but at least today there is the possibility of shaming them based on their own stated values.
  
  Just on a structural level, this is an admirable book. Its not thrillingly written by any means, but it makes a very methodical case that is worth considering even if you reject its arguments. I don't think many people, including me, are ready for the total revolution in values that he is actually proposing here. But it is important to engage with his ideas and the merits of a possible realist international system, given that that is where the world seems to be headed. Trumpian America, China and Russia are not liberal states. They don't care about press freedoms of other countries, let alone their own countries. They are not interested in supporting foreign dissidents or spreading universal values. Given these stark realities, we can only hope that somehow whatever is coming next manages to be less brutal than the liberal-order has turned out to be, despite its own positive self-image.
• 
  Max Berendsen

  Review to follow
• 
  Tyler Tidwell

  IR Liberalism is the theory that democracy, inalienable natural rights, and diplomatic, economic, and security interdependence are the achievable variables in creating a peaceful and prosperous world order. As the title of this book implies, Mearsheimer believes this is simply a delusion. Building his argument on two fundamental assumptions about human nature, he attempts to show flaws in the logic of IR Liberalism which, ostensibly, have made it the impetus behind tens of millions of civilian deaths in numerous interventionist conflicts since the end of WWII. Mearsheimer claims that IR Realism – while typically perceived as narrow and nationalistic – actually provides less incentive for nation-states to go to war than its liberal counterpart, and it is therefore a more peaceful theory. Here is an outline of his ideas:
  
  REASON AND RIGHTS
  
  Mearsheimer’s first assumption about human nature is that reason alone is inadequate to get people to agree on first principles; namely, how we should live and what constitutes the “good life.” Environment, sentiments, and intuition are typically much more formidable in shaping our worldview than pure, cold logic. This is somewhat analogous to the debate between Hume and Kant in philosophy, in which Hume’s skepticism towards the role and resources of human reason continues to be a thorn in the paw of Analytic Philosophers to this day. Plenty of highly-intelligent, highly-educated, and highly-reasonable people come to radically different conclusions when faced with difficult issues.
  
  One of these issues is the interrelationship of the community and the individual. Which one is more important and why? In most Western cultures, we have a strong tradition of inalienable natural rights, which has in turn created an ethic-of-autonomy within our societies: communities serve as the foundations from which individuals may flourish in a generally unconstrained manner. This concept of inalienable natural rights is so ingrained in our Western minds that we treat it in an unreflective, uncritical manner; it seems axiomatic. Is it though?
  
  To use an anecdote I read elsewhere, Jonathan Locke went for a stroll one day in the woods of 17th century England and upon his return announced that he had discovered “natural rights,” and everyone has been playing along ever since. Even the name is ironic- if there is one thing not to be found in nature, it is rights. The lion seems oddly insensitive to the right-to-life of antelopes, and nature is much more apt to exterminate a species than preserve it. Of course, none of this is to imply that natural rights are somehow nonsensical or bad; indeed they have proven to be a very, very good thing. But are they the best thing? Most non-Western societies (which, it should be noted, constitute a majority of the world’s population) operate according to an ethic-of-community in which natural rights are secondary and therefore not inalienable. In such societies, individuals serve as the foundations from which communities can flourish.
  
  As we’ll see below, Mearsheimer believes this lack of universal consensus on the preeminence of natural rights throws a deadly wrench into the machine of IR Liberalism.
  
  SIMPLY SOCIAL
  
  Mearsheimer’s second assumption is that humans are inherently more social than individualistic. There are many reason for this, but perhaps the most basic one is that being a member of a group is a great way to stay alive. Again, this idea is lost on most wealthy Westerners who live in prosperous environments that afford illusions of self-sufficiency. Many of us could work from home, have everything we need delivered, and attempt to forego any reliance on social groups. It’s hard to fully stress what an aberration this level of security is relative to the vast majority of human history and current world circumstances. Beyond raw survival however, people also find identity, meaning, purpose and a whole host of other essential psychological needs through their association with various social circles. The truly autonomous individual seems an illusion.
  
  If we extrapolate man’s social nature to the macro level, the implications to Mearsheimer are clear: nationalists sentiments will always trump whatever empathy or trust we have for peoples of other nation-states. Simply put, most Americans are always going to care more about other Americans than about people in foreign countries with whom no strong social bond is felt. While this may sound prosaically obvious almost to the point of stupidity, Mearsheimer contends that, at its core, IR Liberalism thinks this dynamic can be changed – that the level of trust and empathy we feel for our immediate neighbors can be extended to foreigners. However, after all the rhetoric about being a conscientious “global citizen” is said and done, are most Westerners actually willing to go fight and die to protect the natural rights of someone they’ve never met?
  
  THE LIMITS OF LIBERALISM
  
  When we view these assumptions about human nature in light of two further observations of international dynamics, we begin to see the limits of IR Liberalism. The first observation is that most countries are nowhere close to being truly democratic, and the international realm is essentially anarchic. There is no one entity that has authority over all the others – much less the capability and willingness to exercise said authority. Nation-states are ultimately on a self-help system, like kids in the schoolyard left to their own devices while the teacher is on lunch break. There is no one to appeal to in order to rectify an injustice. International bodies have proven wildly ineffectual at stopping genocides, resolving territorial disputes, and preventing the blatant stealing of one country’s resources by another.
  
  The second observation is that foreign leaders can never really know each other’s true intentions. World history is nothing if not an endless series of pacts, betrayals, the hedging of bets, the flipping of sides, and the saying of one thing while intending another. This happens even among nation-states of ostensibly similar ideological inclinations (witness the tumultuous happenings of the European Union).
  
  Let us accept Mearsheimer’s four points for the sake of argument: reason cannot settle disputes about the relative import of natural rights; man cares deeply about his closest social bonds; the international realm is anarchic and actual democracies are rare; and we can never know the true intentions of others. Then let us return to the proclamations of IR Liberalism: democracy, inalienable natural rights, and diplomatic, economic, and security interdependence are the achievable variables in creating a peaceful and prosperous world order. To say there is extreme dissonance between these two lists seems an understatement. They appear more or less mutually exclusive; if one is true, the other must somehow be false. If Mearsheimer’s premises are accurate, IR Liberalism is an unachievable fool’s errand* which should be abandoned in favor of IR Realism, a theory which more closely aligns to the true state of human nature and international affairs.
  
  *It’s important to note that Mearsheimer has no major issues with liberalism in the domestic context, where there is a central authority to arbitrate disputes and where social bonds are highly operative.
  
  DYING (AND KILLING) FOR PEACE
  
  IR Liberalism laid roots in the Wilsonian thinking of the 1920s and has purportedly been the modus operandi of every administration since Eisenhower (Trump is proving a bit of an exception). Naturally, there are plenty of case studies to examine – Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, et al. Let’s reiterate the driving logic though: IR Liberalism believes in the universality of inalienable natural rights and the special role of democracies in protecting and promoting these rights. This provides a powerful incentive to intervene (often militarily) in the inner workings of another nation-state, whose sovereignty is violated under the auspices of protecting the natural rights of its citizens. There is an invariably moral flavor here that makes claims of exclusivity and superiority: the good life is defined by natural rights and an ethic-of-autonomy for us, so it must be for others as well. While domestic liberalism promotes tolerance at home (where natural rights are unquestioned), IR Liberalism promotes intolerance abroad where natural rights must be imposed by force.
  
  Mearsheimer’s main charge is that this line of thinking has kept the U.S. continuously involved in conflicts of intervention for the last seventy years. While many of the non-democratic regimes we have opposed (or deposed) were led by some genuinely bad guys, the question becomes: what is an acceptable cost to institute these changes? The problem, as John Tirman has pointed out in a recent book, is that we typically only care about and measure American blood and American treasure when evaluating the cost of a foreign intervention. Yet these factors constitute only a minuscule fraction of the total burden of any conflict – a burden which is primarily levied on foreign peoples. U.S. wars of intervention may have cost trillions of American dollars and hundreds of thousand American lives since WWII, but they have completely evaporated several foreign economies and have led to tens of millions of foreign deaths.
  
