The Ego Trick: In Search Of The Self by Julian Baggini

The Ego Trick: In Search Of The Self Reviews

• 
  عبدالرحمن عقاب

  يقتبس الكاتب، وهو فيلسوف بريطاني، في كتابه هذا مقولةَ "بيركلي"؛ أنّ الفلاسفة يثيرون الغبار (بأسئلتهم) ثم يشتكون صعوبة الرؤية!
  في هذا الكتاب يبحث "باغيني" في مفهوم "الذات". يسأل عن معنى أن يبقى الإنسان ذاته رغم ما يشعر به من تغيرات وتطورات في شخصيته. ماذا الذي يبقى وما الذي يتغيّر؟ إنه سؤال الثابت والمتحوّل في هوية الإنسان وذاته. الكتاب نقاش فلسفي غني ومثير، ما بين سؤال ومحاولات إجابة، بأسلوب بسيط، واستطرادات فكرية وأمثلة من الحياة والواقع.
  ومن تصورات شديدة البساطة، مثل فكرة أنّ الذات هي وحدة تكمن في الجسد أو العقل أو الذاكرة، إلى تصورات تقوم على ذات متعددة تُنشأ إنشاءً، وتعيش في حكاية نرويها وثقافة ومجتمع ننتمي إليه. وانتهاءً إلى ذات مخادعة تحتال لتجعلنا نوقن بوحدتها واستمراريتها، وتواري عنا حقيقة أنها حزمة متداخلة مخاتلة. ويرفض الكاتب "المادي" فكرة الروح والإجابات التي ترى في الذات وهمًا مطلقاً. إنها باختصار..."حيلة الأنا"!
  والكتاب مثال-أيضاً- على ما يقتبسه الكاتب من "راسل" الذي قال أنّ: (الهدف من الفلسفة هو البدء بشيء شديد البساطة، لدرجة تجعله يبدو غير جدير بالذكر، والانتهاء بشيء شديد المفارقة، بما يجعله غير قابل للتصديق).
  كتاب يستحقّ القراءة والنقاش.
  
• 
  Tulpesh Patel

  The Ego Trick* by popular philosopher Juilian Baggini is a highly-readable attempt at describing what makes you, you. Using a blend of anecdote, religious and secular philosophy and smatterings of neuroscience and neurology, he tries to answer questions that have plagued us as soon as we became ‘self’-aware: What is the ‘self’ that we are aware of? Where is it found? What exactly is it made of?
  
  The first half of the book tries to get at what the self is by illuminating what it isn’t. Baggini uses a ‘black swan’ approach, using anecdotes and personal testimony to falsify the idea that we have a discrete core, or ‘pearl’ which constitutes self-ness. For the idea that the self is intimately tied to the body, he uses examples of those who experience gender dysphoria, who have an overwhelming sense that their gender does not match the sex of their physical bodies, to show that whilst the medium of our existence (the physical body) most certainly shape the person, the person is not just the medium. I thought his neat metaphor of bodies as musical instruments was so good it bears repeating: “just as a violin can play notes that a bass guitar cannot, and vice versa, so a tall, beautiful female body provides different possibilities to a short, plain male one … [those with gender dysphoria] are like players who have switched instruments mid-performance.”
  
  Some of the best known experiments in neuropsychology also show up: Zimbardo’s infamous 1971 Stanford Prison Experiment is used as an example of how context-dependant and discomfitingly malleable personalities are; Phineas Gage and his famous and fascinating personality change after having a steel pole spear his frontal cortex; and patient HM, one of the most studied human beings in all of science, who developed anterograde amnesia(the inability to form new memories) after having some of his brain surgically removed to cure epilepsy. They’re all used to demonstrate the way that personalities can and do change according to the brain and the environment. Away from these classic examples, there are the occasional contemporary references, particularly Belle De Jour, that make the writing, but not necessarily the ideas, feel needlessly dated, although I was fascinated to learn that Dr Brooke Magnanti is actually a research scientist with a raft of publications under her name.
  
  Baggini, as he is well-known for doing, wears his atheism lightly throughout the book, and readily draws the parallels between scientific thinking and the teaching of Buddhism. He is, however, careful not to show Buddhist monks too much reverence, and is quick to point out where they, and Christian apologists, have gone awry in their tangled philosophising as they attempt to ‘rationalise’ reincarnation and the resurrection of immaterial souls.
  
  Having done an admirable job of putting to bed the idea of a singular pearl of self, and not getting bogged down in stodgy philosophising on the way, Baggini outlines his own thesis, the titular ‘ego trick’, which is the ability of the brain to (un)consciously create a uniform self from disparate, fluid character traits, which evolves over time and is far more contextually dependant than we might like to admit or be comfortable with.
  
  This ‘bundle’ theory (Hume, is quoted as saying ‘what we call the mind, is only a bundle of thoughts, passions, and emotions, without any subject’) is founded on the functionalist philosophy that, as Baggini put it ‘we are no more than, but more than just, matter”. In laying the foundation for this paradoxical statement, Baggini must be commended for managing to write one of the plainest and neatest debunking of mind-matter dualism
  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dua... (that mental/non-physical aspects of the ‘mind’ are different and distinct to ‘matter’ of the body) that I’ve come across. To take the Cartesian line is to make an elementary category mistake: the mind is not something which is distinct from the body, but it is a function of the body - the mind (the self/consciousness) is what the brain/body does.
  
