Embattled Rebel: Jefferson Davis as Commander in Chief by James M. McPherson

Embattled Rebel: Jefferson Davis as Commander in Chief Reviews

• 
  Jason Koivu

  Wow, that was incredibly adequate! If you don't want to be overly impressed with a historical work on the American Civil War, Embattled Rebel is where it's at!
  
  Who wants deep insights, anyhow? I'd rather hear a broad recap of the entire war with the occasional tenuous link to Jefferson Davis' role as President of the Confederate States of America. Sure, James McPherson might've dug deeper to given the reader a more meaningful account of Davis. We might've learned more about the man's motives. However, McPherson stuck to his guns and kept his subject at a distance. Bravo!
  
  Yes, yes, this was a rather thorough retelling of the Civil War from the South's perspective and I definitely have a better understanding of their strategy as well as Davis' reasoning for the moves he made, but let's be honest, I didn't know jack shit about the South's side of the story prior to reading this book, so anything would've been more than nearly nothing. This was more than nothing.
  
  Very serviceable writing here, as well. I don't recall the last time I read the placing of one word after another in such good order without them venturing into lyrical territory at least once in a while. McPherson laid it out pure and simple. No frills here folks! So few in fact, he might've been writing about the ancient Spartans.
• 
  Alan Tomkins-Raney

  Interesting analysis of Jefferson Davis's capabilities as a wartime commander in chief. At 252 pages of text, this book can seem rather like an overview; and I did at times feel like I would have appreciated a little more depth and detail. But it does succeed in making the point that Davis probably did as well or better with a doomed cause than anyone else available to be president and commander in chief of the CSA could have done. That Davis and his cohorts saw their chances initially as the opposite of doomed, indeed virtually guaranteed by God and fate, is perhaps the first and greatest strategic deficit on his part to be considered. Davis did have many outstanding qualities as a military commander and strategist, but his tendencies of micromanagement and favoritism towards his old West Point friends compromised his effectiveness.
  When one considers the differences in economic development, infrastructure, manufacturing capacity, and population between the north and the south, the eventual outcome of a war between the two regions should seem like a forgone conclusion. The South overwhemingly believed that chivalry and enthusiam could overcome such discrepancies. They were wrong. And they gravely underestimated the dedication and fighting ability of northern troops. One of the things I found most interesting is that many histories focus on the supposed superiority of the Confederate generals compared to Union generals, but this book gives the lie to that notion. The infighting and backstabbing, and frequent refusal to support and cooperate with each other make the majority of Confederate generals look like egotistical, immature jerks. Managing that clown show was no party for Davis.
  In the end, personality wise, Davis comes off every bit as unlikable as he is usually reputed to be, but also as a generally capable strategist and commander in chief who was undone by a superior opponent, and is not at fault or responsible for losing the war. As the author concludes, "the salient truth about the American Civil War is not that the Confederacy lost but that the Union won."
• 
  Doug Hibbard

  How do you handle presenting a biography of the President of the Confederacy? Very carefully.
  
  After all, Davis became the leader of treason, the face of a would-be nation that desired to retain slavery, and in the end, a failure, for his new nation never came to be.
  
  That it never came to be is a fact of history that we should be grateful for, and McPherson makes it clear that he is. Yet is there not something to be learned from Davis and his time at the helm of the Rebels? It does seem odd that I have seen more effort to extract viable lessons from Germany and its leader 1932-1945 than I have any effort to seek value from Davis' life.
  
  All of that aside, Embattled Rebel looks as much at Davis' faults as it does his good parts. With the hindsight of history, we can easily see the mistakes, but McPherson has done well in setting the stage of seeing through Davis' eyes.
  
  I was enlightened to Davis' skill-much of the history I have read of the era squarely casts Davis as an incompetent. Neither Northern victors nor Southern vanquisheds were in the mood to speak well of him, and he is scapegoated perhaps more than anyone else. I have often heard of Lee's valor and honor, but never of Davis' honor.
  
  Yet here McPherson paints us a man who tried, and yet was beset by the same challenges that hit us all. His health, his limited access to communications, and the egos of others. That the Confederacy lasted 4 years is a testament partially to him--without his efforts, the war would have likely been more vicious and shorter.
  
  I also appreciated the look at how Davis attempted to coordinate a unified strategy for the South, and how he maintained his commitment to Southern independence. He even, at one point, allowed for the possibility of ending slavery--if the South would be set free to be its own nation. That was a year before the war ended, but the North would have none of it.
  
  In all, I liked this read. It was worth my time, and as history nerd, I was enlightened in an area I have not considered before: Jefferson Davis as a successful leader.
• 
  Praxedes

  Most of my knowledge about the US Civil War has come from the winning party, the North. I am quite familiar with Lincoln's life during this confrontation, but never really saw things from the other side.
  
  This book explores the leadership style of Jefferson Davis, Lincoln's opposing president in the South, at this time of strife. It chronicles Davis' wartime decisions and the unceasing challenges to his term in office. It was interesting, but hardly delved into the inner workings of Davis' mind. It mostly recounts battles, memos, and the struggle to keep everyone on board.
  
