Blood and Sand: Suez, Hungary, and Eisenhowers Campaign for Peace by Alex von Tunzelmann

Blood and Sand: Suez, Hungary, and Eisenhowers Campaign for Peace Reviews

• 
  Steven Z.

  Last week was the 60th anniversary of the 1956 Suez Crisis as well as the Soviet invasion of Hungary. Both events had a tremendous impact on the geo-strategic balance in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. The Eisenhower administration was confronted by overlapping crises that brought the United States in opposition to its allies England and France at a time when it seemed to President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John F. Dulles that allied actions in Suez had provided cover for Soviet tanks to roll in to Budapest. The interfacing of these two crises is the subject of Alex von Tunzelmann’s new book, BLOOD AND SAND: SUEZ, HUNGARY, AND EISENHOWER’S CAMPAIGN FOR PEACE. Von Tunzelmann has a unique approach to her narrative and analysis as she chooses certain dates leading up to the crisis, from October 22 to November 6, 1956 and within each date she explains events and delves into the background history of the issues that are raised. In so doing she effectively examines how decisions were reached by the major actors, and the impact of how those decisions influenced the contemporary world order. The only drawback to this approach is that a sense of chronology is sometimes lost, and with so much taking place across the Middle East and Eastern Europe it can be confusing for the general reader.
  
  Von Tunzelmann begins by providing the history that led up to British control of the Suez Canal. She goes on to examine the major players in the conflict; Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary and later Prime Minister who despised Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser and basically “wanted him dead” as he blamed him for all of England’s ills, domestic and foreign. President Dwight Eisenhower, who had grown tired of British colonialism and its impact on American foreign policy, and provided the guidelines that Secretary of State Dulles implemented. Gamal Abdul Nasser, the Egyptian President who rose to power in 1954 and was bent on achieving the removal of the British from the Suez Canal Base, and spreading his Pan Arabist ideology throughout the region. It is fascinating as the author delves into the role of the CIA in Egypt and the relationship between Kermit Roosevelt, the author of the 1953 Iranian coup, and Miles Copeland with Nasser taking the reader into an area than is usually forbidden. Other profiles are provided including Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, French President Guy Mollet, Imre Nagy, the leader of Hungary, and the troika that controlled the Kremlin.
  
  Each country had its own agenda. In England neo-imperialist forces believed that “if they could no longer dominate colonies openly, they must try to foster a secret British Empire club….a powerful hidden empire of money and control,” this was apart from the “Commonwealth.” (23) This was the overall strategy that revolved around access and transportation of oil. An example of Von Tunzelmann’s approach is her March 1, 1956 section where she concentrates on Jordan’s King Hussein’s firing of John Glubb Pasha, a British serving officer who headed the Arab Legion. For Eden, Nasser was the cause and his actions were a roadblock to achieve a Middle Eastern defense pact (Baghdad Pact), and Jordanian membership. Eradicating Nasser became Eden’s life’s mission. In her discussion of March, 1956 the author raises the role of American policy, but she only mentions in passing American attempts to bring about peace between Israel and Egypt, i.e.; Project Alpha and the Anderson Mission. She presents a number of reasons why the US withdrew its offer to fund the Aswan Dam project on July 19, 1956, forgoing that Washington had already decided as early as March 28, 1956 that Nasser was an impediment to peace and the US launched Operation Omega designed to take Nasser down a peg or two, and once the presidential election was over more drastic action could be taken. For the French, Mollet blamed Nasser for all Paris’ difficulties in Algeria. When FLN leader Ahmed Ben Bella, a World War II hero in France left for Cairo it confirmed that Nasser was providing Ben Bella weapons and a safe exile. To the author’s credit throughout the narrative she whittles down all of the information in expert fashion and she sums up the interests of all concerned as the crisis approaches.
  Von Tunzelmann provides many interesting details as she delves into individual motivations. For Ben-Gurion, the Straits of Tiran were the key. Many have speculated why Israel would ally with England under the Sevres Agreement, a country that had been a thorn in the side of Jews for decades. The key was an oil pipeline that was to be built from the southern Israeli port of Eilat to Ashkelon in the north (Trans Israel pipeline or Tipline) that would bring Iranian oil to Europe. In 1957, Israel brokered a deal with Iran, and the Suez Canal, by then under Egyptian control, would be bypassed. This deal would also make the Jewish state a strategic ally of Europe.
  