  I remember reading somewhere that “I” is best thought of as something dynamic rather than static; more like a verb than a noun. This simple to express but difficult to grasp idea is one that has been the mainstay of neuroscientific conceptions of the self for some time, and with The Ego Trick, Julian Baggini has done an excellent job of bringing this sophisticated and counter-intuitive idea to the public conscience.
  
  How conceptions of the self will change in light of our ever-increasing lifespans or dependence and meshing with technologies is touched on only briefly at the end of the book. Many of the ideas mentioned, such as Aubrey de Grey’s Methusala Foundation, Baroness Susan Greenfields far-fetched doom-mongering, or transhumanism are pure speculation, but as thought experiments (i.e. when not presented as actual science à la Greenfield), pose fascinating questions.
  
  What’s not speculation, however, is that the Tulpesh in one, five, or fifty years down the line, will not the same person that is sitting here typing these words, but my brain will be doing its best to convince me that it is, and that is a very trippy thought.
  
• 
  Jasmin.M ياسمين منصور

  4 stars. Very interesting concepts about how & what to think of ones self.
  Great blog that reviews Baggini concepts are in this blog :
  http://rationallyspeaking.blogspot.co...
  
  Interview of author about the book :
  
  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XKEr2...
  
  Quote on Death:
  "If you try to deny death you're also denying life,in a way you are refusing to accept what is fundamental to your condition as a person: that you are dying all the time, you are dissolving, you're failing; potential you could flicker out at any moment."
• 
  ميثم الموسوي

  حيلة الأنا
  جوليان باغيني
  
  هذا التيار المتدفق من الأستمرارية الذي يربط الماضي بالحاضر ويعبر إلى المستقبل المعبر عنه ب(الأنا) بحيث يعبر عن ذات واحدة مستمرة يصدق إطلاقها وأنا جنين في رحم الأم أو طفل يحبو و شاباً بكامل الحيوية والنشاط ..وسيصدق أيضاً على ما أكون عليه في المستقبل حتى لو وفقدت كل الذاكرة ، يبقى هذا الثابت الذي هو الأنا يعبر عن كل تلك المراحل ويوحدها معاً في كيان واحد .
  
  مثل هذة الاستمرارية شكلت لغزاً فلسفياً وبيولوجياً ونفسياً على مدى مسيرة البشرية في نتاجها الثقافي وتم طرح الكثير من الأجوبة لتفسير ثبات الهوية رغم كل التغيرات بين طرح بيولوجي متشدد لا يرى هناك أبعد من كوننا قصبات مفكرة .. فليس هناك سوى الجسد الذي تشكله الخلايا المادية المتصلة بالدماغ الذي ينتج الأفكار التي توحد كل ذلك الجهد البيولوجي في مسمى واحد نطلق عليه الأنا ...
  
  ومع أن هذا ما يدل عليه التشريح البيولوجي لجسد الإنسان وعمله تبقى هناك الكثير من الألغاز التي تمنعنا من الانسياق تماما وراء هذة النظرة مثل ثبات بعض السلوكيات والتصرفات عند بعض الأشخاص حتى مع تغير الجسد في عمليات تغيير الجنس واستمرار خيط ضعيف جدا من الهوية عند المصاب بالزهايمر الذي ينسى أقرب الناس إليه مثل الزوجة والأطفال لكن لا يزال هناك الخيط الضعيف الذي يعبر عنه بالأنا
  وبين من تصور بعد آخراً غير الجسد والمادة والذي مع ثباته يمكن أن تبقى الهوية والمعبر عنه بالروح او النفس او الذات، إنها مثل المشجب الذي يعلق عليه كل ما لم يتمكن العلم من إعطاء جواب حاسم له مثل الفكر ومعنى الحياة وتفسير المشاعر والعواطف وغير ذلك ...
  ومع أن هناك وهم حدسي بتلك الثنائية : جسد متغير وجوهر ثابت رسخته المعتقدات الدينية والتأملات الفلسفية إلا إن هذا الفهم يعاني من مغالطة القفز من كون النشاط لا مادياً أو غير مفسر علمياً إلى ربطه ببعد آخر غير مادي .
  وبعد مناقشة ممتعة يقوم بها الكاتب لكلا من النظريتين يطرح تفسيره الخاص لثبات الانا والذي ينطلق من خلال فلسفة ديفيد هيوم و جون لوك حيث ينظر إلى الأنا على أنها إنشاء نفسي يوحد حزمة الأفكار والأحاسيس على اختلافها وتغيرها وحتى تناقضها لتمثل مثل تلك الحزمة حيلة نفسية اجتماعية ثقافية تمكن الإنسان من الاستمرار في حياته فإن توحيد كل تلك الاحساسات والأفكار في بوتقة واحدة أفضل في التعامل مع الآخرين ومع الواقع الخارجي ويحقق للانسان استقرار نفسي واجتماعي أكثر ...
  