  The book is not bad; I wish there was more of Davis' introspection and personal life included in it.
• 
  Joseph

  A good, concise single volume treatment of the Confederacy's commander-in-chief. The author describes Davis's tendency to mettle in minor military matters. He argues that had Davis delegated responsibility better, he would have been a better leader. I agreed with most of the author's conclusions. However, I found the chapters to be a bit choppy and they felt rushed, as if the author was pushing up against a deadline. Still for a short book, this was a good one.
• 
  Sammy

  James McPherson is an excellent historian and writer. I have enjoyed his other books, most notably "Battle Cry for Freedom", likely the greatest single one volume history of the Civil War. When I saw him on Charlie Rose promoting his new book about Jefferson Davis, someone about whom I knew too little, but wanted to know more since he served a fascinating role in history as leader of the Confederacy, I immediately purchased this book.
  
  I wish I still had the receipt so I could return it. Don't buy it. Don't even waste time reading it if you can borrow a copy for free from the library or a friend. Harsh, but fair.
  
  First off, this book isn't really even a book. It's 252 pages minus 39 pages for maps and illustrations. Each of the eight chapter breaks is two pages long. It's a long essay.
  
  Second, it's not that informative. It's basically just a recap of some Civil War battles and what Davis was doing or thinking during that time.
  
  Third, it's a boring Civil War recap at that.
  
  Overall, a major disappointment. Save your time and money.
• 
  Sean Chick

  Almost rated it 4 stars. This is more a narrative than an analysis, although McPherson is fair to the often maligned Davis, often unfairly cast as either the author of Confederate defeat or a pale reflection of Lincoln.
• 
  Al

  I knew two things about this going in. James MacPherson is one of (if not) the most reverted authors of civil war history and second, reviews of this book weren’t great.
  
  But I did like the premise. There are plenty of books about Presidents, but you don’t really see much in terms of Jefferson Davis, who was President of the Confederate States of America. Indeed, I thought might be interesting to see how the Confederacy was governed.
  
  Not sure that the book really is that. MacPherson alludes to his leadership style at various points. David as a former Secretary of War was probably the best the South could have done, but he was also a micromanager and often sick/tired and certainly between both of those qualities, not ideal.
  
  Much of the book deals with the Generals and Davis’s relationship with them. The relationship with Joseph Johnston was interesting as he was likely the most competent of generals but unlike say Grant, was reluctant to fight. The book mainly focuses on these details, which is interesting but repetitive.
  
  I conclude as I think the author does that Davis was competent but he wasn’t Lincoln (and who would be). It does talk about some of his relationships with the Southern press and political rivals.
  
  It is of course, noteworthy that the Southern States were more interested in defending their home turf than coming together as an United country. This surely complicated things as Mississippi soldiers weren’t interested in defending, say Virginia
  
  It is interesting to see how some in the South wanted to pursue some kind of conciliation with the North, though Davis didn’t see that as a real possibility (neither did Lincoln, which proves Davis right, but it is interesting how they tried).
  
  As major cities fall in the South, Davis seems rather misguided and quixotic in thinking the South could continue to exist and fight the war. As African Americans join the Union army, the conversation goes towards whether the Confederacy should allow slaves to enlist. Ultimately, it’s a thought that is ultimately shot down in the South, but it is interesting to see how the argument progressed.
  
  This is a short book but dense. Your enjoyment of the book likely depends on interest in the American Civil War (as in this should not be the first book you go to) but if this sounds like it might be interesting, it’s short enough to read. Just don’t expect too much.
• 
  Donna Davis

  Book review Embattled Rebel: Jefferson Davis as Commander in Chief, by James M. McPherson*****
  
  This was my first biography of Jefferson Davis. I have studied and taught about the American Civil War for decades, and read biographies and memoirs of and by some of the other principals in this conflict; I have avoided biographies and memoirs of Southern generals and politicians that smacked of nostalgic yearning for that Lost Cause. I would swear some of them would cheerfully go back to the enslavement of people of color given half a chance, the way they carry on. In any case, when I found this gem recently released by one of my favorite historians, I knew I had to read it. Sadly, I didn’t get the ARC when I requested it; hey, it happens! But my spouse popped through the door with a copy of it and I was in business at last. It was well worth his time and effort. James M. McPherson won the Pulitzer for Battle Cry of Freedom, the best single volume treatment of the Civil War I have read. He didn’t disappoint this time either.
  
  If you read this biography, don’t skip the introduction. All of the details that follow are succinctly outlined in interesting and readable form; in fact, I read it before I read the book, and then I read it again afterward.
  
  The book is punctuated by photographs of commanding generals in excellent resolution when read on an e-reader. I was also pleased to see that the maps could be zoomed to where I could generally tell what was on them when I held the e-reader near the light. This is a huge improvement over early history texts produced digitally. I used to suggest to those reading military history that they spring for a paper copy so that they could read these, which are often key to understanding what is being said. If you buy this one digitally, it will serve just fine.
  
  The thing I was most curious about was whether it was true that Davis was insane by the time the war ended, and that the proceedings were mostly left to Robert E. Lee. Whereas Lee made his own decision to surrender to Grant, Davis, though undoubtedly in denial and out of touch with the reality of Northern conquest, was not insane nor near death, as the terrible textbook I was assigned to use with my teenagers had it. Happily, I noted that the sections on the Civil War had a number of other incorrect entries, and so I greatly limited my use of that book. Now I am really glad I did. Davis didn’t want the presidential nod, but he got it and took it; in fact, he died many years later, entirely unrepentant. McPherson believes he was a strong politician who did a creditable job with a damnable task; Lincoln was a better president, but the Confederacy did not lose the war because of Davis’s failures. It was going to lose anyway.
  
