God and Cosmos: Moral Truth and Human Meaning by David Baggett

God and Cosmos: Moral Truth and Human Meaning Reviews

• 
  Jonathan Brown

  A tour de force of rigor, insight, and wisdom, slow and plodding for most of the journey but rising to a monumental crescendo at its climax. This book presents the moral argument for God's existence like you've perhaps never seen it before!
  
  In another book,
  Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality, Baggett and Walls briefly critiqued secular ethics in one chapter and devoted the remainder of the books to a defense of theistic ethics. Here, in
  God and Cosmos: Moral Truth and Human Meaning (which they variously term a 'sequel' or a 'companion volume'), the ratio is flipped: the bulk of the book scrutinizes secular ethics, with a "moral case for God's existence, building on insights gleaned along the way," serving as the capstone (274). (They aim here to interact primarily with moral realist versions of secular ethics; they propose to "hold in abeyance our treatment of moral anti-realists and skeptics until a later volume" [37].)
  
  Baggett and Walls defend a moral argument for the existence of God, but a much more sophisticated and diversified one than is usually encountered in the literature. For instance, many moral arguments might assert that nontheistic approaches are wholly unable to account for some feature of morality, whereas a theistic approach is able. Baggett and Walls do not follow this binary approach. They maintain, on the contrary, that nontheistic approaches are partly able to account for features of morality, because they have ample theistic resources to draw on – namely, the world itself. And because of the way the world is constructed (by God), it provides the resources to partly explain moral phenomena. However, with respect to each feature of morality, Baggett and Walls mean to argue that "God plus the world" is explanatorily superior to merely "the world," and so that the existence of these moral features of reality favors a theistic explanation on the whole. For, "as awe-inspiring and mysterious as the world is, it remains contingent, and, considered in isolation, incomplete where morality is concerned" (275).
  
  Propounding this abductive moral argument (and I'm not really satisfied by their critique of deductive forms, e.g., W. L. Craig's), Baggett and Walls choose to focus on five features of moral reality that they argue favor theistic explanations: (1) moral value, (2) moral obligations, (3) moral knowledge, (4) moral transformation, and (5) moral rationality.
  
  In their chapter on moral value, also termed moral goodness, Baggett and Walls focus in on one key feature: the inherent dignity and worth of human persons. Any suitable approach to morality must account for this, and whatever limited progress secular theories may accomplish, none are quite up to the task. Utilitarian ethics doesn't get there – Bentham infamously condemned natural rights as 'nonsense on stilts,' and Mill softly follows by rooting the convention of 'rights' merely in advantage to society; utilitarian approaches, taken in isolation, lack explanatory power to cover intrinsic human dignity.
  
  Philippa Foot's secular natural-law angle does not succeed in crossing the divide between what is good for human beings and the goodness of human beings. (Baggett and Walls object on five grounds: Foot's approach is virtually defenseless against smart free riders; hers is a deflationary analysis of Aristotelianism, which was not content with us being merely human but was meant to include transformation through fellowship with the divine; her intuitions are rooted in resources beyond what naturalism affords, contrary to her insistence; she neglects a deeper analysis of all that is entailed in human nature; and her work does not confront the challenge of contemporary evolutionary moral psychology a la Gilbert Harman.)
  
  Nor do the strains of deontology espoused by David Enoch, Derek Parfit, and Erik Wielenberg gain success here. Wielenberg's robust normative realism holds that moral properties supervene on non-moral properties, and then he must distinguish three types of supervenience: R-supervenience, or being-reducible-to; A-supervenience, or entailed-by-base-properties-plus-necessarily-instantiated-properties; and D-supervenience, a modal co-variation open to several forms of making relation (and Wielenberg favors a causation-style making relation here). But Baggett and Walls note that "it is quintessential question-begging to assume that this supervenience story is consistent with secularism because, if humans are created by God in his image, then 'being human' would have for one of its essential features a relational property of which God is a part," and Wielenberg seems to illicitly assume that he can bypass "rugged honesty about the implications of such things as causal closure of the physical" (140). Nor does Wielenberg overcome a historical amnesia about the relevance of theism to generating conviction in intrinsic human value (142).
  
  Given that human beings have inherent value, what accounts for this truth the best? Theism does. On theism, the Source of value is personal, and so the value of personhood as such is secured. Wielenberg's critique – that this only gets us to a derived goodness and not an inherent goodness – fails; his proposals of brute facts are ad hoc stopping points, whereas dependence on God is a principled one, and at any rate, human existence is essentially relational.
  