  يناقش الكتاب الكثير من الموضوعات الشائكة والمعقدة مثل حالات الشعور بالعيش في الجسد الخطأ , مفهوم الهوية الذي يشكله الدماغ حسب علم الأعصاب , بناء الذاكرة الإنسانية وأمراض الزهايمر وتأثيراتها ، التعددية والهويات الاجتماعية التي يعيشها الانسان ، صورة الذات التي تقدمها الديانات الروحية ومنها البوذية ..
  ارتباطات مبدأ الهوية بالكثير من المفاهيم الفلسفية الدينية مثل مبدأ وجود حياة بعد الموت سواء كان ذلك بالتناسخ كما ترى البوذية أو القيامة و العالم الآخر في المسيحية والإسلام،
  التحديات العلمية المعاصرة التي تواجهها نظرية ثبات الذات والهوية مثل نظريات توقف الشيخوخة أو ما بعد الإنسانية .
  
  الكتاب دسم جداً و يناقش مبحث مهم كثيراً يتفرع بين عدة فنون منها ما هو فلسفي وما هو ديني وما هو علمي وطافح بالاقتباسات والإشارات إلى الكثير من الأعمال الأدبية والسينمائية وبذل الكاتب فيها الكثير من الجهد وعقد عشرات المقابلات مع مختصين في مجالات علمية وفلسفية ولامات بوذية و لاهوتيين مسيحين و متحولين جنسياً ومصابين بالزهايمر ...
  نادرا ما أمنح العلامة الكاملة بالتقييم لكتاب ولكن هذا الكتاب يستحقها بكل جدارة . لقد نقلته إلى رف الكتب المهمة التي سوف أرجع إليها مرة اخرى .
• 
  Rob Thompson

  The main reason I picked the book up was that I wanted to explore what is means to be me. Effectively the central premise of the book is that “I” is a verb masquerading as a noun. “I” is not a "thing" but what my brain and my body `does'. The self,
  
  

  is a function of what a certain collection of stuff does.

  
  
  It’s the fact that I can use my memories and experiences to develop a sense of continuity in my life without actually having a central command centre. However,
  
  

  your life is not a pack of cells; your life is what your particular pack of cells collectively do.

  
  
  There isn’t a fundamental “thing” that gives continuity to my life making me same person from birth to death. My robust sense of “me” or "I" is real, but not what I assume “me” to be. There is no such thing as a soul. Effectively, I’m a bundle of thoughts which are assembled together in my brain:
  
  bundle theories explain why it is we believe ourselves to be individual persons who exist over time, but deny that any such beings really exist
  
  As Hume said:
  
  

  What we call a body is only a bundle of sensations; and what we call the mind is only a bundle of thoughts, passions and emotions, without any subject.

  
  
  Mental actions arise from physical ones, just as:
  
  

  a university emerges from all the buildings and individuals.

  
  
  Thoughts and feelings are real,
  
  

  but they are not themselves lumps of matter.

  
  
  The mind is not something which is separate from the body, but it is a function of the body - the mind (the self/consciousness) is what the brain/body does. In other words, your mind is not your brain; it is what your brain does. How does consciousness arise out of physical neural activity? I don’t know but I’m sure that it does damage the brain, and you impair consciousness.
  
  How has this influenced my thoughts on my mortality?
  
  The ideas outlined in the book lend themselves to determinism and not free-will. Baggini suggests that “freedom” is actually “'autonomy”. In other words, I can regulate my behaviour due to “internal machinations” of my brain and not external events.
  
  So, I’m going to worry less about what happens in twenty years time as opposed to what happens in, say, twenty minutes time. I’ll change over time, so even if I could live forever, I wouldn’t be the same person that I am now. This all leads me to consider a real focus on becoming more mindful. As noted in
  Mindfulness: A practical guide to finding peace in a frantic world
  
  

  We re-live past events and re-feel their pain, and we pre-live future disasters and so pre-feel their impact.

  
  
  I need to focus on seeing my own thoughts as they occur, so that I live life as it unfolds in the present moment.
• 
  Kirthi

  Tom Hiddleston recommended this: so I must read it. It sounds very fascinating, and I really do want to read it for more than just that reason!
• 
  AHmed Muhammed

  ممتع .. لكن تخصيص فصول للحديث عن البوذبة كان في غاية الملل.
  
  بشكل عام الكتاب غني في محتواه واتفق مع اغلب ما وصل إليه، وما يدور في ذهني تقريبا الكتاب تحدث عنه بوضوح وسلاسة والترجمة كانت ممتازة.
• 
  Kareem Brakat

