Bird Flu: A Virus of Our Own Hatching by Michael Greger

Bird Flu: A Virus of Our Own Hatching Reviews

• 
  Richard Reese

  Dr. Michael Greger’s book, Bird Flu, is both fascinating and spooky. Many people are aware of the Black Death, which hit in 1347. Far fewer know anything about the Spanish Flu of 1918, which killed more people in one year than the bubonic plague killed in 100 years. For some reason, our culture has suppressed the memory of this recent horror.
  
  Back in 1918, millions of humans, mostly between the ages of 20 and 40, experienced muscle aches and pains for a few days. Then their lungs filled with blood, they turned purple, bled from the ears, nose, and/or eyes, and died a few hours later. It was hard to tell whites from Negroes. Some called it the Purple Death.
  
  Within a year, up to 100 million died. The virus ran out of targets. You were either resistant or dead. This was the H1N1 virus, and it infected half of humankind. It was highly contagious, but only five percent of those infected died. The only place that the pandemic missed was the island of American Samoa, a US Navy base, which cut all contact with the outside world for 18 months, into 1920.
  
  For millions of years, the influenza virus existed only in wild ducks, and it didn’t make them sick. When humans domesticated ducks, the birds were raised in farmyards in close company with other domesticated animals. These unnatural living conditions made it easier for pathogens to spread from species to species, and they did just that. It was almost inevitable that humans would become vulnerable to them.
  
  A number of epidemic diseases emerged in species that tend to herd or flock together, and some of these were domesticated by humans. Goats and cattle gave us tuberculosis, which kills millions of people each year. Measles and smallpox came from cows. Typhoid is from chickens. Whooping cough is from pigs. There are too many to list here. “Entire ancient civilizations fell prey to diseases birthed in the barnyard.”
  
  Imagine what life would be like if we had never enslaved our animal relatives. When Columbus arrived in the New World, the Native Americans had few domesticated herd animals. They had no resistance to Old World diseases, and up to 95 percent of them died. “Why didn’t Native American diseases wipe out the landing Europeans? Because there essentially weren’t any epidemic diseases.” We often blame disease on the filth and crowding of city living, but Mexico City was one of the biggest cities in the world in 1492. Epidemic diseases were largely an unintended consequence of enslaving animals.
  
  In 1997, the new H5N1 virus appeared in Hong Kong, and it was far more deadly than the H1N1 of 1918. It killed an astonishing 50 percent of those it infected, but it was not highly contagious — yet. Health experts had a panic attack, because flu viruses constantly mutate. When/if the super-catastrophic mutant eventually appears, it will take six to eight months to create a vaccine. By the time the vaccine is mass-produced, the pandemic will be over.
  
  The avian flu outbreak in Hong Kong was quashed by exterminating every chicken in the region. But four years later, it moved from ducks to chickens once again. It also spread into migratory waterfowl. It kills humans and chickens, but it is harmless to the wild birds that move from continent to continent. The cat is out of the bag. Ducks crap in a pond, chickens drink the water and die, the dead chickens are fed to pigs, and the swine get the flu. Pet cats, and tigers and leopards in zoos die when fed infected chicken.
  
  We were able to wipe out smallpox because it existed only in humans. The flu virus now exists in a number of species, and the guts of highly mobile waterfowl provide a widely dispersed reservoir of H5N1. It is now “virtually impossible to eradicate.” All it takes to wipe out thousands of confined chickens is a virus brought in by a mouse that has stepped in duck poop.
  
  In 1928, the average American only consumed a half pound of chicken per year, because it was expensive. Today, it’s cheap, and we eat 90 pounds a year. Nine billion chickens are slaughtered in the US each year (45 billion in the world). If we deliberately set out to greatly encourage the possibility of a catastrophic influenza pandemic, we would raise of billions of chickens in high-density confinement, like we are now.
  
  We would also slaughter and process the chickens the way we are now. Super-efficient mechanized systems frequently puncture intestines, causing fecal contamination of the meat. Then, the contamination is spread to uncontaminated carcasses in the soaking bath, where they absorb water (“fecal soup”) for an hour to make the meat heavier ($). “At the end of the line, the birds are no cleaner than if they had been dipped in a toilet.” Greger says, “As long as there is poultry, there will be pandemics. It may be us or them.” Our massive appetite for cheap chicken could trigger a pandemic that sweeps away a billion people.
  
  Some believe that raising chickens outdoors is safe, but there were no factory farms in 1918. Any day the H5N1 virus could mutate into a highly-lethal form that excels at human-to-human transmission. It could occur in someone’s backyard, but it is far more likely to happen in a poultry confinement facility.
  