  In their chapter on moral obligations, Baggett and Walls ask a different question. Not all good acts are obligatory acts, after all. There are actions wrong not to do ('moral obligation'), actions not wrong to do ('morally permissible'), and other actions wrong to do ('forbidden'). Obligations are not identical to feelings of obligation, though they do at least roughly correspond. Key features of obligations are guilt; dessert of punishment; and, especially, authority.
  
  Any suitable approach to morality must account for all this, and again, limited secular progress does not wholly rise to the occasion. Frans de Waal's functionalist approach flounders, in that he frequently "does not try to explain moral obligations at all, but merely our feelings or sense of moral obligations," but also argues that moral obligations are unimportant, for "moral feelings provide better moral reasons to act than do obligations" (156). But offering evolutionary explanations for moral concepts or altruistic inclinations "does not show that evolution has explained morality" (157). Nor does E. O. Wilson's approach, which, through collaboration with Michael Ruse, eventually came to see morality as redundant (158-159). Baggett and Walls scarcely see the need to interact at length with Philip Kitcher's effort to cast morality as an evolutionary tool for extending empathetic responses beyond the limit of the human imaginative faculties; for "Kitcher's view in particular is particularly bad at explaining obligations," but rather denies their existence (159-160). Baggett and Walls do interact with Scott M. James (which in the end can only offer "a substitute, a watered-down variant lacking in prescriptive force," and thus has "changed the subject" [164]) and the Cornell realists such as David Brink (whose "account of goodness would be more likely successful if in fact theism were true," and who really "have not provided an effective secular account of moral obligations" after all [166-167]). As it turns out, various naturalist approaches to moral obligation "replace obligations with rules, objective guilt with subjective guilt, intrinsic goods with instrumental ones," resulting in "a watered-down, emaciated, deflationary account of morality, a shell of her former glorious self, emptied and divested of her most enchanting and winsome distinctives and charms. We would respectfully suggest perhaps it's time morality refuse to settle, declare it's time to see other people, and say to naturalism, her ignoble suitor, 'It's not me. It's you'" (178).
  
  But what secular ethics does not accomplish well, theism does. Baggett and Walls defend a divine command theory, which need not be in competition with natural law and other approaches, but which does add something other approaches tend to omit. In the experience of some (e.g., Plantinga and Craig), the moral argument focusing on this particular feature is the most persuasive in contemporary usage.
  
  In their chapter on moral knowledge, Baggett and Walls come to the question of how we can explain our formation of true moral beliefs. They argue that we have both discursive moral knowledge and nondiscursive moral knowledge, and any approach to moral knowledge must account for both. But in fact, secular approaches tend only to give us Gettier cases, objective justification failures, and especially 'random time' scenarios in the form of misleading moral belief-forming and belief-evaluating mechanisms (cf. 180-183).
  
  There's Strong Evolutionary Ethics (on which natural history explains moral ontology: had we been raised like hive bees, fratricide and infanticide would have been right) – but this flounders back already on the issue of commitment to intrinsic moral value, and what's more, has other problems as well. If rights are based on natural capacities, then individuals with physical/mental defects or lesser natural capacities have unequal rights. Further, Strong Evolutionary Ethics fails to bridge the "logical chasm between what serves the biological interests of a species and what is morally valuable" (196, quoting Angus Menuge).
  
  And then there's Weak Evolutionary Ethics (on which natural history explains moral psychology but not moral ontology: had we been raised like hive bees, fratricide and infanticide would have been wrong even if we didn't think so) – which not only "gives no grounds for thinking we could know moral reality," but in fact "gives us reason to think we couldn't," for accidental belief does not amount to knowledge under any epistemology. If Weak Evolutionary Ethics were true, it would be "highly unlikely that our belief-forming mechanism would be apt for moral truth," given "the vast number of possible natural histories we might have had" (197).
  