  The most important parts of the narrative deal with the October 23-24, 1956 dates. It is during those few days that Von Tunzelmann provides intimate details of the negotiations between Israel, France and England at Servres. All the important players from Eden, whose health is explored in relation to his decision-making; Ben-Gurion, who exemplifies what she calls “muscular Judaism,” who wanted a preventive war before the Egyptians could absorb Soviet weapons; Guy Mollet, who agrees with Israel and promises aid in building a nuclear reactor for the Jewish state, and others. Within each chapter Von Tunzelmann switches to the machinations involving events in Hungary and how precarious the situation has become. As machinations were taking place Von Tunzelmann describes events that are evolving in Hungary. With demonstrations against Soviet encroachment in Poland and the visit of the Soviet leadership to Warsaw to make sure that the Poles remained in the Russian orbit, the aura of revolution was in the air and it spread to neighboring Hungary. With mass demonstrations led by Hungarian students, workers, and intellectuals, Moscow dispatched the head of the KGB, Ivan Seroy. Von Tunzelmann examines the thinking of Soviet leadership, the role of Imre Nagy, hardly a revolutionary, but a reformist acceptable to the people, as the situation reaches a breaking point. Finally, on October 24, 1956 Soviet troops and tanks roll into Budapest sparking further demonstrations allowing an excuse for Russian forces to crush the demonstrators. The end results vary from 60-80 killed and 100-150 seriously wounded. The proximity of Soviet actions with the Israeli invasion of the 29th would make Eisenhower apoplectic, in part because the CIA had a coup set to go in effect in Syria on the same day as the Israel attack.
  
  One of the most conjectured part of this period is whether the United States was aware of the Sevres conspiracy and what was the role of the CIA. Von Tunzelmann approach to these questions is fair and plausible. After reviewing the available documentation she reaches the conclusion that Allen W. Dulles, the Head of the CIA, who destroyed his documentation knew about the plot in advance and kept the president in the dark because if Eisenhower had known he might have pressured England and France to call it off. The CIA had so much invested in Nasser, with the relationship fostered by Miles Copeland and Kermit Roosevelt that they wanted to protect him, in fact according to the author the CIA warned Nasser that the British wanted to kill him. According to Israeli historian and later politician, Michael Bar-Zohar the CIA was fully aware of what was going on and Allen Dulles informed his brother of the conspiracy. For the CIA “plausible deniability” was the key. Whatever the case it is clear that crucial information was withheld from Eisenhower. However, the president was fully aware of the Anglo-American plot to overthrow Syrian leader Shukri al-Kuwatty, who was developing closer ties with the Soviet Union. Explaining CIA and MI6 machinations is one of the strongest aspects of Von Tunzelmann’s work. Reading about the British obsession to kill Nasser, reminded me how Washington pursued Fidel Castro few years later.
  
  At the same time she discusses Suez, Von Tunzelmann shifts to Hungary and analyzes Moscow’s hesitancy to invade. Her portrayal of Imre Nagy’s difficulty in controlling the uprising is solid as the demonstrations spirals out of control inside and outside of Budapest. However, once Imre Nagy decides to withdraw Hungary from the Warsaw Pact and claims neutrality for his country it is a forgone conclusion in the Kremlin that despite some hesitation they must invade. The Suez situation provided Moscow with excellent cover at the United Nations. As the French and British dithered in delivering their forces to Egypt, Moscow became emboldened. Von Tunzelmann does an excellent job following communications between Dulles and Eisenhower on the American side, Mollet and Pineau for the French, Eden and the Foreign Office, and within Imre Nagy’s circle in Budapest, as it is clear in the eyes of Washington that the allies really have made a mess of things. The author’s insights and command of the material are remarkable and her new book stands with Keith Kyles’ SUEZ as the most important work on the topic. What enhances her effort is her ability to compare events in Suez and Hungary during the first week of November shifting back and forth reflecting how each crisis was dealt with, and how the final outcome in part depended on the evolution of each crisis.
  