  Poultry corporations are concerned about disease because it’s a threat to profits. Exterminating infected flocks is bad for business. China and Thailand have a reputation for keeping disease outbreaks secret. When H5N1 hit Turkey, and the government ordered the destruction all turkeys, the farmers opposed the authorities with pitchforks and axes. The editor of a poultry industry journal clearly stated his priorities: “I'm not as worried about the U.S. human population dying from bird flu as I am that there will be no chicken to eat.” Who could disagree?
  
  Greger provides 19 pages of tips for surviving a flu pandemic. Wear goggles, gloves, and a facemask (masks offer minimal protection). Stay away from crowds. Don’t breathe near coughers and sneezers. Avoid contact with commonly touched surfaces like doorknobs, handrails, and so on. Don’t shake hands. Stay home. If you don’t have antiviral drugs, the primary treatments are fluids, rest, prayer, and good luck. Maintain a several week supply of water, non-perishable food, cash, and ammunition. Do not trust officials and experts who proclaim that everything is OK. Be prepared for civil unrest.
  
  Greger is not a wacko. He is the Director of Public Health and Animal Agriculture at the Humane Society of the US, and an MD. Virology magazine reviewed his book favorably. His views are shared with world leaders in public health. By 2005, the experts were very worried that a colossal flu pandemic was just weeks or months away. The sky was falling, and humankind was essentially a helpless deer in the headlights. Greger’s 2006 book was written with a mixture of urgency and paranoia. For a long discussion on public health, it’s exciting and unforgettable.
  
  As I write, it’s six years later, and the anticipated disaster has yet to arrive. The H5N1 threat is not gone. A catastrophic mutation may have happened five minutes ago. Or it might happen in 30 years. Or brilliant gene-splicers might succeed in creating 500-pound transgenic chickens that nothing can kill.
  
  I just checked the website of the World Health Organization (WHO). The first H1N1 pandemic in this century ran from April 2009 to January 2010, and spread to 19 nations. About 70,000 were hospitalized, and 2,500 died. On 7 June 2012, WHO issued a global alert on an H5N1 outbreak in Egypt, with 168 cases and 60 deaths. On 6 July 2012 a global alert was issued on an H5N1 outbreak in Indonesia, with 190 cases and 158 deaths.
  
  
  
• 
  mad mags

  Playing chicken with our food supply…
  
  (Full disclosure: I received a free copy of this book for review at the publisher's invitation.)
  
  BIRD FLU: A VIRUS OF OUR OWN HATCHING opens not with H5N1, the modern day "bird flu virus" which has the potential to mutate into the deadliest pandemic that the world has ever seen, but with H1N1, the influenza virus responsible for the 1918 flu pandemic. In just two short years, an estimated 50 to 100 million people perished as World War I raged on.
  
  As described by author Michael Greger, MD, in chilling detail:
  
  "What started for millions around the globe as muscle aches and a fever ended days later with many victims bleeding from their nostrils, ears, and eye sockets. Some bled inside their eyes; some bled around them. They vomited blood and coughed it up. Purple blood blisters appeared on their skin. [...] [The Chief of the Medical Services, Major Walter V. Brem] wrote that `often blood was seen to gush from a patient's nose and mouth.' In some cases, blood reportedly spurted with such force as to squirt several feet. `When pneumonia appeared,' Major Brem recounted, `the patients often spat quantities of almost pure blood.' They were bleeding into their lungs."
  
  Yet, H1N1 had a "low" (relatively speaking) mortality rate of 2.5% to 5%. Compare that to H5N1, which thus far has killed 55% of those infected - and one must wonder why the possibility of bird flu pandemic is confined to occasional media reports that are quickly dwarfed by the latest Hollywood gossip. Is bird flu-inspired panic just another example of media sensationalism?
  
  Not so, argues Greger. From 1918 he transitions seamlessly to the research laboratories of today. Greger, who is Director of Public Health and Animal Agriculture at The Humane Society of the United States and "an internationally recognized lecturer on public health issues", launches into Viral Biology 101, explaining in layman's terms how a virus reproduces, spreads, mutates, and interacts with its host. Though he's dealing with (arguably) dry subject matter, Greger manages to keep the discussion engaging via the liberal use of colorful analogies and sharp, witty prose. This isn't your high school bio textbook.
  