  Drawing on Alvin Plantinga, Gilbert Harman, Sharon Street, et al., Baggett and Walls note a challenge: On a naturalistic evolutionary account, "it would seem that an exhaustive genealogy of our moral beliefs can be provided without as much as broaching the issue of whether such beliefs are true," and "unless there is a connection between moral truth and our moral judgments, the dependence thesis is undermined, justification for our moral beliefs is lost, and a defeater for moral knowledge has been identified" (200). If there is a relation between reproductive fitness and moral truth, then either moral beliefs have reproductive fitness because they are true (a 'tracking' relation), or else we have those moral beliefs simply because they are adaptive. Moral realism would require a tracking account, but such a thing would be hard to come by on any naturalistic evolutionary account. Baggett and Walls examine proposals by the Cornell realists and by the 'robust realists' (David Enoch and Erik Wielenberg), and all flounder. Cornell realists like Nicholas Sturgeon prpose a strong supervenience that ends up embracing Weak Evolutionary Ethics, while Enoch and Wielenberg hunt for a third factor to explain the correspondence between moral facts and human moral beliefs. Enoch posits survival or reproductive success as at least somewhat good, and uses this as a third factor; Wielenberg sees the goodness of the cognitive faculties that generate moral beliefs as themselves being a third factor to secure moral rights. But Enoch's solution fits even better in other worldviews, and Wielenberg's does not "satisfactorily explain the existence of binding moral obligations and inextirpable human rights" (207-209).
  
  But theism provides a deeply teleological account of moral knowledge, wherein our belief-generating and belief-evaluating capacities do track objective moral truth. Theism not only affirms robust moral knowledge, but explains how we can have it, and does so better than any secular theory of ethics. Even with the third-factor approaches that may be naturalism's best bet of escaping 'Darwinian dilemmas,' "such solutions are consistent with theism, there are reasons to think that theism could better deploy such solutions, and theism has additional resources to account for moral knowledge," and so "even if moral knowledge is consistent with naturalism, a better explanation for what makes such moral knowledge possible can be found in theism" (212).
  
  The chapter on moral transformation is perhaps the most interesting, because this is not a facet I see considered in most moral argument. Any moral realist must note that there exists a chasm between, on the one hand, the high moral demands we face (and can be aware that we face), and, on the other hand, our limited capacities to meet the obligations so demanded. Can secular approaches to morality adequately offer the resources for sufficient moral transformation? Certainly, they may offer limited betterment; but, Baggett and Walls see, this is not enough. (Shelly Kagan "puffs up the human capacity to live the moral life" [223]; Carol Gilligan and some other feminist writers, as well as others, "embody this approach of reducing the moral demand" [226]; Sam Harris, Donald Campbell, David Gauthier, and Alan Gibbard aim at "secular efforts at substitution" [233].)
  
  "At any rate, what to [George] Santayana and [Bertrand] Russell qualified as heroic seems instead to be a sober concession of defeat. … If this life is all there is, no aspiration to moral perfection will ever be achieved. … Holiness in Kant's sense remains forever elusive and beyond our grasp. … If we despair of discharging our duties, how much ever more short do we fall of a life of perfect love? At best what we see in most persons is incremental moral improvement through dint of effort and a few humble acquired virtues along the way" (236).
  
  Theism, on the other hand – and here they focus in on Christian theism – offers an account of how divine assistance is available to transform and deliver us, achieving a radical moral transformation at both the individual and collective levels. And so they argue that "classical theism and orthodox Christianity possess the necessary resources for moral transformation without, as John Hare puts it, reducing the moral demand, artificially exaggerating human capacities, or settling for substitutes for divine assistance that do not suffice" (214).
  
  Individually, such resources may produce saints (where Guenther Lewy, himself an agnostic, has fairly charged that secular ethics are not likely to produce such people [284 n. 12]). Collectively, Baggett and Walls note the arguments of others (e.g., Paul Copan, but confirmed even by atheist Jürgen Habermas) that, on the whole, Christianity-transformed civilizations have been predominantly positive forces for good in the world. And not only this, but theism also accounts for the idea of a moral destination, which is a teleological concept with which any secular ethical theory is likely to struggle (294-295).
  
  Finally, the chapter on moral rationality takes the other half of Kant's 'moral faith' on: "the need for morality to make full rational sense, for correspondence between happiness and virtue" (114). Drawing on C. S. Lewis' work The Abolition of Man and on J. R. R. Tolkien's essays on Beowulf (where he observed that the Beowulf poet saw that “the wages of heroism is death" [256]), Baggett and Walls note that "the question persists of whether sacrificial death could ever be a moral duty in a world where the forces of destruction prevail over valor and where resistance is finally futile and goes down in ultimate defeat" (257). Engaging deeply with Henry Sidgwick and Immanuel Kant, Baggett and Walls perceive that "a truly satisfying account of moral obligation requires ultimate sanctions, and this is where morality requires a satisfying ontology to be fully rational" (268). Given that the demands of morality "are often difficult and even extremely costly," it is difficult to find a secular account that can answer 'yes' to establishing such a demand as reasonable when "the cost is not compensated." But what secular approaches cannot satisfyingly produce, theism can: "Full moral rationality requires an ontological ground of morality that, among other things, 'guarantees' an unbreakable connection between morality and the ultimate self-interest of all rational beings" (269).
  