  حسنا
  في رحلة شيقة تستغرق ما يقارب 500 صفحة يصحبنا جوليان باجيني في محاولة للاجابة على السؤال الاصعب والاهم وهو من هذا "الأنا"
  في هذا البحث الهام المعنون بـ ( حيلة الانا) – وقد قلصت الترجمة للاسف بعض من دلالات العنوان بلغته الاصلية ego trick - يبذل باجيني مجهود جبار وملهم لتغطية كل الجوانب المتعلقة بهذا السؤال الشائك
  يبدا الكتاب باستعراض العديد من النظريات ووجهات النظر التي تحاول وصف الذات او الهوية سواء من الفلسفات المختلفة او علم النفس او الاجتماع وحتى علم الاعصاب وايضا البوذية والديانات الاخرى وهو لا يكتفي بالبحث والاطلاع ولكنه يجري العديد من المقابلات مع علماء وكهنة ولامات بوذيون وكذلك متحولون جنسيا ومرضى نفسيين وعقليين ومع ذويهم ليرى اثر حالاتهم الذهنية والعقلية والجسدية على شعورهم بذاتهم وكذلك شعور ذويهم
  يقسم باجيني الاجابات حول الذات الى مجموعتين رئيسيتين
  اولاهما تلك التي تدعي وجود جوهر داخلي يمثل الذات الحقيقية او ما يسميه لؤلؤة الذات وهو يرفض كل هذه الادعاءات بداية من افلاطون وصولا الى ديكارت كما يرفض فكرة الروح الدينية وهو امر مفهوم باعتباره ملحد علموي مادي ولكنه يعود فيظهر في ختام نقده تناقضا كبيرا حين يقول اننا من المؤكد اننا مصنوعون من مادة فقط لكننا في نفس الوقت اكثر من مجرد مادة !! وسر هذا التناقض غير المستغرب على العلمويين ان المتطرفين منهم يعانون من مغالطة منطقية خطيرة تتلخص في تعاملهم مع غياب الدليل على انه دليل الغياب . ولكننا لسنا بصدد مناقشة هذا الان
  اما المجموعة الثانية فهي نظريات التعدد سواء التعددية العادية التي تدعي وجود اكثر من ذات داخل الجسد الواحد – مثل فيلم سبليت- او الذات الاجتماعية او الثقافية التي تختلف باختلاف الدوار الاجتماعي او الثقافة اضافة لنظرية التناسخ البوذية وهو ايضا يرفض تلك النظريات من خلال مناقشات جميلة وعرض سلس للحجج والردود عليها بامثلة واستعارات غاية في الذكاء والوضوح
  وفي بداية النصف الثاني يبدا في عرض نظريته الخاصة او مايسميه ( حيلة الانا ) التي يبنيها على اربعة اعمدة اساسية
  -لا يوجد جزء معين يشكل جوهرك فانسجتك وخلاياك ومشاعرك وذكريات وافعالك جميعها تشكل ( انا) او سيسميه من الان ( نظرية الحزمة)
  - لايوجد بداخلك روح او شيء غير مادي والعقل هو النشاط الذهني للجسد
  - شعورك ذاتك يجب ان يشبه الانشاء ( مثال الجامعة) فلا يوجد شيء واحد يجعلك انت بل عدء اشياء واجزاء مجتمعة
  - الوحدة النفسية التي تشعر بها هشة من بعض الجوانب وقوية من نواح اخرى وقد يتاثر شعورك بذاتك بالعالم الاجتماعي لكنه يظل في اساسه نفسيا وداخليا
  وبالتالي فالذات او الانا هي حزمة وليست شيء وهو فعل وليست اسم وهي سيء دينماميكي وغير ثابت كما ان شعورك بالوحدة النفسية والاستمرارية اقل في الحقيقة مما تشعر به بسبب ما يسميه باجيني ( حيلة الانا)
  في الجزء الاخير من الكتاب يبدا الباحث في الحديث عن بعض الافكار التي تنبني على الاعتقاد بنظرية الحزمة فعلى سبيل المثال يمكننا اعادة بناء الذات بما انها شيئ ديناميكي يتاثر بالسياق الاجتماعي اكثر مما لو انه لديه جوهر يحدد صفاته وقد ناقش هذه الفكرة من خلال استعراض تجربة سجن زيبماردو الشهيرة وقد ذكر ملاحظة ذكية في هذا الاطار تتعلق بتأثير التجربة على دكتور زيمباردو نفسه باعتباره المراقب للتجربة
  كما يناقش نظرتنا للموت والخلود في حدود نظرية الحزمة كما تطرق ايضا لقسم الدراسات مابعد الانسانية الذي يطرح افكارا مبالغ فيها حول تأثير التقنية والذكاء الصناعي على ذواتنا وكيف سيكون شكل الذات الانسانية في المستقبل
  الكتاب مهم ومليء بالامثلة والشرح ومثير للكثير من الافكار والاسئلة وقد بذل فيه مجهود كبير وواضح كما انه مكتوب بطريقة سلسة وسهلة وهو اجاد في عرض وجهة نظره حتى لو اختلفنا مع بعض ما جاء فيها
  الجدير بالذكر انه اثناء حديثه مع بعض العلماء اتو على ذكر القضاء على الشيخوخة واجراء تجارب على الفئران وهي تجارب كانت في طور البحث (الكتاب منشور عام 2011) وقتها واذكر اني اطلعت على مقال عام 2022 يتحدث ان البحث المذكور قد نجح في عكس ممسار الشيخوخة بالفعل او معالجة اعراضها على ما اذكر رغم ان ذلك العالم كان يتحدث عن مدى اطول بكثير من 10 أعوام
  الفكرة التي كانت ملهمة جدا بالنسبة لي الحديث على انه بمعدل التسارع التقني الحالي فمن المتوقع ان يصبح منحنى التطور عمودي في المستقبل فذا كانت التكنولوجيا تؤثر عبلى ذواتنا وشعورنا بالاستمرارية فان حيلة الانا ستقل فاعليتها بمرور الوقت واذا كان الانسان يشعر انه تغير ولم يعد كما سبق كل عدة سنوات فربما سيراوده ذلك الشعور في المستقبل اكتر من مرة في اليوم .
  وقد كنت محظوظا ان شاهدت فيلم باردو للمخرج المكسيكي الاشهر اليخاندرو ايناريتو الذي يناقش نفس القضية اثناء قراءتي للكتاب
  الكتاب جميل وانصح به وهو من اصدار دار ادب
  وهي دار لها العديد من العناوين الهامة والجميلة في الحقيقة
  
