The Human Predicament: A Candid Guide to Life's Biggest Questions by David Benatar

The Human Predicament: A Candid Guide to Life's Biggest Questions Reviews

• 
  Stephen Rowland

  I have been aware that life sucks for a very long time, but this book opened my eyes to new ways this "gift" is undeniably bad. Thanks a lot, mom and dad, you selfish shits.
  
  EVEN BETTER THE SECOND TIME.
• 
  Andrei Khrapavitski

  David Benatar is a dangerous mind. You won’t find a photo or a video with his face online. Keep reading and you’ll understand why. Remember True Detective Season 1? Oh, yeah, that classic! Now recall the pessimistic philosophy of detective Rustin "Rust" Cohle brilliantly portrayed by McConaughey. Guess where the script writers found ideas for that? Enter Benatar (and a number of other authors with similar ideas).
  
  Well, pessimism in philosophy is nothing new. The classical forms of pessimism are found in works of pre-socratic philosophers such as Heraclitus and Parmenides. You would also find pessimism in works of Baltasar Gracián, Voltaire et al. Later came (most notably) Schopenhauer and many others.
  
  Why bother with another pessimist author? Well, unlike some other contemporary pessimists (like Thacker or Ligotti or previously Cioran), Benatar’s works are recognizably philosophical texts, well-written and clear, not some pessimistic musings about the horrors of life. Even if you disagree with his conclusions, you can certainly follow his reasoning. Maybe this is the reason why Peter Singer chose to engage (at least, thrice) in discussing the works and ideas of this author. I also posted an interesting conversation between David Benatar and Sam Harris. So, yeah, Benatar gets noticed.
  
  So here is his latest book. In fact, this is already a third book by this author I’ve read. And I have to tell you, if you are into philosophy, Benatar ensures you’ll have evenings of engaging reading.
  
  So what is that “Human Predicament” all about? Well, in short, there is no cosmic meaning of our lives whatsoever and the quality of our lives is much worse than many of us like to think. In addition, we bring more unhappy lives into existence by procreating. We also create a lot of misery and suffering, for instance, by consuming animal products. Benatar, a vegan by the way, spares some pages for the predicament of nonhuman animals, too.
  
  First, Benatar deals with the question of meaning, whether there is some significant point to our lives or whether our lives are rather all either pointless or insignificant. Put another way, meaning, in his view, is about “transcending limits.” A meaningful life is one that transcends one’s own limits and significantly impacts others or serves purposes beyond oneself. According to Benatar somewhat good news is that our lives can be meaningful on individual level or the level of a family or a small group. But the wider the circle gets the less of any meaning our life possesses. Take even the level of the family. A few generations pass, and you are forgotten as if you’ve never existed.
  
  If we get to talk about a life having a “point” or be “significant” or “transcend limits” on a larger scale, it is usually by making an important mark. However, people can make marks in numerous ways, and many of those marks are moral stains. Indeed, among those who have made the biggest impacts in human history are vast numbers of vile people, claims the author.
  
  Few people can claim to have truly made a mark on a global scale. And if we get to talk about meaning “from the point of view of the universe,” sorry Sigwick, there’s no meaning whatsoever.
  
  In Benatar’s view, it is wrong to equate the cosmic perspective with terrestrial concerns. In fact, if you are really following what science tells us, you should be appalled by how cosmically insignificant we are.
  
  Well, I must admit, my own intuitions about meaning diverge from Benatar’s. I think it's liberating that we are deprived of some predefined cosmic purpose or meaning. We don’t need an omnipotent dictator to give us meaning. We are thrown into existence and are forced to create it for ourselves. Benatar acknowledges that we are able to do it. Otherwise we would see an unending stream of suicides and chronic depression. Benatar himself opposes suicide on moral grounds unless it is really warranted. While taking one’s own life would bring relief from the angst associated with the absence of cosmic meaning, it would not actually give one’s life any cosmic meaning, Benatar is right to claim. Still you wonder how come he is not a promortalist, rather an antinatalist? According to him, the quality of our lives is truly horrid.
  
  Unconvinced? Consider this, for example. Your worst pains are worse than your best pleasures are good. If you deny this, ask yourself whether you would accept an hour of the most delightful pleasures in exchange for an hour of the worst tortures. Arthur Schopenhauer makes a similar point when he asks us to “compare the respective feelings of two animals, one of which is engaged in eating the other.” The animal being eaten suffers and loses vastly more than the animal that is eating gains from this one meal.
  
