Anger and Forgiveness: Resentment, Generosity, Justice by Martha C. Nussbaum

Anger and Forgiveness: Resentment, Generosity, Justice Reviews

• 
  Mehrsa

  This was not an easy read, but it was so rewarding. It is the most convincing approach to forgiveness I have ever read. The anger portion is interesting, but not particularly remarkable, but her thoughts on forgiveness were really inspiring. I especially appreciated the end of the book where she talks about truth and reconciliation and social movements. I have always thought that South Africa's transition has been a particularly remarkable one and as Nussbaum dissects Cry the Beloved Country (one of my favorite books) and Mandela's own life, I was struck again by the lessons we can learn from the mercy demonstrated by the man and the novel. This book is essential reading today.
• 
  Peter A. van Tilburg

  Een systematische en logische analyse waarom woede niet verstandig is. Woede is gericht op vergleding of statusverhoging. Vergelding lost het punt niet op waar de woede over bestaat en de status gaat ten koste van anderen en is daarmee moreel te verwerpen.
• 
  Nick Klagge

  Again, I found Nussbaum to be both extremely incisive and eminently readable. This book builds out one particular strand of a position on the emotions in general that she laid out in _Upheavals of Thought_, which is the book I actually wanted to read but wasn't available at our library. In this work, she turns a critical eye on the roles of both anger and forgiveness in our society. Her argument on anger is probably the more familiar--essentially, that it is almost always unproductive, and should be replaced by a more forward-looking orientation that she calls "Transition Anger," which focuses on how to reduce harms in the future. This is similar to a generic Stoic position, and indeed Nussbaum cites Seneca extensively. Perhaps more interesting is Nussbaum's take on forgiveness. She is critical of both conditional and even unconditional forgiveness, seeing them both as rooted in the inherently problematic precondition of resentment and, in the case of conditional forgiveness, taking on an unhelpful transactional approach. (I think she is aligned with Nietzsche here, who she mentions, but I am not familiar enough with his attitude to be sure.) In its place, she counsels an ethic of unconditional love and generosity (which does not entail any sort of apology/forgiveness ritual).
  
  Interestingly, just as I was reading this book, a piece was published in the NY Times by my former writing professor, Cris Beam ("I Did A Terrible Thing. How Can I Apologize?" 6/30/18), recounting her attempt to atone for ending a relationship in a particularly hurtful way. The article touches on many of the themes that Nussbaum raises, and although Beam retains the "apology/forgiveness" framework, I think she ends up in a place not that different from Nussbaum. Both writers talk at some length about the Jewish forgiveness ritual of teshuvah, which I hadn't known much about before.
  
  Nussbaum certainly means for her book to have an impact on people's behavior. She walks through applications of her basic ideas in intimate relationships, stranger interactions, and public policy, and includes some (often very funny) examples from her own life, in a charming Senecan style. She talks at some length about the examples of King, Gandhi, and Mandela (and the philosophical writings of the former two) in illustrating the effectiveness of "Transition Anger" and unconditional love and generosity. She also has some interesting discussion of the cultural status of anger in various cultures.
  
  People who know me will be aware that I don't get angry very easily. But what may be less apparent is that when I do get angry, it can be very difficult for me to "shake" the feeling. Here, I think there is an important aspect of anger that Nussbaum doesn't address adequately. In her telling, the key distinguishing characteristic of anger, as opposed to other negative emotions, is the desire for things to go badly for the person on whom it is focused, or for them to suffer a status reduction. In contrast, the content of the preferable emotion of "Transition Anger", in her formulation, is "How outrageous--something should be done about this." On a narrow reading of this, I feel like most of what I experience as anger is in fact Transition Anger. And yet, I still feel that it is an unproductive force in my life! For me, the key problematic characteristic of anger is its obsessive quality--the inability to forget the (perceived) slight or injury, and the feeling of "something should be done!" without any accompanying intent to actually do something.
  
  I think that one big thing missing in Nussbaum's account is some enumeration of tactics. It is easy enough (for me) to rationally assent to most of her analysis, and perhaps even to remember it when I am feeling angry about something. But although this might help, I can well imagine this failing to do away with an obsessive feeling of anger entirely. What would Nussbaum counsel us to do when we feel anger? Certainly part of her answer would be to remind ourselves of paragons of non-anger such as King--although this might seem a tad grandiose for everyday slights. I've personally found helpful the blog of David Cain ("Raptitude"), including for example the essay "How To Be A Good Stranger." The strategy that he outlines there, of responding to a feeling of anger or annoyance by resolving to adopt the opposite attitude, is one that I have remembered and found effective on more than one occasion.
  
  Related to the above, I also think Nussbaum gives insufficient attention to the importance of ritual in helping us to lead good lives. The "transactional" apology/conditional-forgiveness ritual may indeed have a component of down-ranking, as Nussbaum argues, but it also plays an important role as a signpost reminding us to move on. (If we start to feel angry again about the event, we can remind ourselves that we already forgave the person.) For religious people, such as King, prayer and confession can also serve as triggers and reminders of non-anger or even unconditional forgiveness. But, assuming we assent to Nussbaum's analysis, and aspire to an ethic of unconditional love and generosity, eschewing the notions of apology and forgiveness, are there any tools available to help us along the way--particularly for those of us who are not religious? Unconditional love and generosity is certainly an exacting standard and one that we are likely to fall short of, even if we aspire to it. In my experience there are definitely things that can play this role--warm physical contact, eating a meal together, or doing something nice for the other person, for example--but this is an ad hoc personal list. I think, to the extent that we assent to Nussbaum's analysis, it would make sense to develop an array of reinforcing rituals to take the place of those she proposes to discard.
• 
  Octavian Gabor