• 
  Joe Flynn

  Thought provoking, clearly written, and well argued throughout, an exemplary popular philosophy book.
  
  The work grew out of the authors PhD work, and can be separated into 3 sections, a slightly slow opening half probing and then ruling out what the 'i' or a person really is. We then have a small and punchy statement of the central thesis, followed by a really interesting exploration of what that means.
  
  The book feels modern and slips seemlessly between philosophy, science, phycology, and religion, often via interviews with leaders in these fields, without ever getting derailed by their at times conflicting views. Indeed, the author comes across as open, reasoned, and balanced, even when his own view differs from his subjects.
  
  I already agreed with the central viewpoint of a bundle theory of mind, but as a testament to the structure and skill of the argument would struggle to see how you can argue against it without failing back to a faith in some form of the soul.
  
  For people who think of themselves as fixed or stable over the long term it would also be an eye opening read!
  
  I particularly enjoyed several philosophical and academic asdides, a small section on Wittigstien and a much needed critique of postmodernism stick in my mind.
• 
  Håvard Bamle

  What is the self, and how can we make sense of the continuity of selfhood through changes in identity over time?
  
  Chapters 1-4 examine four versions of what Baggini calls the "pearl view" of the self; the idea that there is a stable, fundamental core that defines the self, more primary and essential than other attributes of a person. Candidates include 1) the body, 2) the brain, 3) memories, and 4) the soul.
  One important insight from this section is that a lot of confusion occurs from confusing things with actions. Thoughts and feelings, for example, are not the body or the brain: they are what the body and brain /do/. A pearl is therefore not necessary for a self: the self is that which is done, rather than the thing that does.
  
  Chapters 5-9 move on to what Baggini considers a better explanation of the self, namely construction; the idea that the self is constructed from some set of circumstances. Candidates for construction theories include 5) Multiplication; the idea that the self is multiple, 6) social construction; the idea that the self is constituted through social roles, and 7) "the ego trick". The Ego Trick is the central part of the book, lending its title to the cover. This is Baggini's own theory of the self. This theory states that the self is constructed from what is fundamentally nothing more than a "bundle" (cf. Hume's "bundle theory") of sense experiences, thoughts, feelings, and physical attributes, through some not-yet-accounted-for biological-mechanical engineering trickery into a psychological continuity. The unity of self is thus only psychological, derived - but not as simple representation - from the material reality of a messy and complex bundle of physical identities. The following chapters serve to position this concept of the self between similar concepts, specifically 8) Anatta (the buddhist idea of "no-self"; that the self is "only an illusion") and 9) character (largely inspired by the ethics of Aristotle).
  
  Chapters 10-12 deal with the consequences of adopting this knowledge of the self as less substantial and more fluid than people have believed; as tangled, messy bundles rather than pearls.
  
  Highlights:
  [85] The idea that the world has no real essence, but rather that reality is constituted by our understanding of it, can be captured in the idea of the rejection of grand or meta-narratives. Humans make sense of their world by telling stories. Meta-narratives are big stories that tie everything together. But these grand narratives are all false, because they impose a unified, singular structure on a world which has no fixed essence. In their place we need a multiplicity of narratives, ones which capture the different, contradictory perspectives that people in different times and places have of the world.
  [85-86] This analysis applies to the self as much as it does to anything else. The self has no immutable essence. Rather, it is constructed, like a fiction. But what is doing this constructing? The answer is often 'discourses': the ways in which language shapes thought and perpetuates power relations. A woman's identity, for instance, is 'constituted' by the discourses of her time which tell her how a woman should be.
  
  [119-120] This is the heart of the Ego Trick. The trick is to create something which has a strong sense of unity and singleness from what is actually a messy, fragmented sequence of experiences and memories, in a brain which has no control centre. The point it that /the trick works/. It's like a mechanic's trick, not a magician's trick. The magician's aim is to get you to believe that something happened which never did. The tricks of mechanics, engineers and scientists, in contrast, are short cuts or improvisations that enable them to get systems to behave as they want them to behave, bypassing the usual means of doing so. So if you car needs a repair and the mechanic can't get the part, he might have a 'trick' that gets the car working as normal anyway.
  
  [124] We are made ip of nothing more than physical stuff, but to describe our true nature, you need more than just a physical vocabulary.
  