  Consider too the temporal dimensions of injury or illness and recovery. One can be injured in seconds: One is hit by a bullet or projectile, or is knocked over or falls, or suffers a stroke or heart attack. In these and other ways, one can instantly lose one’s sight or hearing or the use of a limb or years of learning. The path to recovery is slow. In many cases, full recovery is never attained. Injury comes in an instant, but the resultant suffering can last a lifetime.
  
  Benatar claims that we are subjective and often wrong in evaluating the quality of our lives. He is right to notice that those who sustain severe injuries or get impaired, after a while, get adapted to the new reality of their lives, and their subjective quality of life increases as they get used to the new circumstances.
  
  Well, he himself has pointed out a problem with this sort of argumentation. We are indeed subjective. It is hard to evaluate human life as a whole and convincingly claim that all things considered the bad outweighs the good.
  
  It was interesting to spot Benatar’s interest in the ideas of transhumanism. However, he thinks that transhumanism is often unduly optimistic. It assumes that the quality of life after the anticipated enhancements would be good (enough). This assumption is problematic for Benatar. While the quality of life would be better, it is not clear that it would be good enough to count as good. For example, it would be better to live much longer in good health, and it would be better if we knew much more than we do, but even lives enhanced in these and other ways would be far from ideal. We would still die, and we would still have vastly more ignorance than knowledge.
  
  Well, you get the picture. So what are we left with? As Benatar famously claimed in this and other books, we shouldn’t procreate. You can also spare yourself the trouble of reading philosophy :).
  
  As Benatar puts it, the optimist might say: “I recognize the human predicament. It is horrible, but I want to adopt an optimistic view to help me cope. I shall continue, at the back of my mind, to be aware of the predicament, but I can compartmentalize those thoughts—or at least try to.” Let’s call this offering a pragmatic optimism.
  
  But this is not what Benatar prefers. On reason is that if you are eclipsed by the optimism, you might lose sight of the human predicament and create more people.
  
  For Benatar, the preferred option is to embrace the pessimistic view, but navigate its currents in one’s life. It is possible to be an unequivocal pessimist but not dwell on these thoughts all the time. They may surface regularly, but it is possible to busy oneself with projects that create terrestrial meaning, enhance the quality of life (for oneself, other humans, and other animals), and “save” lives (but not create them).
  
  Whatever you think of his line of thinking, in conclusion, he is right to observe that individual humans have their own personal predicaments, some of which are worse than others: All things being equal, the poor and destitute are worse off than those who are economically more privileged; the sick are worse off than the healthy; the ugly are worse off than the attractive; and the gloomiest pessimists are worse off than others, including those pessimists who have the gift of managing the negative impact of pessimism on their lives.
  
  So maybe what we can do is help one another cope with predicaments in life, create meaning for those around us and try to have a positive impact on our global civilization while we are alive.
• 
  Uroš Rajšić

  
• 
  Luciana Nery

  I'm buying a few more copies, so that I can give them away to friends. The one I had is gone already.
  
  Not that the book is without its problems. The excess of "if, then" arguments make the reading objective and simple to follow, but it also lays out many traps for the reader - if... then? What if no, it does not follow? Because whereas I agree with the author on this main points, I also find that his conclusions are not so trouble-free as to warrant an "if, then" syntax.
  
  The most intriguing part, for me, is when he details the extent of which no life is good. Not mine, not yours. Even the best of lives is still pretty tragic. Our quality of life is appalling in general, though much worse in some cases. By your mid-twenties it is all one big decline, even as people try to compensate those losses with wisdom and kindness. Yet the truth is that we lose our health in the small and big ways; we lose our youthful appearance and the skin starts to sag; our cognitive abilities decline, then we suffer pains and more pains, and then we die. All this decline is happening even as we earn a promotion, enjoy our precious vacations or feel good for some of the time.
  