  This is an unsettling, paradoxical observation which Mearsheimer decries as the ultimate hypocrisy of IR Liberalism: history seems to show that the attempted imposition of democracy in a foreign state will invariably come at the cost of countless innocent civilian lives. The most fundamental and inalienable of all the natural rights is the right-to-life, yet this is exactly the one we incidentally violate on a massive scale when we initiate a war of intervention…in order to create a democracy…in order to protect natural rights. Something does seem to be amiss with the logic here. Additionally, our obsession with our own natural rights has shaped an American way of war focused on using firepower, technology, and standoff distance to protect our troops – a strategy that has led to the greatest of Western military euphemisms: “collateral damage.” Here’s another unsettling question: how many Iraqis died a violent death in the final ten years before the overthrow of Saddam versus the first ten years afterwards?
  
  Mearsheimer concludes his discussion by reiterating that most of the world is not a democracy and does not value natural rights in the same way Westerners do. If we would treat state sovereignty with the same reverence we treat natural rights, the world may not be as democratic as it is now, but it certainly would have seen far less death and destruction in the last several decades.
  
  CRITIQUES
  
  -Mearsheimer could be accused of a somewhat slanted interpretation of events, as the demarcation between Realist and Liberal actions probably isn’t as well-defined as he suggests. We seem to be interested in protecting the natural rights of others only when there is also something else to be gained. The Western world has stood idly by and watched genocides in which natural rights were (mostly) all that was at stake. Yet we have intervened in far less severe situations when some other tangible interest seemed to be in jeopardy – whether a regional balance-of-power or the protection of vital energy resources. Liberal rhetoric is often employed to gain domestic support for actions that, in hindsight, look very Realist from an international perspective. Pure IR Liberalism probably hasn’t been as operative as Mearsheimer would have us believe. When American blood was shed in Mogadishu, we realized just how flimsy Liberal motivations are without some sort of Realist underpinning.
  
  -I think Mearsheimer’s assumption about the social nature of man is questionable. I tread lightly here, since Aristotle’s maxim that “man is by nature a social animal” seems to be more or less vindicated by human history, and Mearsheimer is hardly remarkable in following this line of thinking. However, I’d like to offer an alternate hypothesis.
  
  Man is both a physical organism seeking survival and a psychological entity seeking meaning, purpose, and identity. These two fundamental requirements are radically different, but both are radically important; we do whatever it takes to satisfy them. Historically, social groups have an excellent track record of fulfilling both of these needs, but this doesn’t logically entail that man is therefore inherently social. Such a claim improperly conflates an action with its underlying motivation. A man may inherently look like a meat-eater, but in actuality he is just inherently hungry; the meat would be seen as superfluous if he had some other viable way to satisfy his hunger. Likewise, it’s totally conceivable that certain environments could provide alternate modes of securing both physical safety and psychological satisfaction without appeal to social groups.
  
  For example, in prosperous Western societies where physical survival is no longer a daily concern and ideological tolerance is high, we find that divorce rates are on the rise, birth rates and church attendance are declining, and the extended family (even more so the tribe) is something only to be found in classic literature. If man is inherently social, why do social bonds seem to be dissolving in some communities? Perhaps man’s historic sociability has simply been in the service of his physical survival and psychological satisfaction. As he finds alternate means to secure these, he might dispense with tribe, totem, and toddler altogether. Only time will tell.
  
  What would this mean for IR Liberalism? It’s hard to know. However, it does seem to imply that the impediment of nationalists sentiments could erode over time, making the vision of an interconnected world order seem increasingly plausible to more and more people.
• 
  William Gallo

  OK, so I listened on Audible. And I have no idea why it took five hours to get to the main point of the book, which was fascinating and pretty convincing: America should not pursue liberal world hegemony, but instead adopt a more restrained, realist foreign policy that is based on balance of power logic.
  
  But again, the first five hours were an almost hilariously theoretical discussion about human nature and people not being able to agree on "what constitutes the good life." I swear, if I ever hear anyone talk about "what constitutes the good life" again, I will probably kill them.
  
  But anyway, good book! It motivated me to read more about what a realist approach would mean, in practical terms, for US foreign policy.
• 
  Lee

  Mearsheimer offers a valuable but flawed critique of the Liberal Internationalist Theory of international relations.
  
  I appreciate what Mearsheimer is doing. He is asking why, after the end of the Cold War, America has been involved in so many wars? His answer is that liberalism or Liberal Internationalism (this is quite different from what is meant by ‘liberal’ in discussions of American politics) inevitably leads to many wars. He rejects Liberal Internationalism, and instead advocates for the Realist Theory, claiming that a clear-eyed view of the world will lead to fewer wars.
  
  His argument is not all that complicated. He claims that liberalism, the belief that every individual has certain inalienable rights, fails because it is always trumped by Nationalism and Realism. Nationalism trumps liberalism because people are social animals and they tend to be more engaged with group identities, like a national identity, and less willing to think of themselves as autonomous individual. He claims that Realism trumps Liberalism because baked into Liberalism is the idea of the night-watchman state. If you do not have this night-watchman keeping people or countries from killing each other or stealing from each other, then Liberalism is not viable. There is no 911 for you to call when another country invades you.
  
  He goes into more detail in the book, but that is the essence of his argument. He claims that this belief in Liberal Internationalism has caused America to be more bellicose since the end of the Cold War because America’s diplomatic complex believes in Liberal Internationalism and therefore believes the US should intervene in other countries affairs to offer their citizens the opportunity to live in Liberal states. The value of this book is that it should cause Americans to rethink their commitment to Liberal Internationalism, particularly in the belief that we can change the governments of other countries.
  
  But...Mearsheimer’s argument has several holes in it, holes big enough to drive a semi through.
  
  First, he often offers only woolly definitions of key concepts that his argument rests on. He has several pages devoted to defining the concept of ‘nation,’ but I still came away wondering what exactly qualified as a nation for him. Essentially, he suggests that a nation is a group that has a shared culture and believes itself to be a community. But that definition is so capacious as to be meaningless. With that definition, couldn’t Catholics qualify as a nation? Are Apaches a nation or are they a part of the American nation? At one point, he talks about Canada and India being a nation “with two or more nations.” What is a multi-nation nation? I think he ducks answering these tough questions, not because he does not know the answer, but rather because he does not want to complicate his simplistic argument.
  
  At one point (p. 105), he claims that “Civic nationalism is not a useful concept,” but on that same page he also states that the Declaration of Independence was America’s birth certificate. This is historically inaccurate and contradictory all at once. In 1776, Americans did not think of themselves as part of a single people, rather they thought of themselves as citizens of their respective colonies (hence, they eventually called them states, rather than provinces), so it would be wrong to suggest that 1776 was the birth of Americans thinking of themselves as a single nation. It was only through the process of being a part of a single polity that slowly transformed these citizens of these individual states into citizens who identified more with the wider identity of Americans. In other words, it was civic nationalism, the participation in a polity sharing common ideals, that created Americans. His woolly definition of the ‘nation’ allows him to miss these types of mistakes in his argument.
  
  This wooliness causes lots of problems in his argument. For example, he claims that most people around the world do not buy into liberalism. He says that Russia has a “strong preference for order over rights and democracy,” and that “Russia has become steadily more authoritarian” (p. 114). But he is never clear on who he means when he is referring to “Russia:” is it the elites or the general populace or what? If it is the elites, that makes sense, because elites (inside and outside Russia) always want more power. But if that is his claim, it really proves nothing; it is like saying people want more money. Of course, elites want more power and, of course, elites are skeptical of checks on their power. In fact, the way Mearsheimer makes his claim, it seems he is applying that it is the general populace that wants this authoritarianism. He points to a 2014 poll that said that 71% of all Russians are ready to sacrifice civic freedoms to maintain order...okay, but that poll, he notes was conducted by the All-Russia Public Opinion Center. What he does not note is that the ARPOC is a state-owned polling group that has been criticized for concocting polls as a way to demonstrate Russian public support behind state policies. It is hard to claim that this poll reflects the general populace’s attitude. But because Mearsheimer never tells us what he means when he says “Russia,” his woolly definitions allow his argumentation to duck the question.
  