  I wrote a review for this book here:
  http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/...
• 
  Kramer Thompson

  A very easily readable text, littered with many illustrative examples of anger (elucidating its weakness) drawn from Nussbaum's own experiences, fiction, and recent historical events. Nussbaum's primary contention was that we ought not to get angry, and ought instead to express unconditional love towards one another. Anger expresses either a desire for payback towards someone who has wronged you, or a down-ranking of that person in order to (relatively) improve your own social ranking. Either of these thoughts are fundamental mistakes, according to Nussbaum. In the first instance, getting revenge on another in no way improves your own wellbeing, and in the second, the occupation with social hierarchies which acts as a foundation for this belief is a bad one because it results in honour- or status-obsessed societies which are worse morally.
  
  I found Nussbaum's arguments very convincing, although I do disagree with her on some finer points. For example, she says that getting revenge on someone does not improve your own wellbeing whatsoever. She justifies this by saying that we ought not consider relevant any pleasure derived from the pain of others. I would not omit such pleasure. However, I do think that overall society would be better if people let go of their anger, rather than acting upon it, so I agree with Nussbaum that we ought to avoid anger for this reason (even though in many instances, getting vengeance would improve the wellbeing of the victim).
  
  So, overall, I'm convinced that we should all try to do away with anger. Being very prone to anger myself, I am not too sure how well I will enact this judgement, but along with Nussbaum, I will do my best.
• 
  Catherine Mustread

  From New Book Network:
  http://newbooksnetwork.com/martha-nus...
  
  "Anger is among the most familiar phenomena in our moral lives. It is common to think that anger is an appropriate, and sometimes morally required, emotional response to wrongdoing and injustice. In fact, our day-to-day lives are saturated with inducements not only to become angry, but to embrace the idea that anger is morally righteous. However, at the same time, were all familiar with the ways in which anger can go morally wrong. We know that anger can eat away at us; it can render us morally blind; it can engulf our entire lives. So one might wonder: What exactly is the point of anger?
  
  In Anger and Forgiveness: Resentment, Generosity, Justice (Oxford University Press, 2016), Martha Nussbaum argues that, in its most familiar forms, anger is not only pointless, but morally confused and pernicious. Drawing lessons from the Stoics, Nelson Mandela, Gandhi, and Martin Luther King, Nussbaum advocates replacing anger with forms of generosity, friendship, justice, and kindness. She develops her critique of anger across the spectrum of human experience, from the intimate, to the interpersonal, and eventually the political. Along the way, she proposes important revisions to common ideas about punishment, justice, and social reform."
• 
  Robert

  Martha Nussbaum's Anger and Forgiveness is a philosophical exploration of the life of the emotions that benefits from numerous case studies, personal examples, and historical references. The fundamental point is that anger per se is a losing proposition. Nussbaum gives two major reasons: 1) being angry, and taking revenge, is not going to restore life to a murdered relative; 2) being angry and humiliating the offender so as to lower her status in life won't raise the status of the person who has been offended except in a relative sense.
  
  Nussbaum argues that we should learn to transform anger into what she terms Transition-Anger, i.e., an anger that gives us the momentum to alter the conditions that led to the offense so that it is less likely to happen again. Example: Someone who commits a violent crime who has been neglected, malnourished and poorly housed and educated in her early years presents us with the opportunity to take on the conditions that spawned reckless rage in the first place more than on warehousing the offender in punitive conditions that offer no hope of rehabilitation.
  
  Nussbaum's overall thrust is social life that she terms welfarism--positive actions in support of the society's needs as a whole.
  
  Her philosophical roots trace back to Aristotle and Seneca (who wrote an important essay on anger) and proceed through Bentham and Mill. Seneca, the stoic, was of the view that anger gives external existence too much leverage on the internal peace of the self. He would have us cultivate detachment.
  
  Mill and Bentham focused on existence as a proposition of utility, i.e., what can we do that will lead us to something of value. Welfarism goes a step beyond utilitarianism, defining the specific value Nussbaum contends we should seek.
  
  Forgiveness seems to be given short shrift in this book, but Nussbaum would have it viewed along the same lines as anger--a rearward looking perspective that often does not achieve positive future results...unless connected to some kind of transitional reordering of future conditions.
  
  There are many philosophical (or simply logical) nuances embedded in this text that are interesting to consider, but the argument dwindles in force until the final chapters on anger leading to pointless revenge versus anger leading to a positive transition in the cases of King, Mandela and Gandhi. There we do see Nussbaum's proposition played out on large, complex stages. None of these leaders was "perfect" but each refused to be drawn into the cycle of revenge, counter-revenge, and so on--as exemplified by the miseries of the House of Atreus.
  
  The utility of this book (if I can use that term) is that it provides an opportunity to think with some sophistication about major contemporary issues, the most salient of which is the U.S. practice of maintaining an enormous "system" of penal institutions that are a form of ostracism, internal exile, banishment, or whatever you want to name what we do instead of looking at rehabilitation seriously and comprehensive social welfare programs even more seriously.
  
  
• 
  Dan Graser

  This very passionate and dense text centers around the pernicious elements of both anger and forgiveness within normative social contexts, our criminal justice system, and within elements of various progressive revolutionary movements during the 20th Century. Martha Nussbaum is at all times an eloquent and erudite speaker and brings much in the way of history and philosophy to bear on these concepts.
  