  Also enjoyed how he claims that suicides should be avoided at all costs - except if there is a perfectly rational motive for doing it, like a terminal illness or deep incapacitation. Suicide is not stupid, egotistical, brave, or cowardly - it is a decision that can be made in a manner of despair, but, ideally, should be made rationally.
• 
  Christopher

  You can consider me someone who agrees with Benatar that Life is a Battlefield, and with his most famous antinatalist views. That being said, I think I am coming to the realization that I do not find many of his other subsidiary arguments convincing. His attempts to make the case that death is also bad, though heavily quantified, seem to me utterly unconvincing. His attempt to get one over on Epicurus makes me think Epicurus still holds the lead in this discussion. More importantly, the general pessimist viewpoint that a lack of meaning and purpose in life leads to suffering I find utterly baffling. Those things are, if anything, liberating from the everday suffering that generally makes me favor anti-natalist arguments.
  
  Perhaps, in the end, I am much more like Lovecraft: an indifferentist. Existential crisis are for try-hards and pearl clutchers. Even still, in a relentlessly and terrifyingly optimistic culture as ours, its necessary to read such things as this as both escape and a corrective. And Benatar is, in the end, a good writer and a rigorous thinker.
• 
  Chant

  Extremely light reading.
• 
  Haselrig

  I received this book as a Goodreads giveaway.
  
  David Benatar's The Human Predicament: A Candid Guide to Life's Biggest Questions is a sober, clear-eyed exploration of what may represent the essential questions of human existence.
  
  The fundamental tragedy of being human is our capacity to understand that, through no fault of our own, we find ourselves in an existential trap. One for which there is no escape. That humans tend towards a sort of optimism about their predicament that leads them to pass this tragedy on to their offspring in an attempt to circumvent their essential meaningless only prolongs our suffering as a species and only serves to pull more and more bodies into that self-same trap. Depressing stuff, but as presented by Benatar, hard to dispute.
  
  Not a light or easy read, but for anyone who questions their place in the universe, an essential one. Five stars.
  
• 
  Nenad Vukusic

  Got this book for my 45th birthday, in the year 2020 from a friend who knew I was kind of depressed and losing interest in things that usually had me going. The author is an analytical philosopher, meaning he looks and compares things in a dead pan manner, taking out emotion and humanities love for romanticising stories and times. It is bleak and depressing, but somehow, among all these fears and insecurities of the end of times and fiery tornadoes and nazis coming back and earth boiling us alive, it seemed strangely relaxing, even funny at places. I have just scratched the surface and have found myself worried and amused with the accuracy and normalcy of some of the claims Benatar makes about the meaning of human life (have you considered yours yet? don't worry, you will), and am really looking forward to chapters on suicide and death. I would not recommend it to a depressed person, but since I was depressed when I started reading it and had a "oh, wait EVERYONE feels this?!" moments while reading it, maybe depressed people need to read it.
  
  Tl:dr. No, there is no meaning, so try to make the best of it and be nice to people around you. Treat them like human beings, therein you just might find meaning.
• 
  Scriptor Ignotus

  The Pessimistic Predicament
  
  David Benatar is what you might call a Debbie Downer. He preaches a robust, but not unmitigated, pessimism, arguing that although our lives may have some “terrestrial” meaning insofar as we make a positive impact on our communities and leave behind a legacy from which others may benefit, our existence is nonetheless completely meaningless—both as individuals and as a species—from what Benatar calls the “Cosmic Perspective”: the perspective the universe[s] would have if it had a perspective. Human life, though not without the possibility of momentary pleasure, is overwhelmingly bleak and tragic at its core, pervaded by varying degrees of physical and psychological anguish, and is unfailingly performed, like a jester-show in the court of a tyrant, under the shadow of our certain annihilation.
  
  Although hedonistic philosophers like Epicurus saw death as a release from the pain of existence and thus not something to be feared or despised, Benatar wants to rob us even of that consolation. Death, he says, is a bad thing in-and-of itself, even for the one who dies, because it deprives us of what we want most instinctually—that is, to live—and because it annihilates us. Being born under the shadow of death is thus a greater evil than never being born at all, because the latter possibility does not necessitate suffering, deprivation, and obliteration, while the former one does. It is therefore “unconscionable”, according to Benatar’s reasoning, to create new living beings. By having children, we trap new consciousnesses in the snare of the human predicament; we spread the disease of existence. This man explicitly describes procreation as a “sexually transmitted ‘virus’” that “spreads the existential predicament”, and attributes the perpetuation of the human race to “negligence”, “indifference”, “selfishness”, and “misplaced altruism”. He is no doubt a hit at baby showers.
  