  Once a basic understanding of viruses has been established, Dr. Greger addresses modern animal agriculture, specifically, how it's especially conducive to the transmission and evolution of avian influenza. Animals, particularly "broiler" (meat) and "laying" (egg) hens, are packed into windowless sheds by the thousands; by the time they're fully grown just 45 days later (in the case of broiler hens), they don't even have enough space to spread their wings or turn around. Chickens are selectively bred for fast growth or maximum egg production - much to the detriment of their immune systems. Rather than improve the birds' ability to stave off disease (which would come at the expense of their "energy efficiency"), large-scale corporate "factory farmers" opt to pump their livestock full of antibiotics, thus contributing to bacterial resistance in humans. Add to this mix the fact that chickens literally spend their short lives wallowing in their own feces (and sometimes even that of previously butchered flocks), and you've got the perfect environment for a virus such as H5N1 to thrive.
  
  And thrive it has. The billions of chickens, turkeys, and pigs raised and slaughtered for food annually act like "petri dishes" in which avian influence can mingle, swapping genetic material in order to mutate, gradually evolving into a strain more lethal and infectious to humans. Their compromised immune systems and unsanitary and stressful living conditions only facilitate this process. Despite numerous attempts at eradicating the virus - for example, by wiping out entire flocks of chickens, to the tune of millions of birds at a time - H5N1 (along with additional viral strains) can still be found on many farms, throughout the world.
  
  While some critics - particularly those in the animal agriculture industry - dismiss this as scare mongering, Greger argues his points convincingly, and offers a wealth of evidence to support his claims. Indeed, his "Reference" section spans an impressive 90 pages! Throughout the text, he quotes a myriad of experts in the field, including Robert Webster, Kennedy F. Shortridge, and Michael Osterholm, as well as health professionals from the USDA, CDC, FAO, and WHO. Even "food scientists" admit - in the comfort and familiarity of their own trade journals, mind you - that the industry is flirting with disaster. The general - nay, unanimous - consensus seems to be "when, not if."
  
  A pandemic is inevitable, that is, unless we swiftly and dramatically move away from factory farming methods towards less intense animal agriculture methods, such as free range farming. Additionally, this must be preceded by a temporary global moratorium on meat and egg production, in order to eradicate the bird flu virus(es) already present in farm animals worldwide. None of which is bloody likely to happen.
  
  Thus, Greger urges readers to take precautions before a pandemic hits. He recommends obtaining and filling a prescription for Tamiflu (the more effective of two antivirals used to treat avian influenza), as well as stocking up on necessary groceries and such - TODAY. Greger also advises readers on how to purify water with bleach, and concoct cheap, homemade hand sanitizer. Oh, and do make sure you have plenty of liquor, cigarettes and ammo on hand, just in case the world reverts to the barter system! Though Greger reiterates and even elaborates upon government-issued pandemic guidelines in this last section, I didn't exactly walk away with a sense of empowerment. The rest of BIRD FLU was so horrifying that stocking up on canned veggies and medical masks won't do much to ease my troubled mind.
  
  Whether you're a vegan, a carnivore, an average Jane, a state Senator, an animal welfarist, or a hunter, BIRD FLU is one book you can't afford to ignore. For too long, we've been playing chicken with our food supply - and nature may soon see fit to reward our taste for cheap meat with a global pandemic.
  
  
  http://www.easyvegan.info/2007/01/25/...
• 
  Kathy

  Published in 2006,this scholarly treatise on the origins, history, and epidemiological patterns of bird flu seems prophetic given the severe outbreak in the U.S. last spring. The author supports his premise that the increase in concentrated animals feeling operations of chickens is making it more likely that the virus will mutate and make the leap to human to humans transmission. He argues for great potential for a worldwide pandemic. And bird flu in humans (there are examples of chicken to human transmission in Asia) is a terrible way to go. It's not just a week of aches and chills. It's symptoms rival ebola in terms of a miserable death. Makes one want to buy face masks, get some tamiflu, and stock up on batteries and canned food, especially if your county is full of chicken operations.
  
• 
  Keith Akers

  Great book -- typical of Dr. Greger's entertaining and thoroughly scientific style. Check out "nutritionfacts.org" if you haven't already. There is a video, "Pandemic prevention" which he did which conveys some of the same information.
• 
  Jacob Darley

  Excellent read, simultaneously dead serious and humourous.
• 
  Steven Peterson

  H5N1. Pandemic or fizzle? Will this version of Avian Flu be a killer as bad as the great Pandemic Flu of 1918 (also an avian flu)? Or worse? Or a fizzle like Swine Flu in President Gerald Ford's administration? If it is akin to the first two choices, Americans will be faced with one of the worst health threats in its history. To this point in time, this particular flu has not "taken off." And let us hope that continues to be the case.
  