  One of the major aspects of the Suez Crises that many books do not deal with which BLOOD AND SAND discusses is that once war was unleashed the Palestinian-Israeli conflict could only be exacerbated. Israeli actions in Gaza stayed with those who were displaced and suffered and it would contribute to the hatred that remains today. Once the crisis played itself out and Eisenhower forced the British and French to withdraw from Egyptian territory in early November, using oil and currency pressure; threatening the Israelis, who finally withdrew in March, 1957, it seemed that American standing in the Arab world would improve. However, the United States gave away the opportunity to furthering relations in the Arab world with the introduction of the Eisenhower Doctrine which was geared against the communist threat. Von Tunzelmann makes the case that Eisenhower was the hero of Suez, but within a few years his doctrine led to dispatching US troops to Lebanon and the overthrow of the Iraqi government. By 1958 the Arab world began to view the United States through the same colonialist lens that they evaluated England and France, tarnishing the image of Eisenhower as the hero of Suez.
  
• 
  Paltia

  Highly readable account of major turning points in history. Exposes the lack of sound judgement based on a reasoned study of potential outcomes made by most of the key players. I’m not sure why but it continues to confound me how people like most of these remain in power. I have this peculiar fantasy about time travelling to the past and providing psychotherapy to Anthony Eden. At the very least I could offer him a referral to a good physician.
• 
  Christopher Saunders

  Alex von Tunzelmann's Blood and Sand offers a good kick-off to my Suez Crisis research project. A recent narrative history paralleling Suez and the Hungarian rising of '56, it's engagingly written even if there's little substantively new after the in-depth volumes by Keith Kyle, Barry Turner, etc. The Hungarian sections of the story are much weaker, almost perfunctory in spots; Von Tunzelmann instead focuses on the well-worn but still fascinating verities of Suez: the bizarre Anglo-French-Israeli conspiracy to recapture Suez and "knock Nasser off his perch," Eden's personal vendetta against Nasser and increasingly erratic behavior, the bizarre, James Bond-ian assassination plots (from poison gas and commando teams to exploding razors) and America's refusal to back its allies in an act of naked, imperial aggression. It's the kind of story that would be rejected as absurdly convoluted in a film or novel, yet it really happened and it's even more bizarre than a summary can hope to convey.
• 
  Cold War Conversations Podcast

  Excellent and very readable account of the Suez Crisis of 1956
  
  Alex von Tunzelmann has put together an excellent account of the political manoeuvring that resulted in the 1956 Suez Crisis and how that crisis prevented a more effective response to the Soviet invasion of Hungary that occurred at the same time.
  
  It’s an incredible story of British, French and Israeli duplicity and conspiracy with US President Eisenhower valiantly trying to prevent a potential World War whilst trying to fight an election.
  
  The writing is excellent and whilst the content itself could be quite dry the author recounts the story in style that keeps your attention via an hour by hour account featuring a colourful group of international politicians.
  
  With the 60th anniversary approaching I’d highly recommend this for anyone wanting to understand the modern Middle East and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism.
  
• 
  Steve

  This is a less balanced effort than Ms. von Tunzelmann’s prior excellent work, Red Heat; I felt the greatest focus on Anthony Eden, the British Prime Minister. By comparison, there was far less discussion of the Hungarian, Egyptian, Russian, Israeli and French leadership. I leave this work with particularly good feelings for Presidents Eisenhower and Nasser; nearly every other major player, particularly Eden, and, to a lesser degree, the Dulles brothers, appear tainted—I can hear Boss Hogg’s voice, ‘Them Dulles boys is nothin’ but trouble.’
  
  Suez and Hungary coincided with the 1956 US presidential election, making for an interesting moment in American foreign policy. Eisenhower acted with an acute sense of perspective, absent, it seems, in the behavior of many American presidents when put to similar tests. To attach a single word to some of the primary characters in this tale, Eisenhower – wise, Dulles (John Foster) – duplicitous, Eden – foolish, Nasser – patriotic, Mollet – myopic, Nagy – naïve, Khrushchev – predictable, Ben-Gurion – murderous, although to be fair, that word should also be associated with Eden, Mollet and Khrushchev; a wonder, for these leaders seemed such amiable humans when chatting over coffee.
• 
  Phil