  Such a bleak view of the human condition is nothing new. We find it, in various forms, in Heraclitus and Democritus, Epicurus and Lucretius, Macbeth and Hamlet, in Qohelet (the Biblical book of Ecclesiastes) and in the Wisdom of Solomon. Many have lamented the suffering and futility intrinsic to life. The world’s largest religion is devoted to the worship of a man who is said to have emerged on the other side of death, and who now serves as a portal through which the children of Adam might transcend the vanity of life in the realm of corruptible flesh and matter; which, whether or not one accepts this belief, testifies powerfully to the perceived direness of life under the reign of death and impermanence.
  
  Yet it is peculiar that in our own time, the sort of philosophy espoused by Benatar—pessimistic, materialistic, hedonistic, and vaguely utilitarian—has become fashionable primarily among the middle and upper classes of Europe and America: precisely those people who have been better positioned than virtually anyone else in the history of the world to mitigate the unpleasant aspects of life. Though Benatar argues convincingly that even the most fortunate human lives are unavoidably tragic, it is a predominantly “first-world” phenomenon to assert the meaninglessness of life over and above any supposedly false consolation. Meanwhile, the peoples of the “third world”, with whom we shudder at the prospect of trading places, who work harder, die younger, repose in squalor, and spend their lives suffering from ailments which are easily treatable in wealthy nations, live lives which they perceive to be rich with meaning. The tribal animists of the world smile in the face of death, while we in the sedentary world sulk behind our palace walls.
  
  This may be because there is something romantic and individualistic in the pessimistic stance, which makes it more conducive to the navel-gazing existence of post-industrial societies than to the more communal forms of life to which human beings are more biologically accustomed, and which still prevail in significant—but shrinking—corners of the world. A romantic pessimist can only fulfill his pessimism alone (or at least with the perception that he is alone), because his pessimism is a means of establishing his uniqueness. In a world of mindless, self-deceiving optimism, he imagines himself to be the only one with the perception to recognize the harsh realities of existence and the courage to face them head-on. Like Hester Prynne’s baby in The Scarlet Letter, the pessimism of the pessimist, that which draws the scorn of the surrounding society, is both the means and the evidence of his transcendence of that society. One might detect something of a typological Savior complex subtly at work in the minds of certain first-world pessimists; though I’m not accusing Benatar of this.
  
  But what about Benatar’s arguments? They’re certainly coherent; but they’re only compelling if one accepts certain presuppositions that underlie his thought process. The most fundamental of these is his materialism: his treatment of the cosmos as a closed and self-contained system of matter and energy; of physical cause and effect. His materialism proscribes any engagement with metaphysics; in fact, he offers no discussion of metaphysical arguments at all; which I found odd, because the most longstanding contrary perspectives to pessimism typically have metaphysical dimensions to them. Such a perspective, though not obviously wrong, is susceptible to challenge from any number of non-materialist positions.
  
  This materialism somewhat narrows Benatar’s definitions of both the meaningfulness and goodness of life. Meaning, for Benatar, is reducible to leaving a legacy; which, when one considers that time obliterates all “legacies”, makes it unsurprising that he would go on to conclude that life is ultimately meaningless. Likewise, Benatar reduces the goodness of life to a felicific calculus: a simple ratio of pleasure to pain. If we spend more time in discomfort than in states of bliss, then to live is simply a misfortune. Anyone coming from an idealistic or, dare I say, theistic perspective; who believes, like the Thomists, that physical existence is only a type of metaphor or analogue of a greater, original, all-encompassing reality—is unlikely to go along with an analysis of the “big questions” of life undertaken under such restricted terms.
  
  There’s also an irony in Benatar’s conceptual framing of his arguments. If we accept his materialism and say that all discussion of meaning, goodness, and value must refer only to the realm of physical contingency, then the distinctions he draws between life and death, humanity and nature, and the terrestrial and cosmic perspectives become completely arbitrary. Life and death are merely two chemical states, and the mutation of one into the other is no more significant than the changing of a liquid into a gas. It seems like a big deal in our minds, but our minds are nothing more than another type of matter, and thus a part of the same chemical processes.
  