  Most of this is all rather heady stuff, and following their trail through the meat of Part II of the book is not the easiest of tasks. Those wishing for something lighter to help them get their bearings may find it fruitful to begin with the ninth and final chapter ("A Moral Argument"), wherein Baggett and Walls summarize and synthesize their arguments and results from each chapter. Where prior chapters were laborious endeavors, this chapter is not only refreshing but brings to bear Richard Creel's argument against the triumphant mode of atheism by positing that we have a moral obligation to at least hope that God exists, for the sake of those whose suffering so many atheists gleefully enlist in an argument from evil.
  
  In a fit of poetry, Baggett and Walls' conclusion meditates on the awe and wonder due the cosmos, with its "astonishing facets" from "the seemingly infinite to the immeasurably infinitesimal," but even moreso on the "cosmos within, a world of infinite richness, where truth and goodness and beauty merge and dance and sing"; for, if morality gives us a true glimpse into reality's true nature, then "it reveals a Goodness that cares for us, that loves us, that pursues us, and that is worth pursuing," and a moral truth whose "eternal notes" are "infinite intonations that whisper in our hearts a message that salvages significance and imbues us with dignity and value once more" (303-304). "Not only is moral truth at the heart of human meaning," Baggett and Walls conclude, but "it is an essential part of the script for the whole world," and so "the deepest truths about reality are discerned not through the cosmos alone, but rather, through the nature and will of the good God who is its ultimate source, final end, and relentless lover" (308).
• 
  Nelson

  As a work of philosophy this is an exceptional work - absolutely top notch. So then, why am I giving it 3 stars? Well, as an approach to the moral argument I found it weak in comparison to the (much maligned) deductive argument put forward by the likes of William Lane Craig.
  
  First some cons (later some pros):
  
  Firstly, the authors put forward an argument for why their abductive approach to the moral argument should be preferred. I found their reasoning thoroughly unconvincing.
  
  Secondly, they spent too much time explicating the different secular theories for various moral phenomena but too little time clearly explaining how such views failed. Further, their counter-arguments seemed excessively charitable. Now I’m all for being charitable (where deserved), but I found their arguments lacked a strong compelling force (but perhaps I lack the ability to appreciate their subtle zingers) given how weak the atheistic alternative explanations turned out to be.
  
  Thirdly, I didn’t like the structure of the book focusing on individual moral phenomena separately (at least I thought). If they had dealt with the individual secular moral systems each separately then offered an analysis throughout or at the end of the chapter that might’ve been better.
  
  The pros:
  
  Firstly, the book is readable yet very academically respectable. Well referenced and the authors’ explanations of their opponent's views was very fair and (as I mentioned earlier) charitable. There was absolutely no straw-manning.
  
  Secondly, some may appreciate their chapter-by-chapter consideration of explaining and analysing individual moral phenomena + atheistic arguments + their counter arguments.
  
  Thirdly, their working out and including detailed subject matter of relevance - such as moral knowledge and their own argument for a theistic *best explanation* of morality - added depth and clarity to the book.
  
  In all, a good book. Great as a work of philosophy but not my favourite approach to the moral argument. I think I’ll much more enjoy their future work on moral realism.
• 
  Roger

  Like most of the books I've read so far this year, this one was required for grad school.
  
  This books is, by the authors' own explanation, a follow-up volume to their previous work, "Good God." This volume expands to present what the authors believe is a complete abductive moral argument for God's existence.
  
  
• 
  Emily Gayle

  What a book! This has a wonderful and detailed account of the moral argument for Gods existence. I learned a lot from reading it. It states that we have more rationally because of morality to believe that theism is true rather than an alternative religion or worldview. The language is hard to understand at times but it is a good academic read.
• 
  Rebecca

  Scholarly yet understandable argument for the existence of God. Really well written and researched.