  The second hole is his claim that it was a Liberal Internationalist ideology that led to the wars America has engaged in over the last three decades. His point is that, if American foreign policy leaders had adopted a clear-eyed, that is, Realist perspective like the one he is advocating, Washington would not have gotten into all these wars. On page 164, he lists five states America has tried to “topple”: Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Syria.
  
  Of course, the US did not “topple” the governments in Egypt, Libya or Syria. Let’s take Egypt as the best example of how flawed Mearsheimer’s analysis is. The US has been sending billions of dollars to Egypt’s army since well before the Cold War ended. Mearsheimer says nothing about that. Instead, he focuses his ire on President Obama’s decision to allow the people of Egypt, who started their own revolution, to topple their octogenarian dictator. Mearsheimer claims that this nod from Obama, which stopped the army from killing protesters and which the Egyptian army carefully considered (as they are dependent on US aid), qualifies as a “toppling” lead by a American Liberal Internationalism.
  
  Note what Mearsheimer is doing here. He is making the bizarre claim that the US giving money to the Egyptian army is not a Liberal Internationalist interference in Egypt, but having any say over whether that money is used over killing an Egyptian-lead revolution is. His solution for the US not interfering in Egyptian policy: continue giving money to the army as it violently suppresses an Egyptian-led revolution.
  
  Mearsheimer’s book makes some valid points. Maybe the US should stop invading other countries, thinking they can pop some caps in a few dictators and magically turn their countries into democracies. But, when you get into the weeds of Mearsheimer’s argument, a lot of his points rest on a flawed foundation.
  
  For Iraq and Afghanistan, it is not too much of a stretch to say that Liberal Internationalism animated US designs to send in troops and try to change the governments of these states. But even if his claim is not as egregious as in the Egyptian case, it is still flawed. Did the US invade Iraq entirely because it wanted to bring democracy. Certainly, that is what President Bush said, but I vaguely recall someone mentioning something about oil in the lead up to the invasion... One would have to be credulous to believe that Realist politics and thoughts of oil did not play a role in the US invasion of Iraq. That does not sound like a Realist to me.
  
  Finally, the third problem with Mearsheimer’s book is that he is so smug. Everything he says seems to be imbued with this feeling that “I’m right and everybody else just needs to recognize that and get with it.” And this tone is more than annoying, it hits at the first two flaws. He has trouble acknowledging that his intellectual antagonists, the Liberal Internationalists, have valid points. If he were to acknowledge those points, think a little bit harder about his opponents criticisms, he might be able to deliver a better, more nuanced rethinking of international affairs.
  
  Instead, he just gives a smug, at times, insightful, at times, deeply flawed, critique of American foreign policy.
  
  Finally, I think there is an empirical test we can perform to test his hypothesis. He claims that the best way to make America safer would be to have an American foreign policy focused not on achieving the ideals of Liberal Internationalists, but rather one run by hard-nosed Realists looking to maximize American power. That Realist policy sounds a bit like the principles undergirding President Trump’s. Let’s do a Pepsi Challenge: After four years of an administration that rejects Liberal Interventionism for something like the Realism he advocates, is America safer and stronger in its foreign policy position? Though this is not an entirely fair question for the book (I am not sure Mearsheimer would conclude that Trump is entirely a Realist actor), I still think the answer to this question (hell no) suggests that my critique of Mearsheimer’s argument has a lot of value.
  
• 
  Manar

  Mearsheimer offers a substantial theoretical critique of political liberalism, arguing that its failures are due to incompatibility with nationalism and realism. He argues that a balance-of-powers logic should be adopted moving forward since the liberal hegemony approach has proven to be counter-productive. While I enjoyed reading his criticism of US foreign policy, he comes across as delusional as the liberals he critiques. He does not even entertain the possibility of other motivators besides spreading democracy for the sake of liberal peace. Does he really buy into the argument that invading Iraq was to liberate its people?
• 
  Joseph Stieb

  Took a few grad seminars w. Dr. Mearsheimer, and I'm always struck by the clarity of his thought. This book is no exception. In many ways it is the summary of a life's work, a sweeping and exceptionally clear argument that begins with first principles not just about the nature of international politics but human nature itself. Nonetheless, there are big parts of the book I disagree with, even if I generally agree with the thesis.
  
  Ok, here's the argument: JM argues that realism and nationalism can, and to some extent should, trump liberalism in international politics. Nationalism is closely connected to our deeply social, even tribal natures. It speaks to us in more compelling ways than liberalism doesn't, which Mearsheimer treats as a fairly modern idea with limited purchase in the world (especially outside of the educated and Western parts). Realism flows naturally from nationalism: obviously you will do (or expect your leaders to do) what benefits your country and keeps it secure. Plus, in classic realist fashion, the anarchic structure of international politics compels states to act for security first, and there's no real way around this.
  
  The real problem for Mearsheimer is when a highly liberal country (America) no longer has a superpower balancer (Soviets) and is therefore free (or at least believes it is free) to spread its doctrines and beliefs around the world. Mearsheimer lumps neoconservatives and most conservatives into this more deeply rooted liberalism here, and he shows how a foreign policy based on universalistic claims about human rights, capitalism, and democracy, the desire to spread these things, and the delegitimization of the legitimate security concerns of other states has led to a host of disasters: the Iraq War, the GWOT, Libya, Syria, bad relations with Russia, widespread anti-Americanism, and an exhausted and disillusioned populace at home.
  
  I agree with the broad structure of JM's argument, and I greatly enjoyed his discussion of liberalism, realism, nationalism, and their relationships to international politics. However, I disagree with him in 3 big ways.
  
  1. Mearsheimer assigns far too much significance to ideologies, which he treats as determining foreign policy decisions, and not enough attention to context and contingency. As a historian, I have to say this, but it is true. This is where I particularly need to defend the Obama admin. In cases like Libya and Syria, there truly were no good options. The Obama admin didn't seriously believe they were going to fundamentally alter the political systems/ideologies of these societies. They were trying to avert disaster: ongoing Civil Wars and the possibility of near-genocidal slaughter. Critics can and should question these decisions, but for JM they emerge quite deterministically from Obama's liberal ideals rather than the broader desire to minimize harm. This was a problem in several parts of the book.
  
  2. Now I need to critique the theory a bit. Mearsheimer has a near endless patience with Russia. Somehow, none of the current situation with America is Russia's fault. Here's his story: Russia has always feared great power encroachment on its western borders, and in the 2000s and 2010s the US, as a liberal, regime-changing state, spooked Putin by supporting Georgian separatism, expanding NATO, offering rhetorical support to Russian protestors, and lastly, intervening diplomatically to support Ukrainian independence. Putin is simply striking back out of realist, geopolitical calculation to balance against this over-use of US power.
  
  The broader point here points to realism's greatest flaw: the internal composition of states, or their regimes, matter in terms of how they behave in int'l politics. Why does Russia see the US as a threat? Does it really fear a German style invasion? No. Its oligarchic, arch-conservative, dictatorial regime fears in large part what the Soviets feared: the example of free, prosperous, Western-looking societies on their border that are living refutations of the Russian ideology and political system. This is where I fundamentally agree with Tim Snyder's take on Russia: Putin's global attempt to sow tribalism, reinforce blood-and-soil nationalism, and undermine democracy is ultimately an attempt to save his own ass. His regime is in jeopardy the more there are successful liberal democracies in the world and the more they more toward his border. He would be safer if those democracies become more like Russia; corrupt, both cynical and arch-conservative, selfish, unequal, and deeply divided by moral and cultural conflict. The geopolitical concerns still matter, but this is the root of Russia's current assault on the free world. There's really nothing the United States can do to change this viewpoint other than capitulate to Russia. Putin will always see anything the US does as trying to undermine him, and even if the US is truly doing nothing he will just make up whatever lies he wants. The US might as well stand up for the sovereignty and nascent democracies of Eastern Europe because our differences are irreconcilable at their core. And yes, I know that this is almost exactly what George Kennan wrote in the Long Telegram. Consider this the "Long Goodreads Review."
  