  What objective distinction is there to be made between the terrestrial and cosmic perspectives? The earth and its biosphere are as much part of the cosmos as the Andromeda galaxy; nothing in the universe is really more significant than anything else. Benatar asserts the indifference and non-perception of the cosmos, and yet a small segment of the cosmos—about the size of both of my fists put together—is currently ordering its appendages to type up a review of his book, based on its perceptions of his arguments and their significance. The “rest” of the universe may be indifferent to us, but in point of fact, what does that actually mean? Benatar’s definition of the “cosmic perspective”—as the perspective the universe would have if it had a perspective—trivializes his conception of our meaninglessness. To say that the universe is indifferent to us is to say that Alpha Centauri doesn’t know or care how your day went. But who gives a shit? This is not what most people have in mind when they wonder about the meaning of life.
  
  In the end, though it’s unlikely to change minds, The Human Predicament is a valuable elaboration of an old but tireless mode of thought.
  
• 
  Richard

  Life sucks
  
  The anti-natalist philosopher David Benatar goes to great lengths to explain why "life sucks and then you die" (which sucks).
• 
  Romany

  A clear, sensible argument that I’ll probably read more than once. It also felt deeply reassuring. I will try to be a pragmatic pessimist and create as much terrestrial meaning for myself as I can.
• 
  SAM

  A small part of me regrets reading this but I knew what I was buying so I've only myself to blame.
  
  The chapters that covered Quality of Life and Death were the most miserable.
  
  Hard to argue with anything he wrote.
  
  Wouldn't recommend this if you're ridiculously optimistic. (fuck you if you are!!)
  
• 
  William Nist

  Professor Benatar codifies my long held but unpleasant viewpoint that our situation as humans is unfortunate because it is cosmically meaningless and that the reasons for living must be derived from more terrestrial sources such as our family, pets, job and interests. For some this may be obvious (the professor is excellent at unfolding the basis of this proposition), but for others this is distinctly an UN-popular philosophy at the highest level of seriousness.
  
  Along the way, the author takes up the ramifications of this unsavory viewpoint, and talks about death, suicide, conceiving children, extinction, and optimism. His exposition is engaging and not overly technical. In the introduction, he actually provides a reader's guide that indicated the more difficult sections that may be skipped without losing the gist of the work.
  
  If you are actually interested in the implications of our dismal predicament (and you should be in my opinion), this work is the philosophical Rosetta stone which will decipher you deepest fear.
  
  
  
  
• 
  Daniel Hageman

  Benatar's argumentative clarity nearly warrants a 5-star rating regardless of any fallibility in the arguments themselves, and I would recommend this book to anyone who takes the question of the 'human condition' seriously. It will coldly challenge any intellectually honest optimist, and undoubtedly have profound effects those looking to objectively understand the state humans find themselves in.
  
  A few highlights that I find worth remembering before I come back to this book again in the future:
  
  His definition of the term 'appropriate' seems align more with my definition of 'understandable'. I think that negative emotions following a net negative experience are understandable, but would only be appropriate if such emotions serve a positive instrumental function. While it might be understandable that someone is stuck in an indefinite cycle of negative emotions due to an unrectified objective ‘bad’, it seems confused to say that such is the appropriate response, as Benatar openly asserts. He goes on to say that appropriate responses like these often 'should be mitigated'. As far as I see things, if something should be mitigated, it is for the reason that it’s not 'appropriate' (all things considered), albeit understandable.
  
  I think that the framework of cosmic vs terrestrial meaning can indeed be a helpful one, akin to the distinction between 'meaning of life' (doesn't exist) and 'meaning in life' (likely does and almost certainly can exist).
  
  With respect to his arguments that the 'badness of death' should be broken down into deprivation of goods (not analogous to the deprivation of those who never existed in the first place; see his previous and arguably best work, 'Better Never To Have Been'), and permanent annihilation, doesn’t seem to outweigh the Epicurean arguments that death itself is not a harm to the individual that endure it. Granted, the challenge that an Epicurean can’t coherently claim that death is in any individual’s best interest, given they won’t exist to benefit from it, is a fair challenge worth pondering, and one that necessitates a response to comprehensively defend against Benatar's assertions.
  