  Far from just going a middle road and identifying everything that is somewhat individual as, "problematic," (the new catch-all cliché for what really is individual thought), she is not afraid to make a very bold stand and in this volume it is a bizarre yet compelling amalgamation of Seneca's stoicism and the best elements of the non-violence, and more importantly, the non-anger based work of Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr, and in particular, Nelson Mandela. Her examination of these three great revolutionaries is fascinating and reveals a level of analysis in terms of their personal and political uses of rage/anger that haven't been this fleshed out before.
  
  The recommendations and cursory element to this text dealing with the criminal justice system certainly deserved to be included but, on such a complicated topic seemed much more hurried and not nearly as potent as her exposition on "Transition-Anger," and the aforementioned closing section on the great revolutionaries of the 20th century. Anyway, minor critiques of a very interesting work that will surely make you think about our instinctual and political anger as well as the concepts of forgiveness and atonement in very different (and more erudite) light.
• 
  Marks54

  It was recently brought to my attention that Martha Nussbaum has published a new book on anger and forgiveness. After a fairly grim year that was capped off by a presidential campaign that coupled a near absence of substantive discussion on issues with the unfurling of flags of anger and rage on both the right and the left, I decided that I needed to read her book. It is a fine book and one that will be appreciated by most people, especially those who from time to time get angry at themselves or others. Don't expect a lot of support or any reasons to feel good about anger based on the book. Professor Nussbaum demonstrates effectively that while nearly all of us get angry from time to time, in the vast majority of cases, anger is an emotion that does not serve us well and that we would do well to usher out the door before it overstays its welcome. Any logic we see in our anger is likely to be faulty (magical thinking) and whatever benefits anger may seem to possess are almost certainly outweighed by its negative effects.
  
  Nussbaum has been doing a lot of work on the philosophy of emotions. This intrigues me because it links social thought directly with behavior and keeps the outlining of definitions and the development of arguments and counter-arguments from becoming parlor games. In this book, she outlines various meanings that people have when they talk about anger and related ideas. It becomes immediately clear that much confusion in intellectual life comes from the failure to clarify the different meanings of the terms we use in argument and the implications of ambiguous and conflicted meanings for how we deal with other people.
  
  I cannot begin to summarize the arguments that are presented, but be prepared to keep track and follow her thinking. She is perhaps the best philosopher working these days on such topics - and certainly one of the most prolific. It is a joy to attempt to follow the exposition and keep up. The major takeaway is that embedded in most notions of anger is the idea of payback - somehow getting even or punishing the target of anger. The problem is that with only a few relatively minor exceptions, this idea of payback does not make much sense or promise to make our lives any better. Violations are not undone; wounds are not healed; "closure" is not attained. More likely, following through on anger tends to make matters worse rather than better and create new problems.
  
  The book is filled with references to other philosophers, psychologists, and therapists. The sections on the Stoics were most interesting to me. To make her case about linking anger with emotions, Nussbaum is also informative in her use of examples, including some from her own experiences. She write very credibly and her examples are good. I also suspect that I would do well to avoid getting Professor Nussbaum angry.
  
  Not everyone will agree with her. Indeed, her core positions go against much current "common sense" thinking. That is OK with me, since she forces one to think more carefully about handling anger and counters most objections fairly well in my opinion, although it would have been nice to hear her treatment of road rage. As to the Presidential campaign, she does not talk about Trump in the book, but I am certain that she could and most likely will write more about it - if she has not done so already. Don't worry about the philosophical references either, the writing is so good that the reader is frequently kept on track with the main arguments, which are summarized towards the end of the major chapters.
  
  This book made me think and it was well worth the effort.
• 
  Sharad Pandian

  Nussbaum's theoretical structure in the book is pretty straightforward: she claims that although anger signals being wronged, a conceptually necessary part of ordinary anger is the wish for payback against whoever wronged us. However this payback wish, and hence anger itself, is undesirable since:
  
  1) No amount of it can bring back what has been lost
  2) It involves magical thinking about how humiliating the wrong-doer will somehow elevate the victim's social standing
  3) It threatens to unleash a chain of vengeance where either side keeps getting angry and striking out.
  
  Instead, we should prefer "transitional anger" where we quickly realize the futility of payback, and instead look for ways of how the future can be better. This isn't a call to not engage with the world or to dismiss all wrongs as unimportant, since she is firm that the wrongness of acts will need to be recognized. But the recognition should contribute to a future-orientated way of thinking, and we should endeavor to switch from ordinary anger to transitional anger as quickly as possible. And it is crucial to ensure that out institutions only deal with the latter, and not give in the popular public desire for revenge.
  
  Even though the theoretical structure might seem straight-forward enough, she uses Greek Tragedy, Literature, Scripture, empirical studies, psychology, personal experiences, and the lives of moral revolutionaries (Gandhi, MLK, Nelson Mandela) to explore various intricacies and arguments that are relevant.
  
  As with any of Nussbaum's books on emotions, it's best not to read it as merely of abstract academic interest but as a challenge to examine closely our behaviour and look at whether we might be deceiving ourselves. For example, she points out that although forgiveness is often talked about as though the forgiver is being generous and conciliatory, too often the forgiver is engaging in a vindictive social down-ranking in the name of accountability.
  
  This project is a demanding one that asks that we pay attention and set on what can be an incredibly difficult path of change. For those who might think this is impossible, that anger is just hard-wired into human nature, she points out the different ways in which culture can influence how anger is expressed and thought about. She admits that change might be hard, but she points out that so is education and fitness and all sorts of activities that involve becoming better people, why not this?
  