  Michael Greger's book, "Bird Flu: A Virus of Our Own Hatching," explores H5N1 (the current strain of the virus that has generated so much concern)--from its origins, to its transmission, to its potential lethality, to how we might work to minimize the death and destruction that a pandemic might cause.
  
  He begins by discussing the 1918 pandemic (sometimes referred to as Spanish Flu), from its origins as a relatively mild flu bug to its emergence as a mass killer. This serves as a starting point for considering H5N1. It also allows him to discuss the origins of a number of major diseases. One thing to note: influenza in its various forms began as a bird flu.
  
  A couple basic statistics to orient one. The 1918 pandemic killed about 5% of those exposed to the virus (in an interesting tidbit, Greger notes that we have rediscovered the 1918 virus and, through modern genetic technology, have supplies of it in labs. It is also sobering to note that when the rediscovered 1918 bug was injected into mice, most were dead in a short period of time. So we have a very lethal strain from 1918 to study). Thus far, of the 200+ known victims of H5N1, almost 50% have died. If the H5N1 strain does not lose its killing power (and it may, since some lethal strains become less lethal with time), this suggests a destructive potential that is almost unimaginable.
  
  And, if the author is correct, humans have done this to themselves. Mass chicken farms are havens for the rapid spread of H5N1. Also, the virus has been shown to infect pigs. This is bad news, since pigs can also be infected by human viruses. If bird flu and a human virus interact, pigs might provide the breeding ground for a lethal strain of H5N1 that can be easily transmitted from pigs to people and then from person to person. One plus at the present is that H5N1 does not pass from one human to another easily.
  
  What to do about the threat? First, address how chickens and other commercial birds are raised. The vast farms where they are now raised are seedbeds of mass infection by H5N1. Prevention of the emergence of a virulent virus that can be transmitted from human to human is a priority for the author. He says (page 347): "To reduce the emergence of viruses like H5N1, humanity must shift toward raising poultry in smaller flocks, under less stressful, less crowded, and more hygienic conditions, with outdoor access, no use of human antivirals. . . ." Next, work hard to develop vaccines against the virus. This may be difficult, given that we are not sure of what form the virus will take and the slowness of development of a new vaccine. Third, try to develop larger stockpiles of Tamiflu. If the author is correct, the United States is stunningly slow in this effort. Fourth, as bland as it sounds, wash hands regularly! Engage in some degree of "social distancing," not being around large gatherings of people if the flu strikes. Fifth, prepare at home. Stow away nonperishable items in the event that one must try to ride things out. Several weeks of food and water would be needed. The chapter provides a useful check list of items to store in the event of pandemic.
  
  In the final analysis, this is a sobering book. To the extent that the author's analysis is correct, we ought to be taking action now. Certainly, communities ought to be planning for what happens if the pandemic actually occurs. The same with health care organizations. If 30-40% of workers are ill, there will be a breakdown in services all over, and there has to be some planning for such an eventuality.
• 
  Debbie Hates the New Book Page Redesign

  This was a very well written and meticulously researched book about how the avian influenza came about thanks to our intensification of the domestication of poultry, the possible catastrophe that is coming, and some simple ideas of how to protect ourselves. After reading this book, I'm a believer to how bad the bird flu will be and am appalled at how the poultry industry around the world is ignoring the signs and what experts are saying in order to continue making their profit.
• 
  Suzanne

  Well written. Easy to read. Very interesting. I hope the day soon comes when human and environmental health concerns take precedence over intensive factory farming and big-profit agribusiness. Sadly, I agree with the closing statement of this book... a global pandemic is most likely going to be what forces change, and at an unspeakable human cost.
• 
  Grrlscientist

  Have you wondered what the big commotion is regarding bird flu? Are you still confused about how avian influenza came to be and why epidemiologists are so afraid of it? Do you wonder why I have gone on numerous tirades about how the virulent H5N1 strain did not originate in wild birds, but rather, is a product of human creation? Throughout the entire book, Doctor Michael Greger examines influenza viruses and what makes them into such killers by meticulously weaving together historical, medical, ecological, agricultural, viral, and economic factors that contributed to the “hatching” of this disease threat in his book, Bird Flu: A Virus of Our Own Hatching (NYC: Lantern Books; 2006).
  