  Prior to reading this biography, I had believed that the south held on for as long as it did because its military leaders were stronger than those of the Union. This actually isn’t saying much about Confederate leadership. McClellan cost both sides a lot of years and bloodshed that didn’t have to happen. It isn’t so much that the South had amazing generals; it was more that the Union had nobody who was dedicated and proven. In fact, says McPherson, the Confederate military was practically tearing itself apart through gossip, infighting, and rivalry. Jefferson probably was guilty of promoting his friends beyond their level of competency; yet the cabals and gamesmanship practiced by those assigned to answer to General Bragg were at best a morale-draining waste of time, and at worst may have cost the Confederacy some battles. And the now-venerated Robert E. Lee was castigated in the Southern press for the number of dead Confederate soldiers who didn’t walk away from his battles. He was dubbed “the king of spades” for the graves that had been dug.
  
  One Confederate general I had wondered about was John Bell Hood. My impression of him, I admit, was that he was a bad-ass general. He never seemed afraid to attack, even with one leg and one arm gone. Who does that? But this is one more hole in my scholarship that McPherson quickly rectified. Hood would fight unwinnable battles. He destroyed an army during the last-ditch effort to save the Confederacy, losing a full fifty percent of the tens of thousands of men he led, and most of the rest of them soon thereafter. The “reserves” consisted of old men; children too young to sign up initially; and those proud wealthy souls who had originally paid someone else to fight on their behalf. (I can imagine how well the latter took orders!)
  
  I was familiar with a lot of the primary information provided here and was therefore free to focus on, and enjoy, the details. One new bit of amusing minutiae was that Southern women saved “the contents of chamber pots to be leached for nitrate to produce gunpowder”. Those of you more familiar with chemistry will know whether they were lined up with their number one or number two. For me, it was a stitch to envision all those fine ladies dressed up in their hoops and bonnets standing in the potty-donation line!
  
  I was particularly interested in what McPherson had to say about guerilla warfare. Lincoln was intent upon making it as easy as possible for the Confederate states to rejoin the Union. Some of us, had we been present, would have made a strong case for executing Davis and some other leaders—particularly those in South Carolina who started the whole mess—for treason. And some who were in Washington DC at the time made that case, too; but the decision was for quick, peaceful reunion. One reason for this was the concern that rebels made bitter by the price of losing the war might take to the hills and wreck endless havoc upon the offices of government and the economy long after the war had officially ended. But guerilla actions during the period when the Confederate government was in place and holding out for official recognition would have been unwise. Says McPherson:
  
  "Guerilla actions as the main strategy are most appropriate for a rebel force trying to capture the institutions of government, not defend them. And a slave society that
  practices guerilla warfare is playing with fire, for it opens
  up opportunities for the slaves to carry out their own guerilla actions against the regime."
  
  But what of Beauregard? What about General Johnston and General Johnston? (Of course, there were two.) Bedford Forrest? What was the deal with Kentucky? Ah, there’s so much more to discuss.
  
  I write really long reviews. If you are still with me by the end of this one, your interest is sufficient to go out and get this wonderful book. I don’t recommend it for those unfamiliar with the Civil War; for that, you ought to read Battle Cry of Freedom first. But once the basics are in your tool kit, you will find this biography accessible, interesting, and rewarding. Go for it!
  
  
  
  
  
• 
  Louise

  
  This is a short overview by a top (or may be THE top) Civil War scholar. Civil War buffs will know most of the content and be dissatisfied. Those knowing nothing about the Confederate Army would and should start elsewhere. Those like me, who know about most generals, some battles and a bit of strategy will find a short book like this comfortable.
  
  The South could hardly have won this war, and Davis should have known it. In the end, when there was clearly no winning path, he became even more delusional. He was deeply committed to the war working day and night, micromanaging, giving speeches, visiting encampments, telegraphing and delivering orders, consulting with his cabinet/generals and changing Secretary's of War. What could have he done differently?
  
  One of the biggest problems was being outmanned 2:1 (or more). The Confederate Congress only reluctantly passed a conscription bill, and at that a restrictive one. The resulting army had to defend a huge border and given that the war was about “state’s rights” governors were reluctant to have their troops defend anything but their own state. Procurement of any manufactured goods from weapons to shoes was difficult in this agrarian region. Later with drought and economic collapse procurement of food and horses also became problems. Were these problems even solvable?
  
  McPherson takes you through a raft of personnel problems facing Davis. While he may have had to make some political appointments, his discretionary appointments may not have been the best. Some generals clamored in the press for more troops putting Davis in a tough position since there were no troops to send and one piece of strategy was to bluff on the Army’s size. Davis was undermined by the popularity of some of his generals, one being Joseph E. Johnston, who, had he followed the chain of command, might have stopped Sherman at the start of his march to the sea.
  
  You get the feeling that Davis has little insight into people. He is often sick, buried in details and may not see the forest for the trees.
  
  This appears be have been an essay or a lecture that the author and/or publisher decided to print and stretched to 250 pages with photos maps and blank page chapter introductions. This is OK with me, since it was just the right size to give me some understanding Davis, his relationships with his generals, how he attempted to implement his strategy and his overall management of the war.
  
• 
  Jean

  Civil War scholar and Pulitzer winning (“Battle Cry of Freedom” 1988) author James M McPherson has taken a fresh look at a subject with whom he is eminently familiar: the life and times of Confederate President Jefferson Davis. With open minds in short supply these days the author takes a big risk in challenging past postulations. Many still consider Davis a traitor.
  McPherson has methodically, without emotions written this short book. It is obvious he has conducted an enormous amount of research in preparation to write this story of Davis. This is not a biography in the traditional since as details of Davis’s life before Secession and his fate during Reconstruction are not covered.
  