  3. Lastly, while I think JM has a strong critique of one type of liberalism, he does straw man and oversimplify liberal internationalism to some extent. HIs liberalism is rather all or nothing: it is the uncompromising democratic imperialism of the neocons, one that is doomed to drive the US into conflict in unimportant areas. But Mearsheimer seems to overlook the usefulness of some degree of institutionalization, norm-building/enforcing, and interdependence. The liberalism of the postwar international system that the US built through institutions like NATO, the UN, other regional security arrangements, human rights treaties, acting as the balancer of last resort in key regions, Bretton Woods, etc, etc (as explained brilliantly by G. John Ikenberry and others) is far more moderate, cooperative, and effective. It often got out of hand (Vietnam), it faced tons of domestic criticism from both sides, but overall it created a far more stable world and enabled the freedom and economic growth that undermined tyranny in places like the Eastern Bloc. If I were Mearsheimer, I would be arguing for the abandonment of the crusading form of liberalism he discusses here and a return to this more chastened liberal internationalism.
  
  The real test, however, if whether nations can avoid seeing themselves as the arbiters of morality and the saviors of the world, especially when they have deeply liberal cores. That is JM's ultimate rejoinder to my criticisms here, and it's an important one. Still, I think his argument has some big problems. I nonetheless learned a ton from this book. There are some moments in it where the descriptions of big ideas (both his and other people's) are so crisp and clear that you just think: Damn, I hope someday my intellectual life comes together as nicely as this. Once again, even though I didn't agree with him all the way, JM challenged me to think more precisely and marshal better counterpoints. Recommended for people with a bit of an IR background who like very ideas-driven analysis of foreign policy.
  
• 
  Ali Hassan

  This book actually talks about three great isms of liberalism, realism, and nationalism. It makes these isms easy to understand and provides all the substantial material necessary for concluding the present and future dynamics of these three ideologies or isms.
• 
  Markus

  A book by John Mearsheimer, a history professor in the US, famous for developing the realist school of thought, which describes how great powers in the world are mainly driven by a rational desire for regional influence and survival. I read this because Ive watched his lecture and his interviews and he seems to have an accurate understanding of the reasons behind the Ukraine war.
  
  Basically the liberal delusion is the notion that it might not be a good idea to forcibly supplant a more primitive, autocratic regime with our Western democratic system. The thinking behind the delusion is that United States, as the most powerful nation in the world, only wants good in the world, doesn’t want to be a threat to anyone and just wants to spread happiness in the form of democracy. Consequently, any nation that reacts aggressively to this behavior, is crazy, irrational, warmongering and so on. There is some good reasoning behind this, namely that Western democracy is indeed better to live in than in more primitive and autocratic regimes but that doesn’t mean forcing it on nations and people is a good idea.
  
  A more simplistic thinking would be that democracy is good and spreading it is the right thing to do. People like freedom and they deserve to be freed of autocratic regimes. Yet it’s not that simple. There is, for example, the idea of the good life. For us in the Western World it might be freedom and democracy and so on but it can mean something far different in other parts of the world. What is the best form of society? I definitely think that the more individual freedom, the better a society in general but people don’t agree with that and it is okay. The point is that even among our own relatively homogenous wester society, there is a lot of disagreement on what the good life is. It is only reasonable to say that this disagreement grows a lot wider when dealing with markedly different societies. Hence it might seem to us that we deliver happiness and freedom in the form of democracy but that doesn’t mean it will look like that to the recipient.
  
  The problem arises when western (US) politicians see themselves as do-gooders and emancipators of the non-western world. This will lead to conflicts since our politicians refuse to understand the other side’s perspective and this will lead to war. The current mindset of these politicians and the mainstream media is that if any targeted regime doesn’t agree with its “emancipation”, it is basically justified to destroy that regime. This would at least be the official reasoning but behind-the-scenes it might be completely different. Example would be the 2011 Libyan war where Qatar tried to overthrow the Libyan government by sponsoring radical Islamist rebels. Qatar’s aim was to gain influence over the region and when the coup failed, Qatar sought for help from the Western military machine and as a result NATO bombed Libya into a rubble. The official reasoning behind this clusterfuck in the western media was that it was a humanitarian mission and we were liberating Libyan people from an evil autocrat while we were actually trading favors with Qatar and destroyed the most stable society in North Africa. After the war Libya became a hub for radical Islamists, terrorism and eventually an impetus for the 2015 European migrant crisis.
  
  Some more important points would be the success rate of western intervention in other regimes, where the available studies show that it is rather an exception that any kind of intervention would result in democratic implementation. According to one study, the US intervened in 35 countries between WWII and 2004 and only in one of these cases a stable democracy emerged within 10 years. That’s a success rate of less than 3%. Furthermore intervention usually results in a decline in democracy. The conclusion from this is that implementation of a democracy in a country is only feasible when certain internal preconditions are present before the intervention. These condition are however rare in countries where the cost of intervention is low, and the US as a rule intervenes in countries where this cost is low.
  
  Another idea against this kind of liberal expansionism is that it reduces liberal values in the home country. Intervening in other countries around the world will require a large military force and lots of manipulation from the politician to get to population to at least somewhat agree with the military actions. An example would be Obama using the US military in 2011 without Congress approval to bomb Libya because it was supposedly an urgent humanitarian mission. Examples like these and amassing a large military force to intervene in other countries will hollow our liberal values at home. These hollowed values would be individual freedom because we are encroaching on other people’s freedom without provocation; transparent institutions since we are creating less transparent institutions in order to get the populace to agree with the wars; and free market economy since wars are funded through forced taxation and not voluntary participation.
  
  Furthermore the influence of nationalism will usually prevail over the all the other ideologies including liberal democracy which adds another layer of difficulty to successfully overthrowing regimes in order to implement democracies. An example would be communist countries fighting wars between each other in the 20th century and the Soviet Union eventually falling apart after nationalist revolutions in its member countries despite these countries being communistic.
• 
  Nick

  Mearsheimer makes a compelling case that US foreign policy should be driven by realism, as opposed to liberal policies that have inspired interventions abroad throughout the Cold War and since its end. Mearsheimer shows that intervention abroad rarely works out as intended, and is usually very costly, and that the US would be better off only intervening abroad when core interests are at stake and instead focus on domestic issues. Notably, Mearsheimer does argue that the US does have an interest in stability in North and South America, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, leaving only the countries Africa, Central Asia, and the weaker countries in the Middle East out of the US's areas of interest.
  
  Mearsheimer's argument is flawed for several reasons. First, Mearsheimer does not address the possibility that the failures of liberalism may not be due to the theory itself, but due to bad implementation of the theory. He also ignores the fact that although the US has been often driven by liberal ideas when intervening abroad, there is a very strong case to be made that the US only used the rhetoric of liberalism to justify fundamentally realist policies. For example, the rhetoric of liberal intervention has not prevented the US from allying itself with dictators throughout and after the Cold War, and the US has frequently not intervened abroad when doing so would have saved countless lives. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 may have been supported by liberal rhetoric, but failed not primarily due to weaknesses of liberal interventionism, but due to the war planning that did not plan for stability operations, the unaccounted for animosity between Sunni and Shia factions, and multiple unforced errors that undermined US operations. One could argue that intervention in Libya and Syria after the Arab Spring were driven by liberal interventionism, but they were also driven by a sense of realism that led the US to limit its involvement in both conflicts, leading to instability in both countries that remains to this day.
  
  Another flaw of Mearsheimer is that it is unlikey that US policymakers would effectively implement a realist foreign policy, just as they have failed in the past when implementing liberal policies.
  