  A really fascinating and well paced account of the two most significant events of the late 1950s and probably the 20th century: The Hungarian uprisings and the Suez crisis. The author does an excellent job intertwining the different threads of both stories to show how they were connected and how each impacted the political maneuvering of the other. Highly recommended!
• 
  Jared Nelson

  To be fair, I think for someone who is looking for all the details about specific conversations of world leaders and their machinations concerning the Suez crisis this is a solid book choice. I was hoping for a bit less than I got. What I loved were some of the author’s final conclusions such as the United Kingdom was fortunate to stay out of the Vietnam debacle because they were still reeling from being snubbed by Eisenhower’s public rebuke of their under handed handling of the Suez Crisis. Eisenhower came out even politically stronger than he started and the reputations of both the UK and France took a bit of a dive on the international stage because of it. The Soviet invasion of Hungary was coincident to the Suez Crisis and enabled largely because of it. But the author did a poor job really linking the two events. It seemed the two narratives were more co-located in the text instead of truly integrated. This irritated me. I wanted some clear parallels to be articulated instead of what seemed to feel like reading two stories simultaneously for a few chapters. However, because of this book I hold Nasser in slightly higher regard and understand his worldview a bit better.
• 
  The Contented

  Possibly not the way I would have interpreted things, but it did make for a very interesting read and got me into history again.
  
  I am struck however, by the complete omission of people who should have featured more in the telling of the history of the region. I am sure that the folk in Gaza did not feel that all was quite as benign as all this... and how did Iraq get to be such a puppet show?
  
  The book has left me keen to read even more.
  
  (Hey, even British-Pakistani relations would make for interesting reading)
  
  I also wonder about the thesis that Britain and France’s involvement in Suez was the reason the US could not be more effective in Hungary.
  
  (on a separate, totally unrelated note, - why did GDF Suez change its name to Engie?)
• 
  Bob

  A terrific read on the twin crises that hit the world in the Autumn of 1956, and how they have reverberated to the present. Beautiful research into what the leaders in Egypt, Britain, France, Israel, Hungary, the Soviet Union, and the United States thought and did during the Suez and Hungarian crises. Recommended reading for those interesting in this dangerous time in world history.
• 
  Pinko Palest

  very readable and gripping, and even a bit more sympathetic to the USSR than one would expect (though not too sympathetic and the anticommunism does seep through at times)
• 
  David

  Amazingly well-researched and well-written account of the two weeks in 1956 that included the Suez Crisis and the Soviet invasion of Hungary. Barbara Tuchman wrote a book called "The March of Folly". These events have folly written all over them. England, France and Israel connived to work together and fool the world. The USSR could not accept a defection of a client state. One crises allowed the other to continue. Nothing good came out of any of it and we live with the results today.
  
  Only the USA and Eisenhower come out looking good. Eisenhower felt strongly that the Suez situation was wrong and acted accordingly. He did fail to help the people of Hungary for fear of igniting WW III. Eisenhower said the only way to win WW III was to stop it from happening.
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  Nick Carraway LLC

  1) "On November 21, it was announced that Anthony Eden was leaving London for three weeks on the orders of his doctor. Rab Butler would fill in for him temporarily. Two days later, Eden and his wife departed for Jamaica and Goldeneye, the beachside villa owned by James Bond creator Ian Fleming. This was a public relations disaster. The austerity-bound British public generally felt that a serving prime minister ought not reward himself for orchestrating the biggest foreign policy disaster of the postwar era with an extended holiday in the Caribbean. 'Torquay and a sun-ray lamp would have been more peaceful and patriotic,' admitted Fleming’s wife, Ann."
• 
  Lynn

  Today's Nonfiction post is on Blood and Sand: Suez, Hungary, and Eisenhower's campaign for Peace by Alex von Tunzelmann. It is 560 pages long including notes. The cover is black and white with different pictures dealing with the content of the book. The intended reader is someone interested in the Middle East post World War 2 and Eisenhower. There is foul language, talk of sex, and voilence in this book. There Be Spoilers Ahead.
  