  McPherson claims Davis was not an inept leader as many historians have claimed. Davis was a graduate of West Point and had served in the Mexican War. The author states that the south also had problems with its Generals. He compared the tentative George B. McClellan to the backpedaling Joseph E. Johnston. While he documents that Davis made his share of mistakes and was an impolitic politician, McPherson concludes that Davis devised a credible strategy for fight the war. The South’s material and manpower handicaps are well known, but McPherson list other obstacles such as the Southerners were anything but united. The “States Rights” mantra often inhibited coordinated military tactics. The author covers the 1862 threat by Arkansas to secede from the Confederacy and in 1863 North Carolina’s leaders favored negotiations. On top of this Rebel soldiers deserted in droves.
  
  McPherson’s overall evaluation of Davis is fair-minded. He criticizes Davis but also points out some favorable points. The book’s worth a read particularly for those interested in the Civil war. I read this as an audio book downloaded from Audible. Robert Fass did a good job narrating the book.
  
• 
  QOH

  This is a popular biography of Jefferson Davis during the war years, and it's an odd little book. It's not exhaustive, it's more military than biography, and it's not a full picture of Davis during these years--to my disappointment, because my great-great-great grandfather (27th Mass Infantry, Company F) was his orderly after he was captured. If you thought Lincoln had trouble with his generals, I think Davis had it much worse. Davis made an interesting leader during the war, given his extensive military experience and sickbed command. Would things have been better if he'd relied on other generals? It's an open question.
  
  The author felt compelled to put a bit in about his personal beliefs: this short biography is, in some ways, an apologia for Davis. (He's clearly on the Union side.) I think we're all pretty clear on this one. Davis's views on slavery are reprehensible now, and they were for my Yankee family in 1861. Does he deserve the blame for the defeat of the confederacy? I came away from this amazed that--given McClellan's repeated screwups--the Confederacy lasted as long as it did. Davis put generals in play who didn't deserve to be there, out of personal and political loyalty--but he had to deal with the the politics of the confederate states, limited manpower and materiel. The author adds a lot of nuance to this part of the story.
  
• 
  Jill

  This book is in many ways a “mirror image” of McPherson’s book on Lincoln as Commander in Chief of the Union Army (Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief).
  
  As with the book on Lincoln, McPherson organizes the book around five functions performed or overseen by Davis in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief: the formulation of policy, national strategy, military strategy, operations, and tactics.
  
  McPherson calls Davis’s operational preference an “offensive-defensive” strategy, which the author defines as an effort “to seize opportunities to take the offensive and force the enemy to sue for peace.” Of Davis’s generals, only Stonewall Jackson (who died early on however, from complications of friendly fire) and Robert E. Lee had much interest in the “offensive” part of the equation. Joseph E. Johnston had an attitude matching George McClellan’s in the North; neither of those generals seemed interested in fighting, much less defending. [As an interesting aside not included in the book, after the war, Johnston became friends with both Grant and Sherman. He served as a pallbearer for Grant's funeral, and also served, in very inclement weather, as a pallbearer for Sherman’s funeral, dying of pneumonia he subsequently contracted. One might say that in a way, Sherman finally killed Johnston.]
  
  Davis was much more involved than Lincoln in the minutia of planning battles. He had graduated from West Point, and actually would have preferred to be out in the field. But Lincoln’s efforts at self-education had made Lincoln into a brilliant strategist, in spite of his lack of formal education or battle experience to match that of Davis. Nevertheless, knowledge and insight helped neither Commander in Chief. Just as Lincoln experienced, Davis’s suggestions, requests, and even direct orders were often ignored. Also like Lincoln, Davis was constrained from replacing these recalcitrant generals by political pressures and/or the lack of suitable replacements.
  
  Unlike Lincoln, Davis rarely employed tact in dealing with commanders he didn’t like, and as a result, many of them ended up loathing him. In addition, Davis had a personality that was described as - to take one example of a detractor’s evaluation - “conceited, hypocritical, sniveling, canting, malicious, ambitious…” Others similarly excoriated him for being haughty, disagreeable, peevish and egotistical. McPherson largely dismisses these assessments of Davis, pointing out his many painful medical conditions, which may have explained Davis’s behavior, but certainly doesn’t render it null.
  
  My primary objection to this book is that McPherson makes it sound as if the main criterion differentiating Lincoln and Davis is the fact that Lincoln commanded a winning army, and Davis did not. I have to say that this tone sort of gave me the creeps.
  
  Davis was absolutely and irrationally rabid about the “fact” (as he saw it) that whites were meant to rule, and that “property” was meant to serve. Lincoln was a corrupt abomination in Davis’s view for wanting to free the slaves, thereby making “slaves” of white Southerners. (If this sounds totally psychotic, there are many quotes by Davis in this slim volume that sound as if he is certifiably insane.) Did this impact Davis’s decisions as a leader? I contend that it did, and should have been addressed.
  