  Lastly, Mearsheimer fails to consider that we should not judge foreign policy by whether or not it fails some of the time, but by whether or not the probability for conflict is increased or decreased. It is no small accomplishment that the international community has avoided a nuclear war and that there has been peace in Western Europe for over 70 years. This is partly due to the cold, realist logic of nuclear warfare, but also certainly due to the economic interdependence and opportunities for cooperation in international forums that are part of the liberal international order.
  
  Overall, Mearsheimer is right that liberal foreign policies often fail, but he does not show that realist foreign policies would be implemented more skillfully. However, he is correct that the US should not be driven solely by liberal interventionism, and instead ask whether or not fundamental national interests are at stake when considering which foreign policy to pursue. This consideration would have helped the US avoid the costly 2003 war in Iraq and may have led to better outcomes when thinking about other areas the US has intervened.
• 
  Nazmi Yaakub

  Buku yang dibeli ketika mantan Presiden Amerika Syarikat (AS), Donald Trump dicabar Joe Biden dalam Pilihan Raya Presiden negara ‘Pak Cik Sam’ tetapi mula betul-betul membaca selepas Biden mengangkat sumpah kepresidenan berlatarbelakangkan serbuan ke atas bangunan Capitol kira-kira dua minggu sebelumnya.
  
  Dengan Biden atau ahli politik tradisi kembali menakhodai Rumah Putih dan bukan ‘tokoh luar’ yang tidak boleh sepenuhnya dikawal berdasarkan ‘tradisi’ dasar politik luar AS, maka buku ini wajar dibaca sama ada rakan wartawan, ahli politik mahupun aktivis di negara ini. Apatah lagi antara arahan eksekutif yang ditandatangani Biden adalah juga berkait dengan dasar liberal progresif yang menjadi amalan negara liberal yang menduduki status kuasa besar dunia.
  
  Buku ini menjelaskan mengapa dasar dan tindakan AS untuk mengembang dan mengukuhkan hegemoni liberal hanya membawa negara itu kepada keburukan, malah bertentangan dengan hasrat atau kepercayaan yang berakar kepada liberalisme itu sendiri. Pengarang yang berpegang kepada aliran realist meyakini ia lebih tepat untuk dipegang dan dilaksanakan AS berbanding meneruskan hegemoni liberal dalam dasar luarnya.
• 
  Michael

  The Great Delusion investigates the interplay between liberal democratic, realist, and nationalist forces in the international arena, convincingly articulating a case for offensive realism as an alternative foreign policy approach for uni-polar liberal hegemons such as the post-Cold War United States. Before this exploration, Mearsheimer spends a significant amount of time enumerating and defining the essential international relations and political philosophy concepts at play, which includes important metaphysical digressions to Hobbesian, Lockeian, or Kantian worldviews. Although this may seem gratuitous to many readers, I do appreciate his clarity. I suspect the opening chapters and the rather colloquial prose throughout the book lend it a broader appeal—a vital consideration since the American media and populace will need to get on board with academics to disturb the obstinate foreign policy elites.
  
  Mearsheimer follows the foundational chapters with a wide-ranging explanation of the limits of political liberalism. While he believes liberal democracy is a worthy pursuit domestically, he points out the contradictions and flaws in a system with such grand assumptions. These "cracks in the liberal edifice" usually reappear as calamitous failures when liberal democracy is purveyed on the international scale, which, as an anarchic playing field, lacks the requisite hierarchical organization (e.g. within nation-states) to ward off survival-driven realists and self-determined nationalists. In short, Mearsheimer contends that liberalism greatly underestimates these other forces. Time after time, liberal efforts abroad prove to be horribly naive, assuming that paternalistic good intentions and state-building activities will be greeted with appreciation as more states see the economic incentives, democratic virtues, and international integration that comes with caving to the liberal hegemon.
  
  To bolster these claims, Mearsheimer takes a tour of the various U.S. failures since it became the preeminent global power after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Syria are rather briskly explained, but I don't fault the author for some of the succinct declarations because most readers will already be somewhat familiar with these case studies. (As a brief aside, I'd like to applaud Mearsheimer's exhaustive endnotes—newcomers and experts alike will have plenty of reading to do!) Though George W. Bush may be the biggest culprit for liberalism's disasters, no recent president can avoid blame (highlighted by Mearsheimer's more detailed case study of Ukraine and the decades-long creeping threat of NATO and the EU on Russia's perimeter), and future presidents will likely cave to a liberal foreign policy as long as the U.S. remains the sole power and tolerant of its repeated failures.
  
  Mearsheimer's prescription for continued U.S. security and preeminence amounts to a lighter footprint abroad through a realist foreign policy that at once acknowledges the limits of state-building, economic influence, and cultural understanding; the resilient power of realism and nationalism, even among weak states; and the ghastly track record of liberal endeavors thus far. I, for one, am thoroughly convinced. This is an excellent book for realists looking to contextualize their arguments, liberals and idealists looking for compelling alternatives, and any curious reader wondering what may have caused things to go so horribly wrong.
• 
  Komal Mahmood

  Don't be fooled by this book. It looks simple and short, but it isn't.
  I came across this author when I was researching about the liberal international order and I read one of his papers on the emergence and the possible downfall of the currently sweeping trend of liberalism. I was impressed and a 20 paged paper wasn't enough for me. Fortunately I got an entire book on it and by the same author.
  
  I learned a lot from it. It is thoroughly researched and elaborates several points for why the current system is likely to falter in the face of the various other paradigms which are better suited to explain the evolving international relations in an utterly complex political world.
  Thomas Kuhn describes a criteria for the acceptance of a paradigm, it is the one which can best analyze contemporary events. Liberalism in the words of Francis Fukuyama in his article 'the end of history', had managed to defeat fascism in the first half of the twentieth century and communism in the second half, and during the time of Woodrow Wilson, when in that tumultuous inter-war situation he set out to enumerate his fourteen points and pin the blame on Germany, the liberal idea was an apt opponent to the capitalistic and fascist endeavours of Germany who had singlehandedly managed to ravage the order of the world.
  Doubtless liberalism was a champion then, and Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in the book Power and Independence claim that the entire United States foreign policy during the cold war was based around liberalism. It was the paradigm of the era. But could a single theory really help align the universal order with the complexity of human psychology and the near impossible nature of the latter to utterly let go of its quest for security and self preservation in order to maintain a civil society peacefully collaborating with every other without any fear of all its concept of nationhood being trampled underfoot.
  Kenneth Waltz in 'Man, the State, and War' cites Reinhold Neibuhr, St Augustine, Spinoza, and Hans Morgenthau to demonstrate that man since he is born and raised in insecurity endeavours throughout his life to make himself completely secure. He is a pygmy who believes himself a giant.
  St Augustine says that however wretched the existence of a man he will shrink with fear at the prospect of death. For the philosopher Spinoza, the end of every action of man is self preservation.
  It is the primal human instinct which is hard to ignore. Security, Mearsheimer says, is the goal of man, who is a social animal. Hobbesian contractualism is denied by Mearsheimer and that the philosopher's hunter gatherer is not a loner either. Man seeks his security in society which then defines its subjects who seek collective security through expansion, conquests, subjugation, curtailment of the opponent's powers. Mearsheimer encourages the utilitarian thought and cites Jeremy Bentham as having ridiculed the concept of natural right. Collective security and not individual security is what is the ultimate goal. Liberalism oversells individualism and universalism. It aims to spread its ideology throughout the globe and often oversteps it's boundary in that attempt, violating sovereignty of other nations, particularly authoritarian nations who are certain to be offended by a liberal state's interference in its state of affairs, which is liberalism's aim.
  But how potent is liberalism in the concepts it sells to the world? Mearsheimer writes about the liberal paradoxes which have no resolution. Limitless tolerance for one. Liberals believe in absolute tolerance but would they sit and wait when a liberal society is overthrown by another perhaps an authoritarian group to allow their live-and-let-live policy? Certainly not! John Locke was a staunch liberal but his writings are loaded with intolerance towards both the religionists and the atheists; the former he said pledged solely to God, the latter he believed had no faith in any higher authority whatsoever and are therefore not to be trusted. His title of 'the enemy of the human race', which Dan Edelstein in his book 'The Terror of Natural Right', cites as the pivotal clause of his works employed by the revolutionary Committee of Public Safety in France to pursue the execution of Louis XVI, as an epithet for every tyrant, and for the liberals every authoritarian dictator in whatever country is a tyrant. Locke says that it is the *duty* of the citizen to dispose of such an enemy who will inevitably cause the ruination of society.
  Mearsheimer also states that liberals sell individualism meanwhile completely neglecting the fact that human beings are organized into societies who possess a distinct culture, have a sense of sovereignty and autonomy, and are likely to defend it tooth and nail. A liberal state may wish to enter another territory but the intruded society will rebel without a doubt. And with this I agree. United States the flag bearer of liberalism has been engaged in the most wars throughout the world. It had its great moment when in the post cold war era it sat at the head of world politics as the unipole with its 'ministerial oversight', engaging militarily pretty much everywhere and behaving like a warden at the centre of a panopticon.
  