  [126] Thought and feeling are what matter /does/, when it is arranged in the remarkably complex ways that brains are. Matter is all that is needed for them to exist, but they are not themselves lumps of matter. In this sense, 'I' is a verb dressed as a noun.
  
  [131] strictly speaking, 'identity' is the wrong concept to apply to persons.
  For philosophers, 'identity' comes in two main forms: /quantitative/ and /qualitative/. Two or more things are qualitatively identical when interchanging them would make no difference. Such qualitatively identical objects, however, are not quantitatively the same: they are not literally the same object. If you smash one, you do not smash the other. When we talk about the identity of objects over time, it is quantitative identity that we are interested in. Quantitative identity is governed by a strict logic, summed up in what has become known as Leibniz's law. In essence this says that if x and y are the same object, then what is true of x at any given time is also true of y at that same time.
  [132-133] The problem is that this logically strict notion of sameness only works for reasonably solid, stable objects. In all sorts of real-world cases, notions of 'sameness' are vaguer and more context-dependent. Take Hobbes' famous example of the ship of Theseus. Or a band that has changed all of its members since its formation in 1969. If you're asking 'But is it the same band?' you're asking an empty question.
  [134] One way of looking at this is that, rather than there being one question of personal identity, there are actually (at least) two different questions. There is a /logical/ question about the identity of objects and the /existential/ question about what matters to us about our survival and the survival of those we care about.
  
  [135] Most, but not all philosophers of personal identity have suffered from this misapprehension. One exception is Paul Ricoeur who seems to appreciate the unsuitability of applying logical identity to persons. His central idea is captures in the phrase 'selfhood is not sameness'. Ricoeur uses the Latin terms /idem/ (sameness) and /ipse/ (selfhood) to distinguish between sameness and selfhood. Sameness /idem/ is unique and recurrent: one thing continuing to exist as exactly the same thing over time. In other words, /idem/ is what we have called quantitative identity. But selves do not have this sameness over time. It is in their nature to change, never exactly the same from one day to the next.
  Ludwig Wittgenstein is another thinker who can help explain why exactitude is not always possible. He saw that many words and concepts do not have precise rules for their use, and cannot have their meanings analysed in strict logical terms. Wittgenstein famously used the example of 'game'. Games are so varied that it is impossible to specify them without there being exceptions. Games are usually for fun, but war games aren't, nor are all the games people play in relationships. Many games have winners and losers, but many playground games, for instance, are just fun activities.
  
  [168] On a simple bundle view, wedding vows make no sense: I cannot bind my future self if that self is in a real sense not the same self as I am. But to be a person does not just mean to be whatever series of psychological connections and continuities endure; it is to commit oneself to making certain connections and continuities happen. In that sense, we can perhaps see the wedding vows as being even deeper than usually thought: it is not just that I promise to have and to hold, I promise to try and build future selves that will be able to maintain this vow. We do not so much promise /to be/ good spouses as promise /to make ourselves into/ good spouses. Korsgaard's view puts the ethical where some see only the metaphysical.
  
  [201-202]Susan Greenfield: 'When you're born, you're born with pretty much all the brain cells you'll ever have, but it's the growth of connections between those brain cells that accounts for the growth of the brain after birth. So, even if you're a clone - that means an identical twin - you will have a unique configuration of brain-cell connections because they are driven by your unique experiences. Greenfield speculatively imagines variations in types of selves which might emerge if different kinds of connections become dominant. The first she calls the 'Someone' scenario, which is the normal case of 'you being different from someone else'. This is how we almost all, almost always, feel ourselves to be. Although we tend to think of ourselves as Someones, we are on occasion also 'Anyones', the second of her scenarios. 'Sometimes in our everyday life, we're all parts of a team, it's where we subsume our own interests, our own individuality, we sacrifice what we personally want to do in favour of the group.' Instead of 'living out an individual life story', Anyone lives out a collective life story. We sometimes live life under the third scenario, as Nobodies. 'Human beings have stalked this planet for 100,000 years, [and] we have from time to time indulged in wine, women and song; or, drugs and sex and rock and roll, the modern equivalent. There are moments in most of our lives when we want to "let ourselves go", "blow our minds". The very word "ecstacy" in Greek means to stand outside of yourself. These are moments when we abrogate our sense of self, when we are no longer self-conscious, we're just conscious.'
  
  [215] So far, the vast majority of thinking about what we are as persons has been an attempt at description. I think we now have a fairly comprehensive understanding of what we are. You and I are what our brains and bodies do. There is no pearl at the center of our being etc.... However, we are moving now to a time when questions of /prescription/ are becoming much more important. The most important question from here on is different: what do we /want/ it to mean to be a person?
  
  [225] One of the most striking claims made by Derek Parfit is: 'There is still a difference between my life and the lives of other people. But the difference is less.' It sounds strange, but the logic behind the claim is clear and compelling. For Parfit, a person is simply a highly ordered and complex network of psychological connections and continuities. But if you ask yourself what we are connected to and continuous with, the answer includes many things that are not inside our own bodies. These include not only other people, but other things.
• 
  DonutKnow

  While quickly flicking through, this book taught me about how the self is also affected by our social connections. To define yourself by your own perspective would be incomplete, because we do not exist in isolation, and are/can be defined in different ways.
• 
  Max Rohde

  The Ego Trick is another book that I have ready quite a long time ago but that I find myself coming back to, like the
  The Power of Habit I have also reviewed today.
  