  
  From the back of the book- Over sixteen extraordinary days in October and November 1956, the twin crises of Suez and Hungary pushed the world to the brink of a nuclear conflict and what many at the time were calling World War III. Blood & Sand is a revelatory new history of these dramatic events, for the first time setting both crises in the context of the global Cold War, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the treacherous power politics of imperialism and oil.
  Blood & Sand tells this story hour by hour through a fascinating international cast of characters including Gamal Abdel Nasser, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Anthony Eden, Christian Pineau, Nikita Khrushchev, Imre Nagy and David Ben-Gurion. It is a tale of conspiracy and revolutions; spies and terrorists; kidnappings and assassination plots; the fall of the British Empire and rise of American hegemony. Blood & Sand is essential to our understanding of the modern Middle East and resonates strikingly with the problems of oil control, religious fundamentalism and international unity that face the world today.
  
  
  Review- I wanted to be engaged with this book. I wanted to learn some new things about a president that I do not know much about but this book was a very slow and boring read. It is about the beginning of the Middle East as we have it today and it should have been interesting. Instead the writing is very slow, with lots of details that do not really add to the overall story, just slow it down. The notes are good and give pointers about where to go next if you want to do more research but after this book I do not.
  
  
  I give this book a Two out of Five stars. I was given this book in exchange for an honest review by Harper Collins.
• 
  Tanner Nelson

  This book was like receiving a gold necklace strung with gravel after specifically instructing your child to make a gold necklace strung with pearls. There might be a pearl or two among the devastatingly ugly gravel rocks, but for the most part the necklace is a stunning disappointment.
  
  The first, and most egregious error in my opinion, is the author’s choice of title. This book is more a history of Eden’s absolute inability to recognize Britain’s end as an imperial power than it is a history of the Suez Crisis. Incredibly, the author chose to include but not really tell the story of Hungary’s near revolution. Suez and Hungary are linked, but this book does a very poor job of telling that story.
  
  You might forget that France and Israel participated in the foreign policy blunder known as the Suez Crisis if you read this book. They’re largely absent from the latter half of the book and I cannot fathom why. They escape largely un-attacked from this Anthony Eden hit piece.
  
  Aside from the litany of problems I have with this book, I did learn some new things. The author provides fascinating insights into Colonel Nasser’s behavior during the crisis. The notes regarding Eden’s cabinet were also eye-opening. I appreciated the detail provided, but I felt like all the stories were poorly displayed. It was a bit like displaying a beautiful watercolor painting in a cardboard frame.
  
  I feel like this author could have done better. There were strings that needed tying and I don’t feel like he accomplished that. This is an important moment in world history, but this book doesn’t do it justice.
• 
  Denise

  Pros: This is a thought provoking and well researched book. Both crisis' are interwoven into the same chapters that reveal the simultaneous events of the Suez Canal "police action" and the Hungarian Revolution. This format stresses the chaotic and uncertainly of that time period. The importance of Eisenhower's elections also added to the turbulence. Appreciated the brief yet informative biographical information on John Foster Dulles, the shaky stance (ie collusion and out right lying) that Sir Anthony Eden partook. The psychological impact the Hungarian rebels had on Nikita Khrushchev and his brief try at debunking Stalinism was also intriguing, yet sad. Glad to discover MP Dingle Foot. Three poignant passages are below:
  
  ‘Historical folly’ Barbara Tuchman described acts of leaders based on preconceived fixed notions while ignoring all contrary signs. “But I thought then as I think now, that the British thrive on folly so they’ll always soldier through somehow.” Miles Copeland CIA officer “The genius of you Americans,” Nasser told Copeland, “is that you never make clear cut stupid moves, only complicated stupid moves that make us wonder at the possibility that there may be something we are missing.”
  
  Great use of pictures and maps.
  
  Cons: A brief retelling of the building of the Suez Canal would have been brilliant. More information (yet brief) would have been appreciated on why Tito encouraged Khrushchev to be so brutal to the rebels.
  
  Cover Art work: 5 out of 5 stars.
• 
  Mac McCormick III

  Blood and Sand is an engaging book that links the Suez Crisis and the Hungarian Revolution to each other. Both events unfolded at the same time and Von Tunzelmann shows that they certainly influenced how each turned out. The book certainly covers the events, but it also gets into relationships - relationships between both the leaders involved and the countries involved, particularly Eden and Eisenhower and the United Kingdom and the United States. I have to admit that I've never studied the Suez Crisis or the Hungarian Revolution in detail and this book not only illuminated both events for me, but also showed me how both effected not only the countries involved but the Middle East as a whole and the Cold War. Blood and Sand not only puts the events of the past into perspective, but allows us to put the present into perspective as well by showing us part of what has brought about the current situation in the Middle East.
• 
  Callum Soukup-Croy

  An excellent book on the Suez crisis in 1956 and how it came about, developed and its ramifications. Alex von Tunzelmann has clearly done a great deal of research with a multitude of quotes from private diaries, telephone transcripts and meetings and it really helps build the picture of what went on and how people felt about it. The writing style is very easy to get into and a pleasure to read.
  