  While he discusses cryopreservation, I think it'd be extremely helpful if Benatar could differentiate the potential obligation of bringing previously existed persons back to life, a short-term unconscious person (coma or deep sleep) back to life, and a not yet existing person, to life. If it's merely a matter of previous interests of the person, that justifies the regaining of consciousness of the first two cases, then it seems to have quite odd implications regarding the many deceased beings (let's assume they don't come back in a state the would suffer immensely for not having adjusted to modern climate/culture.
  
  His recommendation at the end, to approach the human predicament as a pragmatic pessimist, as opposed to a pragmatic optimist, seems to take the normative nature of morality (in this case the idea that optimism would lead to procreation) for granted, which left it unconvincing for me.
  
  Lastly, his reference to another work the argues for a 'reverse lifecycle'..is hilarious.
  
  "In my next life, I want to live my life backwards. You start out dead and get that out of the way. Then you wake up in an old people’s home feeling better every day. You get kicked out for being too healthy, go collect your pension, and then when you start work, you get a gold watch and a party on your first day. You work for 40 years until you’re young enough to enjoy your retirement. You party, drink alcohol, and are generally promiscuous, then you are ready for high school. You then go to primary school, you become a kid, you play. You have no responsibilities, you become a baby until you are born. And then you spend your last 9 months floating in luxurious spa-like conditions with central heating and room service on tap, larger living space every day and then Voila! You finish off as an orgasm!"
  
• 
  Omelian Levkovych

  Well at least I haven't yet made a mistake by producing new biological puppet to this place and I am happy that this book has forced some thinking process about another 'dark side' of reproduction & recreation. And you know what? I think it's worth that despite of the 'bad news' from the book that you could discover for yourself about this world. Probably I will start actually knocking on people's door offering to share the 'bad news' with them. And some fun quote which I have found in my journey - the optimist proclaims that we live in the best of all possible worlds; and the pessimist fears this is true. Feels bad man.
• 
  Si-Yan Teo

  3.5 stars
  
  Interesting position that I'd summarize as: that although our lives can have some limited meaning, ultimately life mostly sucks and is meaningless in the grand scheme of things. Although life sucks, death is also bad (so no, he's not advocating for everyone to commit suicide), so the "human condition" is really a "predicament". Hence, it's actually correct to be more pessimistic about life. Also, we should seriously rethink having children and imposing this predicament on more people.
  
  I'm semi convinced by the points haha. But the writing is kind of tedious and it got annoying how he kept saying things are "good" or "bad".
• 
  Ryan McCarthy

  Benatar is the most important philosopher of our time. I loved this book, but in spite (or perhaps because) of the fact that I agree with him wholeheartedly, this book became a bit of a slog.
• 
  Uninvited

  David Benatar is a South African modern philosopher, known for his antinatalism stance, i.e. the idea that one is better off never having been born (see
  https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/6... as well as
  https://www.newyorker.com/culture/per...)
  In this book, Benatar takes on questions like "Does life have any meaning, especially in a cosmic sense?", "What constitutes a quality life?", "Is death a good or a bad thing?", "Is suicide a rational choice, and if so, under which circumstances?". Those questions are answered by Benatar's arguments regarding, what he calls, The Human Predicament, i.e. the inescapable fate of the human being who has been thrust into life without his/her consent. His arguments are very interesting, and provide valid points of view on issues such as the optimistic bias that humans tend to have regarding their life quality; the stubborn, animalistic, and unreasonably exaggerated default value humans give to life; the impossibility of any meaning a human life can hope to acquire beyond a terrestrial sense; the inescapable trap of having to choose between bad and less bad; and more in the same vein.
  This is not a self-help book, obviously, and it is certainly not a book for happy-go-lucky humans who live in a bubble of bliss, and recite Coelhoesque platitudes. As Benatar notes, a good reason may exist to try and point out where someone who is underestimating the quality and meaning of their life may be mistaken, but there is no reason whatsoever to point out the mistake someone has made in overestimating how good life is.
• 
  VII

  Boring, tedious and uninspiring. Also, a chapter is an exact copy of his Better Never to Have Been. The only part that moved me were the descriptions concerning wild life suffering.
  