  Though Mearsheimer to some extent supports the clash of civilizations theory, he does not believe that culture alone can serve as an effective glue to ensure one's commitment to society. To him, fear and threat to one's security are key to keeping a society together and that is best done when a certain foreign agent is marked as the 'boogeyman' to watch out for.
  When it comes to sovereignty, self determination, and security, none of the liberal theories like democratic peace, liberal institutionalism, and economic interdependence work. Even Samuel P Huntington does not believe they work for he says that they may instead be agents more divisive to friendly relations because states are likely to engage in interdependent endeavours as long as they feel these capitalistic pursuits would last long and to their greater benefit.
  
  Economy is key in all this, Mearsheimer, when explaining the two branches of liberalism; progressive and modus vivendi (a la Adam Smith), says that the latter is related to economy because it discounts positive rights of the government in interfering in open market as anything but a promoter of jealous competition. Adam Smith's 'free hand' he says would guide the economy to a more prosperous end. Progressive liberals on the other hand, though agreeing with modus vivendi liberals on the content of individual rights, do not approve of their complete neglect of the government's ability to have a greater role in property redistribution, granting of equal opportunities, and playing an activist role in social engineering abroad. Progressive liberalism is therefore the one currently in vogue across the world. America is a Progressive liberal country with a highly activist policy which is likely to lose due to United States return to its pre-Roosevelt isolationism, especially if we analyze president Trump's speeches during his campaigns where he said that the liberal theory has done America more harm than good. Mearsheimer agrees with Trump on this, for with the resurrection of Russian power and the rise of China as the new economic empire, America will have no choice but to put realism back on the table. Mearsheimer and Trump definitely have a similar idea on how to 'make America great again'.
  
  Overall this is a good book, the ideal I believe for learning in detail about the liberal political thought. However I believe Mearsheimer is given to redundancy. there was much repetition throughout the text which if further edited could have reduced this 200 page book down to a 100 to 150. Mearsheimer tends to clump too many philosophers into a single paragraph which makes it hard to keep up (although it could just be me being dumb :/).
  But Mearsheimer writes in simple, easy to read language limiting the use of jargon where needed and when he employs it he ensures expounding on it. If you're looking for floral prose and top notch writing by contemporary political theorists, I'd suggest you pick Kissinger or Jonathan Israel or Kenneth Waltz. Mearsheimer is definitely not your thing.
• 
  Dustin

  If you've read any of Mearsheimer's paean's to realism before, then this doesn't break much new ground. He considers realism the most powerful explanatory tool for international relations as well as the superior approach to foreign policy.
  
  He presents realism, liberalism, and nationalism as three countervailing forces in international affairs, where he concludes realism triumphs over all. His arguments on nationalism seem like an afterthought to make the book feel more timely, and he mostly uses it as a cudgel to bash the prospects of international cooperation. He seems to glide past any tension between realism and nationalism.
  
  The book spends a lot of time with throat clearing and defining of terms, where you expect him to eventually get to a very tight argument, but it just sort of fizzles out, leaving a disjointed, mostly a priori argument in favor of realism. When he does offer evidence for his points it's often anecdotal. In some instances he makes sweeping pronouncements about state behavior based off of recent U.S. foreign policy decisions.
  
  But the book isn't without merit. The strongest argument he makes is about how liberal hegemony has meant more war and more restrictive rights at home, which are glaring contradictions in liberal beliefs. It's an important point to consider.
  
• 
  Michelle

  The first mearsheimer book I read. Really interesting and something new to think abt
  
  tbh this 1-hr long lecture (
  https://youtu.be/D_Mx_e8t7nU) was basically equal to my 2-week long reading of this Mearsheimer book
• 
  Karen

  I agree with the arguments and all, but could we please have gotten there faster?
• 
  Michael Gormley

  The Great Delusion offers a case for the pursuit of realism as the guiding principle of American foreign policy rather than liberal internationalism, or “liberalism.” This work succeeds in making a case for a restrained foreign policy in terms accessible to both newcomers and veterans of IR theory, though the book struggles with its critique of liberalism and its theorizing when applied to the foreign policy context.
  
  Mearsheimer writes with stark clarity and heavy sourcing to related pieces across the IR spectrum, in one sense making this book an excellent starting point for study of realist and liberal theory. The author takes care to explicate the definitions of his terms so to ensure his liberalism being largely associated with American neoconservatives, for instance, doesn’t confuse.
  
  While this work being a text of academic political science theory should grant it leeway in critique regarding its structure and prose, I must note the text’s formulaic structure stands out from the norm. The Great Delusion is essentially one giant list of lists. Mearsheimer took the Rule of 3 far too close to heart, with every subsection replete with a list or two of reasons and explanations. This has the effect of making the book a difficult speed read, as the great many arguments presented tend to meld together like bullet points on a never-ending checklist.
  
  I have many issues with Mearsheimer’s arguments, both in how they’re presented and what they omit. It’s difficult to capture them all under one trend, though I do believe one particular issue tops the rest: The core definitions presented for realism and liberalism seem tooled to not only confirm the author’s beliefs, but preclude any reasonable opposition. Mearsheimer’s liberalism is an all-or-nothing game, in which the only true adherents are those willing to crusade globally in the pursuit of universal rights and world governance. Any apparent regard paid to self-preservation renders one a realist. Perhaps this is informed by my bias as a liberal-minded realist, but I doubt even the most idealistic of internationalists would adhere to the author’s definition of liberalism.
  
  Mearsheimer also has a habit of dismissing or insufficiently responding to the arguments he critiques. For instance, he barely touches upon the U.S.-China relationship as an example of interdependent economic peace while baselessly asserting that China would still go to war over Taiwan. Raising the American Civil War as an example of interstate democratic war is highly tenuous, both in arguing the Confederacy was an independent state and a democracy, let alone a liberal one.
  
  In a way, The Great Delusion seems to take focus on the same event that many critiques of 21st century American foreign policy gravitate toward: the disastrous War in Iraq. It is perfectly suited to proving the work’s central thesis, as a war explicitly predicated on democratization that resulted in epic blowback. The focus on Iraq coupled with the author’s extreme definitions, though, exposes vulnerabilities in the argument through the remaining less applicable case studies. One might wonder how North Korea managed to survive the bloodthirsty liberal Clinton/Bush/Obama regimes unscathed, along with a great many other surviving despotic regimes that go unmentioned. Of the five other American excursions that Mearsheimer does mention, Libya and Syria stand out as poor examples of failed attempts at democratization since they were primarily humanitarian interventions.
  
  In fact, humanitarian motivations are rarely mentioned in the context of what drives liberal internationalism save for a brief acknowledgement of Responsibility to Protect. This gets at a key gap of the book, being the near exclusive interest in war as a means of foreign policy. Soft power and influence go unmentioned, despite their import to modern liberal foreign policy practice. Domestic motivations for war and peace are also barely considered, with liberal/democratic ideals given far too much weight in an effort to expressly confirm the thesis. Altogether, these gaps indicate a need for piecemeal or wholesale rebuttals to this work.
  