  Take, for example, how Davis insisted that keeping the right to slavery intact was worth fighting for, even if every single home and city were destroyed by fire. Or consider the 1862 passage of the so-called Twenty Negro Law, according to which one able-bodied white male could be exempted from the draft for every twenty slaves on a plantation. This law, which benefitted the small rich white planter minority and alienated the more numerous white men who had no recourse but to fight and send their sons to die, was passed out of necessity to protect slavery. If the whites were all off to fight and no one was left at home but weak old men, women, and children, it was hard to maintain control. Slaves began to run away to the Union lines and/or put up more resistance to the authority of those left on the plantations. Yet manpower was desperately needed, and the additional spur to desert among those not offered exemptions was crippling. In this way, Davis’s priorities parallel those of Hitler, who allowed his deranged obsessions to guide his policies and strategies repeatedly, such as the way he took away much-needed trains from his army so that he could push through the transport of Jews to extermination camps.
  
  McPherson also makes very little of the fact that many of the policies inspiring Davis’s rants against Lincoln were policies adopted by Davis as the war progressed. (To McPherson, this was just part of the natural evolution of war. Perhaps it is, but it doesn’t gainsay the hypocrisy and irrationality of Davis, whose venom towards Lincoln only increased as he found he needed to take similar measures.) Davis even, near the war’s end, advocated arming slaves. (When Lincoln began recruiting former slaves into the army, Davis declared it to be “the most execrable measure recorded in the history of guilty man…”) In Davis’s first message to his congress, he derided the North for their continuing efforts to impair the security of property in slaves and “thus rendering the property in slaves so insecure as to be comparatively worthless, and thereby annihilating in effect property worth thousands of millions of dollars.”
  
  If one accesses
  this speech of Davis’s online, one can read how he further demonstrates his divorce from reality as he continues:
  
  "In the meantime, under the mild and genial climate of the Southern States and the increasing care and attention for the well-being and comfort of the laboring class, dictated alike by interest and humanity, the African slaves had augmented in number from about 600,000, at the date of the adoption of the constitutional compact, to upward of 4,000,000. In moral and social condition they had been elevated from brutal savages into docile, intelligent, and civilized agricultural laborers, and supplied not only with bodily comforts but with careful religious instruction. Under the supervision of a superior race their labor had been so directed as not only to allow a gradual and marked amelioration of their own condition….”
  
  Needless to say, in Davis's world, there was no violence involved in keeping slaves "docile." He makes no mention of how much difficulty the planation owners had experienced keeping the slaves in place once the war started, which would hardly have been necessarily if what he said were true, or even how it turned out that the numbers of slave were so augmented without any more slave trade. This process must have been part of the “bodily comforts” to which he alludes….
  
  As for the desperate consideration in 1865 of arming slaves, the mentality espoused by Davis led one editor in Alabama to opine that “We can make them fight better than the Yankees are able to do. Masters and overseers can marshal them for battle by the same authority and habit of obedience with which they are marshaled to labor.”
  
  McPherson reports these ravings, but doesn’t comment on them. As he noted in his Introduction, “I have sought to transcend my convictions and to understand [Jefferson Davis] as as a product of his time and circumstances.” But there were plenty of people, even in the same time and circumstances, who did not suffer from the same delusions as did Davis. McPherson also offers no analysis of how a large portion of the South could be consumed by mass psychosis and monstrous barbarism toward people they shackled, raped, beat, and abused, and whose children, who were often the product of these rapes, were then also used as slaves. I believe such a study would have been much more useful as a historical look at what drove Jefferson Davis and those who supported him, and would have furthermore illuminated the reasoning behind some of Davis’s decisions.
  
  McPherson credits Davis with inspiring Confederate persistence, but at the same time allows that as the war went on, there was growing disaffection with the job Davis was doing. Again, McPherson totally ignores the fact that the doggedness of the Rebels may have been due more to their own hard-core racism and desire to keep slavery in place (free labor and free sex being difficult to part with for many).
  
  Finally, McPherson touches only briefly on Davis’s involvement with efforts of Confederates hiding in Canada to destabilize the Lincoln government. He does not mention at all the allegations that Davis approved plans to assassinate Lincoln. Given Davis’s involvement in every little aspect of the Confederate struggle, it would be surprising had he not in some way at least have been aware of these efforts.
  
  In any event, it is probable that none of Davis’s strategies - no matter how good or ill-advised - could survive the combination of the Grant/Sherman juggernaut and the crippling lack of infrastructure and resources (including quite importantly, food) that plagued the South.
  
  Evaluation: This examination of how Jefferson Davis fulfilled his role as a wartime Commander-in-Chief seems to be missing context. Jefferson Davis was not only the commander of a force opposing that of the loyal states in the Union. He was also a rabid racist, whose rantings are reminiscent of Hitler’s in their insanely savage and malignant insistence that some human beings are not humans at all, and that if maintaining that demented delusion meant the destruction of all the land and homes of the South, it was worth it to him, just as Hitler was willing to let his own people die to uphold his similarly insane vision.
  
  I do not agree with McPherson that the main sticking point in comparing what Davis did to what Lincoln did was the fact that Lincoln won and the South did not, and I deplore McPherson’s decision to structure his analysis in this way. No one would claim that the main difference between Franklin Roosevelt and Hitler was that Roosevelt won and Hitler lost. To explain away Davis’s psychosis as being just a “product of his time and circumstances” is to deny the very essence of what drove Davis, and why he made the decisions he did. It is also a shocking moral lapse.
  
  Shortly after this book was published, we went to a book talk featuring McPherson. I asked him how he would rate Davis as a president. He seemed rather annoyed or at least defensive on Davis’s behalf, pointing out that Lincoln would inevitably rate higher just because he was on the winning side. I don’t agree at all. Lincoln would rate higher even if he lost.
• 
  Caleb J.