  In part one, “Storm Gathering”, the author discusses the 1918 pandemic, also known as Spanish Flu, revealing what is known of its humble beginnings as a relatively mild flu bug to its emergence as a powerful world-wide pandemic. Then the author turns his attention to the current strain of avian influenza, H5N1, and discusses how intensive production of domestic poultry for their meat and eggs have allowed this strain of influenza to become a killer and how it is changing from a birds-only virus into a new strain that can infect humans — albeit inefficiently so far. One particularly lethal version of H5N1, known as the Z+ H5N1 strain, has become very efficient at killing a variety of mammals, including humans — similar to the SARS virus. Unfortunately, we do not have an effective way to treat such a virus, if it ever becomes better at transmitting itself from human to human. Antibiotics only kill bacteria and thus do not touch viruses, it takes a nearly full year to manufacture a vaccine, and there is only one drug that is effective at treating an infection, the anti-viral, tamiflu. Finally, the author gives a brief overview as to why this form of avian influenza could be more disastrous than the 1918 flu pandemic.
  
  Part two, “When Animal viruses Attack” is the largest and meatiest section of the book, by far (no pun intended). This section focuses on a variety of animal microbes that have emerged in the human population, including HIV, SARS and ebola, and it explores the epidemiological similarities and differences between these emerging diseases and avian influenza.
  
  Then the author describes how we have done this to ourselves by relying on intensive animal farming methods to produce cheap meat and eggs. These methods include extremes in overcrowding, inbreeding and accumulated filth, the wide-spread use of antibiotics in animal feeds and the practice of feeding processed animals and animal waste to other farm animals. After these microbes become established in domestic animals, close contact with people — as seen on many farming operations in Southeast Asia — allows them to jump the species barrier into humans. Then overcrowding and poor hygiene in people leads to efficient transmission and increased lethality of viruses within the human population, as witnessed in the 1918 flu pandemic among soldiers during WWI. That particular influenza strain, H1N1, jumped from domestic animals into soldiers and then was transmitted throughout urban civilians and people living in small towns, killing on average half of those that it infected. And some small towns were completely devastated.
  
  Part three, “Pandemic Preparedness” discusses the strategies for containing influenzas with pandemic potential before they can escape into the human population and how it is crucial for such a reaction to be very quick if it is to be effective at all.
  
  Part four, “Surviving the Pandemic”, describes a basic personal “survival kit.” The author recommends that everyone should try to accumulate a personal stockpile of Tamiflu because, if the author is correct, the United States government has been embarrassingly slow in this effort on behalf of its citizenry. Additionally, as mundane as it sounds, the author also recommends washing your hands frequently as well as practicing avoidance techniques such as “social distancing” — avoiding large gatherings of people if the flu strikes. Additionally, he advises us to prepare at home by saving several weeks’ worth of nonperishable food items and water in the event that one must ride things out.
  
  The last part, “Preventing Future Pandemics”, maintains that the emergence of Ebola-like superstrains of influenza can be prevented. The author reviews the totality of variables that accelerate ongoing genetic mutations within H5N1. He takes us step by step through the process whereby a harmless waterborne duck virus becomes a deadly airborne chicken killer that now threatens all of humanity. As a result, we are facing a deadly killer that was caused by the excesses of large commercialized poultry farms. However, one positive aspect at the present time is that H5N1 does not easily pass from one human to another.
  
  What can society do about this gathering threat? First, we must correct how chickens and other domestic animals are raised. The huge factory farms where they are now raised commercially are seething with a variety avian influenza strains and other diseases. “To reduce the emergence of viruses like H5N1, humanity must shift toward raising poultry in smaller flocks, under less stressful, less crowded, and more hygienic conditions, with outdoor access, [and] no use of human antivirals,” Greger advises his readers. Next, we must support the development of vaccines against the virus. However, he recognizes that this will be difficult because we cannot know which form the pandemic virus will take and also because it takes so long to develop a new vaccine.
  
  With eloquence and precision, the author cites data from hundreds of scientific and lay sources within multiple disciplines, overcoming the compartmentalization that characterizes most other approaches, to analyzing the origins and characteristics of the virus itself, without diluting the rigor of scientific analysis.
  
  No doubt about it; this is a sobering book. If the author’s analysis is correct, we should be taking action now. Certainly, communities and health care organizations ought to be planning for what could happen if a pandemic actually occurs. If nearly half of all workers become ill, there will be a breakdown in services everywhere, and there has to be some planning for such an eventuality. And last but not least, we must get used to paying more for chicken and eggs.
  
  
  NOTE: Originally published at scienceblogs.com on 28 February 2007.