  The length of the critical portion of this review should not be taken for overall dissatisfaction with this book. I found it a worthwhile read and would recommend it as a case point in the argument for realism. I would simply caution relying on this too heavily as a foundational text, especially for newer readers too inexperienced to identify the biases and omissions I’ve noted, and to instead supplement this with some Ikenberry or other scholars across the ideological spectrum.
• 
  Azhar Zeeshan

  BOOK REVIEW:
  
  “As according to some natural law, in every century there seems to emerge a country, with power, will and the intellectual and moral impetus to shape the International System in accordance with its own values.” (Henry Kessinger)
  
  In the wake of the end of the Cold War, US emerged as sole superpower. The unipolar moment had arrived. With no rival major powers in the backyard, US embarked on a journey with firm determination to shape the world in its own image and to proselytize liberal values throughout the world. To achieve the desire objectives, US in the post-cold war era, pursue an ambitious foreign policy. John. J Mearsheimer a scholar of International Relations has termed the concerned ambitious foreign policy as “Liberal Hegemony” in his recent book “The Great Delusion.” Mearsheimer has described Liberal Hegemony as, a strategy aims to turn as many countries as possible into liberal democracies while also promoting an International economy and building international institutions.” The reason for pursuing such an ambitious foreign policy is the widely held belief in liberalism held by liberal elite in foreign policy establishment of US. They considered Liberalism as panacea for all the ills which have encompassed the contemporary world. On contrast, Mearshiemr argues liberal hegemony has made world more vulnerable rather than peaceful. It is the central argument upon which “The Great Delusion” is predicated.
  
  In the first quarter of the book the author has explained the basic philosophy underlying Political Liberalism. He has discussed the various strands of liberalism such as Modus Vivendi liberalism, Progressive Liberalism. Moreover, he has also unveiled the contradictions underlying liberalism such as contradiction exists in Particularist and Universalist strand of Liberalism (discussed in details in the book.)
  
  Level of analysis get change in the second quarter of the book. Mearsheimer, would put Liberalism and its various off shoots such as Economic Interdependence, Liberal Institutionalism and Democratic Peace theory on trial in the context of International Politics. By highlighting the limitations of these theories and by contrasting them with empirical historical records, the author has put forth convincing arguments, that neither Economic Interdependence, neither Liberal Democracies nor the International Institutions could guarantee the world peace. Nationalism according to author is the most powerful political ideology in contemporary world, shaping the entire International setup as nearly all the states of the world are nation states. In the clash of nationalism and liberal hegemony, the argument goes on, ultimately nationalism would prevail. Nationalism is the key factor behind the failure of Liberal Hegemony in achieving their desire objective to turn most of the states into Liberal democracies.
  
  At the end of the book the author predicts about the future orientation of US foreign policy. With the rise of China, and resurrection of Russia, the author argues, unipolarity is fading away and Power Politics would once again back into the limelight in International Politics. In that scenario, realpolitik would dictate the US foreign policy. In the face of nationalism, the author concludes, US should avoid pursuing liberal hegemony. To put it bluntly, US should avoid interfering in other states affairs and instead adopt the policy of restrain.
  
  Though, the book is convincing and argumentative enough overall, but there are certain gaps. For instance, by attributing the US intervention solely to the phenomenon of liberal hegemony the author has either smeared or ignored the fact, that most of the US interventions are driven by their scramble for resources. Moreover, by linking the failure of Liberal Hegemony to nationalism only, Mearsheimer has somehow ignored the importance of Geo Politics which are at play in most of the countries US has invaded, consider the example of Afghanistan for that matter.
• 
  Pete

  The Great Delusion : Liberal Dreams and International Realities (2018) by John Mearsheimer is a fascinating book where Professor Measheimer describes a thorough theoretical framework for how realism, nationalism and liberalism interact in international relations.
  First Mearsheimer defines liberalism. He defines modus vivendi liberalism which is what others would term classical liberalism and also progressive liberalism. These use something like Isiah Berlin's positive and negative freedoms. Positive freedoms are used for progressive liberalism and negative freedoms for modus vivendi liberalism. But both forms of liberalism are defined as looking at individual humans. Mearsheimer looks at this as a weakness and not being reflective of how people actually are in families and larger groups. The US's foreign policy is described as being driven by positive liberalism. Classical liberalism is far less interventionist.
  The book also makes the interesting philosophical point that liberalism allows for people to find their own values, but anyone who finds values that don't align with liberal values create problems with liberal democracy.
  Mearsheimer points out that nationalism is more powerful than liberals expect or allow for. Liberalism in international affairs is also driven by elites who have less national loyalty and are able to move more easily between countries. The elites pushing these ideas also see spreading these rights and liberal democracy as a mission that gives them a purpose.
  Realism is also carefully described. Realism is defined as respect for the balance of power, a realisation that conflict between states is something that must be allowed for and that respecting other states strategic interest is wise.
  Finally Mearsheimer points out that the attempt to propagate these rights threatens the rulers of any country that isn't a liberal democracy and makes normal relations with them difficult. This is because leaders of liberal democracies see leaders of states that are not liberal democracies as illegitimate.
  Finally the practical implications of the US's foreign policy since the end of the Cold War is described. The Liberal Interventionist idealogy that Mearsheimer has defined earlier is used as the framework for this. The failure to create new liberal democracies and the endless war is the price for this. Mearsheimer points out that the US has been at war for 2 out of every 3 years since the end of the Cold War. Also that the US has now been at war for 19 years since 2001.
  Mearsheimer then goes on to say that realism would be a better foreign policy for the US. This is because it would be far less ambitious and it would not threaten other powers that are not liberal democracies. In particular Russia and China would not feel as threatened by the US as they do now.
  The Great Delusion is a dense, heavy read that provides a thorough theoretical foundation for current US policy and provides a strong justification for an alternative foreign policy. It was also interesting for me in that it contained careful exposition of theory that wasn't math. It's well worth reading for anyone interested in foreign policy. The Great Delusion is an excellent book.
  
• 
  Qing Wang

  Given the spectacular failure of American foreign policy on display and the disastrous consequences caused by its military intervention, no wonder the oppsition voices are becoming more and more audible.
  
  This book does a good job in explaining how realism and nationalism should not to be neglected, as well as in dissecting the inherently incompatible strands in liberalism.
  
  What it fails to do, if the author's ultimate goal is to bring about a more peaceful and prosperous world, is to discern what does liberal dream exactly mean. I hope it is not a dream confined to America understanding alone.
  
  America's biggest mistake is that it tries to reshape the world in its own image. In other words, it tries to force other peoples to dream a dream in its own particular way.
  
  Americans believe there is a fundamental set of inalienable human rights that should transend everything else. The reality is that as social anminals individuals are usually willing to sacrifice personal interests for something they deem higher/nobler.
  
  It might be interesting for a linguist to ponder over that Chinese language does not distingush "liberty" and "freedom". If liberty is to do as one wills, freedom is to exert the liberty rights with discretion. America perhaps is putting too much emphasis on liberty without realising the significance of freedom.
  
  For a nation-state, self-determination means the freedom to choose how to behave. Liberty hegemony is a ridiculous term as it brings disgrace to liberty itself and makes it a lesser pursuit. There is always something higher/nobler, even the liberal crusaders are setting their course to find the universal liberty. Should we see it as they put hegemony above liberty?
  
  It seems that America (or this book) has difficulty in understanding that the longing for freedom/liberty is in human nature and thus not something to be imposed but to be cultivated and nurtured.
  
  Individuals should be encouraged to find their own path, the same with a country or a nation-state. Authoritarian is no good because it hinders individuals' pursuit of their own fulfilment. Liberal hegemony is bad because it denies that other countries/cultures can have their own values and can do good for their own people.
  
  Liberty/freedom will not be a remote dream if we put faith in people. Great powers compete and go to war because they feel insecure. How to make them feel safe? The answer should not be a higher authority. That's against the principle of liberal democracy itself. Why something good for a nation cannot be reproduced in the international community? What is lacking is a common culture and history. Can we bring that around?
  
  Of course we can. Understand each other as human, not as American human or some other human. Aim to help, not to prevail. Violence only breeds violence. Killing cannot bring about love.
  
  As America cannot understand the difference between its own interpretation of liberty and those of other cultures/nations, now it is retreating from the world stage, acting irresponsibly and thus bringing more damage to the liberal aspiration and its own image. It's a tragedy for itself and for the world.
• 
  Ted Tyler

  Mearsheimer is one of the most controversial figures in the American political science establishment. He says things that are really tough, and he does it in an unrepentant manner. That said, I think many of his arguments in this book are compelling. Even if one disagrees with him, Mearsheimer's writing style and disciplined technique has a certain "je ne sais quoi" characteristic that is found lacking in most academic books. He writes in plain English and is easy to understand.
  
  In his most recent book, he talks about why liberal hegemony has been the cornerstone of American foreign policy failures. He favors liberalism as a form of government in the US, but his book talks about the problems liberal democracies encounter when they become superpowers. Mearsheimer's analysis points out that liberal democracies end up wanting to undergo regime change, social engineering, and democracy promotion. These things are actually incredibly difficult and the US has failed. For every Japan and Germany, there is an Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Nicaragua, Vietnam. Why does these tactics fail? Part of the problem is hubris, thinking that state building can be undertaken by a country that sees farther and wider.
  
  But the larger problem are forces of nationalism. Underestimate these forces that your peril. Mearsheimer argues that humans are far more socially-minded than they are individually-minded. This is important because it lays the foundation for banding together as tribes, clans, and nation-states. Liberalism ends up emphasizing individual rights and discounts the power of social forces. This makes it hard to create and sustain liberal democracies. In Mearsheimer's telling of the story, national interests will always end-up trumping liberal interests. For example, the US invaded Iraq after the UN opposed the motion.
  
  Mearsheimer also sees the problems liberal hegemony creates back home. He points out that the importance of leveraging military power creates a national security state that is cloaked in secrecy, deception, lies, and ever-expanding power. These create problems for free speech and transparency, which are necessary for the continued health of democracy. Instead of trying to actively promote democracy abroad and undergo grand feats of social engineering, Mearsheimer calls for a strategy that would have the US pull back and focus its political efforts on core interests. He sees American core interests as maintaining dominance in the Western hemisphere and balancing against the emergency of a regional hegemon in Europe or East Asia.
• 
  Solo Wrightson

  An elaborate narrative that articulates the premises of liberalism and its various boroughs that came out over the last few centuries mainly in the English-speaking world.
  
  Its main purpose, though, is to deconstruct the cornerstones that hold up the current political thinking predominant in the United States, to spread liberal democracy all over the world, which does not vary far among the two parties.
  
  Limited background knowledge concerning alternative historical narratives which might be vital to understand what lies beneath the conflicts present in today's Middle-east and East Asia, possibly due to the author's unwillingness to read up on the history outside of Europe before the 16th century.
  
  Because of that, Mearshemier cannot explain how liberal democracy could be successfully applied in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, and not in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan, anywhere beyond stating that "Japan had partial democracy in the 1920's", which is not an explanation enough to back up his arguments that liberal democracy can hardly be installed anywhere outside of the West.
  
  For that matter, it is crucial for readers to understand that the Enlightenment philosophy, upon which the modern states in Europe have been founded, was essentially an extension of Chinese political thinking which had held a prototypical parliamentary system, where a group of high-ranking bureaucrats who were in charge of different parts of policies who had the rights to object and check upon the potentially tyrannical emperor's order. At times, the emperors in Chinese dynasties had hardly any practical influence in practice.
  
  This philosophy was imported by the Christian missionaries who were initially sent to teach Bible in the 13th century Yuan, who eventually came back to teach what seemed non-existent in Western Europe at that time. This fact is also left unmentioned in his other book, 'The Tragedy of Great Power Politics'.
  
  The style of writing is clear and inviting to beginners.
• 
  Tan Heng

  A persuasive and compelling case for the realist school of thought for international relations, the world and the approach of foreign policy rather than the pursuit of U.S. liberal hegemony. Professor John Mearsheimer, a prominent and accomplished American realist scholar, analysed the rival liberal school of thought and provided his insights and counterarguments in support of the realist approach. He believes that foreign policy establishment is delusional in trying to turn as many countries into liberal democracies as possible through liberal hegemony, resulting in problems for itself and the world. For instance, in the Greater Middle East, America intervened in Iraq and Afghanistan and turned the region into what he calls “a great disaster zone”. He believed that America as the sole superpower has underestimated the power of nationalism in the world, which the author repeatedly emphasised its importance. He pointed out the flaws of liberalism, such as violating the others’ countries sovereignty in pursuit of liberal hegemony. He called for a change to realist and restrained foreign policy which will best serve American interests and also make the world a better place. I believe that it would be an influential book for many people. This book is a valuable contribution to realism. It will be valuable in influencing my thinking and applications to what is happening in the world today. It has also served to “burst” the “delusional” thinking of liberalism by showing that it does not work in the international realm. Overall, a powerful critique of liberalism and an appeal to realism.
• 
  Amid عميد

  The traditional globalist view of the United States’ role in the international order is that the country has a responsibility to spread liberal democracy across the world, foster an open international economy and build global institutions.
  
  This policy of remaking the world in America’s image is supposed to protect human rights, promote peace and uphold liberal democratic values.
  
  John Mearsheimer argues that the United States has, in reality, become a highly militarized state fighting wars that undermine peace, harm human rights and threaten liberal values on US soil.
  
  He contends that the liberal hegemony that has defined US and Western foreign policy since the Cold War is doomed to fail and a more restrained foreign policy based on nationalism and realism could prove more effective.
  
  إن النظرة العالمية التقليدية لدور الولايات المتحدة في النظام الدولي هي أن الدولة تتحمل مسؤولية نشر الديمقراطية الليبرالية في جميع أنحاء العالم ، وتعزيز اقتصاد دولي مفتوح وبناء مؤسسات عالمية
  
  من المفترض أن تحمي سياسة إعادة تشكيل العالم على صورة أمريكا حقوق الإنسان ، وتعزز السلام وتدعم القيم الديمقراطية الليبرالية
  
  يزعم جون ميرشايمر بأن الولايات المتحدة قد أصبحت ، في الواقع ، دولة عسكربة تخوض حروبًا تقوض السلام وتضر بحقوق الإنسان وتهدد القيم الليبرالية على الأراضي الأمريكية
  
  وهو يؤكد أن الهيمنة الليبرالية التي حددت السياسة الخارجية للولايات المتحدة والغرب منذ الحرب الباردة محكوم عليها بالفشل وأن السياسة الخارجية الأكثر انضباطًا والقائمة على القومية والواقعية يمكن أن تكون أكثر فاعلية
• 
  Douglas

  Quite depressing reading realist foreign policy proscriptions. It would be nice to have some further solution or solution analysis than "be an example" since that happens anyway, to some extent. One of the things that undermines that is a US electoral system that means Republicans can hold effectively more than half of power despite numerically being well under half the electorate: true for presidential and congressional elections as well.
  
  I'm also rather underwhelmed by the analysis of Tr*mp's policies. Though consistent with realist policy in some ways the motivation would seem to be anything but. A realist approach to Russia would be completely open-eyed, rather than obsequious. A realist approach to China would likewise be open-eyed, rather than bellicose. A realist approach to the Middle East would ... you get the idea.
  
  I'll definitely read more Mearsheimer but I can't say that the realist approach is in any way compelling, lacking in vision as it is. For example, one simply yields Ukraine, Georgia and similarly the Baltics to Russia? That's it? Might not a realist approach find ways to question granting Russia such power in the first place? Hence the reason Putin so readily placed nuclear weapons in the discussion.