  Another excellent Civil War book by McPherson. This book focuses on Jefferson Davis as Commander in Chief of the confederate states from 1861 to 1865 only. It illustrates the challenges that he faced and personality clashes he had with his generals and Confederate cabinet while trying in vain to win the Civil War. A very good book for those interested in getting into the Civil War weeds.
• 
  Ozymandias

  John McPherson is the best living writer on the American Civil War. His
  Battle Cry of Freedom is by far the greatest single volume history of the war and
  Ordeal by Fire is a great account of reconstruction. So once I read
  Tried by War, which focused on Lincoln’s military strategy and relationship with his generals, and saw that McPherson had written a similar book from Jefferson Davis’ point of view I know that I had to read it. Unfortunately, for whatever reason, this book never manages to do its subject justice in the way Tried by War did. People reading this book without an understanding of the course of the war will be at a loss to explain what’s going on. Those who do know the war will find it a rushed and disjointed account.
  
  I’m not really sure what this book is trying to do. I’m not sure it knows either. Tried by War outlined Lincoln’s evolving strategic sensibilities as he tried to conduct a great civil war, but Davis never really evolved that way since he was a military man going in and thought he knew better than his generals. Some of the basic strategic considerations that made him decide to disperse his army to deal with any potential threat rather than concentrating it at any fixed point are laid out rather well at the beginning, but his basic strategy seems to have evolved little from there. Outside of that the book mostly just offers a brief summary of various campaigns and how they went. The contextualization of these campaigns is pretty bad – if you don’t already know why they matter you won’t learn it here. The book’s coda offers a basic summary of why Davis’s decisions mattered and what his strategic concerns were, but this analysis needed to be made clear throughout the book. We hear a lot about feuding and the difficulties he had in finding reliable generals, but even his relationship with Lee (the finest example of good civil/military relations) is ill explored. It is mentioned but never detailed. Was their entire relationship defined by interpersonal ties that were never reflected in letters? Even if that is the case, we need more to understand their relationship.
  
  From this, Davis sounds like he was pretty tangential to the whole affair. Was he just responding to Union moves? If so, his lack of proactive measures explains much of his failure. Yet I don’t think this is fully so. Antietam and Gettysburg were major offensive operations, as were several of the Western campaigns, and yet they receive little attention here. The entire invasion of Maryland is passed over in a single page, and this from the man who literally wrote
  the book on Antietam! As near as I can figure, McPherson has written a dozen books on Civil War battles and one already on a president’s view of the war. At this stage he doesn’t want to repeat himself and just takes for granted that you’ve already read his previous work or something like it. It feels like an incomplete book.
  
  This is not the book to consult for an account of Davis the man. There is little in here of a personal nature apart from his feuds (endless) and health (poor). Obviously the focus of the book is not strictly biographical, but a brief character sketch at least in the introduction would have aided this book immensely. Instead, we’re treated to a defense of why Jeff Davis deserves to be reassessed and an observation that he’s simply not as likeable as Lincoln. And that’s the book’s main contradiction – it’s written for a pretty broad audience but assumes background knowledge of a relatively narrow sort. Lincoln takes center stage in accounts of the war, but Davis often recedes into the background even in books focused on the South. It’s likely that many Civil War buffs can say little to nothing about the man’s background. Certainly less than they can say about many of his generals. That, of course, is why this book exists. And why its failure to engage with Davis on any level beyond the most superficial is genuinely sad.
  
  That’s not to say this book has nothing of value. McPherson knows Davis quite well, and if he’s not great at explaining who he is to us who he is he does have some insights. To a disinterested observer at the start of the war, Jeff Davis would have seemed the better leader – he had effective military experience, strong ties to people in power, and a tenacity that was hard to top. I thought that it was interesting that he went into the war expecting to be appointed to a generalship and never fully got over his desire to lead armies into battle. He appeared just behind the frontlines several times during the war, endangering himself needlessly out of a desire to participate. He basically served as his own Secretary of War. Such aggressive passion seems ideal for a warleader. Yet it wasn’t enough. The problem with Jeff Davis wasn’t that he made mistakes so much as he didn’t correct or learn from them. Lincoln made so many mistakes in his early years it was astounding, yet he emerged from the fiery trial a stronger man. Davis seems to have come out much the same as he went in – confident in his abilities and stubbornly refusing to take advice.
  
  His loyalty to the friends he made generals was astounding, although we see little of what those relationships consisted of. And the rivalries in the service were insane. Hard as it is to imagine, the feuds between Confederate generals were worse than the festering wounds that blighted Union veterans for decades. It is true, in this context, that Davis was more sinned against than sinner. He didn’t deliberately promote feuds and none of his were as bad as those perpetuated among rival generals. Yet it was part of his job as commander-in-chief to handle such bickering and I can’t see that anything he did made things better, not worse. When the army has lost faith in its general you can’t just ignore it. Even if he is a friend you feel was unfairly stigmatized. And in making trust rather than success the essence of his appointments he did exacerbate blunders (Hood being the prime example). McPherson is right to point out, as he eloquently puts it, that the pertinent fact is not that the Confederacy lost but that the Union won. Davis’ mistakes as commander-in-chief likely did not cost them the war (though some of his political decisions in the crucial early years helped), and the war was a close run thing where a Southern victory seemed possible into 1864. Yet it is also impossible to deny that Lincoln was the more skillful warleader and had a better grasp of the requirements of his office. For that reason this book is best read in tandem to, or as a supplement of, his book on Lincoln at war.
  
  This book is short – 253 pages minus an additional 39 dedicated entirely to pictures and maps (even when the pictures are so small 3/4 of the page is left as empty space). But even that undersells how little there is here. The formatting seems to have been deliberately designed to artificially increase the number of pages. We get a large font, almost a full space between sentences, and huge margins. As short as it seems already it’s shorter still in reality. I found myself surprised by how fast I was tearing through it – twelve pages in five minutes. Were the book to be permitted a natural length I doubt it would be more than 150 pages long.
  
  Jeff Davis is not as compelling a character as Abe Lincoln. He was a stern, supercilious man who had little of Lincoln’s wit or warmth. This book was never going to be as enthralling as Abe’s. Yet it could have been much, much better than this. For whatever reason McPherson’s heart just wasn’t in it. By skirting over major events the book leaves the reader with little to hang onto and offers no major insights into Davis the man. He’s probably right that Davis’ failing have been overstated by a blame-seeking posterity, but the flaws are there and even McPherson can’t always deny their prominence. I don’t think my views on Jeff Davis have changed that much as a result of this book. Sadly, if you’re interested in exploring the war through a Southern point of view this book isn’t the place to go. I’m not sure what book is (there’s a lot of Lost Causerism corrupting Confederate history) but somewhere out there must be a book better than this one. If this book is a topic that really interests you, I’d recommend reading Tried by War first and then treating this as an appendix. You’ll get a lot more from it and its flaws won’t be as significant.
• 
  Jerome Otte

  Although the premise sounds interesting, this is basically just another general military history of the war, albeit a well-written one. It’s something MacPherson obviously does well, especially in relating everything to the big picture, but there isn’t anything new or original here. His treatment of Davis though, is actually pretty evenhanded, although it largely reinforces the image of Davis as an arrogant, prickly, thin-skinned, argumentative micro-manager quick to take offense to perceived slights.
  
  MacPherson is a great writer, but the book is somewhat dry, short on analysis and, again, there isn’t anything new here. Upon completing the book, a cynic will call it a ploy by MacPherson to cash in on his well-deserved reputation. The book is also surprisingly short (the type and line spacing are pretty generous). Oddly, MacPherson doesn’t dwell much on the internal politics of the Confederate war (although he does dive into army politics), the role of slavery, or the role of Confederate governors or legislators.
  
  Basically, Davis was an emotionally sensitive man overly concerned with maintaining his reputation and winning minor arguments with his rivals (unfortunate since so many southerners considered Davis pathetic and contemptible anyway). At the same time, he was unwilling to delegate authority and often he engaged in passive-aggressive feuds with his generals, who were more than eager to reply in kind. He could be remarkably patient with incompetents, but never kind. Still, MacPherson suggests that a different commander-in-chief could not have done a better or worse job; the ill-defined Confederate “offensive-defensive” strategy would probably have been adopted by any other leader due to political considerations. MacPherson suggests that the Confederate war effort was almost singlehandedly sustained by Davis after their hopes for victory were dashed.
  
  The book feels pretty padded, given the short length, large font, wide margins, blank pages between chapters, and large photos. Also, a better editor is in order: one of the maps claims that First Bull Run took place on July 31, 1869. A pretty fast and probably not essential read. It’s not bad given who the author is, but it’s definitely not top-drawer material. Still, a clear, efficient, and engaging read.
• 
  Socraticgadfly

  Disappointingly thin.
  
  Like many other 1- and 2- star reviewers, I was very disappointed when actually looking at the book, versus the advance hype. It's barely paperback novel length, stretched to book size by using at least 16-point font on 20-point leading, wide margins, large-sized mugshot photos of generals, and more. But, there's little actual analysis, and nothing new in the analysis that's there.
  
  For example, McPherson could have engaged in some alt-history type analysis in the Western theater. Whether Longstreet was angling to replace Bragg after Chickamauga, or after Missionary Ridge, or not, should Davis have considered him? Or when he nominated Hardee and Hardee said no, should Davis have told him, "Eventually I'll promote somebody (like Hood) over your head."
  
  And, in the East, especially post-Gettysburg, how much did Davis talk with Lee about the big picture vs. Virginia?
  
  More than McPherson tells us, surely.
  
  Like one reviewer notes, I expected more in part of the name "McPherson," and didn't get it. He seems to have "coasted" on some mix of his reputation and churning out one more volume for the Civil War sesquicentennial.
  
  I first gave this a two-star, then moved it down a notch.
  
  That's in part because I think some people are upvoting it based in part on McPherson's reputation, and in part because someone like McPherson knows better. From a newly-minuted Ph.D., this might almost get three stars; from someone who's taught a few years but, for whom this is his or her first Civil War book exercise, a slightly charitable two stars.
  
  But, I refuse to let McPherson coast on his reputation.
• 
  John Daly

  With the thousands of books out there about Lincoln there are few about his counterpart Jefferson Davis. In comes James McPherson's latest book Embattled Rebel. McPherson who's Battle Cry of Freedom is a staple for students of Civil War history especially contained in a single volume.
  
  This is a quick read I started it Saturday night and finished it Monday afternoon. It also just jumps into its point which is an examination of Davis' leadership and the execution of his role as Commander and Chief. There is no backstory and McPherson works off the assumption that if you are reading this book you are familiar with the major players in the Civil War and does not waste the readers time explaining them.
  
  McPherson does not compare and contrast Davis to Lincoln stating at the beginning of the book that he has too much bias towards Lincoln and wanted to provide the reader an un-obstructive view of the President of the Confederacy.
  
  Davis will always suffer from a what-if examination and second guessing simply because his side lost the war. Could the CSA have done better who knows. But this book does bring some perspective into how Davis conducted the war from his side.
  
  
• 
  Ben Denison

  Interesting book on Confederate President, Jefferson Davis.
  
  These bios/recounting of confederates are usually a duality “good guy” vs their support for the terrible insidious institution of slavery. How could they be both? How could there be any good in this or that man.
  
  In “Embattled Rebel” , the author really gives Davis no quarter as he exposes his many flaws. His desire to really be the commanding general and lead the war probably caused way more harm than good with mixed messages, muddled strategies, and a very political leadership.
  
  Interesting to read this Civil War (or any pre-technology) strategy as the communications and delays often ruined very winnable a battles and inexperienced leaders of winning when it was possible.
  
  Overall good book, reinforcing the terrible times.
• 
  Kusaimamekirai

  This is a short but interesting look at the four year tenure of Jefferson Davis as the president of the Confederate States of America. What jumps off the page immediately is that Davis is quite unlikeable. Let me rephrase that. He is petty, vindictive, short tempered, a micro manager, “ambitious as lucifer”, cold…and yeah. Not a particularly good guy.
  In fairness to McPherson, he doesn’t explicitly make these conclusions and even argues that to a point, Davis was placed in an impossible situation where he had few resources or troops to fight a war or defend a vast territorial coastline. What resources he did have were often demanded by member states to protect their own borders rather than the collective. This is the story of the Civil War as well as Davis’s presidency. You can’t fight a war under the banner of states rights and then refuse to acknowledge those rights.
  But back to Davis being a bad human being for a moment. There are some who seek through historical revision to rehabilitate Davis (who unlike Robert E. Lee who was loved by the South at least has undergone a similar revision) yet anyone who truly looks at Davis’s body of work would find this difficult. As McPherson writes, it’s highly unlikely the South could’ve have won under any commander yet Davis didn’t help his cause at times. From showing favoritism to his often inept but preferred generals to trying to micro manage battles better left to his more competent generals, Davis made more than his share of mistakes that can be attributed to matters of an oversized ego and pride.
  For me however, it was Davis’s order in regard to 6 black Union soldiers that really shows who we are dealing with here:
  
  "They cannot be recognized in any way as soldiers subject to the rules of war and to trial by military courts. Summary execution must therefore be inflicted on those taken"
  
  I can find many admirable things in otherwise unlikable people. Andrew Jackson for all his faults was a staunch supporter of the Union. Robert E. Lee was by all accounts a gentleman and a generally humane person despite some other serious flaws. Davis was vindictive, racist, and a murderer.
• 
  Nancy Ellis

  James McPherson is one of the absolute best ever Civil War historians/authors! This book gives him the opportunity to go into minute detail about Davis as President of the Confederacy, much more so than a total biography or history of the war would provide. He begins by stating that history has not been kind to Davis. That's an understatement. However, it is also not as widely recognized that Davis had as much trouble with his politicians and his generals as Lincoln did. I had no idea Joseph Johnston was such a thorn in his side, as McClellan was to Lincoln, and I laughed at the quote by historian Richard McMurry that if Johnston had remained in command, the final battle to save Atlanta would have been fought in Key West! Davis gave new meaning to the term micro-management, or perhaps he invented it. He certainly was an interesting man, if a difficult one, and unfailingly dedicated to his cause. An excellent book, it is a must-read for all those interested in gaining an understanding to the Civil War.
• 
  Sarah Bierle

  An easy to read history book about Jefferson Davis's role as commander in chief of the Confederacy. Very straightforward text, quite objective, and minimal interpretation from the author.
  
  I particularly thought it was interesting that Mr. McPherson was very honest in his introduction about his views of Davis while also explaining his desire to examine Davis's commander in chief role as a counterbalance to Lincoln's.
  
  The book is good overview of Davis's military wartime influence. I did not realize the extent of his "advice" to his generals - particularly in the Western Theater. Very little examination of the political and social conflicts President Davis faced, but the goal of the book was military focused...so it did stay on target which was nice.
  
  For a fast-paced overview of Davis's military goals, trials, failures, and successes, this is the book to read.
• 
  Patrick Macke

  mcpherson is solid and with his very tight focus - strictly davis as CinC - he revealed some interesting points ... i appreciated that he never backtracks to facts and stories covered in so many places elsewhere, and what stood out to me among his insights were that: davis was a control freak dedicating time to minutia that could have been better utilized elsewhere, that while union officers are most often slammed as plodding, indecisive and cautious, many rebel leaders in the field hurt their cause in much the same way, that davis was fearless and many times road into harm's way - into battles - as president, and that davis, perhaps ultra committed, perhaps delusional, seemed to truly believe the south would win the war and be allowed to pursue its own national pursuits - well beyond the point where the opposite was clearly reality
• 
  victor harris

  As always, a quality effort by McPherson. Davis was and is one of the most misunderstood figures in the Civil War and always suffers in comparison to Lincoln; as anyone would. This is a somewhat more charitable view of the Confederate president as it addresses the overwhelming tasks he faced in dealing with the daunting administrative problems confronting the Confederacy and the personality conflicts among politicians and generals. McPherson also quite properly notes that Davis made matters worse by being a micro-manager with a very thin skin who easily took affront to minor slights. He also suffered from chronic health problems that affected his already difficult disposition.
  Must-read for Civil War aficionados.