  The only reason this is not a 5 star book is that for a book sold as covering two crises, Suez and Hungary, there is barely any of the latter covered. In terms of split it is very much 90/10. I understand why Hungary was included at all because it formed part of the context of the Suez invasion but I feel it either should have been built up to an equal footing or cut down to background information only. This middle ground frustrated me.
• 
  Reza Shaeri Shaeri

  A fast paced and gripping telling of a sadly oft ignored chapter in the history of the Middle East, and of the Cold War. Not surprising that it is ignored, since the primary actors in the illegal invasion of Egypt, the UK, France, and Israel, would sooner forget that it ever happened. Many western readers will be familiar with the brutal Soviet suppression of the "Hungarian Spring" and of Imre Nagy, but few will know that virtually simultaneous to the Red Army tanks rolling on Budapest, the paragons of the Free World were doing much the same to Egypt. Also noteworthy are the retelling of particularly heinous moments in the war, of summary executions, and outright mass murder of civilians.
  
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  Matthew Griffiths

  I've read both of the author's previous books and was highly impressed with them, and to follow suit this did not disappoint in the slightest. The style she uses to address the different reactions to the same events in Budapest, Cairo, London, Paris and Washington is eminently readable and it does make what was a fairly complex diplomatic situation much easier to understand.
  
  I would say that the book focusses far more on the events in Suez over Budapest which is a shame as I had hoped for a more even split between the two conflict zones but beyond this the portrayal of a whole range of people is fascinating. Eisenhower very much comes off as something of a literal superhero, Eden as villain and Nasser as something of a victim.
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  Dave Neary

  I had never heard the story of the Suez crisis of 1956 before, not was I aware of the Hungarian uprising - so learning about the interplay between the two (Russia being distracted from getting more involved in Egypt, and Eisenhower and Dulles feeling like they could not do more in the UN or in Hungary because of the actions of the French, British, and Israelis) was fascinating. The book also provided background information about the early years of Israel, the checkered history of Ariel Sharon, and the role of Moshe Dayan in the modern Middle East, which was all new to me.
  
  Amazing to see how a major conflict like that could deescalate so quickly too.
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  Rob Neyer

  Tremendously entertaining, well-written, and (yes) damning account of one of the most momentous few weeks in the 20th century. My only small quibble is that I would have appreciated a bit more detail about the military campaigns waged by the IDF in the Sinai, and the Anglo-French forces along the Suez Canal. It's never really clear how many troops were involved, or why the defending Egyptian forces were (we're led to assume) so terribly ineffective. But if you want to see governments of great powers behaving deceitfully and dishonestly, this is definitely the place.
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  Daniel Ostrowski

  Good but more focused on Suez than might be expected
  
  This is overwhelmingly a book about the Suez crisis, with Hungary taking a back seat. With Suez, the book provides a lot of background detail- the French in Algeria, Britain’s Baghdad pact, etc. Hungary by contrast is pretty much all about the 1956 Uprising specifically with little context beyond it and far less detail about the actors involved. Just be aware of this if, like myself, you are mostly interested in this book for Hungary rather than Suez.
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  Nick Harriss

  An excellent book, on a par with the author's equally excellent "Indian Summer". It starkly highlights the stupidity of many of the decisions then being made, especially those of Eden. Eisenhower comes across as the only grown-up in the room, while pretty much everyone else got caught up in their own petty machinations.
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  Ian Coutts

  My experience with Alex von Tunzelman's book was like one of those blind dates that the Guardian sends their readers on. I wanted to read a ripping battle book about Suez that mentioned lots of ships and regiments. She wrote a quite good diplomatic history. Nothing bad about it, it just wasn't what I was looking for . Second date? Well...