  The Ego Trick examines what our idenity is constructured from. What stayed most with me is the argument that really, for the most part, what we call our individual identity is an illusion created by our mind to help us make sense of the world and our part in it. Looking at it empirically (as much as that is possible with something we cannot see or touch or measure indirectly), our identities are much more fluid than we are usually aware of.
  
  We change a lot over time and also depending on the environment we find ourselves in. You may have problems recognising your self from 20 years ago, as well as having a different work-self and being-with-your-children-self. That being said, Baggini still thinks it is worthwhile to consider ourselves one 'integrated' being, even if we are 'more internally fragmented than common sense assumes'.
  
  There is also a somewhat extensive discussion arguing that we further do not possess a metaphysical soul which may stand in for our idenity. Not being very religiously inclined, this seemed rather self-evident to me to begin with.
  
  

  
  [Y]ou have no immaterial soul. Whatever stuff you are made from, it is the same kind of stuff that everything else is made of, be it plankton, cabbages or orang-utans.
  

  
  
  I wouldn't call The Ego Trick the most easily readable and accessible book. There is work involved in reading this, but I do think it is worth the effort for insights about that often most important thing for us; ourselves.
  
  
  
• 
  Nicholas Binge

  I enjoyed this book a lot. Much of what Baggini discusses in the start about gender dysphoria and dementia is fascinating, and though I had come across most of the neuroscience before - studies by Zimbardo, Damasio, Gazzaniga are oft quoted in these types of books - Baggini has an excellent excellent way of building his arguments cohesively and clearly. He easily shows nuance in what others aim to see as simple and often common-sense like simplicity in what is too often over complicated.
  
  I was also very much enamoured with his love for the late, great Derek Parfit, who is a personal love of mine. His work on modern moral philosophy is an absolute wonder and it was great to see it recognised and discussed in detail here.
  
  I was less intrigued by the explorations of theology, particularly Christianity, but also ideas of Buddhist reincarnation. In such an otherwise lucid and intelligent book, they seemed poiuntless. Perhaps this is mainly because I am a staunch atheist, but debating which is the better of two theological viewpoints feels unnecessary, like debating whether ketchup or mayonnaise is best on ice cream. They are of course both wrong.
  
  Nonetheless, it ended strong and Baggini's discussion of free will was really fascinating. Would happily read more of his work.
• 
  David

  I read this on my Kindle and when I got to the end unexpectedly early, I actually went "noooooooooooooooooooooooooooo!" (very quietly, as I was on the tube). I didn't want it to end.
  
  The Ego Trick is absolutely fascinating. Julian has a refreshingly thorough way of presenting ideas and thinking them through, something you don't often get with 'popular science' books.
  
  It might seem like an examination of the true nature of 'self' would be enough for a book, but what delighted me was that Julian then took his answer and then discussed how this will be challenged in the future, from what it would practically mean to live forever to transhumanism. Highly recommended.
• 
  Pete

  The Ego Trick 2011 by Julian Baggini explores what the self is and what it isn’t. Baggini is a philosopher who wrote his PhD on personal identity and has written this related book.
  The book explores how a curious chunk of matter can house a self, how self changes over time and the nature of our own view of ourselves.
  Baggini presents the views of various philosophers and looks at conditions where the self is revealed such as sex changes and mental degradation. How the self reacts when put under extreme conditions is also used to examine what the self is.
  Baggini writes well and the book describes a mutable material-self created by it’s own structure with aplomb.
• 
  Sam

  Packed with philosphical and psychological reference and example. Chapter quotes from eminent persons. The thrust of the argument seeks to portray that the self is an illusion. Emphasis, is placed on a "bundle," theory of self. A bit like the combustion ability of a petrol engine. All kinds of bits - fuel, vaporisation, electric spark have to be in place - collectively to get an engine that purrs to life. Self, in this bundle theory idea, arrives when collective components are in place. Give five stars, because there is so much, well researched information and case example. This does not make "The Ego Trick," into a text book, pure and simple. What came across for me was a point of view.
  We are, if you like, coloured, by religious doctrine and belief. Buddhism, Christianity, differ in concept of self and are not scientifically setting out for you to accept proof. The faith belief doctrine of a religion does not quibble. This "In Search Of The Self," proposition takes a scientific view -point, down several avenues, to assist reader's arrival, at the conclusion that "self," as we understand ourselves vanishes into the ether, ultimately - never to be known about again. Appreciate outright atheists will have little trouble with going along with argument, but at the end of journey, through this excellently prepared, and presented book, conclusion is that the author's thrust, toward illusory existence of self, is still a point of view and not conclusive.
• 
  Shawn