  Benatar only cares about the third person perspective. All his descriptions assume there are no mysteries left in the world, subjective experience doesn't count and he just goes on showing the most obvious things. Life lacks cosmic meaning but even though a lot of people realize it, most of them do not care at all about it. Isn't that a sign that he is arguing for irrelevant things? If he is really trying to convince people that life is meaningless, he should try engaging with the difficult issues of subjectivity and the first person perspective instead of hiding them under the rug and pretending they do not matter. The chapter about death and the epicurean argument were also tedious and boring. I don't think he brought anything new and it seems that it was there simply to defend and distance himself from pro-mortalism.
  
  Read Better Never to Have Been instead, even if the asymmetry argument there is also probably wrong.
• 
  Ivana

  I really struggled with this book. On one hand, the questions he poses are valid. They’re profound. But his hubris is really off putting. He seems to build his argument by first defining what objective meaning is or should be, and uses his mental framework as a blunt instrument against any opposing view. He also uses the “I shall allow this, I shall allow that”, and the question is- who is he to allow anything? Who is he to tell us what objective meaning or an objective reality is when everyone’s reality is shaped by their lived experience? I would counter that, precisely because our existence is meaningless in a cosmic sense, we have absolute freedom to “do our worst”. Of course this is easier said than done as most of us are trapped in societies that have defined for us what “meaningful” is, therefore making a lot of people miserable. For example, people who experienced transcendence on entheogenic plants would offer a very different take on this cosmic meaninglessness.
  I’d still recommend this book because it does offer a different, albeit unpopular view on the human predicament.
• 
  Jordan

  Really fantastic book on a terrible subject.
• 
  Sippy

  (almost) final words "ignorance is an existential analgesic." Amen. 3.5⭐
• 
  Tobias Leenaert

  a very readable treatise on difficult philosophical questions, with answers that go beyond clichés. Obviously not the most cheerful book you can find, but not as depressing as I'd feared :)
• 
  Bogdan Balostin

  Two sentence review: "Life sucks. Get over it."
  
  I want to give this book 5 stars because all my life I wondered why people cannot see the truth. All their beliefs are just coping mechanisms. Was I the only one who didn't get life? Well, this is the truth as closely as it can get to the truth.
  
  Even if we are not meaningless from the cosmic perspective, probably the meaning of existence would be something akin to the spreading of genes. That is the purpose of human organisms and yet it seems so unsatisfying, you know. Better be no meaning as we can create our own, than a frivolous meaning like proliferation.
  
  If you're a beginner in philosophy, try to read some of his references. It may help you combat his arguments or to agree more.
• 
  Jim

  Wow, I’ve never seen the word “annihilation” used so often in a book (and I’ve read
  Annihilation). I think it, or some other spelling, e.g. “annihilate” or “annihilates”, was used 112 times.
  
  The premise of this book can be summed up pretty well by this sentence from chapter 1: “ Life is bad, but so is death. Of course, life is not bad in every way. Neither is death bad in every way. However, both life and death are, in crucial respects, awful.”
  
  This book is mostly an explanation / justification for antinatilism. While I definitely consider myself an antinatilist, I wish this book was a little more accessible to the lay person. For example, I recently read
  A Guide to the Good Life: The Ancient Art of Stoic Joy which I considered to be a very accessible book to the philosophy of Stoicism. However The Human Predicament, while well-written in its theory, was often hard for me to follow / comprehend. That’s one of the main reasons that it took me 6 months to finish. It’s not a long book, but I would often have to reread passages several times to grasp their full meaning. Similarly, there was some great vocabulary here that slowed me down a bit.
  
  Some of my favorites were:
  - a fortiori
  - anodyne
  - apposite
  - excoriate
  - ischemic
  - meliorate
  - millenarianism
  - mutatis mutandis
  - nociceptive
  - obscurantism
  - opprobrium
  - palliate
  - paradigmatic
  - philatelists
  - tendentious
  
  This is definitely a heavy topic (antinatilism) and I appreciated both the depth of the author’s knowledge, as well as the obvious seriousness with which he addresses the subject. It’s hard to have a conversation about antinatilism with someone who is unfamiliar with the subject, without them getting upset or dismissive. Especially if that person is already (or soon-to-be) a parent. It was refreshing to be able to read so much about the subject, in such a serious manner.
  
  So this is a hard book to recommend, but if you’ve ever been interested or curious about antinatilism, or have grappled with the insignificance of life, this may be a good book for you. I will most likely also be checking out his other popular work,
  Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence.