Fighting with America: A Lowy Institute Paper: Penguin Special: Why saying ‘No’ to the US wouldn’t rupture the alliance by James Curran

Fighting with America: A Lowy Institute Paper: Penguin Special: Why saying ‘No’ to the US wouldn’t rupture the alliance Reviews

• 
  Philip

  While a lot has happened since this essay was published in 2016 (e.g. the election of Trump, Covid, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and US / Australian / Chinese trade wars), its premise remains relevant: Australia's foreign and defence policies should remain independent and maintain sovereign decision-making.
  
  The essay begins by contextualising the ANZUS alliance, namely that unlike NATO, it is vague and does not include an ironclad agreement that an attack on one party is an attack on all. Rather, it just requires all parties to consult. This was clear from the beginning in 1951 when John Foster Dulles said to General Douglas Macarthur in the wake of the treaty's signing that ANZUS "does not commit any nation to action in any particular part of the world" and therefore the US could "discharge its obligation by action against a common enemy in any way and in any area that it sees fit".
  
  The essay portrays a clear divide between how the US views the ANZUS obligations versus how Australia interprets it. Australia chooses to see it as a "political institution in its own right, comparable with a political party or the monarchy". This means ANZUS is sacrosanct and the cornerstone for all Australian foreign and defence policy planning. But this wasn't always the case. As Gough Whitlam pointed out, "adherence to ANZUS does not constitute a foreign policy". Self-reliance was a central tenet of Australian policy up until the Howard Government when ANZUS was invoked for the first time after 9/11. Previous Governments, both Labor and Liberal, had found comfort in the imprecise language of the Treaty as it both provided a deterrent effect while also not derogating Australia's sovereign decision-making.
  
  The author points out that Australia should not always rely on the US for military support simply because our national interests do not always align. An example is the US refusal to send military aid during Indonesia's "Confrontation" towards Malaysia during the 1960s. Similarly, the US did not commit so much "as a ship, a plane at the very least" to the INTERFET operation in East Timor. Later, this led some politicians to argue that just as there were no US boots on the ground in East Timor, there should be no Australian boots on the ground in Iraq.
  
  There is also the issue of the US not involving or informing allies in its decision-making when it directly affects the national security of allies. An example is the 1993 decision by the US to launch cruise missiles into Iraq despite Australia having a naval ship in the Red Sea to enforce an embargo against Saddam Hussein's regime. Similarly, in 1983 the Reagan administration failed to consult Margaret Thatcher prior to the US invasion of Granada, despite it being a Commonwealth Nation.
  
  Since Australia's participation in the US-led War on Terror, "the image of Australia as an American lickspittle has almost completely disappeared from mainstream Australian politics". This became evident from Julia Gillard's approval of a permanent US marine rotation at Darwin, and the silencing of any politician or public official who may suggest that ANZUS would not necessarily require Australia to support the US in a conflict over Taiwan (a la Alexander Downer in 2004). As a side note, this unquestioning faith in US military support was demonstrated by the immediate support of AUKUS by the Labor Party, despite not being consulted, in 2021. This unquestioning support would not have happened in pre-Howard politics.
  
  I gave this essay three stars because it did not outline how Australia should implement a foreign and defence policy that disabuses the US that Australia's support is automatic, but US support is optional. How do we re-interpret ANZUS so that, in the words of Gough Whitlam, it's not the "be all and end all" of Australian policy.
• 
  Sunny Flynn

  A well written essay that puts history and future into perspective.
• 
  NinaCD

  Excellent analysis of the ANZUS alliance -- both historically and current.
• 
  Jonathan

  Writes Curran: "Australian governments and commentators should aim to transcend some of the older stereotypes and themes that have constrained public discussion on the relationship with Washington: the idea of Australia as an American satellite; of ANZUS as a kind of insurance policy; or the asusmption that a commitment to 'Western civilisation' and 'Western values' explains policy choices made by Australian governments since 9/11. These all derive from the kinds of arguments being made by policymakers, historians, and strategic commentators in the 1950s and 1960s. As historian David McLean has shown, the resilience of such conceptual frameworks shows nothing less than the 'triumph of memory' over history. This is cause for concern. It represents not only a failure to treat the past on its own terms, but an alarming complacency in terms of reconceptualising the alliance for the new circumstances."
  
  This book is best as history: his charting of the course of Australian disagreement with America as shaped by different governments' outlook on the alliance is illuminating, and I particularly enjoyed his contextualizing of the anti-American (or America-skeptical) Labor left of the 1970s and 1980s. Relatedly, Gareth Evans has a fair few quotes in here that should be read by those tempted to treat his comments on Trump and America this past week as significant news: Evans has been saying not dissimilar things for a long time.
  
  The contemporary argument is a staid one, which does not mean it is not wise; the sensible analyst of Asia-Pacific politics will always have the problem that the Hugh White–or-beyond side of things will inevitably be attention-grabbing, even as — or because — it urges less sound prescriptions.
  
  There are things I would like to see further considered on this subject, though they are outside this short book's purview: the Australian public's evolving view on the US, for instance, and the change in form that anti-American sentiments have taken over years.* I am curious also about Australia's lack of reflection on its enthusiastic support for the Iraq disaster, the starkest example this century of when it would have been appropriate for us to "stand up" to our alliance partner. And though we hear of John Howard's preference as PM for an Australia that sided with its historical ties to the United Kingdom and the United States over its Asian present, I think we should remember that Howard's analysis is flawed, deriving from racist theories of Anglo unity and supremacy. We are departing far from our subject matter here, but better to see Australia's relations with Asia and the US equally as a means of moving beyond our colonial past.
  ——
  *There is still disdain for America to be found on all sides of politics — conservatives are only pro-American in the sense that it makes for a useful political attack on the other side's foreign policy crededentials — but in an Australia of American barbeque, semesters abroad in US colleges, recent memories of Barack Obama, and premium Netflix dramas on demand, we have moved beyond the mixture of ignorance of, and disgust and disdain for, American culture and society that undergirded an Australia more in thrall to the apparent sophistication of its European colonial past. I think of David Dale writing in 1988 of how he could not find a single good restaurant in all New York; a reverse Crocodile Dundee of a Sydney sophisticate turning his nose up at what we all knew was a global capital of uncouth cowboys.