  Overall, it's an excellent book and continues her work of analyzing emotions that began in "Upheavals of Thought" and "Hiding from Humanity". There are times when the book seems a little naive. For example, although she admits anger can be instrumentally useful to get justice, she doesn't really dig into this and explore to what extent. Instead she focuses on the lives of people like Nelson Mandela and generalizes that leaving anger behind is probably best for the long run. Despite this, the sheer ambitiousness and earnestness that goes into the book makes it essential reading for people interested in this topic, whether academic or not.
• 
  Hanik Kotecha

  As always, Nussbaum is a great writer. The chapters flowed well and there is a clear progression from start to end.
  
  If you plan on reading the book for the just the philosophical arguments, the first 3 chapters will more than suffice for you. The rest of the book deals with how one should apply these ideas into the real world.
  
  The reason for just the three stars is due to my knowledge of the Stoic writings beforehand, thus Nussbaum's work is more of a modern update to include the importance of close relationships rather than a grand introduction into this school of thought. Also, the final chapter was lacklustre in comparison to the rest of the book (it felt more rushed if I was to word it another way).
  
  While may one may agree or disagree with the ideas being presented here, the book does present a good foundation for those looking to venture into the subject area or who wish to have some guidance when dealing moments of anger and what to do in the aftermath.
  
• 
  Christopher

  If you ever look at protest signs and wonder how love powers a revolution, this is the book for you. In these days of injustice and justifiable anger, Martha Nussbaum's book is an argument for love. I think her argument can be challenging to contemporary thinkers - as it was at times to me - but, as always, Nussbaum is clear, well-reasoned, and focused on justice for every person.
• 
  Jana Light

  I don't agree with Nussbaum's definition of anger (I think there must be a version that doesn't wish ill on the perpetrator) so all that followed was flawed (for me). Otherwise a very accessible philosophical text on anger from the cognitivist tradition.
• 
  Ted Morgan

  An essential reading for reformation of our social thinking. Being constructive opens doors.
• 
  Wouter Zwemmer

  Waarom vinden we dat we ons best moeten doen voor gezondheid en studie maar vinden we dat niet over woede?
  
  Functies van woede:
  - signaal aan jezelf en anderen dat een krenking heeft plaatsgevonden
  - Bron van motivatie om iets aan de krenking te doen
  - Afschrikking voor anderen, ontmoediging van hun agressie
  
  Transitie = pad van irrationele woede naar productievere, toekomstgerichtere gedachten over wat er gedaan kan worden om persoonlijk en maatschappelijk welzijn te bevorderen. Transitiewoede = 'wat een schande, daar moet iets aan gedaan worden'.
  
  Excuses kunnen nuttig zijn als uiting dat de persoon in kwestie voortaan weer kan worden vertrouwd. Kan echter ook worden afgedwongen als vergelding of geringschatting, vernedering...
  
  Vergeving gaat meestal gepaard met zelfvernedering (joods-christelijke traditie); vergeving door god na boetedoening. Zuivere vergeving is onvoorwaardelijk: uit vrije wil afstand doen van woede door de beschadigde persoon; of onvoorwaardelijke liefde en ruimhartigheid.
  
  Veel mensen zoeken excuses, vernedering en vergelding, maar dat zijn obstakels naar verzoening. Beter is het hele drama van woede en vergeving achter je te laten voor vertrouwen en verzoening. De waarden die dat ondersteunen zijn: ruimhartigheid, gerechtigheid en waarheid.
  
  Woede is altijd gericht op personen, de focus ligt op een krenkende handeling. Woede wordt veroorzaakt door de ervaring van een situatie, niet per se door de situatie zoals die is. Woede gaat heel vaak over statuskrenking: minachting, belediging, geringschatting... dat heeft een bijsmaak van narcisme: ipv focus op de handeling heeft de woedende persoon focus op zichzelf en rang tov anderen. Woede vaak context van ervaren onveiligheid of kwetsbaarheid, behoefte aan herstel van verloren controle. Hiermee is woede dus deels cultureel beïnvloed, in geval een cultuur aanmoedigt om je kwetsbaar te voelen bij geringschatting.
  
  Woede heeft twee gezichten: pijn (iets slechts in hier en nu) en terugslaan (toekomstgericht, iets goeds dat nog gaat komen). Woede heeft in zich het verlangen dat het de dader slecht vergaat.
  
  Vergelding
  - Woede, ook die goed gefundeerd is door laakbaarheid van een daad, omvat verlangen naar vergelding, naar lijden van de dader.
  - Vergelding is niet steekhoudend want schade wordt niet gecompenseerd of geëlimineerd.
  - Woede kan gericht zijn op relatieve positie: als de een relatief zakt dan stijgt de ander.
  - Woede kan iemand er toe brengen dat hij in de toekomst iets goeds doen: transitie.
  
  Woede in persoonlijke relaties
  Twee mensen proberen autonomie en gedeeld leven te verenigen. Daarbij helpt een speels en lichtvoetig gemoed (Aristoteles). Meer woede bij: star, onverdraagzaam, onzeker (bedreigend), verlangen naar controle en inperking vrijheid van de ander. Woede en vergelding leveren niets op: vertrokken liefde komt niet terug, pijn wordt alleen maar meer. Erkenning en waarheid zijn redelijke eisen; helaas gaat dat vaak over in vergelding en vernedering. Woede houdt de persoon af van introspectie. Woede en schuld houden de gekrenkte persoon steeds bezig met de vertrokken persoon.
  