  *sigh*
  Apparently I can't kill the ego because it doesn't truly exist if I were to believe Mr. Baggini. Over the course of this work he theorizes that what we know or feel to be our "self" is not a solid, unchanging thing that exists within, but rather a "loose bundle" of things including but not limited to, memory, character, perceptions, emotions, and things outside ourselves like other people and things like our smartphones and books we've read. Because this bundle is forever in flux, it is impossible to pin down and eliminate it. But apparently it can be controlled by playing it at its own game. If one sees through the illusion, one could ideally shape exactly how their self is, like a sculptor with marble.
  Baggini's work here crafting and defending his idea of the self is well scouted, informative, and believable. He takes various disparate sources and holds them up against each other in the light and while making certain declarations, never fully makes his conclusions concrete to stifle the readers own judgement. I was entertained throughout, and even though it only made my hunt to find and kill my ego more mystifying than when I first started reading, I would definitely recommend this book.
• 
  Jacob Longini

  I read Baggini's book in an interdisciplinary class on the science and nature of the self. Taught in concert by a philosophy professor and the head of the psychology department, we first read Bruce Hood's book, The Self Illusion, before moving on to this one. In this way, we tackled ideas of "the self" in many realms, primarily those of neuropsychology and philosophy. This book was a wonderful way to tie together the disparate findings and conclude the class. Baggini looks at the nature of the self from an incredibly diverse group of sources, including eastern religions, psychological experiments, individual experiences, and philosophical writings. He develops a solid understanding of what it is like to experience "the self" before exploring at length why this is the case. Finally, he constructs a theory of the nature of the self, what makes it up, and why this matters. Regardless of whether you agree with his argument (which I do), you will make discoveries about your"self" along the way.
• 
  Rodeweeks

  Absolutely wonderful! I almost thought Baggini is a Buddhist as I excitedly read through the book. His bundle philosophy reminds strongly of the Buddhist concept of no-self. I was convinced by the improbability of humans having souls - which is one of the big reasons why I gave the book its five star rating. I always struggled with the question of who/what I am and could not figure out how that could be one thing - this book clarified it for me. I also, for a long time, doubted the idea of heaven or reincarnation, although I still hope there is some kind of an afterlife (my thinking is more in line with becoming one with God/the Universe). I love books that challenges the "normal" way of thinking.
• 
  Shahad

  يطرح الكاتب سؤال حول ذاتية الأنا وأين يكمن مركزها، فألغاز الهوية تثير الكثير من التساؤلات من ناحية سكيلوجية وفلسفية.
  
  معضلة الكتاب أجدها في مراوغة كاتبه لإقحام معتقداته بين سطور علمية، فتجد عقلك قد تماهى معها دون إدراك لوجود مغالطات فكرية بين النصوص!
  
  فأفكار مثل البوذية، نظرية داروين، والمادية يستعملها الكاتب كحجج وبراهين لإثبات ما توصل له من استنتاجات هي في الأصل افتراضات قائمة على الجدل ليس إلا!
  
  هل هذا معناه أنني لا انصح بقراءته؟ بل العكس، إن قراءة كتب تخالف ما نسلّم به وتستفز عقولنا هي محرك ودافع قوي لاستعمال أذهاننا في تفنيد معتقداتنا وترسيخ القيم والمبادئ التي بعد آمنا بها إيمانًا حقيقيًا وليس مسلّمات ورثناها أو تشرّبناها دون تفكر بها.
  فنصيحة الوردي لنا "إقرأ ما يستفز تفكيرك، ما تختلف معه، ما يجعلك تتساءل و تُعمل عقلك".
• 
  Marek Pawlowski

  I wanted to remind myself about whole topic of the problem of personal identity and I think this book fulfil this desire. You can find here probably all the main, views, topics plus some additional reflection of author itself. I don’t understand this focus on Buddhism though, focusing on that religion is just unnecessary, like quoting any other random book, or poem just to make it fancier. But other than that, this is nice introduction to philosophical problem of personal identity, that can be understand also by non-philosopher.
• 
  Ogi Ogas

  My ratings of books on Goodreads are solely a crude ranking of their utility to me, and not an evaluation of literary merit, entertainment value, social importance, humor, insightfulness, scientific accuracy, creative vigor, suspensefulness of plot, depth of characters, vitality of theme, excitement of climax, satisfaction of ending, or any other combination of dimensions of value which we are expected to boil down through some fabulous alchemy into a single digit.
  
• 
  Wade Z

  the whole book is like "nailing custard to the wall"
  
  what i mean by that is its really good if you have never nailed custard to the wall before. now if you look at someone else nailing custard to the wall then you go why are you nailing it like that and they tell you that its because this is the answer then you go what
  
  thats like me
• 
  Larry Jordan

  The Ego Trick by Julian Baggini is a deconstruction of the elusive concept of the self. Baggini concludes that the self is a bundle of associations, ephemeral and fluid, and that the self is not identical to our bodies and brains or our personalities and thoughts. What does that tell us about our ourselves and our gods?
• 
  Vivek Kumthekar

  Do you exist or you are a product of electrochemical actions in your brain .
  An idea being discussed for many years in Neuroscience . Good book.
  I find the word self which is considered as synonym to ego leads to major confusion.
• 
  Giuliana

  Nos enseña a reconocer las formas en que subconscientemente construimos nuestras identidades, lo que nos lleva a desarrollar un mayor self-awareness que nos ayudará a liberarnos de ideas sobre lo que somos y podemos hacer