A Defence of History and Class Consciousness: Tailism and the Dialectic by György Lukács

A Defence of History and Class Consciousness: Tailism and the Dialectic Reviews

• 
  C

  Reading Lukács is always pleasurable. Look at him, on the cover of this book, peaking out over the rim, saying hello, like an affable puppet from Mr. Rogers neighborhood. Well, I daresay, reading him is even more enjoyable than wearing one of Mr. Rogers warm sweaters. Unlike Mr. Rogers though, who changes his sweater every 5 minutes, depending on what he plans to do, Lukács informs us to always wear the cloak –in rain, shine, or even gun fire - of historical materialism!
  
  This book is a defense of his masterpiece History and Class Consciousness, which Zizek, in an afterword, claims is comparable to no other book of the 20th century; the quintessential Hegelian-Marxist work. I haven’t read as much as Zizek, but my experience is about the same. Lukács is a philosophical genius, and a militant, who makes for fiery writing, reminiscent of Trotsky to the working class, but in this case, the audience is fellow philosophers.
  
  The opening introduction by John Rees is top-notch. It’s the ideal short bio on Lukács, who he was, the philosophical struggles he dealt with, and the political machinations he participated in.
  
  The first half of the defense by Lukács is just okay. Lukács is brilliant, but the peoples he’s arguing against (Mensheviks) without a doubt misunderstood his philosophy. And one begins to mildly tremble when he states that Bolshevism is the necessary logical conclusion of Marx’s Marxism. Fortunately, if one reads the 1960s preface to History and Class Consciousness (HCC), we find Lukács admitting that he had to entirely change his philosophical approach upon the publication of Marx’s earlier writings. Which, in my opinion, show that Leninism is not the necessary conclusion of Marx’s Marxism.
  
  The second half of the essay is where the real ingenuity emerges. Lukács begins to develop a Marxian theory of nature, against the Engelian perspective. Moreover, he discusses Kant, science, and industry in great detail. This essay comprises parts of HCC, and is later augmented in his manuscripts for The Ontology of Social Being. Lukács point is to constantly reaffirm that social being conditions consciousness, to the degree that Kant’s thing-in-itselfs is resolved in knowledge of praxis, as the thing becomes a for-us. At least I think that’s what he’s saying. I admit this section got abstract really fast.
  
  Finally, there is Zizek’s afterword. It’s trash. I’d mark down a star or two for how crappy this essay is, but this would inadvertently be a punishment to the work of Lukács, and potential future readers of Lukács, so I’ll refrain from doing so.
• 
  Shulamith Farhi

  It might seem perverse to devote a book to reviving the somewhat marginal Leninist category of tailism. Lukacs' defense of HCC, in my view, succeeds in showing why we can't simply ignore the phenomenon of tailing.
  
  First of all, for the non-Leninists, here is a quick reminder of what Lenin meant when he coined the term in What is to be Done:
  
  "what else is the function of Social-Democracy if not to be a “spirit” that not only hovers over the spontaneous movement, but also raises this movement to the level of “its programme”? Surely, it is not its function to drag at the tail of the movement. At best, this would be of no service to the movement; at worst, it would be exceedingly harmful. Rabocheye Dyelo, however, not only follows this “tactics-as-process”, but elevates it to a principle, so that it would be more correct to describe its tendency not as opportunism, but as tail-ism (from the word tail). And it must be admitted that those who are determined always to follow behind the movement and be its tail are absolutely and forever guaranteed against “belittling the spontaneous element of development”."
  
  The key phrase is "tactics-as-process." Those content to track the movement aren't exactly opportunists, since in principle one can maintain fidelity to revolution while deliberately avoiding the question of strategy. The tailists, exemplified by Deborin and Rudas, fail to see that philosophical questions require philosophical treatment. To put it simply: the dialectic cannot be liquidated by industry.
  
  The main philosophical lesson of the book concerns the logic of essence. We need (materialist) dialectical thought if we want to navigate the capitalist husks enveloping the productive forces. Only the dialectician "knows that the capitalist husks [are] just as much a part of objective reality (just as with Hegel the appearance is a moment of essence)." Crucially, this knowledge of the social determination of husks is *conceptual.*
  
  Why is this relevant today? In the wake of the fall of the USSR, many on the Left treat any strategic rationality as inherently oppressive, advising that our attention is better focused on microscopic interventions. Lukacs thinks we can do better, encouraging us to develop an analysis of paradoxical situations to determine when the subjective leap of an intervention is justified. It's difficult to disagree.
• 
  Pedro Corrêa

  O livro é bem complicado. Lukács nele se afunda ainda mais nas partes problemáticas de História e Consciência de Classe, e contra oponentes ainda menos valorosos. Única coisa que salva o livro de ter 3 estrelas é o excelente posfácio de Nicolas Tertulian, que simplesmente vale o preço do livro inteiro pelo artigo. Tertulian faz um balanço sóbrio dos pontos fracos e inovações do livro. Pelo contrário, o prefácio de Michael Löwy é detestável, se apoia nos pontos mais equivocados do livro (que mesmo Lukács vai rever mais tarde em sua vida) para defender típicas posições de acadêmicos meia boca (inclusive critica Lukács por ceder ao "sentimento" de que as revoluções na Europa tivessem sido derrotadas após 1923 - seria interessante, para apoiar essa posição, demonstrar a existência de um movimento revolucionário que se colocasse à tomada do poder como esse de 1917-23 na Europa após esse período para sugerir a loucura subjetiva de Lukács e outros). Enfim, leiam o artigo de Tertulian se já leram história e consciência de classe, ele está correto quando diz que o texto tem mais caráter documental que qualquer outra coisa.
  
  The book is riddled with problems. Lukács goes deeper into the swamp he got himself into in History and Class Consciousness, against even less worthy opponents. The only thing that saves the book from getting 3 stars is the most excellent afterword by Nicolas Tertulian, which alone is worth the price of the book. Tertulian makes a sober assessment of the weak points and innovations of the book. By contrast, the preface by Michael Löwy is detestable. Löwy leans on some of the most problematic positions of the book (positions that even Lukács would renounce latter in his life) so as to defend typical positions of shoddy academicians (even going as far as accusing Lukács of surrendering to the "sentiment" that the revolutions in Europe had been defeated in the period after 1923. It would be interesting, so as to gain some grounding to this position, to show the existence of a revolutionary movement which moved towards the seizure of power in Europe in the scale and after the period of 1917-23. That would show, as Löwy suggests, the subjective madness of Lukács and others in facing this historical period). Anyway, do read the article by Tertulian (besides the Brazilian edition as this afterword, there is a french edition - Avatars de la philosophie marxiste : à propos d'un texte inédit de Georg Lukács) if you have already read History and Class Consciousness, he is correct in saying that this book has more documentary character than any other thing.