  Woede jegens zelf
  Zelfkennis is beperkt: we veranderen in de tijd, vergeten, houden onszelf voor de gek, kennen niet patronen en motieven die voor anderen wel zichtbaar zijn, we zijn bevooroordeeld, we merken veel dingen niet op (lichaam), of voelen juist dingen die anderen niet zien.
  
  Schuldbesef is woede jegens jezelf vanwege een wandaad. Schaamte is negatieve reactie op jezelf met eigenschap of karaktertrek als focus. Schuldbesef impliceert pijn en de angst daarvoor jou je moreler laten leven (oa Kant). Positieve liefde en compassie zijn een toereikend en minder problematisch motief voor moreel gedrag. 'Alles zal goed komen als ik pijn berokken aan mezelf', is een irratione en onproductieve gedachte. Transitie: aandacht voor anderen en hoe jouw gedrag hun leven beter kan maken.
  
  Het recht mag geen vehikel zijn voor het nemen van wraak.
  
  Middendomein = dagelijks leven met onbekenden, zakenpartners, werknemers, kennissen; mensen die niet behoren tot intimi en vertrouwelingen, maar wel mensen en geen instituties.
  Woede in middendomein: aanvallen op status en eer, opgevatte beledigingen, schadelijk gedrag; gebrek aan respect, onbeleefd en onverschillig gedrag. Als intimi iets fout doen is er een verzachtende omstandigheid: het zijn onze dierbaren; bij onbekenden ligt woede altijd op de loer.
  
  Waarom vinden we dat we ons best moeten doen voor gezondheid en studie maar vinden we dat niet over woede? Omdat veel mensen denken dat woede goed krachtig en mannelijk is. Ze moedigen het aan in hun kinderen en staan het toe bij henzelf.
  
  Emoties en lichaam
  Vrijwel alle emoties worden ook lichamelijk gevoeld, maar:
  - verdriet voelt als buikpijn, maar niet alle buikpijn is verdriet
  - Lichamelijk gevoel van een emotie kan veranderen terwijl de emotie er nog wel is
  - Onbewuste en achtergrondemoties uiten zich niet altijd lichamelijk
  - Emoties zijn gericht op een object of subject dat van belang is voor de persoon: we treuren niet om alle doden in de wereld. De beoordeling 'van belang' hoeft niet bewust te zijn.
  Dieren en babies hebben ook al vermogen tot primaire emoties op basis van onderscheid goed slecht (eten, warmte etc)
  
• 
  Mark Valentine

  What a fascinating study of anger! Nussbaum uses a vast span of literature, historical events, and case studies to evince three forms that anger exhibits: status, revenge, and transition. Status-anger appears when trying to down-rank someone through rage; revenge-anger seeks payback, while transition-anger flashes hot but then cools to seek constructive ways to mend and reconstruct.
  
  She uses the Orestian trilogy by Aeschylus as the springboard for studying rage. Medea also enters the conversation and illustrates the insane drive to destroy based on the revenge principle. Nussbaum writes, "helplessness can easily be deflected into anger, which gives the illusion of agency and control." For transition-anger, the constructive, sane, and ethical response, Nussbaum uses a wide range of teaching texts. In the road to forgiveness, a path that begins with transition-anger, she draws from Dr. King, Gandhi, Mandela, Paton's Cry, the Beloved Country, Dickens' David Copperfield, Trollope's Dr. Thorne, Eliot's Middlemarch, and Roth's Pastoral as her guides.
  
  Her treatment of forgiveness also draws on Rev. Tutu's work with Apartheid South Africa. The forward-looking journey to reconciliation requires a foundational understanding of how irrational angry emotions can direct us into blind alleys and wasted energy.
  
  I think this essential reading for teachers, judges, therapists, spouses, parents, sons and daughters, workers, drivers, voters....
• 
  Kåre

  Nussbaum beskriver og analyserer vrede og tilgivelse i relationer og politik, samfund og religion. Hendes fokus er nomativt, idet hun igennem rigtig, rationel tænkning ønsker at være normdannende. Det er vel forbilledlig filosofi, som dels inddrager empiri, dels belyser dybe kulturelle forestillinger, dels er fremadrettet imod en bedre fremtid. Bogen er også klart skrevet og velorganiseret.
  Organisering af bogen.
  De første to kapitler handler om henholdsvis vrede og tilgivelse. De følgende kapitler beskæftiger sig med personlige relationer, bekendte og politik. Dette er en super opdeling.
  Nussbaum beskriver i de to første kapitler problemet og argumenterer for, at vrede skal undgås. I stedet skal man hurtigst muligt komme til the transition, som består i at tænke på den bedst mulige fremtid for de involverede. Eneste positive aspekt ved vrede er, at det kan få nogle øjne op for forhold, der skal ændres. Derefter skal man ændre forholdene og komme ud af vreden. Særlig problematisk er status vrede, som egentligt ikke skal lægges mærke til. Tilgivelse har heller ikke meget at byde på og er i det store hele en form for vrede eller forsøg på forkert statusanerkendelse.
  Vrede er uundgåelig i intime forhold. Ofte handler de om status og er nyttesløs, negative. Man skal hellere fokusere på det, man positivt og reelt ønsker, end på at opnå status på andres bekostning. Kapitlet er også en historisk gennemgang af væsentlige religioner – jødedom og kristendom – og deres forskellige forståelser af vrede og tilgivelse. Dermed får vi også en fornemmelse for, hvor dybt disse forudfattede meninger stikker. Samtidig er der stor indsigt i disse religioner.
  The middle range handler om forhold på arbejdet, i bussen osv. Der er en del gentagelser, og flere interessante analyser af hverdagssituationer. Der bruges sjovt nok mange eksempler fra litteratur.
  Det første kapitel om politik handler om selve retssystemet. Her er mange super analyser af den forkerte holdning til straf, som er gældende mange steder og især i amerika. Hun viser, at straf er en for snæver tilgang til forbedring af fremtiden. Der er også en strålende analyse og kritik af genoprettende retfærdighed. Kritikken er, at den genoprettende retfærdighed ikke skal foregå i the community men i retssystemet.
  Det næste kapitel om politik handler om eksempler på situationer, hvor systemet ændres radikalt, og hvor vrede kunne spille en rolle, men hvor det i de analyserede eksempler netop ikke får lov til det.
  Vurdering.
  Oplagt, at værket skriver sig ind i en vestlig tradition. Der er således intet om Islam, og det savner jeg. Det kunne have været interessant at få den vinkel med, både for at forstå islam bedre – ligesom jeg beriges i forhold til forståelsen af jødedom og kristendom – og for at kunne komme med en funderet og rimelig kritik af islam. Dette ville have været så velkomment, idet kritikkere af islam nu enten er imod eller for. Her kunne hun have givet en nuanceret analyse.
  Bogen minder på flere måder om Derridas bog om friendship, som jeg brugte mange timer på ikke helt at forstå. Begge ser således på tillid, alliancer, politik, kultur ud fra et for mig umiddelbart uvant sted. Begge graver dybt i den filosofiske litteratur og viser dermed, at disse skæve tilgange er interessante og vigtige.
  Jeg startede på bogen fordi jeg er blevet interesseret i at forstå bl.a. højrefløjen bedre. Jeg læste amerikanske tænkere, hvor Nussbaum var placeret på venstrefløjen. Som jeg ser det, er hun venstrefløjsagtig, fordi hun ikke godtager et hierarki som naturligt, men derimod ser lighed som det naturlige udgangspunkt. Hun siger ca. at man ikke skal tænke på status, men på, at mennesker har umistelige rettigheder, der på fundamental vis gør dem lige. Samtidig er hun skeptisk overfor alle praksisformer, hvor uligheder eksisterer og opretholdes. Fx ægteskab, hvor mænd ikke er eller kan være højere placeret end kvinder. Eller racer, hvor noget lignende gælder. Jeg er imidlertid usikker på, om Nussbaum adresserer de bekymringer, som højreorienterede kan have angående dette. Vil de ikke føle, at hun ikke forholder sig til de hierarkier, som skal være på plads, for at noget kan virke? Fx er der statusforskel mellem elever og lærere, overordnede og underordnede osv. Hvilken rolle spiller dette i Nussbaums teori, og forholder hun sig til det? Det kunne og burde jeg undersøge, eventuelt gennem inddragelse af højreorienterede teorier, hvor de angiveligt vil mene, at hierarkier i højere grad er ok.
• 
  Giorgos

  Η Nussbaum έχει γράψει πολύ σημαντικά βιβλία για την αρχαία φιλοσοφία και τη θεωρία των συναισθημάτων, κι όπως και να το κάνουμε είναι μια σταρ της σύγχρονης φιλοσοφίας , και εν πολλοίς όχι άδικα. Και στο βιβλίο της αυτό δείχνει ότι γνωρίζει πολύ καλά πώς να απευθυνθεί όχι μόνο στο ειδικό κοινό αλλά στον καθένα που ενδιαφέρεται να σκεφτεί θεωρητικά πάνω στην οργή και τη συγχώρεση. Είναι σημαντικό ότι δεν χρησιμοποιεί μόνο αυστηρά φιλοσοφικά επιχειρήματα, αλλά –όπως το έχει κάνει και σε άλλα βιβλία της– εμπλουτίζει τη συζήτηση και τα επιχειρήματα με αφηγήσεις από τη λογοτεχνία, την ιστορία και με προσωπικές ιστορίες, και δείχνει ότι την νοιάζει να συνδέσει (αυτή ως συγγραφέας και ο αναγνώστης) τις έννοιες αυτές με την καθημερινή ζωή.
  Η οργή αφορά, το έχουμε νιώσει όλοι μας…, σωματικές αλλαγές και προσωπικά αισθήματα, αλλά η Nussbaum ενδιαφέρεται εδώ κυρίως για τις πεποιθήσεις και τις εκτιμήσεις που σχετίζονται με την συναισθηματική κατάσταση της οργής –αυτό που λέμε το γνωσιακό περιεχόμενο της οργής (που εντάσσεται στη γνωσιακή θεωρία των συναισθημάτων). Βασική της θέση είναι ότι η οργή ορίζεται (α) από την πεποίθηση ότι κάτι που βρίσκεται εντός του κύκλου των πραγμάτων για τα οποία μεριμνά κάποιος έχει ζημιωθεί κακώς και αδίκως, και (β) από την επιθυμία να ανταποδώσει, να αντεπιτεθεί στον «δράστη» που θεωρεί υπεύθυνο για αυτήν τη βλάβη. Και η N. εκτιμά ότι έτσι οριζόμενη η οργή είναι πάντα ένα συναίσθημα προβληματικό από κανονιστική άποψη –δηλαδή, εν ολίγοις, δεν πρέπει να είμαστε οργισμένοι. Ο (γνωσιακός, εν τέλει) λόγος είναι ότι η οργή βασίζεται σε εσφαλμένες πεποιθήσεις, σε αμφιλεγόμενες μέριμνες για τα πράγματα, ή και στα δυο. Η επιθυμία μας να επιτεθούμε σε όποιον (μας) έκανε κακό προϋποθέτει ένα είδος «μαγικής σκέψης», και θα είχε νόημα εάν υπήρχε μια κοσμική ισορροπία (την οποία θα επανέφερε η ανταπόδοση).
  Αξιοσημείωτη εξαίρεση, κατά την N., είναι εάν αυτό που υποφέρει το θύμα από την κακή πράξη είναι μία «ελάττωση/υποβάθμιση της κατάστασής του», και ο μεν δράστης εμφανίζεται ισχυρότερος ενώ το θύμα ασθενέστερο. Εκεί, προτείνει η Ν., μπορεί να χρειάζεται η οργή και είναι στρατηγικώς ορθολογική, δεν σημαίνει όμως ότι μπορεί να θεμελιωθεί κανονιστικά (το πρέπει της). Μπορεί να έχει την τάση ο καθένας μας να θεωρεί ότι όλα στρέφονται γύρω από αυτόν και η ιεράρχηση των πράξεων να είναι εντελώς ναρκισιστική.
  Η «λύση» για την Ν. είναι μια τρίτη εκδοχή, την ονομάζει «μετάβαση»: να αφήσουμε την οργή και να υιοθετήσουμε μια στάση που μας προσανατολίζει στην «προσωπική και κοινωνική ευημερία», κάτι που είναι πιο αντικειμενικό και λιγότερο αμφιλεγόμενο από τις δύο άλλες στάσεις.
  Μήπως ένα στοιχείο αυτής της μετάβασης από την οργή σε μια πιο παραγωγική στάση, σημαίνει και τη συγχώρεση του δράστη του κακού; Η Ν. διακρίνει δύο είδη συγχώρεσης, αλλά τα κρίνει προβληματικά. Την συναλλακτική, όπου και ο δράστης συγχωρείται αναγνωρίζοντας το σφάλμα του, προσχωρώντας στην ομάδα των ζημιωθέντων, ζητώντας συγχώρεση –και τότε το θύμα εγκαταλείπει την οργή. Και την απροϋπόθετη συγχώρεση, όπου ο θύμα αφήνει την οργή χωρίς να ζητά τίποτε από τον δράστη.
  Η πρόταση της Nussbaum είναι μια «μεταβατική οργή», μια αγάπη που κάνει να σιωπήσει η οργή (στις βαθιές προσωπικές σχέσεις) και μία στέρεη δέσμευση στην ανιδιοτελή δικαιοσύνη και τη δημόσια ευημερία (σε πολιτικο-κοινωνικά και θεσμικά συμφραζόμενα). Εδώ δεν υπάρχει επιθυμία να ανταποδώσεις βλάβη στη βλάβη. Κοιτά στο μέλλον παραγωγικά: αυτό που έγινε δεν πρέπει να ξαναγίνει. Το πένθος, η πραότητα και η μεταβατική οργή δεν οδηγούν τον πόνο σε επιθυμία εκδίκησης.
  Όλα αυτά μπορεί να φαίνονται ενδιαφέροντα ή γνωστά, αλλά η ανάπτυξή τους από την Nussbaum είναι λεπτομερής, πυκνή επιχειρηματολογικά και διανθισμένη με πολλές κειμενικές αναφορές: από ��ις «Ευμενίδες» του Αισχύλου, τη «Ρητορική» του Αριστοτέλη, τους Στωικούς και ειδικά τον Σενέκα, στη νεότερη λογοτεχνία και φιλοσοφία. Τα επίπεδα ανάλυσης αφορούν την προσωπική ψυχολογία της πράξης, αλλά και την πολιτική. Πολλές σκέψεις, αντιρρήσεις και «εφαρμογές» στην καθημερινότητά μας μπορεί να προκαλέσει η ανάγνωση και αυτού του βιβλίου της Nussbaum.
  Το μάθημα των Στωικών είναι πάντα παρόν στο βιβλίο και μας το θυμίζει η παραπομπή στον Σαίξπηρ. Όταν ο Πολώνιος λέει « My lord, I will use them according to their desert», απαντά ο Άμλετ «God’s bodykins, man, much better! Use every man after his desert, and who should ’scape whipping? Use them after your own honor and dignity».
• 
  J Earl

  Anger and Forgiveness is Martha Nussbaum's exploration of anger, which she has addressed in previous work. In this volume she addresses forgiveness as a way to somewhat counter anger (though that is an extremely oversimplified statement).
  
  While Nussbaum uses classical texts as part of her foundation don't get confused into thinking she is offering a complete and thorough interpretation of any of those texts. She uses what needs for her argument, and her use s are quite legitimate and valid. Don't get confused by reviewers who criticize her for not doing what she never set out to do, namely give a full explication of specific classical texts. She chooses and explains the portions of texts she uses then goes on to develop her own views on anger and forgiveness. To get bogged down in minutiae rather than assess her thesis in the book is a freshman mistake.
  
  This is not, for me, her strongest work, partly because I view her ideas on and uses of forgiveness as problematic. That said I found much of the argument persuasive with only a few sticking points with which I am unsure I agree. As is usually a sign of a good book, her ideas warrant further thought and reading on my part. If you enjoy being challenged about concepts we often take for granted, I believe you will find much to appreciate in this book.
  
  Reviewed from a copy made available by the publisher via NetGalley.
• 
  Melissa

  My problem with this book is that I think her exception outweighs her central thesis. Yes, anger can be vengeful and destructive, particularly in the context of personal relationships, both intimate and non. But in the political realm it can be a signal for identifying injustice and motivation to make change - it can transition to positive future-focused action. Why advocate for non-anger when you can advocate for the transition? I also find Nussbaum's equation of non-anger and non-violence problematic and thus find her analysis of King and Mandela wanting.
• 
  Patricia

  There were a few arguments that could take more support. (It seems like a stretch to use Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, to exemplify Christian thinking on getting forgiven, for instance.) Still, this is a valuable work calling for us to rethink the too common and too easy notions that anger equals strength or that retaliation brings closure and an important call to constructive ways of mending injustice.
• 
  Jerry Wall

  Why be angry? What is the advantage. the author spends time on justified anger as limned in
  ancient Greek and Latin plays stories and philosophical writings. Ultimately, I believe with the Buddhists, that anger is a poor way to handle your thoughts. As they say, things happen that are not pleasant so it is up to us how we think through those unpleasantnesses. The better way, for me, is to
  think what is best for me, not how to get even with someone, or how to make them pay, or how to make them better.
  Aeschylus . . . depict unbridled anger. It is obsessive, destructive, existing only to inflict pain and ill. p. 2
  . . . the idea that political justice offers a thoroughgoing transformation of the moral sentiments in both the personal and the public realms. But I shall go further then Aeschylus, arguing that anger is always normatively problematic whether in the personal or in the public realm. *** I argue that anger includes. . . the idea of a serious wrong done to someone or something of significance, but also the idea that it would be a good thing if the wrongdoer suffered some bad consequences somehow. * * * * . . . road of payback, makes the mistake of thinking that the suffering of the wrongdoer somehow restores, or contributes to restoring,t he important thing that was damaged. * * * people's attempt to recover control in situations of helplessness. But the wrongdoer's suffering does not bring back the person or valued item that was damaged. * * * road of status * * * Lowering the status of the wrongdoer by pain or humiliation does indeed put me relatively, up. p, 5
  [widely thought] 1. Anger is necessary (when one is wronged)to the protection of dignity and self-respect.
  2. Anger at wrongdoing is essential to taking the wrongdoer seriously (rather than treating him or her like a child or a person of diminished responsibility.)
  3. Anger is an essential part of combatting injustice. p. 6 [this is] sometimes useful . . . but this limited usefulness does not remove its inappropriateness. p. 6
  . . . payback or retribution and anger with it are problematic. p. 15
  Why would an intelligent person think that inflicting pain on the offender assuages or cancels her own pain? There seems to be some sort of magical thinking going on. p. 24 !!!!!!
  Retaliation does not confer, or restore, those things (we assume loss by wrongdoing)* * * Thus people in academic life who love to diss scholars who have criticized them, and who believe that this does them some good, have to be focusing only on reputation and status, since it's obvious that injuring someone else's reputation does not make your own work better than it was before, or correct whatever flaws the other person has found in it. p. 26
  . . . anger is always childish, and a threat to the intense cooperation required for group survival in a very adverse climate. p. 43
  If I avoid contact with these animal reminders I will protect myself from being/becoming animal. p. 49
  . . . two ways . . . react to a struggle against adversity. * * * The path mapped our by Mahler is, instead, to keep on being oneself and doing one's work, not wasting time on angry thoughts and feelings, but just giving whatever one has to give. p. 84
  . . .flawed roads . . . road or payback . . . road of status. p. 93
  . . . Bernard Williams's "one thought too many." p. 96
  . . . the Stoics hold that no human relationship is worth getting upset about. p. 97
  The way anger goes away in the Transition seems much more promising: one stops thinking about one's own inner states and starts thinking about how to do something useful, and perhaps even generous to others. p. 136
  . . . conventional ideas of punishment already incorporate certain ideas of non-anger, such as the rejection of humiliation and cruelty in punishing. p. 177
  . . . human values that law protects. * * *
  As Plato says: the person who punishes rationally does not punish for the sake of a past injustice, but rather for the sake of the future. p. 178 !!!!!!
  New York . . . the cost to the city is annually $167,731 per inmate. p. 181
  . . . law is about protecting important, and distinct, aspects of human lives. * * * human flourishing. . . . p. 184
  The social contract, in short, is about human welfare. . . . p. 186
  . . . the unending nature of anger . . . . p. 199 !!!!!!!
  cry, the beloved country, for the unborn child that is the inheritor or our fear. p. 215
  . . . there is enough hating in our land already. . . [isn't there?] p. 217
  . . . one should not wish to humiliate opponents in any way, or wish them ill, but instead should seek to win their friendship and cooperation. p. 222
  . . . most people focus wrongly on status: instead, they should focus on their own inner development. p. 227
  Fable of moving force superiority between wind and sun. Wind made traveler tuck blanket more tightly against him, and the gentle rays of the sun made the traveler loosen and discard his barrier. p. 229
  . . . question of getting the other party to do what you want. He then shows that this task is much more feasible if you can get the other party to work with you rather than against you. p. 230
  . . . when you are a public figure you have to accept the integrity of other people until there is evidence to the contrary. p. 230
  Where truth has been for the most part concealed, one can see that trust is severely threatened. p. 238